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Why do some Governments choose to imprison more people than others? Why are 
some nations’ prison systems more humane, while others are more punitive? And 
how come these systems of imprisonment change over time? This study explored 
these questions by conducting a comparative, historical and sociological study of 
imprisonment in Ireland and Scotland from 1970 until the 1990s. It involved 
interviewing government officials who worked on prisons during this period and 
reading archival material, such as memos, reports, notes and minutes. It also 
included an extensive analysis of government reports and other secondary 
literature. The thesis reveals the contemporary histories of punishment in Ireland 
and Scotland. It describes how people were imprisoned in the 1970s, and using a 
chronological narrative, it describes the changes in practices of imprisonment across 
the 1980s and 1990s. The central argument the thesis is that differences in how 
people were imprisoned were the result of differences in the political culture. The 
values, fears, morals, ideologies of the political culture directly informed the choices 
political officials make. Political culture shapes how governments think about 
justice, crime, criminals, society and the role of the State. By understanding the 
political culture, therefore, we can decode and explain why governments in 
countries that are broadly similar, like Ireland and Scotland, make very different 











Penal politics and imprisonment in the English-speaking west are often presented as 
having become increasingly harsh and exclusionary since about 1970. Yet, curiously 
little attention has been given to Ireland and Scotland, two nations considered as 
exceptions to these pervasive punitive trends, and this presents some considerable 
gaps in our understanding of penal politics in this era. This thesis uses sociological 
and historical research to provide an in-depth comparative analysis of political 
culture and imprisonment regimes in Ireland and Scotland from 1970 until the 
1990s. In so doing, the thesis also explores issues central to the history of 
punishment and comparative penology, in particular the ‘punitive turn’ in the late 
twentieth century. Using oral history interviews, archival research and 
documentary analysis this thesis recovers the history of penal culture in these two 
jurisdictions and examines how that changed and evolved over the latter part of the 
twentieth century. It draws upon resources from cultural sociology, 
governmentality studies and the sociology of punishment to develop the necessary 
conceptual resources to illuminate and compare penal politics and the varied 
practices which constitute imprisonment. Imprisonment regimes here are studied as 
comprising kinds of places, sets of routines and practices. Political culture, 
meanwhile, is understood as the working cultural symbols, passions, logic of 
government, political categories, and perceived social origins of crime. While 
providing grounded and detailed historical accounts of Ireland and Scotland these 
cases show how generic and global concepts, such as managerialism, rehabilitation, 
zero tolerance and incarceration intersect with their local social conditions and 
political relations. This thesis demonstrates that the heterogeneity of imprisonment 
regimes is a reflection of their political and social context. Therefore, the differences 
we see in the uses of imprisonment cross-nationally will both reflect and 
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“Though we live in a world that dreams of ending 
that always seems about to give in 
something that will not acknowledge conclusion 
insists that we forever begin” 
 










This thesis uses sociological and historical research to provide an in-depth 
comparative analysis of political culture and imprisonment regimes in Ireland and 
Scotland in the period from 1970 until the 1990s. In undertaking such an 
investigation, the thesis is concerned to develop a sociologically informed, 
historically situated and politically nuanced understanding of penal culture in both 
jurisdictions. The comparative analysis of the distinct cases of Ireland and Scotland 
also makes a more general contribution, illuminating the cultural, social and 
political foundations of penal politics. 
 
There is something close to a consensus (in comparative research in particular) 
about the punitive character of punishment in English-speaking countries over the 
last four decades or so. Whether it is the arrangement of the political systems 
therein, changes in the political economy, or the embedded sentiments of national 
cultures, something has contributed, to a greater or lesser degree, to a more punitive 
atmosphere in which harsh and excluding penal practices have proliferated, or so it 
is widely argued (Downes 1988; Garland 2001; Young 1999; Lacey 2008; Pratt and 
Eriksson 2013; Cavadino and Dignan 2006; Green 2008). Though their penal 
practices differed from each other in significant ways, both Ireland and Scotland are 
considered to have preserved their respective prison systems from the most severe 
penal practices that developed in the Anglophone world in the late twentieth 
century (McAra 1999, 2005, 2008; Kilcommins et al 2004; Hamilton 2014b; Rogan 
2011).  How and in what ways did these two small countries – nested in the 
economic, cultural and political spheres of the English-speaking West – evade, or at 
least mitigate, the punitive forces which, it is claimed, have dominated this period 




Besides their being considered Anglophone exceptions, there is also something 
simple and timely about situating this research in Ireland and Scotland. There has 
been scant historical or comparative attention paid to political culture and 
imprisonment from the 1970s onwards in either country. Thus the thesis is first, and 
maybe foremost, a recovery of the history of imprisonment and penal politics in 
both Ireland and Scotland. What happened in these places, how were people 
imprisoned? How were their penal politics characterised? What kinds of ideas and 
duties shaped the respective governments’ use of their power to imprison? How did 
these change over time, and why? What political forces, social relations and cultural 
norms supported, promoted and conditioned imprisonment and penal politics in 
both Ireland and Scotland? In investigating these questions, this research is 
interested in enlivening our historical memory of punishment in Ireland and 
Scotland and attempting to reveal it within its own terms. This thesis aims to 
recover the history of Irish and Scottish penality from being forgotten, shrugged off 
as exceptional or parochial, too quickly repudiated, or reworked (for whatever 
reason) into a narrative more readily packaged for contemporary concerns.  
 
To set out the questions this way is to suggest an approach to comparative penology 
that is historical, but also political, cultural and sociological. But comparative 
research in criminology provides us with few conceptual and methodological tools 
which can examine the connections between political culture, social forms and 
actual penal practices. As I will argue, comparative penology also provides few 
strategies capable of illuminating the historical forces which inform imprisonment, 
and fewer resources which can track how these evolve over time. To suggest that 
political culture shapes imprisonment regimes – as this thesis does – seems on the 
face of it like a fairly uncontroversial and an almost mundane statement (Lacey 
2008; Green 2008; Tonry 2004; Newburn and Sparks 2004; Page 2011). However, I 
suggest that such an assertion is more complex than is often acknowledged, 
particular in comparative study. Prisons (kinds of places, sets of routines and 
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practices) and political culture (the working cultural symbols, passions, logics of 
government, political categories, and perceived social origins of crime) are each 
more multifaceted than they are often portrayed in comparative penological 
scholarship, and thus both required conceptual rethinking. 
 
The thesis focuses on imprisonment in particular rather than punishment in general, 
mostly for empirical depth but also for analytical reasons. Arguably, the tendency in 
comparative penology to focus (mainly or exclusively) on the rise of mass 
incarceration and spread of ‘punitiveness’ has meant that the prison itself remains 
opaquely conceptualised in much comparative research (Whitman 2003: Green 2008; 
Barker 2009; Cavadino and Dignan 2006; Lacey 2008; Pratt and Eriksson 2013). The 
prison does not only aim to incarcerate people and to deprive them of their liberty, 
however – though this much seems taken as given if ‘punitiveness’ as such becomes 
the object of inquiry. In reality, the prison is usually a mixed enterprise. It can be 
explicitly aimed at punishment, but also recovery and reform of citizens through 
productive, rehabilitative and educative programmes, or to achieve other purposes, 
acknowledged or denied. Investigating prison practices comparatively means we 
must also be poised to question what is implied by otherwise generic penal 
terminology, which cannot be taken for granted. For example, in practice what ends 
are being sought in rehabilitation, education or training?  
 
In comparative penology there is always the dilemma of where to delimit the 
institutional account of punishment. The focus on imprisonment herein means other 
components of penal culture are omitted from this account, such as youth justice,1 
fines and other penalties. However, for all that it excludes, I hope that the gains 
justify this more restrained focus. Instead of focusing on the body of the prisoner, or 
on how may bodies the prison contains, I research and compare the component 
parts that make up the institutional apparatus of the prison system – its stated aims 
																																																						
1 In relation to Scotland, this thesis excludes what is considered by some commentators to contribute to Scotland’s 
penal exceptionalism, in particular its youth justice system (McAra 2005, 2008; Croall 2006). 
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and everyday practices. By reconceptualising the prison, the thesis maps a fuller 
history of imprisonment than has occurred before in either jurisdiction. Using this 
empirical base, I develop some new interpretive and methodological resources with 
which to compare the uses of imprisonment. These outcomes would not have been 
possible with a more divided or diversified focus.  
 
Using official reports, I mapped the systematic sets of heterogeneous routines, 
activities, interventions, settings and aims which give imprisonment regimes their 
cross-national distinction. I found two prison systems that diverged significantly in 
their respective aims. The Irish and Scottish imprisonment regimes contrasted in 
their depth, tightness and lenience. The kinds of programmes and training used in 
Ireland and Scotland differed in ways both stark and banal. These forms of 
imprisonment were also highly fluid. Across the period of this study both Irish and 
Scottish prison systems appeared to undergo remarkable transformations, as their 
institutional landscapes were incrementally, and sometimes dramatically, 
remodelled. These two prison systems did not just differ from each other. Rather 
they also both displayed striking internal contrasts, concurrently relying on harsh 
and humane uses of imprisonment. These findings created a comparative puzzle: 
why did the uses of prison in Ireland and Scotland differ? But they also generated a 
historical set of questions: why were such diverse kinds of imprisonment used in 
both Ireland and Scotland? Why did they change?  
 
The historical and comparative distinctions recovered in the organising patterns of 
Irish and Scottish imprisonment require explanation. Imprisonment changes in the 
face of surrounding political pressures and social requirements (Barker 2009; Crewe 
2009; Garland 1996; McEvoy 2001; Carlen 1983). But more precisely, the actual work 
of maintaining, administering and building prisons is a government function 
(Garland 2013). Understanding how and why governments go about those tasks as 
they do will allow us to reveal the logics that underpin their prison systems. In this 
thesis, the study of government and penal politics is understood in terms of political 
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culture. But understanding the influence of political culture on punishment 
demands a closer, more embedded and sociologically nuanced approach than is 
usual in the literature. Political culture is often used as a term that is interchangeable 
with political economy, punitiveness, penal populism and electoral arrangements, 
or sometimes as a catch-all phrase intended to capture everything about 
government (Cavadino and Dignan 2006; Tonry 2004; Green 2008; Newburn and 
Sparks 2004). Yet many invocations of political culture are too detached from the 
practices and processes of government to be able to explain the development of 
heterogeneous imprisonment regimes.  
 
Instead this study takes a more grounded approach to the study of penal politics. 
Like others, I agree that national culture, social structure, political ideology and 
historical antecedents are the essential stuff that creates convergence and 
divergences in cross-national punishment. These forces and influences will only 
find themselves realised in the material character of imprisonment regimes when 
they shape the practical logic, values, understandings and conscience of the actors 
who are charged with the power to imprison in situ and in context. As broad social 
ideas are institutionalised as a working political culture they provide the diverse 
emotional supports, political sensibilities and cultural common-sense that permit 
certain kinds of penal intervention, while preventing others. Political culture is the 
buffer between what is seen and felt to be permissible and impermissible in uses of 
imprisonment and the deployment of penal power.  
 
In order to illuminate these processes, this research focused primarily on the 
ordinary business of penal administration and policy development, rather than 
concentrating entirely on critical junctures and moments of transformation. The 
decision to site the comparison as closely within government as possible was so that 
the study could map the choices, events and problems that informed the actual uses 
of imprisonment. To examine political culture historically, I went to under-
researched archives, found previously unread documents and files, and read 
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memos, minutes and unpublished reports. I went and spoke to people who were 
there, for whom government and imprisonment were their career. Interviewees 
recalled the obstacles they faced, the problems they had tried to resolve and the 
aspirations they had hoped to fulfil with each dispensation of penal power. The 
historical material showed that the kinds of people prisoners were perceived to be 
figured prominently in governmental estimations. The government officials also 
understood the prison as a certain kind of place, one that could be productive 
and/or destructive. Feelings about crime and disorder were also vital in justifying 
penal choices. In each context, these specific cultural and penal sensibilities were 
undergirded by their divergent images of government, both its goals and it limits. 
They also relied, though mostly implicitly, on a conception of nationhood and social 
order – of how things are here and how they should be. The historical material 
combined to show the political sensibilities, cultural currents and social norms that 
make-up political culture and its disposition towards imprisonment. This grounded 
historical fieldwork allowed the respective political cultures to be reconstructed 
from a more insider perspective. As a result, this study recovers previously unseen 
histories of Irish and Scottish penal politics, with the aim of extending what we 
know about these two places, and illuminates the cultural and political foundations 
of their penal politics. 
 
Researching penal politics at this micro-level also provided a vantage point from 
which to observe the conversion and implementation of collective morality, social 
norms and political ideologies into practical forms of penal practice (Garland 
1990a). Political culture thus ‘looks distinct, tangible, separate – empirically or 
conceptually – but the closer you examine it, the more it merges into its surrounding 
space’ (Cohen: 1985:197). Building on these insights, this thesis makes an analytical 
scale shift. I attempt to provide an account that shows the relationship between 
political culture, punishment and the wider social relations which support it and 
from which it draws its social utility (Garland 1985, 1990a, 2001). The uses of the 
prison, the level of reliance upon it to control, exclude or transform, also reflected 
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the prison’s place within the landscape of Irish and Scottish social order. Systems of 
social order, other than incarceration, such as emigration, welfare regimes, informal 
social control, social boundaries and community efficacy are also an ineluctable 
dimension of the particular histories of Irish and Scottish penal culture. The power 
to imprison thus supports and reinforces the whole way of life of its jurisdiction or 
region, each governmental act reiterates the prisons’ perceived place in that social 
tapestry. It should be clear that this is thus a ‘punishment and society’ project 
(Simon and Sparks 2012). Undertaking this kind of inquiry over time means we will 
see the shadow of wider struggles and social divisions which shaped Irish and 
Scottish social life in the shifting political sensibilities and changing uses of 
imprisonment. These socio-cultural forces and conventions are also crucial in 
comparatively explaining differences in penality.  
 
There is of course more than one way of comparing. One can organise findings 
thematically, create a comparative catalogue, show cross-national trends and 
patterns, set the data up to conduct an on-going critical contrast or to generate 
explanatory typologies (Cavadino and Dignan 2006; Downes 1988; Tonry 2007b; 
Lappi-Seppälä 2008; Pratt and Eriksson 2013; Barker 2009). Given these historical 
aims, this thesis wears its comparative concerns a little more lightly than might be 
usual. As a result of the grounded historical sociological approach taken the 
comparative account of punishment here is told through a more immersive history, 
with a chronological narrative that unfolds within each distinct historical, cultural 
and social landscape. Here I set out each 'case' in detail and on its own terms, rather 
than to attempt point-by-point comparative and thematic assessments throughout, 
though there is some of this in the conclusion. I do not use each case to provide 
direct and on-going ‘reciprocal commentaries’ (Zedner 1995:529) for the purpose of 
providing comparative lesson-learning. Comparative analysis is used, first, to 
provide a perspective that can produce what I hope are compelling and convincing 
descriptive and analytical histories of Irish and Scottish penal culture. On balance, 
the deeper understanding of each place as well as a better understanding of political 
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culture are clear gains, precisely because the descriptive analysis understands each 
national story contextually and in its own terms, rather than squeezing them into a 
constricting framework. 
 
Therefore, the comparative analysis is the narrative, the narrative is the comparative 
analysis (to paraphrase Carlen, 2010). While each history is presented singly, 
together the distinct cases of Ireland and Scotland make a more general 
contribution, establishing the cultural and political foundations of penal politics. In 
both countries, cultural concepts and political sensibilities shaped government 
officials’ understanding of social problems and the goals of imprisonment. The 
comparison thus demonstrates how political culture is central to how imprisonment 
regimes are organised, showing that the institution of the prison embodies in 
concrete form, historically and culturally specific practices, assumptions, and 
political aims. 
 
Outline of Thesis 
What I found were two remarkable, and perhaps even surprising histories which:  
(1) modify what we know about imprisonment and penal politics in the Ireland and 
Scotland;  
(2) extend and problematize the patterns of change in late modern Anglophone 
penality;  
(3) demonstrate the relationship between political culture and imprisonment 
regimes; and 
(4) illustrate the sociological contingency which underpins and conditions penal 
politics and imprisonment.  
 
The conceptual and methodological framework is laid out in Section One. Chapter 
Two outlines the comparative concept of imprisonment regimes. This combines the 
insights from the sociology of imprisonment with the aims of comparative penology 
to re-conceptualise the prison for the purposes of comparison. Deployed as an 
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analytical and descriptive concept, imprisonment regimes reveal the diverse 
arrangement of schematic interventions, categorisations, forms of exclusion and the 
objectives which, formally or practically, are pursued by a single prison system. 
This makes for a more detailed but still consistent cross-national comparison of 
imprisonment. 
 
Chapter Three argues that a comparative analysis of penal politics requires an 
understanding of political culture. In this chapter, I suggest that social concepts, 
cultural meanings and political ideologies are indispensable to penal politics. These 
ideas create a working political culture within the penal state. This provides the 
practical logic which is integral to how penal power is deployed and imprisonment 
regimes are organised. Drawing on governmentality, cultural sociology and 
sociology of punishment, this chapter provides the comparative conceptual 
framework to understand these empirical processes. 
 
The historical research strategy is outlined in Chapter Four. This draws its 
methodological and analytical approach from historical sociology, post-colonial 
archival studies, oral historiography and comparative cultural sociology. The 
rationale for selecting Ireland and Scotland as the comparative historical case 
studies is addressed here. I set out the conventional wisdom which characterises the 
penal history of Ireland and Scotland during this era, highlighting questions that 
remain to be explored. The development of the project, when and where the 
primary fieldwork took place, is knitted into this chapter.  
 
The historical research and analysis of Ireland begins in Section Two with an outline 
of the dominant social relations which shaped Irish life. These include conflict in 
Northern Ireland, the predominance of family, community, rural life and the social 
control architecture of emigration and the Catholic Church, who operated as a 




Using primary historical research material, I identify a distinct Irish mode of 
incarceration in the 1970s era, pastoral imprisonment regimes. During this period, Irish 
prison underwent a process of modernisation. The outcomes of this transformation 
were that prisons became more porous, and a more individuated system of 
interventions was established. In addition, a high security regime was developed for 
paramilitary prisoners. These highly contrasting forms of imprisonment were 
emblematic of Ireland’s distinct form of political culture: pastoral conservatism. As 
well as offering a closely observed political explanation for Irish imprisonment, the 
chapter concludes by situating Irish penal culture within its wider social context.  
 
The progressive impetus of the pastoral forms of imprisonment was limited by 
economic restraint, protests from prison officers, rising crime and growing prisoner 
numbers from the 1980s into the 1990s, changes which are captured in Chapter Six. 
These events created a more difficult context for the management of prisons. Some 
of the earlier aspirations from the 1970s era were restrained as a law and order logic 
began to emerge.  
 
Chapter Seven describes the changing social and political conditions in 1990s 
Ireland. By the end of the decade prisons, were re-modelled along the lines of 
punitive imprisonment regimes. These new systems of imprisonment openly pursued 
punishment, crime control and exclusion as their practical objectives. These 
practical changes reflected the wider social transformation that was occurring. 
However, broad structural and cultural changes were only realised in penal 
practices after they became institutionalised in Ireland’s operating political culture, 
characterised here as sovereign authority.  
 
While those changes in Ireland’s imprisonment regimes were clearly negative – the 
prison lost much of its humanity and discretion – this was the adverse punitive 
consequence of what might otherwise be considered a much more progressive and 
positive social revolution, one which gradually released Irish citizens from other 
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rigid and oppressive social relations. The government moved closer to the centre of 
Irish social life as the power of the Catholic Church contracted. As that happened, 
the oppressive architecture of informal social control gradually dwindled. The 
power to imprison was modified accordingly to reflect its new and more central role 
in the changing organisation of Irish social order, and, crucially,  at a time of 
heightened social anxiety. 
 
Section Three begins by introducing the 1970s era Scottish social life and cultural 
patterns. Crime, urban disorder, poverty and de-industrialisation were serious 
public policy issues. Chapter Eight proceeds to a description of the Scottish 
imprisonment regimes of this period, which are described as disciplinary and 
exclusionary imprisonment. These regimes emphasised industry, responsibility and 
discipline. These forms of imprisonment were the practical product of Scotland’s 
political culture of paternalistic liberalism.  
 
The chapter concludes by arguing that while Scotland had a much-lauded social 
welfare system, it relied upon the prison as its safety net – a place to put chronic 
criminals and uncooperative social failures. The prison did not set out to reform 
prisoners but to effectively contain and control those people deemed beyond the 
hope of progressive welfare intervention. The prison was the coercive end of 
Scottish social regulation. 
 
Chapter Nine describes the dysfunctional and traumatic consequences of Scottish 
penal exclusion. Throughout the 1980s it was as if a civil war had erupted inside the 
prisons – riots, hostage-takings and violence were ongoing during these years. This 
undermined the legitimacy of the political culture and the government’s forms of 
prison and prisoner management. 
 
By the 1990s, there were striking systematic changes in how people were 
imprisoned in Scotland. As well as mapping these modifications, Chapter Ten 
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investigates the forces and conditions which brought about these penal and cultural 
transformations. In Britain at this time late-liberalism emerged as a new political 
ideology. Simultaneously, and relatedly, a stronger but restless Scottish identity 
developed. In the early 1990s, the political culture of paternalistic liberalism evolved 
into a managerialist culture of neo- paternalistic liberalism. As a practical consequence 
of the changes in the cultural and political foundations of Scottish penal politics, a 
new form of soft authoritarian imprisonment regimes materialised.  
 
The differences between neo- paternalistic liberalism and its cultural predecessor 
should not be overstated; the chapter concludes by arguing that this was not an 
epistemological break. These changes represented a civilising process rather than a 
humanitarian revolution. Government officials did not seek to reduce the use of 
imprisonment, but to refine it. New performance management techniques 
entrenched the prison as the place of last resort. Prison use remained exclusionary 
and disciplinary, but now imprisonment was more profane, professional and 
efficient. The social forces from which Scottish prison exclusion drew its power and 
conditioned political culture were enduring across this period. 
 
The thesis concludes in Chapter Eleven with a discussion of the potential 
comparative, historical and political implications of the research. This thesis looks at 
a familiar time in somewhat unfamiliar places in order to ‘open exciting possibilities 
for extending existing theoretical work in new directions’ (Pierson 2004:6-7). As an 
enterprise history is not just a way to memorialise or describe past events, and 
comparison is not merely a method to catalogue difference or sameness. Historical 
and comparative accounts can be critical analytical instruments. The framework 
developed herein could be used to support future comparative punishment and 
society studies. 
 
What may be particularly relevant for criminological scholars in Ireland and 
Scotland is the development of what Nellis has called ‘a historically tutored 
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memory’. This can, I hope, yield some contemporary benefits, using the past to 
suggest new future visions of punishment and penal politics. An analytical history 
of Irish and Scottish imprisonment and political culture can reveal ‘its roots and its 
achievements, its turning points, its lost opportunities, its past ambitions’, but also 
‘its still unrealised possibilities’ (Nellis 2001:35). Comparatively doing historical 
recovery may serve to open up new avenues of political reflection, presenting the 
hopes and ambitions which may still lie dormant but unfulfilled in our 
























































































































Chapter Two  
	





How, precisely, do we compare imprisonment? What is it we compare and why? An 
understanding of imprisonment is central to the research and analysis of how 
people were incarcerated in Ireland and Scotland, examining how that changed, and 
understanding why it differed. I propose that to further the project of comparative 
penology we ought to concentrate on developing coherent, consistent and precise 
descriptions of imprisonment. But what conception of national imprisonment most 
illuminatingly and sufficiently captures the sometimes perplexing, and often 
contradictory, features which constitute a system of incarceration? Moreover, how 
do we best compare such inconsistent forms, routines and functions? Comparative 
penology, however, provides few conceptual tools which can, first of all, engage 
with a prison system’s variegated routines and practical character and, second, does 
so while also rendering imprisonment comparable.  
 
The chapter begins by highlighting lessons from the sociology of punishment, 
showing the kinds of institutions and practices that give imprisonment its 
characteristic forms and carceral effects. This literature allows us to more easily 
reveal the limitations in how prison is conceived in comparative penology. The 
chapter then outlines some of the themes and debates about the purpose and aim of 
the comparative penology project. As comparative penology has expanded it has 
generally positioned ‘punitiveness’ as its principal concern. More often than not, the 
prison is inappropriately reduced to being a ‘punitive’ or ‘lenient’ intervention. The 
central contention of this chapter is that comparative penology is faced by 
conceptual restrictions regarding how to conceive of imprisonment, and thereby 
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study the arrangements that constitute its practice – interests which can be 
marginalised in the comparative study of something as amorphous as penal 
punitiveness. 
 
This chapter proposes the comparative concept of imprisonment regimes. Though this 
is not an ethnography of imprisonment (e.g. Crewe 2009; Liebling assisted by 
Arnold 2004), the conceptualisation of prison systems proposed here adopts the 
broad lessons from the sociology of imprisonment. This framework can illuminate 
the precise routine activities, institutional categories and interventions which 
constitute it and determine its social uses, but which are often overlooked by the 
comparative penological gaze. It is hoped that the concept will contribute to better 
descriptions and understandings of national practices of imprisonment and, 
crucially, support the continued expansion and refinement of a comparative 
sociology of punishment. 
 
2. The Sociology of Imprisonment 
 
I want to briefly highlight some of the ways we have come to conceive of and 
research the prison in the sociology of imprisonment. Prisons have been identified 
as factory-like (Melossi and Pavarini 1981), a place of treatment (Garland 1985), 
used as a warehouse (Simon 2009), or evolved to reflect other distinct strategies of 
reform and political indoctrination (Piacentini 2004). At the institutional level, we 
know that prisoners are organised and assembled in regimes based on legal 
categories and social labels (Carlen 1983). A single prison system can have sites of 
great depth, as well as places where prisoners possess greater freedom of movement 
and autonomy (Downes 1988; Sparks 2002), but no matter what the security levels, 
prisons are somewhere in which order must always be maintained (Sykes 1958; 
Sparks et al 1996).  Prisons can govern using welfare or more punitive practices, 
though these patterns can evolve and adapt over time (Garland 1985, 2001). In 
addition, a prison system is often informed by more pluralistic penal strategies 
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(Garland 1990a). These are, in turn, institutionalised into the routine of prison life 
(Foucault 1977). 
 
Within a prison system each institution has its own aims and means, it exercises 
power against its prisoner population to seek certain ends (Crewe 2009; McEvoy 
2001). The weight of punishment that prisoners have to bear (King and McDermott 
1995) can vary between prisons. The uses of control can be either authoritarian or 
less abrupt, though the pains of imprisonment imposed by these kinds of control 
cannot be read as immediately obvious as either punitive or lenient (Crewe 2011a, 
2011b). For example, prison education is important and laudable, in practice it can 
be designed to support people to develop confidence (Warr 2015), but it can also be 
used as a narrow means to reduce prisoners’ re-offending (Warner 2007). While the 
size of a national prison estate may expand, we should also pay close attention to 
how its form and techniques of intervention change or evolve (Feely and Simon 
1992; Hannah-Moffat 2005; Simon 2007). 
 
Though this overview is brief, it is drawn on to highlight the complexity of 
imprisonment, its capacity for change and the diversity within prison systems. 
These insights and the kind of research which generates them contrast from 
comparative penology, which as we will see, instead takes a different view of 
prison, where much of this nuance falls away. 
 
3. The Comparative Penology Project  
 
If there was a ‘little avalanche of penal comparisons’ in at the beginning of the 
millennium (Sparks 2001:165), it has become one of criminology’s sustained growth 
industries (Barker 2009, Green 2008; Tonry 2001a, 2007a; Jones and Newburn 2007, 
Newburn and Sparks 2004; Beckett and Western 2001; Downes and Hansen 2006; 
Lacey 2008; Nelken 2009; 2010a; 2017; Savelsberg 1994; Lappi-Seppa ̈la ̈ 2008; Melossi 
2001). The justifications for comparative criminology are plentiful – it opens our 
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eyes to different penal practices across various times and places; it may force us to 
reconsider (sometimes) taken-for-granted penal practices and processes; we can 
build theories connecting different social contexts, test universal claims and refine 
theoretical propositions.  
 
However, before these central projects can be undertaken, comparative research 
needs conceptual anchoring regarding what is being compared, in the case of this 
thesis: imprisonment. The discussion of comparative penological studies here 
focuses on the conceptions and methods for comparatively researching the prison, 
thus leaving aside the very valuable contributions and explanatory insights about 
international penal patterns in this body of scholarship. The critique which follows 
is that the ways of comparatively presenting the prison, though diverse, are often 
restrained by an underlying commitment to making punitiveness the principal 
object of comparison. Punitiveness has become among most dominant issues in 
comparative criminology (Downes 2011b). This has been with good reason. The 
contemporary history of Anglophone criminology suggests that punishment has 
evolved to become more restrictive, stigmatising and extensive, while other 
countries have resisted these forces (Wacquant 2009a; Garland 2001; Phelps 2017; 
Cavadino and Dignan 2006; Lacey 2008; Whitman 2003; Young 2009; Lappi-Seppälä 
2008; Pratt and Ericsson 2013). The implication of comparative penology’s interest in 
punitiveness, and resistance to it, is that in writing about comparative 
imprisonment, ‘the prison’ is most often represented as somewhere to contain and 
confine prisoners and where the power of the prison is starkly represented as 
oppressive or not oppressive. 
  
The Punitive Prison 
Prominent in comparative criminology is an approach interested in matters of 
similarity and difference in international imprisonment ‘profiles’ (Lappi-Seppälä 
2011), using commensurate incarceration rates. As comparative penology has 
developed, imprisonment rates have emerged as a proxy for national punishment 
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styles and they remain popular as a ready reckoner of degrees of governmental 
penal severity (Cavadino and Dignan 2006; Pratt 2008; Lacey 2008; Lynch 2011; 
Lappi-Seppälä 2008; Melossi 2001). There is also sometimes a global narrative arch 
to the use of imprisonment rates, suggesting that ‘there has been a global trend 
towards punitiveness and increasing rates of imprisonment’ (McAlinden 2012:177) 
and an ‘inexorable’ spread of certain types of penal patterns (Cavadino and Dignan 
2006:3). Though, as Lacey (2008) and Cavadino and Dignan illustrate, national 
imprisonment growth has not advanced at similar rate internationally, or at all in 
some countries (see also Tonry 2007b).  
 
The merits of aggregate imprisonment rates are that they demonstrate that despite 
the many political, cultural and historical differences, prison is a global institution 
and a universal political technology. Practically, imprisonment rates provide 
researchers with an even empirical surface for revealing and comparing the penal 
patterns of countries without necessarily effacing transnational diversity. 
Imprisonment rates also allow a greater number of countries to be compared. 
Research in this vein reminds us that even in this globalised world (Chan 2005), 
variation in punitive patterns persists. Those enduring patterns of commonalities 
and divergences in imprisonment rates – and thus penal harshness – have become 
the puzzle that much comparative criminology has set about trying to solve.  
 
For all that they measure and reveal, however, such comparative studies can also 
conceal and obscure (McAra 2011:100). Contrasts in the uses of imprisonment for 
different groups, such as men, women, young people or special category prisoners, 
are omitted. As are the different degrees and forms of control and discipline, 
rehabilitation, management and measurement of prisoners. As such, the very sort of 
peculiar contrast and local specificity that might provide a rich comparative 





Without the addition of this more extensive qualitative data, imprisonment rates are 
sometimes produced as objective representations, inherently emblematic of 
punitiveness, reflecting either virtuous or unethical prison systems (e.g. Hamilton 
2014b; Cavadino and Dignan 2006; Pratt and Eriksson 2013). Indeed, differences in 
imprisonment rates are often the central plank which support often stereotypical 
images of the punitive Anglophone world, with its high and expanding prison 
populations, as opposed to Nordic penal parsimony, with its lower rates of 
imprisonment (Lappi-Seppälä 2011:305; Pratt and Eriksson 2013; Cavadino and 
Dignan 2006; Lacey 2008). Arguably, to investigate whether a prison system is 
relatively more punitive in its orientation or extensively crueller than its 
comparative counterparts must be established at a more grounded level, taking 
account of uses of imprisonment in addition to other forms of incarceration, such as 
‘coercive confinement’ (O’Sullivan and O’Donnell 2012), immigration detainees 
(Barker 2013), and practices such as criminal justice net-widening (Cohen 1985). 
Perhaps one of the most considerable limits of comparative imprisonment rates is 
that they may not really tell us much about what it means to be imprisoned. The 
quantified view of prison practice implies that ultimately, prison is used for the 
overt purposes of penal confinement and physical exclusion.  
 
That imprisonment rates reveal something of importance is not in question. But 
imprisonment rates are more easily understood as an insight into legal, legislative 
and judicial patterns, such as sentencing and uses of remand, rather than as 
indicators of what happens to a person when they are imprisoned, let alone as a 
distillation of an entire culture. As Lynch has written, in the case of imprisonment 
rates ‘penal change is legal change’ (Lynch 2011:676) – which of course would give 
rise to its own series of revealing investigations (see Nelken (2009) for a brief but 
illuminating account of Italian imprisonment rates and their supporting criminal 
justice and sentencing practices). Some forms of imprisonment are without question 
significantly more severe than others, but it seems difficult to reveal the punitive 
complexity, moral nuance and practical character of those systems just at the level of 
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cross-national prison population metric. For example, the UK alone – as a multi-
jurisdictional polity – provides ample evidence of how regional borders divide 
styles of punishment in the same way they divide intra-state nationality. 
Imprisonment rates in Scotland and England have almost entirely matched from the 
1970s but their respective legal systems’ age of criminal responsibility and forms of 
youth justice are but two of the sharp and prominent differences at the level of 
penal policy and practice (McAra 2005, 2008; Muncie 2011). The complex of penal 
practices, legislation and political discourses which create divergent penal systems 
remain unobservable at the level of imprisonment rates. 
 
In order to overcome some of these difficulties other comparative researchers 
incorporate additional facts, criminal justice practices and statistics to create a more 
complex and varied depiction of national or regional punitiveness. This slightly 
contrasting research agenda promotes the significant and important challenges of 
context sensitive comparison. In doing so, this literature tends to argue against the 
global perspective of cross-national imprisonment rates, contending that 
punishment remains a manifestation of intractable local patterns (Tonry 2007b; see 
also Whitman 2003; Green 2008; Hamilton 2014b; Barker 2009). For these scholars, 
such as Tonry (2015), punishment is so entangled and embedded in its national 
history, culture, religion and politics that the usefulness and insightfulness of the 
comparative penology project is in capturing and cataloguing cross-national 
distinctions and revealing its local cultural roots. As a result, illuminating 
comparative penal patterns is often seen to be hindered by the zealous and over-
argued search for commonality.  
 
As a consequence, these scholars forward a more diversified and expansive 
methodological approach to comparing punishment, characterised by a well-
documented collection of regimes of distinction (Nelken 2009), highlighting 
‘pronounced national differences in penal policy’ (Tonry 2001a:519). In this 
endeavour, others have also advanced the indices of cross-national measures. 
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Explicitly surveying the extent of punitiveness in Ireland, Scotland and New 
Zealand, Hamilton (2014a, 2014b) includes the size of the prison populations along 
with a catalogue of other annual prison indices, such as sentence length, 
imprisonment rates for violent and property crime, mandatory sentencing and 
prison admissions. This mode is considered an advance in broadening the points of 
punitive comparison using ‘clear-cut social-scientific criteria’ (Hamilton 2014a:336). 
Whitman’s study (2003) of comparative penal harshness in Europe and the USA 
compares penal practices, the use of pardons, the standards of dignity, prison living 
conditions and the flexibility with which punishment is applied. Similarly, other 
comparativists researching per capita imprisonment rates and punitiveness also 
include prison mortality rates, prisoner rights and prison conditions against which 
the comparative punitiveness of a prison system is judged (Downes 1988; Pratt 2008; 
Pratt and Eriksson 2013; Karstedt 2015). A leader in shaping this comparative 
criminological perspective, Tonry (2001a; 2007b; 2015; Tonry and Farrington 2005) 
uses a more broadly drawn conception of penal policy to illustrate the very different 
cross-national penal trends. This includes sentencing severity, procedural rights, 
penal policy and practices, which are the result of divergent and complex national 
arrangements of un/elected criminal justice officials, policy choice, constitutional 
structures, legislative styles, civil or common law, income inequality, normative 
cycles and hyperbolic crime news (Tonry 2001a; 2001b; 2004; 2007; 2015). Barker 
(2009) has also extended the toolkit of comparative penality by providing the 
helpful concept of ‘penal regimes’ which captures imprisonment rates but also the 
discourses, the severity of criminal justice sanctions and conceptualisations of 
justice. 
 
Downes (1988), who provided one of the first examples of grounded comparative 
penology, went furthest in challenging the reliance on comparative penal statistics 
by showing how static and de-humanised they are. In his comparative study of 
British punitiveness and Danish penal lenience, Downes gives the prison more 
sustained attention and provides an outline of the nature of imprisonment, 
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providing a point-by-point survey of differences and commonalities in the two 
systems under comparison. These include the differentiated character of the prisons, 
the use of security classification, age and gender groupings, numbers of prisoners 
per cell, the ratio of the prison population that is on remand, the average size of the 
prisons, levels of militarism (such as prison officers carrying weapons), use of 
remission and pardons and facilities for mentally ill prisoners (ibid.:22-25). He also 
interviewed prisoners in The Netherlands and England to assess their experience of 
the ‘depth of imprisonment’ (ibid.:166).  
 
The value of these perspectives is that they have yielded ‘more focused and detailed 
policy histories’ (Jones and Newburn 2007:7) and prison features. These more 
grounded accounts have extended our understanding of penality and local uses of 
punishment, such as, probation (Phelps 2016), penal change (Goodman et al 2017), 
youth justice (Muncie 2011), and democracy (Barker 2009). Moreover, they illustrate 
how punishment is organised differentially across time and various places. This 
comparative approach advocates that these distinctly local patterns of punitive 
penality should be the fulcrum of investigations.  
 
The aims advanced throughout this thesis share the general emphasis on the local 
and particular character of penal practices with these scholars. However, I suggest 
that even these more detailed comparative punishment profiles are still confined 
within the punitive/lenient comparative prison categories. For all the additional 
data which shows the multitudinous quality of the penal system, prison practices 
and routines – characteristic of how the prison is conceived in the sociology of 
imprisonment – remain obscured beneath an array of cross-national signal 
legislation, sentence length, normative concepts, average prison size, racial 
disparities, differences in a host of prison programmes, judicial characteristics, 
observations from prison visits etc. One is also left with the sense that, implicitly or 
explicitly, while punishment may have a greater number of comparative points, 
‘imprisonment patterns’ tend to remain tethered to imprisonment rates first and 
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foremost (Tonry 2004:1194; Barker 2009).  Or, wanting to illustrate the dissimilarity 
or penal distinction, the imprisonment estate is sometimes scaffold upon signature 
institutions and pieces of legislation of either excessive harshness or exceptional 
lenience. We are told that institutions like the Barlinnie Special Unit are exemplary 
of Scottish imprisonment style, for example (Hamilton 2014b). One can easily think 
of other exemplar prisons associated with a nation or penal history, such as ‘the 
shining jewel’ of Bastøy (Pratt 2008), or the French prison amnesties (Whitman 
2003). This may well be the case, yet rarely are readers given the wider view of 
systemic imprisonment practices in these places which would confirm that these 
prisons are truly representative of their entire carceral apparatus. These accounts 
lack the descriptive insight which demonstrate how forms of penal pain or probity 
fit within a prison system. 
 
When we are comparing the prison in comparative penology, and despite the 
variation in research strategies, it seems that what we are most often comparing are 
prisons expressive and instrumental punitive dimensions and its capacity for 
confinement. Many of these detailed comparative cases move the project of 
comparative penal theory and explanation along a great deal (e.g. Downes 1988; 
Lacey 2008; Barker 2009), but they leave us with a picture of imprisonment that is 
too thinly drawn and often static. While the prison remains central in comparative 
penology, to make the prison amenable to comparison there is a tendency to tame 
the prison, potentially hide its nature and conceal its social meanings. Thus, most 
often the comparative penology project fails to capture imprisonment’s practical, 
productive and diversified quality, its systematic forms and routine functions which 
conduct prisoners through their imprisonment. 
 
In comparative research, the prison still tends to be conceptualised as something 
that only punishes or represses, or in contrast is lenient (and therefore seen as non-
punitive), and rarely is an entire prison estate that coherent in practice. 
Imprisonment as a system will be incommensurable, differentiated and 
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multifaceted. To be held in segregation in a country which is considered welfarist 
would come as little relief to those persons who experience depths of confinement 
which limit and deny whatever degree of autonomy and physical movement is 
usually afforded the general prison population (e.g. Barker 2013; Shammas 2014; 
Hannah-Moffat 2014). And the opposite is also possible: people held in open prisons 
with strong community links and liberal uses of release may well be experiencing 
incarceration in a manner that feels disconnected from what academics perceive as 
that nation’s punitiveness. Also, two countries may indeed have highly punitive 
prison systems, but punitive practices, and what even counts as a punitive practice, 
may well vary between two countries.  These are national and cross-national 
divergences and penal patterns calling out for comparative investigation and 
explanation. But by comparatively registering the prison by two dichotomised 
points, we might miss some of the other instrumental aims and cultural forces 
which shape prisons diverse system, and thereby support and perpetuate cross-
national divergences in the uses of imprisonment. 
 
To conduct comparative study of imprisonment one is left feeling that the texture of 
a nation’s overall prison system could still be better articulated. Despite the increase 
in cross-national research, and the significant contributions and advances already 
made in comparative analysis and explanation, the need for refinement regarding 
what exactly we are comparing when we compare imprisonment remains. A 
comparative perspective on imprisonment is near impossible without first 




The point here is not just that imprisonment rates (Pease 1991; 1994), key indicators, 
observations or clusters of comparative distinctions are imperfect measures of 
punitiveness. Punitiveness as an object of study – and its associated binary concepts 
of severity/lenience, moderation/harshness – diverts our attention from mapping 
imprisonment as a routine system of practices in which things are done to people as 
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part of prison’s daily rituals (Foucault 1977).2 As the lessons from the sociology of 
imprisonment outlined at the beginning tell us, a prison system is devised and 
adapted so that it can care, feed, educate, treat, reforms, assess, punish, control and 
potentially utilise prisoners. It is those routine activities which cause human 
suffering and foster opportunities for human development within the prison. This, 
and much else about imprisonment that might interest us sociologically and 
empirically, gets lost when the object of concern in comparative study is how harsh 
punishment is or how many people it contains.  
 
Arguably, the problem currently faced by comparative penology is conceptual. 
There is a requirement for a comparative category of imprisonment with a slightly 
different focus. Taking inspiration from the sociology of imprisonment, we can 
better conceptualise imprisonment, re-assembling its core features and practices 
beyond confinement, severity and punitiveness. Looking at the precise functions 
and routines which shape imprisonment may also provide a better platform for 
comparatively examining diversities that exist within a single prison system. Thus, 
we may be better able to explore one of comparative penology’s key question: how 
does imprisonment differ cross-nationally?  
 
The remainder of this chapter provides an outline for a descriptive analytical 
approach to comparative imprisonment. This is not explicitly concerned with 
explaining or measuring punitiveness; to develop the next stage of comparative 
penology this agenda will need to be put aside. To advance our study of national 
and cross-national imprisonment, we require refined conceptual means to moor the 
research and relate penal practices in one country or case study to another (Rose 
1991).  
																																																						
2 To undertake a comprehensive study of punitiveness would involve a complex series of research questions and 
considerations about what constitutes punitiveness? Where can one locate punitiveness – as policy, intention or 
experience? How to account for objective punitive outcomes and non-punitive subjectivities? How best to 
distinguish between the descriptive and evaluative in comparing punishment (Nelken 2009, 2006)? Though whether 
a thoroughgoing investigation like that provides the best account of cross-national imprisonment remains open to 





4. Imprisonment Regimes 
	
As mentioned above, prisons are heterogeneous, functional and moral places in 
which people are incarcerated but also coerced, encouraged and disciplined in order 
to achieve certain social and political ends (Foucault 1977; Melossi 2001). We require 
a way of conceiving imprisonment that can capture its practical and complex 
character, but still render it comparable. The comparative conceptual framework I 
propose aims to reconnect the lessons of prison sociology with comparative 
penology’s aims to examine commonality and local diversity in how people are 
imprisoned.  I take a view of what I shall call the imprisonment regime. Comparing 
imprisonment regimes allows us to identify what kinds of places prisons are, and by 
locating those places more securely within the context of the organisations in which 
they are embedded, we can discern their systems of interventions, categorisations 
and routines. This might help achieve a better empirical grounding in which to 
comparatively assess the divergences in penal patterns. 
  
Imprisonment regimes as a researchable comparative concept would begin at the 
moment of imprisonment (Carlen 1983), be that sentenced or on remand. What 
happens to people once they are imprisoned? As a result, empirically mapping 
imprisonment regimes would still include imprisonment rates but would de-centre 
them as the key comparative variable. Whether or not they are successful, we must 
also examine the direct attempts which are made to expand or reduce the size of the 
prison estate. Imprisonment rates as a sealed and objective indicator of penal 
systems should not be taken for granted. Rather, this is an empirical question about 
how high or low imprisonment rates are seen, imagined and responded to by 
government officials (Armstrong 2013). The tailoring or expanding of the 
imprisonment regime in response to the size of its population is a process of 
comparative concern, rather than seeing imprisonment rates as emblematic of the 
entire nature of the penal system. Small prison systems can be expanded on 
purpose, but still maintain relatively low per capita imprisonment rates, for 
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example. Or large prison systems can implement systems of furlough and remission 
intended to reduce the number of people in prison (Nelken 2011:110). Political 
actors can respond to high imprisonment rates by placing more mattresses on the 
floor of already cramped cramped spaces, or building more prisons, both open and 
closed.  
 
Imprisonment regimes plot characteristic differences within the national 
imprisonment estate as well as divergences between national prison practices. It 
would take into account the function and agenda of the different prisons within the 
prison estate, which tends to traverse a wider gamut – from open prisons to 
segregation units, with much else in between, including closed prisons, high 
security prisons, but also smaller experimental units (Shammsa 2014; Sparks 2002; 
Genders and Player 1995; Sparks et al 1996). Even the standard closed prison may 
differ from one context to the next (Downes 1988; Pratt and Eriksson 2013). 
 
These prisons are not stand alone units, but exist in networks and systems. In 
accounting for all the prisons within a region or state, imprisonment regimes also 
consider how people move through a prison system. This can be reflected in the 
parole arrangements which allow people to move in and out of prison, or in the 
disciplinary procedures organised at the level of the state, which govern how 
prisoners migrate through the prison system. This emphasis on mobility has 
important consequences for how we conceive of comparative imprisonment. With 
imprisonment regimes we compare not only the heterogeneous ways people are 
incarcerated but also the systematic forms of ‘circulation’, or penal mobility which 
constitute the dynamic of the regime (Armstrong 2015:11-12). This means, however, 
that it is unlikely that one prison can ever be an exemplar of an entire imprisonment 
regime, that kind of conceptualisation can become detached from the forms of 




What kinds of activities, such as work and education, do prisoners have access to? 
These are important because they shape the daily fabric of imprisonment. What are 
these programmes intended to achieve – personal development, normalisation, 
reducing reoffending, pacifying or disciplining?  
 
This comparative perspective catalogues the various constituent groups, formal and 
informal prisoner classifications within a nation’s prison population, including men, 
women and special groups, such as dangerous prisoners, prisoners with AIDS or 
sex offenders. These categorisations shape the organisation of imprisonment 
regimes; they are riven with the perceived needs, vulnerabilities, problems and risks 
of the penal subject (Sparks 2001). Categories are an organisational feature 
consistent across western penal systems, though not identical in their application 
and meanings; imprisonment regimes thus seek to capture both these broad 
similarities and difference at the level of practice in cross-national prison systems.  
 
Imprisonment regimes also works as a fluid comparative category. How do 
imprisonment regimes change? What new prison programmes are developed? What 
kinds of prisons are built? These shifts, changes and events themselves become 
points of comparative concern. Therefore, this concept can also help us take an 
historical turn with comparative penology. Using imprisonment regimes as a 
grounded comparative concept allows us to more closely track the changing shape 
of incarceration and observe how these are (or are not) modified, giving us a basis 
from which to examine the changing uses of prison and its relation to the prevailing 
social, political and culture values (Garland 1985; McEvoy 2001). 
 
By researching prisons as a system of practices affords us an improved comparative 
perspective. Imprisonment regimes are inherently varied in their practices and have 
potentially contradictory and conflicting aims. The concept of imprisonment 
regimes redraws the conceptual boundaries of comparative imprisonment. This has 
consequences for how we describe and comprehend national and regional 
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incarceration. A penal topography of this kind shifts the analytical focus beyond the 
deductive cataloguing that can occur when research is concerned with mapping 
punitiveness. Imprisonment regimes are institutional, focusing on how each prison 
system operates; instead of examining penal patterns we are comparatively 
excavating the empirical practices and processes of imprisonment. The logic behind 
these descriptive imprisonment regimes thus seems to be at least as illuminating a 
place to begin comparative analysis as punitiveness or penal exceptionalism. 
Tracing an imprisonment regime pays greater heed to the variation in local practices 
while also rendering these practices comparable. An important potential benefit of 
comparing national imprisonment regimes is that this perspective will likely soften 
the sense of either punitive exceptionalism or convergence, revealing more varied 
patterns and intentions in the organisation of punishment between national states, 
but also within them.  
 
Using the concept of imprisonment regimes, we can more fully ‘establish the 
phenomenon’ (Merton 1987) of national imprisonment characteristics before we 
comparatively interpret them, or suggest patterns of divergence and convergence 
and assess the consequences of governing fields, economic modes, cultural 
meanings or social settings upon imprisonment. The concerns underpinning this 
concept are animated by the idea that comparative research, armed with a fuller 
understanding of the prison system, can challenge both ‘sweeping assertions of 
either difference or sameness’ (Newburn and Sparks 2004:7); and perhaps also 
reveal the critical significance of more mundane penal practices which have 
previously gone unremarked or less examined in comparative study. The research 
agenda proposed by this concept moves our attention away from how many bodies 
are imprisoned. The prison is repositioned so that we can compare how it contains 
people, what demands a prison system makes of prisoners, what processes they are 
put through and what opportunities they are offered. The insights generated from 
comparing imprisonment regimes may redirect comparative penology’s critical 




In grasping this more acute comparative understanding of these practices of 
confinement, new gaps in our explanatory accounts could become evident. In 
attempting to also explain the plurality inherent in imprisonment regimes we may 
also have to develop more complex explanatory models, which themselves reflect 
the multifaceted character of imprisonment regimes. How feasibly can paradigms of 
capitalism, political typologies or embedded foundational cultures elucidate the 
contours of these variegated, yet coherent, systems of incarceration? Nonetheless, 
we will be better placed to develop new theories for exploring punishment by 
beginning with these fine-grained empirical accounts of imprisonment. We can also 
further explicate the relationship between these regimes and the political forces, 
social settings and local cultural meanings which made these forms of 
imprisonment permissible, legitimate and useful. Thus, by prompting a re-
evaluation of what constitutes comparative punishment, the concept of 
imprisonment regimes may refine our understanding of national prison systems but 




This chapter suggests that the problems facing comparative penology are as much 
conceptual as methodological and explanatory. The prison has been under-
conceptualised, and a result its punitive and repressive features (or lack thereof) are 
what tend to be compared in comparative penology. The concept of imprisonment 
regimes is proposed as a means to mitigate against the limitations of comparative 
penology literature. Imprisonment regimes focuses on the operation of prison 
systems and the core institutional features of imprisonment, such as movement, 
prisoner classifications, and the kinds of prisons, all of which function together to 
create a prison system. This will help advance the nascent project of comparative 
penology in greater empirical depth, providing a consistent and clear outline of 
cross-national prison practices, and thus moving us beyond some of the usual 
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prison metrics used to establish punitive comparisons. Imprisonment regimes take 
seriously the peculiarities and distinctions of national prison systems, but provides 
the conceptual scaffolding to support a more consistent and precise cross-national 
perspective of incarceration. While remaining committed to understanding the 
local, imprisonment regimes allows us to do so in a manner which emphasises the 
functionally equivalent features, such as penal mobility, the aims of activities, 
prisoner classification, prison function, programmes and interventions. 
 
The concept of imprisonment regimes will allow us to generate precise, consistent 
and comparable descriptions of Irish and Scottish imprisonment regimes which may 
defy but also alter and extend some the historical narratives about the practices of 
punishment in both places. Rather than seeing merely lenient, pragmatic, welfarist 
or punitive punishment, we can observe more pluralistic modes of imprisonment 
focused on release and segregation; inclusion and exclusion; and penal programmes 
which support and pacify.  
 
But comparative questions will emerge which require explanation. Why are similar 
prison problems met with different institutional responses? When prisons offer a 
familiar menu of activities, why does their emphasis and objectives vary between 
one jurisdiction and another? And why do these functions change over time? What 
is the rationale behind the differences in comparative imprisonment regimes? What 
sorts of ideological resources, ambivalent cultural meanings and social problems 
propelled the creation of these diverse regimes in Ireland and Scotland? 
Researching imprisonment regimes provides us with a more precise sense of the 
differences we must explain in comparative penology. It is to the political processes 
which support and produce imprisonment regimes which will be explored in the 












1. Introduction  
	
The concept of imprisonment regimes allows us to establish the objective practices 
which constitute a prison system’s form and functions. This departs from the 
punitive conception of imprisonment that tends to dominate in comparative 
penology. Building on the argument in Chapter Two, this chapter develops a 
comparative explanation for the characteristic uses of prison in Ireland and Scotland 
as well as the differences between them.  
 
In modern democracies, the government is central in organising imprisonment. 
From providing the financial resources, the legislative framework, creating prisoner 
categories, conducting the daily administration: the political apparatus underpins 
the prison system. Yet, few comparative studies have empirically researched 
government as a source of penal divergences. The explanatory framework 
developed here connects the use of the prison to the governmental processes that 
produce and order it. Others have already opened up avenues for this kind of 
comparative penology, in particular Lacey (2008), Green (2007, 2008), Barker (2009) 
and Cavadino and Dignan (2006). I will first briefly outline the descriptions of penal 
politics in those comparative accounts, concluding that, for various reasons, they do 
not possess the conceptual resources to enter inside the realm of government. Most 
critically for this thesis, they arguably lack the specificity to generate explanations 
for imprisonment regimes. 
	
To help us rethink the political dynamics of punishment I utilise the concept of 
political culture. I employ literature from governmentality, sociology of punishment 
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and cultural sociology to highlight a different way to conceptualise penal politics, 
which attempts to capture the instrumental agendas and expressive forces which 
motivate penal states, allowing political actors to make sense of problems and 
decide on modes of redress. Terms, concepts, sensibilities and idiom cannot be 
taken for granted, therefore, but become the object of comparative investigation. 
This means excavating, disentangling and reconstructing the comparative political 
ideologies, instrumental penal ideas and cultural meanings which inform political 
action. I will further argue that political culture is the ‘practical consciousness’ 
(Williams 1964:130-131) of the penal state, thus it is pragmatic. Political culture 
should be studied in its routine conduct and acts of problem-solving, interpreting 
the pragmatics of its decision-making. Finally, that political culture is relational, a 
product of its social landscape. To understand politics and imprisonment is not to 
study those things in isolation. These processes operate within a wider social field 
and cultural milieu which provide the distinct creative tensions to support, 
encourage and prevent certain kinds of political action. These patterns of action in 
turn cultivate the governmental routines that reproduce imprisonment and thus, 




2. Existing Accounts of Politics and Culture in Comparative 
Penology 
 
This thesis seeks to investigate the political sources of different cross-national 
imprisonment regimes rather than imprisonment rates or punitiveness, as opposed to 
much other comparative penology. By utilising a more complex conceptualisation of 
the penal object, this section will argue that other comparative political frameworks 
are not sufficiently diverse to yield explanatory power. This is mostly due to a 
tendency to rely on political economic typologies and political ideal types which are 
used to comparatively align imprisonment rates with kinds of political systems or 
structures. But while conceptual gaps persist, this is a useful starting pint. There are 
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important lessons to be gleaned from the comparative penology literature – in 
particular, how do we investigate the proposition that certain kinds of punishment 
correspond to certain styles of political reasoning? 
 
Cavadino and Dignan (2006) render governments comparable by grouping 
countries into political economy family models: neoliberalism; conservative 
corporatism; social democratic corporatism; oriental corporatism, each of which 
fosters different exclusionary/inclusionary attitudes. This comparative political 
abstraction allows them to align political and penal systems in what Nelken has 
described as ‘near perfect matching’ (2011:106). Their work significantly broadens 
the breadth of our comparative criminological map, and advances our cross-
national imagination of penal politics.3 However, these are only familial 
resemblances, and these countries, despite their political similarities, continue to 
display remarkable penal (and therefore also political) variation (evidenced by 
Cavadino and Dignan’s own measure of punitive scores and imprisonment rates); 
features which are downplayed within the analytical prism, such as ‘neo-liberal’ US, 
South Africa, England and Wales, Australia and New Zealand.  
 
Their thesis has been advanced by Lacey (2008), who expands the explanatory 
purchase of the framework by supplementing the political economic and penal 
correlations with political science literature, arguing that differences in market 
economies can impact upon the democratic ‘capacity to meet the normative demand 
of reintegrative inclusion’ (2008:8). Liberal market economies of the USA and the 
UK are more individualistic and exclusionary, for example. While co-ordinated 
market economies are more likely to promote inclusionary criminal justice practices 
(2008:58-59). Lacey also complicates these institutional mechanisms by including 
electoral arrangements, short versus long-term market economies, welfare 
typologies and constitutional constraints. Lacey and Cavadino and Dignan’s 
																																																						
3 They include the USA, South Africa, New Zealand, England and Wales, Italy, Germany, The Netherlands, France, 




respective frameworks make clear that cultural values and attitudes of course 
matter in upholding penal systems, but that political dynamics must also be taken 
into account if we are to explain comparative penal convergence and divergence. 
 
Matters of comparative political systems have been taken up in by Green (2007, 
2008), who writes that differences in politics can ‘help account for differences in 
national appetites for punishment’ (2007:591). Using diametrically opposed case 
studies of punitive England and lenient Norway, political culture is argued to be the 
central dynamo of these divergences. Borrowing from political science, political 
culture is framed using typologies of majoritarian and consensus democracies. 
Green concludes that adversarial political systems exhibit a tendency to ‘accelerate’ 
crisis while more consensual systems dampen the incentives to moral panic 
(ibid.:527).  
 
These accounts strongly suggest that there is a connection between political systems 
and punishment outcomes. While political dynamics are central to these accounts, 
by conflating political culture with constricting categories of political systems one 
may wonder what is left on the cutting room floor. As McAra has written, the 
sensibilities that are typified in these kinds of comparison are usually more 
ambiguous and ‘highly complex and not so readily squeezed into the categories of 
punitive/exclusionary or welfarist/inclusionary’ (2011:100). There are dangers of 
dichotomies as well. They risk biasing the case study: one seeks out evidence to 
illustrate punitive or lenient tendencies, rather than objectively investigating what 
was intended by prison choices and developments, and exploring what social, 
cultural and political conditions made them possible. Also, countries such as Ireland 
and Scotland confound these patterns (Cavadino and Dignan 2006; Kilcommins et al 
2004). Moreover, there is something static about these depictions. Even if 
neoliberalism has been the ascendant political ideology for the last number of 
decades, how do we account for the changes in the uses of punishment if political 




Overcoming some of these issues, Barker’s comparative contribution seeks to 
explain divergences in American penal severity by illustrating correlations between 
the character of punishment and forms of democratic engagement. Barker’s study – 
influenced by and building upon Savelsberg’s work on comparative political 
structures (1994) – illustrates a situated comparative historical study of penal 
politics in three American states which reflects, among other things, the diverse 
impact of collective agency, social forces, and cultural narratives of crime within 
different political contexts. Her account highlights agency, showing that political 
action is not merely epiphenomenal to structural and ideological forces, 
emphasising the importance of on-going political struggle and the character of 
political authority in shaping the uses of imprisonment. Using comparison, Barker 
demonstrates that there is something distinct about how politics is practiced in each 
place (Barker 2009:178). However, Barker gives primacy of explanation to the 
democratic institutions, concluding that penality takes it timbre – be it 
parsimonious, punitive or pragmatic – from the particular types of democracy 
which forms its political context. However, her typologies are rooted in her 
empirical data, and the reader is left with a stronger sense that they now know how 
these penal and political systems operate in practice. 
 
Others have put the cultural aspect of political culture at the forefront of their 
analyses; convergence between political culture and national culture has also been a 
common theme in comparative punishment studies. Tonry (2007b) describes the 
divergent punitiveness in Francophone political cultures (Quebec, France and 
Belgium) and Anglo-Saxon political cultures (Scotland, Northern Ireland, England, 
Australia).4 Similarly, Nordic countries have become almost entirely synonymous 
with ‘exceptionalism’ or ‘leniency’ in comparative literature (Pratt and Eriksson 
																																																						
4 By abstracting up in this way can conflate critical place-specific differences. For example, it is unfortunate that 
Tonry (2007b:30) hypothesises that Northern Ireland’s punitive sensibilities reflect an enduring Calvinist legacy or 
embedded Anglo-Saxon political culture given that attempts to make Northern Ireland an Anglo-Saxon and 
Protestant place are among some of the most significant reasons for vexatious social division, civil rights campaigns 
and violent conflict in Northern Ireland.  
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2013; Cavadino and Dignan 2006). Whitman (2003), in ambitious continental 
breadth, contrasts American and European penal culture. Penal politics here is 
infused with the essential national socio-cultural dynamics. But there is something 
ahistorical and deterministic in these depictions of political culture, bound to 
national cultural ideals, political culture is detached from the instrumental and 
pragmatic governmental processes which produce imprisonment. As Melossi 
(2001:414-415) has written, culture is a ‘repertoire of motives’ that is multitudinous 
and changeable, and should not be viewed as a national ‘variable’. But how are we 
to compare these repertoires and how they function inside government?  
 
3. Political Culture 
 
Without diminishing the serious advances these works represent, there remains 
much left unsaid about some important core features of penal politics. Why do 
some governments choose certain kinds of punishment over others? The question 
becomes more complicated if our aim is to explain imprisonment regimes, which 
are inherently heterogeneous. And why do singular political systems – neoliberal, 
corporate, inclusive – produce diverse prison patterns? As a result, we need to 
develop a more multifaceted image of penal politics. We require less singular more 
multidimensional conception of penal politics that can examine the political 
processes – and the character of decisions and choices which constitute those 
practices – which shape imprisonment regimes. Comparative political frameworks 
tend to favour ideological factors, organisational dispositions, political patterns and 
institutional mechanisms. They provide no way to engage with penal politics as a 
sociological site of practice, ideas and cultural passions which converts broader 
ideological, political and social forces into actual prison practices.  
 
Comparative penological scholarship might benefit from a more embedded 
understanding of government and the management of the prison system. This calls 
for more empirical comparative questions. Who is involved in governing and 
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administering imprisonment regimes? How do they rationalise their governing 
power? Why do these bodies and departments construct (often literally), alter and 
maintain the control systems of their national imprisonment regimes – what are the 
sources and foundations of their know-how? What knowledge do governmental 
bodies draw on to make sense of problems and legitimate their actions? How do 
they achieve such ends – with what bureaucratic mechanisms, administrative tools 
and governmental powers? What patterns those enactments of the penal state? How 
do people come to respond to prisons, evaluate needs and make administrative 
judgements?  The answer, I will argue, is political culture.  
 
Culture is a notoriously plastic term, freighted with many meanings, definitions and 
uses in colloquial conversation and academic literature. What is culture? How is it 
related to social world, politics, power or economics? Culture is a term that 
continues to be used5 because, despite its plasticity it has a plausibility, continuing 
to capture some of the integral forces and practices observed in sociological study. 
The persistence of this contested term bespeaks what I believe is its enduring 
usefulness, providing an avenue for thinking about government that helps move 
beyond some of the limitations present in prevailing accounts of penal politics in 
comparative penology outlined above. Culture here is used to give us a way to 
think about the practice of politics in particular, rather than more amorphous or 
simplified macro national culture.  
 
A clear and precise definition of political culture is required if the term is to be 
employed for the purposes of comparative research (Rose 1991). Below I outline the 
kinds of thinking, ethos, emotions, judgements, ideologies and felt imperatives 
which we can reasonably identify as the features which give political culture its 
																																																						
5 Cultural criminology is an established field (Ferrell and Sanders 1995; Ferrell, Hayward and Young 2008; 
Hayward 2016); Melossi’s account of cultural embeddedness continues to be an important reference in comparative 
study (see for example Hamilton 2014b); Garland’s most generative work has been the Culture of Control, though he 
has written more explicitly about culture elsewhere (1990a; 1990b; 2005; 2006). A recent special edition of 
Punishment and Society (2015) was dedicated to Punishment, Values and Local Culture, though the editorial 
provides no definition/s of culture. Newburn and Sparks (2004) edited a collection of essays concerned with 
political culture.  
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precise nature. Literature from cultural sociology (Schalet 2011; Biernacki 1995; 
Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991; Williams 1977; Swidler 1986, 2001), 
governmentality (O’Malley 2010a, 1999; Dean 2009; Rose and Miller 2010; Rose 2010, 
1993; Garland 1997), and the sociology of punishment (Garland 1990a, 1990b; Sparks 
2001; Simon 1993; Melossi 2000; 2001; 2003; Girling et al 2001; Garland 2013; Loader 
2006), are drawn on to outline the concept of political culture, and demonstrate how 
political culture will ibe nterpreted throughout this thesis. While there are some 
overlaps across these literatures they are not engaged in regular dialogue in 
comparative studies of penality. Given the breadth of concerns across these 
academic fields I have sought to identify and refine the most relevant concepts and 




The Penal State 
Penal politics is explicitly located in what Garland has referred to as the ‘penal 
state’, (2013). These are the ‘leadership elites that direct and control’ punishment, in 
this case imprisonment (ibid.:495).	This is a ‘neutral’ and ‘non-evaluative’ term 
which does not privilege a vision of government but is bound to the actual network 
or systems of organisations and bodies which officially wield the power to punish, 
be it administratively devolved to a region or centralised in the political apparatus 
of the national government. Government and the penal state herein is seen as an on-
going activity which contributes to the State (territorial entities that endure beyond 
the lifetime of specific regimes of government), rather than focusing on political 
administrations (elected parties). Throughout the thesis the terms penal politics, 
government or penal state are used interchangeably to refer to real site/s of 
empirical practice which continuously govern prison systems.  Importantly, the 
term political culture is never here used to refer to ‘the political culture’ of the entire 
governing apparatus. It refers only to the very particular ideational and cultural 
views, as they were practiced, in relation to the prison. Motifs of the political culture 
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found in Section Two and Three will likely be broadly generalizable to other 
contemporaneous departments and policy areas. How they work, however, will 
differ depending on what the object of government is. Meaning that across the 
government there will be contrasts and contradictions in comparison to the aims of 
the penal state, even if these departments share broad ideas and aims. 
 
This thesis seeks to comparatively research the penal state ‘from the inside’ (Loader 
2006 original emphasis). By expanding on Barker’s example (2009), comparative 
penology needs to be attuned to research government as something that is not 
comprised of fully formed systems of objective and coherent relations (e.g. 
neoliberal/neo-corporatist), but as something living and active, involved in a 
process of ongoing formation, subject to enduring struggle and incremental 
adaption. As a necessary elaboration and extension of these theses, this study 
suspends the normative conventions that tend to propel other comparative studies. 
Instead, following a descriptive and inductive programme for empirical 
investigation of penal politics, this study reconstructs what Loader describes as the 
disposition toward governance held by government officials. These include ‘the 
beliefs, values, sentiments and fears that constituted this particular reading of the 
art of government’ (Loader 2006:561). Apparent objective visions of political 
reasoning are displaced in favour of subjective forces which make punishment 
meaningful and useful to political actors (Nelken 2011). Thus this study makes the 
interpretation of values, sentiments, political conventions of the penal state the 
object of comparative study rather than institutions and economic models. Though 
the character of those sentiments requires further theoretical reflection 
 
Culture – a form of feeling 
That emotional dispositions and morality are central to the uses of punishment is a 
core lesson in the sociology of punishment (e.g. Durkheim 1984; Elias 1978; Garland 
1990a). There is a tendency, however, to portray punishment as shaped mainly by 
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punitive anger. For example, scholars examine the anger (Hartnagel and Templeton 
2015) inspired by punishment, the complex of negative emotions which limit 
empathy for prisoners (Canton 2015:63), the perverse kind of solidarity we 
collectively feel from punishment (Carvalho and Chamberlen 2017), or research the 
‘punitive views’ of the political classes (Brown et al 2017). Focusing on the worst 
and most debased penal sentiments tends to be exacerbated in comparative study, 
where lenient penal virtues are contrasted to penal punitiveness (see for example 
Pratt and Eriksson 2013; Cavadino and Dignan 2006; Green 2008; Downes 1988). 
Penal sensibilities, unlike punitiveness or lenience, are not homogenous, they are 
inherently ambivalent and have a plural and contrasting quality (Garland 1990a). 
Government decisions may express an emotional maze of hope and despair, 
revulsion and sympathy, an inexplicable desire to exclude offenders but also to help 
them. Penal sensibilities accord penal culture much of its complexity and 
contradictory character. 
Political culture can be first recognised as having a set of penal sensibilities – those 
distinct visceral and unresolved feelings evoked by crime, punishment and social 
disorder (ibid.; Girling et al 2001; Loader 2006; Smith et al 2000). These sensibilities 
are the patterned ways of feeling, felt in reaction to actual penal policies and public 
debates surrounding acts. They are the characteristic forms of ire, sympathy, 
disgust, compassion or fear which people view the lawbreaker. Thus, people 
respond at an emotional as well as rational level. This is because crime and its 
punishment always incites a plethora of feelings, and a range of reactions, moral 
standpoints, complex sympathies as well as aversions and/or commitments to pain 
and punishment.  The first central claim regarding political culture is that these 
feelings are an integral feature of government work, ‘part and parcel of the 
predicament’ of each deployment of the power to punish (Crawley 2004). Penal 
sensibilities contain the ‘specifically affective elements of consciousness and 
relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought’ 
(Williams 1977:132). As a consequence, penal sensibilities place limitations on even 
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the most zealous political regimes (Garland 1990a), as sets of emotions they compel 
and constrain the penal state in what is often ‘the inflicting of pain’ (Christie 1981:i).  
This is a more complicated and generous view of the emotions that simmer beneath 
penal plans and debates. It does not portray penal culture as just negative 
aggressions or episodic moral panics – those are just moments when cultural ire is 
more visible. Penal sensibilities are often inchoate and contradictory, but they are an 
eternal feature of penal reasoning, and are embedded in each attempt to rationalise 
appropriate political responses to crime and punishment. For the purposes of 
comparative inquiry, however, I want to extend the kinds of conceptual content of 
penal sensibilities to achieve greater clarity when contrasting political culture. 
Subjecting penal culture to ‘patient empirical enquiry’ (Sparks et al 2001:889, see 
also Girling et al 2001; Loader 2006) necessitates an investigation of the social 
images and cultural conventions that anchor and pattern primal penal sensibilities.  
 
A Web of Meaning 
These felt penal sensibilities are structured by cultural norms and traditions. They 
are kindled in response to the social meanings which constitute crime and 
punishment. In a provocative metaphor about the pervasive and inescapable 
character of culture Geertz wrote ‘that man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun’ (Geertz 1973:5). These meanings are what orientate 
people’s penal sensibilities. The anxieties which crime generates, the discomfort or 
passions that are revealed in penal debates are not mere cognitive possessions but 
are connected to social and cultural meanings, distinct imagery, visual metaphors 
and layered narrative associations. This is what gives crime, punishment and penal 






Crime and Criminality  
The problems criminality is perceived to present, its causes and possible outcomes, 
all contribute to the logical reasoning that informs government responses to crime 
and, therefore, uses of imprisonment. Research on penal politics must interpret the 
representations of crime which are bound up in the designing, planning and routine 
decision-making of the penal state. It is essential that we see crime as an inseparable 
and foundational ingredient in political culture.  
The absence of a clear statistical correspondence between crime rates and 
imprisonment rates is regularly argued in the literature (Tonry 2005, 2009; 
Alexander 2010), or what Wacquant has called the crime-punishment disconnect 
(2009a, 2009b). This claim is established at the statistical level (Lappi-Seppälä 2008), 
but culturally, socially, and politically, crime and punishment do not operate 
independently, as has been argued by others (Tonry 2015:507). As crime rises and 
more people are exposed to crime, this may alter the subjective views of crime held 
by citizens and governing officials and, as a consequence, reduce the levels of their 
tolerance (Garland 2001; Nelken 2010b). Even if crime has a low statistically 
recorded prevalence and frequency, the public perceptions of it will provide 
governments with some of their essential motivation in making and shaping penal 
policy (Hall et al 2013). This is because crime is a meaningful cultural category, and 
pragmatic penal decisions are not informed exclusively through direct engagement 
with criminal acts or objective reading of statistical reportage. As Hall et al (2013) 
have argued, what crime means in a place is learned and perpetuated through the 
salience of its cultural representation and communication. The perceptions of crime 
held by those actors inside government affect the reliance on imprisonment, 
regardless of the crime rates, according to Melossi (1993). The images and cultural 
narratives of crime and their relationship to penal politics are important webs of 
meaning that need to be mapped and understood. In addition to these, other sets of 







Governing and imprisonment are always undertaken in relation to people: the kind 
of people they are perceived to be and the kind of citizen-subjects governments 
wish them to be. Melossi has described the world of meaning as a ‘cultural 
environment’ which ‘produces a given ‘knowledge’ of the criminal’ (Melossi 
2000:298). Every deployment of the term prisoner, each penal dispensation, is an 
iteration of the prisoner’s perceived criminal motivations, social biography, 
personal needs, and their degree of blameworthiness. The kinds of interventions 
and categorisations employed to correct, punish and encourage transgressive 
citizens are partially founded on this cultural knowledge of the criminal. 
Douglas talks about ‘outsidership’ (1992:120): the greater the social divide the more 
likely the poor (and other related groups, such as the prisoners) are othered in the 
collective consciousness, seen as a hostile sub-group. As a result, ‘the central 
community will be more likely to respond punitively’ (ibid.:119) and less likely to be 
considered for, let alone warrant, positive government support. Thus we might 
inquire: how are prisoners viewed and politically represented in relation to the 
central social community – as solid members or a subcultural threat? This opens up 
the interpretive space for an array of possible meanings which constitute 
personhood and insider/outsider status in a given time, be it labour (Simon 1993), 
community and familial background, immigration (Melossi 2003), social and 
political conflict (McEvoy 2001), gender (Carlen 1983), social marginality (Garland 
1985), locals versus out-of-towners (Girling et al 2001), or ethnicity (Barker 2013). 
Reconstruction of these visions of personhood show the enduring dialectic between 
micro cultural meaning and prevailing social ideas (Melossi 2000). 
In their study of the contentious creation of the Vietnam War memorial, Wagner-
Pacifici and Schwartz (1991) found that the struggle to find a design that was 
suitable, and even to agree in the first place that a memorial was an appropriate 
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undertaking, was partially rooted in the pervasive and unsympathetic visions of 
Vietnam veterans as opposed to other veterans. The American public perceived 
them as degenerate, drunks, and out of work. This serves as a useful illustration of 
the connection between governmental decisions and images of unsympathetic social 
subjects. The prisoner, like the veteran, as a concept-in-use is plural. This is evident 
in imprisonment regimes, which are a collection of prisoner categories. Dangerous 
offenders, sex offenders, long-term prisoners, short-term prisoners – each of these 
categories invokes a slightly different set of penal sensibilities and visions of penal 
subjecthood. And each of these classifications is produced by government, which 
draws upon these cultural resources and images. For example, intersectional 
perceptions of gender and criminality are a constitutive dimension of how prisoners 
are identified. Carlen (1983) has shown how the uses of women’s prison regimes, 
sentencing and denial of community welfare provision were a product of the 
particular social and political assumptions regarding women, femininity and petty 
criminality.  
These divergent meanings of personhood can help explain how coherent political 
systems produce variegated and even logically incoherent imprisonment regimes. 
While gender differences (to stick with this example) between men and women in 
the criminal justice system may prevail cross-nationally, the way that men and 
women are treated in the prison system within the Western or neoliberal countries 
continues to display variation (e.g. Scraton and Moore 2005; Hannah-Moffat 2000).  
Following Melossi (2001), examining the variation in the accepted ideas of the 
prisoner, their social personhood and their perceived criminal motivations, can 
reveal how political culture works and how it yields differential effects at the level 
of the prison. 
 
Place  
We saw above that place has been central to those who argue that comparative 
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explanation is tied to national culture. I suggest that we require a more grounded 
understanding of place, however, which sensitive to the surrounding circumstances 
and the particularities of each place or nation. This will loosen some of the overly 
homogenous depictions of national penal cultures and political systems that prevail 
in the comparative literature (e.g. Francophone or Anglophone). This third set of 
concepts also concerns meanings of insider/outsidership but is embedded in 
collective meanings regarding dispositions towards communities, streets, towns and 
cities, all of which constitute a fluid and complex vision of the nation or territory 
being governed.  
Justifications for punishment and criminal justice interventions often make 
descriptive recourse to concrete places, maps and communities (Story 2016; Girling 
et al 2001). Such narratives summon the attendant ‘place-myths’ and metaphors 
(Sparks et al 2001:888), employing distinct images of crime, civility or order, all of 
which are tied to the meanings of those places, their perceived needs, and the 
threats they pose. Civil servants, ministers and senior administrators make penal 
decisions using these particular national visions, regional cultural frames and 
imagined criminal geographies. This contributes to the acceptability or contestation 
of penal politics. People intuit that certain groups are more deserving of 
punishment, or others see these same acts as a labelling process which stigmatises 
certain communities. The feelings this imagery invokes help produce forms of 
punishment which are culturally legitimate, coordinating penal practices so that 
they align with the sociological imagination that permeates a place and its 
inhabitants. How is imprisonment linked to the places that are governed? How are 
these sites envisioned and enacted through the practice of penal politics? 
 
Meanings of Political Culture 
The work of the penal state is undergirded by a distinct and varied cultural 
currents. These conceptual resources outlined above allow us to explore in more 
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detail the contours of each penal states’ political culture. These are not merely 
rhetorical decoration. When confronted by social problems government actors 
employ these inter-subjectivities and sensibilities to comprehend problems and 
construct a legitimate narrative for the use of punishment. These political truths are 
bound to place and time; therefore, certain meanings and feelings may not be 
acceptable nor indeed accessible in the management of prisons and prisoners in one 
place as they are elsewhere.  
This helps avoid the coterminous view of comparative penal culture which 
envisions generalised or timeless categories such as English speaking, Nordic or 
Francophonic. Political culture is not about abstract universal ideas but about 
‘structures of feeling’ (Williams 1977:132) as they are politically experienced and 
how they evolve in different political contexts in reference to place-specific social 
imagery and webs of meaning. These are the frameworks which allow government 
actors to not just systematically assess but intuitively know, without deduction, who 
and where is dangerous, who are social insiders and who are deviant outsiders, 
firmly rooting the practices of penal politics to their ‘precise moment in history’ 
(Foucault 1982:785). The work of government departments – their daily routines of 
planning and administering – should be studied as acts which reflect these 
persistent, culturally patterned and emotively attentive ‘moral evaluations’ 
(Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991:378, see also Lamont 1992). 
Moreover, emotions and sensibilities cannot be contained and severed from penal 
practices. Those in government are never truly insulated from ‘public emotion’ 
(Tonry 2007b:15) because civil servants and political culture are forged within, and 
draw upon, and contribute to the social spheres which constitute the meanings 
which allow them to make sense of punishment. These form a fundamental part of 
their ‘toolkit’ (Swidler 1986; Melossi 2001); these are the means by which political 
actors make practical penal decisions, forming governmental outlooks. Thick 
description of these associated social views of crime, place and personhood will 





These more fine-grained interpretive accounts can reveal what is distinctly cultural 
about political culture. But what is inherently political about political culture? Penal 
politics is not just motivated by conceptualisations of crime and disorder, but is also 
contingent upon distinct conceptualisations of government. The full scope of 
governmentality’s central claims or popular uses are not outlined, defended or 
critiqued here. Instead this section distils the most relevant concepts – rationalities, 
techniques, subjects – for this comparative study of the politics of imprisonment.6  
Governing is always conduced within a web of strategic mentalities. These are the 
parameters of political objectives; they are the governmental ‘idiom’ which frames 
problems and solutions (Miller and Rose 2010:277). In making decisions about 
appropriate uses of imprisonment, government departments are also always 
making decisions about the appropriate uses of government authority. Such as 
understanding allows us to view imprisonment ‘in a more substantively political 
light’ (O’Malley 1999:189).  
First, rationalities include political principles such as citizenship, justice, liberty, 
common-sense, responsibility, fairness etc. (Miller and Rose 2010:276-277). 
Rationalities also contain a vision of how government should act in achieving those 
ends – what are the appropriate forms of government and kinds of authority, be it 
centralised, devolved or authoritarian, for example.  
Second, these ideals are deployed in relation to the objects of government, be it 
prisoners, families, security, public health, economy, prosperity and so on. In this 
way political ideas are ‘articulated in relation to some conception of the nature of 
																																																						
6 This also reflects the process of how these concepts have developed throughout this thesis. Governmentality, 
cultural sociology or criminological concepts have not been deployed deductively but have been filleted and 
fashioned in a more grounded approach in response to the nature and character of research, how the world was 
viewed by those who inhabited it, and the ongoing comparative mid-range dialectic between the two research sites. 
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the objects governed’ (Miller and Rose 2010:277), be it workers as a resource, 
prisoners as dangerous, or children as vulnerable.  
Following on from this, concerned with shaping the conduct of citizens, guided by a 
particular set of norms, governing bodies aim to direct and align people’s 
behaviour, aspirations and subjectivities with the governing objectives (Dean 
2009:18; Garland 1997:175). The prison is a tool of social engineering, with routines 
and programmes which are intended to instil certain traits in prisoners. This 
provides an important distinction about the nature of penal power as it is conceived 
in this thesis. Governments are not necessarily just ‘punishing’ to inflict pain, but 
imprisoning citizens in ways which may also serve particular political rationalities. 
Penal power is not just negative and prohibitory, but also productive and inciting 
(O’Malley et al 1997:506; Miller and Rose 2010:272; Foucault 1981:253). 
Governmentality is interested in subjects, and how power is exercised towards the 
behaviour of its inhabitants (Foucault 1991:92). According to Miller and Rose (2010) 
and O’Malley (2010:38) there is something inherently moral about rationalities.  
Government action is motivated by a sense of how the society, and all it 
encompasses, should be. Subjectivity is thus not suppressed by government actions 
but the desired personal dispositions are cultivated in prisoners via the prison. 
 
Kinds of Rationalities 
The conceptual resources sketched out above have been prominently employed to 
critique the shifting liberal rationalities of our modern era (Rose 2001; Rose and 
Miller 2010). However, this thesis takes its starting point to be more sociologically 
motivated and inductive, employing grounded questions as suggested by Garland, 
asking: ‘how have governing authorities understood their powers and what 
rationalities of governing are implicit in their practices?’ (Garland 1997:176). I will 
identify and outline some forms of rationalities, their governing traits and social 
agendas, without suggesting these are fixed typologies – these are themes which 
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form the contextual meaning of government, rather than providing an account of 
how they are precisely practiced in empirical reality. 
Liberalism is shaped and informed by a vision of a society inhabited by rational and 
unencumbered individuals who exercise self-denial, reason, responsibility and 
personal initiative. While seeking to inculcate these traits in citizens, through policy, 
education, welfare and punishment (Joyce 2003; Donzelot 1980) liberal political 
rationalities prohibit government agencies from overzealous intervention, instead 
promoting wise restraint (Garland 1997). Governments must avoid trespassing 
upon a citizen’s sense of internal individual responsibility, supporting rather than 
intruding on the autonomy of civil society (Joyce 2003). These particular ideas 
characterise the actions of a liberal government, informing its conduct and social 
expectations. 
This is just one potential form in which the art of government is deployed, however. 
A neo-liberal rationality is motivated first by libertarian economic principles 
(Loader and Sparks 2016). Neo-liberalism envisions citizens as self-regulating 
entrepreneurs, responsible for their own fortunes, prudent in their decision-making, 
increasingly guided by calculations of risk. Governments will therefore ‘govern-at-
a-distance’, allowing the market to fill the regulatory vacuum left by the state.  
Dean describes an authoritarian rationality (2009). As a non-liberal view, instead of 
working through free citizens, it seeks to inculcate obedience in subjects and temper 
any opposition to official authority. A government with an authoritarian mentality 
will go to almost any length – e.g. eugenics, prison camps and death – to suppress 
and extinguish threats to governmental power and social order. 
 
A government that is motivated to support or inculcate ‘membership of traditional 
collectives such as the family, the community, or the nation, are in a sense given in 
the nature of social beings, rather than contractually, rationally, or voluntarily 
chosen by individuals on the basis of self-interest’ (O’Malley 1999:186) could have a 
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conservative set of rationalities. It may rely on overtly moral reasoning, favouring 
caution over innovation. This kind of thinking privileges central state power and 
social authoritarianism, displacing freedom, that key tenet of liberal rationality, to a 
more subordinate agenda.  
 
In describing the character of punishment in the late twentieth century, O’Malley 
identifies a neo-conservative rationality which has conservative traits but is also 
pro-free market. In fact, O’Malley argues that much of what is characterised as 
neoliberal is in fact neo-conservative (1999:185). Neo-liberal and neo-conservative 
mentalities contrast (with their respective and divergent emphasises on individual 
entrepreneurship and social traditions), but they also align in their preference for 
market provisions. Thus despite their divergences, they can exist and operate 
concurrently, creating a ‘volatile and contradictory’ style of penal politics. 
 
This is an important lesson. Governing mentalities may appear hegemonic, but 
careful examination can reveal that other rationales may also be present and equally 
integral. Being attentive to this kind of variation, as O’Malley is, may help explain 
some of the more incongruent practices of penal politics. Moreover, these plural 
political mentalities signal that there is no need to develop totalising or reductive 
‘cookie-cutter’ analyses of government thinking (Rose et al 2006:98). Analysis 
instead should focus on developing a descriptive ‘open-ended, positive account of 
practice of governance in specific fields’ from which rationalities should be read 
(Garland 1997:174).  
We may also observe a pastoral rationality, in which the condition of ‘the flock’ is 
paramount. This set of objectives inspires the government to behave as pastor or 
shepherd, looking after each individual as a member of a community (Foucault 
1982:783). Concerned with the morality of individuals rather than legality of the 
system, the government agent-as-pastor is animated by the desire for care, control 
and salvation of the individual. The aim is to ensure that subjects are brought back 
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into the fold, while also seeking to achieve their total obedience (Golder 2007:167; 
Foucault 1982:783, 1981). In many ways, modern nation states exhibit some form of 
pastoral power, such as the welfare state (Foucault 1982, 1981), though whether 
pastoral reasoning favours traditions and families or the protection of individuals 
and their rights will depend on whether it has hybridized with a variant of 
conservative or liberal rationality. 
 
Government decisions and responses which are ostensibly about imprisonment will 
also conform to the understanding of the ascendant governing rationality. The 
prison thus is organised in such a way so that it may strengthen or sustain the 
character of the state as well as punish or reform (Foucault 1981). Each of these 
positions has a different vision of society and distinct ideas about the conduct of 
government, and thus have divergent claims about the role of incarceration in 
achieving that order.  So, comparative divergences and convergences in penal 
politics and imprisonment are also the outworking of the political order it is trying 
to instil, be it conservative, liberal or neo-liberal, etc. This is close to what Loader 
and Sparks (2016) and O’Malley (1999) have suggested when they wrote that 
punishment is always political. Indeed, as Foucault (1977:23) has already written, 
punishment is a ‘political tactic’ that is designed to have ‘positive effects’. Though 
these instrumental political mentalities often go unacknowledged by government 
officials (Dean 2009:24-25) whose own repertoire of political know-how regarding 
the appropriate strategic methods to use in the control and direction of citizens is 
fundamentally drawn from these rationalities. Following Foucault (1980:121), then 
we must explore how power is rationalised in systems of practice and effect rather 
than focus on the power and autonomous capacity of individual ministers and 
political leaders. The decisions of even the most critical or self-interested political 
actors are often participating in the ongoing production of dominant political 
ideologies (Smith 2015:358). These ‘mentalities of government’ imbue imprisonment 





Competing rationalities are eventually realised through techniques, which are the 
mechanisms governments use to govern social problems, populations and subjects. 
However, this study proceeds to distinguish techniques in three ways, regarding (1) 
techniques of rule, (2) techniques of hierarchy and (3) techniques as cultural 
conduits. 
 
First, decisions of prison design, planning and administration are taken using 
governmental techniques, such as statistics, budget audits, dossiers, performance 
measures, expert insight, prisoner demographics, census information, prison 
population forecasts and surveillance. These provide governments with the 
workable knowledge for penal decision-making. Government’s decisions are thus 
not arbitrary but based on certain kinds of insight, information and intelligence, and 
these techniques are both ‘invented’ and ‘deployed’ in relation to the particular 
characteristics of governing mentalities (Rose1993:290). The prison population is 
‘rendered visible both as an object and as an end of government’ via techniques 
(Gunn 2006:709). Employed to determine ‘the character of social facts’, techniques of 
rule form the reasoning and thus shape outcomes, such as laws and prison 
classifications (Hacking 1991:181).   
 
Second, the form of government, the nature of institutional hierarchy which 
contains, organises and disperses governmental power is also a disciplining 
technique upon the penal state – it imposes rationalities upon civil servant actions 
and binds the state to particular forms of behaviour. Using agencies, devolving 
organisational power, creating additional layers of management oversight, quangos, 
inspectorates, working groups and boards are all means through which governing 
rationalities are institutionalised and made into everyday work via new incentives, 




This may be a slightly unconventional use of techniques; particularly as 
governmentality already contains the concept of ‘governmentalized’, characterising 
how the apparatus of the state has been increasingly organised through a more 
diverse administration (Dean 2009:30). For the purposes of comparative clarity, it is 
more useful to consider how administrative practices are organised as surveillance 
and normalising practices upon governmental institutions, which in turn help 
internalise governmental expectations and ways of thinking, thereby 
institutionalising asymmetrical power relations (Sauder and Espeland 2009).7 As 
such, the systems of paperwork, oversight, report writing, accountability audits, 
evaluations and bureaucratic hierarchies are used to impose a certain political 
rationality and yield practical effects on the working routines of civil servants. And 
despite some practitioner resistance to changes in ethos (McNeil et al 2009), 
Bennett’s study of prison managers has shown that senior staff who ‘embodied’ 
targets and bureaucratic mechanisms were believed to epitomize a ‘good’ manager 
(2016:53). Techniques of hierarchy show how rationalities enforce certain kinds of 
political practices.  
 
Pursuant to this, I propose a third sociological perspective on techniques. The 
creation of these techniques is how political rationalities and culture are enacted, 
solidified and routinised into penal practice. Techniques convert ‘vocabularies of 
motive’ into political actions (Mills 1940:905). The creation of legislation, the 
establishment of boards and management groups, the routine acts of institutional 
decision-making, annual reports, and demands for policy documents are all 
standard and practical functions of governmental practices (Shore and Wright 
1997:10), but they each are embedded with, and a consequence of, the currents of 
political culture.  Garland (2006:438) has written that while cultural meaning and 
ideas may be pervasive, we must clearly identify the ‘processes and mechanisms 
																																																						
7 Sauder and Espeland show how external Law School rankings permeate university departments. Rankings work 
as techniques of normalization and surveillance, and staff internalise these pressures, stigma and anxieties in a 
process of self-disciplining. Though these disciplinary processes are contingent on the dynamics of context and are 




that translate (or enact, perform, inflect, express and rework) culture into action’. I 
argue that techniques are important cultural conduits, converting belief into 
systematic routines of government and, ultimately, imprisonment.  
 
Understanding techniques as such means we must ask certain questions about 
governmental activity. The array of techniques that is used upon a population and 
upon government, their particular forms will depend upon the contextual meaning of 
governing authority in which those tools are formed.  
 
Rationalities of Political Culture 
Governmental rationalities refer to the purposive, strategic and distinctly political 
‘ways of thinking and styles of reasoning’ embodied in penal politics (Garland 
1997:184). O’Malley (2010:13) writes that governmentality is ‘rather hostile’ to grand 
narratives, ‘preferring to focus on contingent and specific turns of history and 
politics, as opposed to unfolding historical logics of modernity, and therefore has 
the capacity for ambiguity and uncertainty’. This grounded approach helps avoid 
reductionist analysis of governing activity,8 which clears the way to think about 
political culture as inflected with instrumental governmental aims, not only 
animated by punitive demands, social norms or penal philosophy. Rationalities 
provide the lens to identify fundamental and avowedly political ideational forces 
which shape how political agents take penal actions. 
																																																						
8 While governmentality is interested in the ‘programmers’, namely those making policy, these agents are implied 
rather than researched explicitly. Governmentality studies usually avoid the ‘familiar, realist, sociological terrain’ of 
government (O’Malley 2001:193), instead conducted in a way that separates programmes and textual analysis from 
the ‘messy actualities’ (Barry et al 1993) in which government work is actually deployed. Leading figures in 
governmentality are candid in the claims that governmentality is not a sociological endeavour as it does not have as 
its object, writes Dean, (2009:28) ‘simple empirical activity of governing’ and is not about creating descriptive 
accounts ‘of how various people or agents in positions of authority rule. An analytics of government is not a 
‘sociology of rule’’. 
Distancing governmentality from sociology has been critiqued by Garland (1997) and O’Malley et al (1997). Garland 
(1997) emphasises the amenability of governmentality to sociological inquiry, and provides an instructive criticism 
about how historically reassembling the character of mentalities and technologies should not be analysed as distinct 




4. Political Culture – A Logic of Practice 
In many ways, governing mentalities, with their strategic rational character, are 
diametrically opposed to the form of non-calculative and emotional values 
expressed by cultural sensibilities. Each framework proposes a different analytical 
and empirical agenda – one concerned with power and control, the other symbols 
and meanings. However, following a view of punishment set out by Garland (1990a; 
1990b; 2006), these are not mutually exclusive. By bringing the cultural and the 
political together, we see that it is in fact these ‘twinned’ dynamics (Garland 
1997:203) that give penal politics its operational fault lines and creative tensions. It 
also shows how difficult it is to create a singular political culture which has a 
coherent quality and set of intentions. Governing, policymaking and penal decision-
making are informed by political rationalities, ways of viewing populations, 
territories, idealised visions of citizenship and an understanding of how 
government works best. This instrumental view risks presenting a world reduced to 
strategic agendas and utilitarian ends in which all outcomes, no matter how 
negative, were the intentional product of instrumental political calculation.9 Despite 
the strength of intention behind political rationalities and professed efficiency of 
governing techniques, matters of crime and punishment can never be purged of 
their cultural narratives and social imagery. If political culture is the collective ways 
of thinking about governing then it cannot be reduced to system effects (such as 
voting arrangements), ideology or political economy. The ways people think about 
crime are always affective; substantive images and practical senses are drawn from 
dominant social relations and cultural inculcation. Governmentality is interested in 
the making-up of subjects, but the cultural is something much more fundamental 
and antecedent. Penal decisions are not just a reflection of the kinds of citizens 
governments want to incite. They are also founded upon much more visceral and 
emotive sensibilities about who the person, in this case the prisoner, is already 
																																																						
9 For example, the creation of delinquents (Foucault 1977; 1980:45).  
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believed to be. Cultural meanings provide the repertoire of common-sense which 
limits and directs instrumental recipes for action. These are the ‘untutored modes of 
doxic opinion that exist prior to ‘ideology’’ (Loader and Mulcahy 2003:55), the 
sources of punishment that exist outside the penal and political field. Instrumental 
rationalities draw on these feelings, institutionalising them, helping assess the limits 
and borders of justice, fairness and citizenship. Rationalities and cultural meanings 
should not be seen as mutually exclusive. Both of these forces are at work 
concurrently. They combine to create a political culture, providing the meaningful 
and strategic frame for what becomes the legitimate response, form and use of penal 
power. 
 
Thus conceived, political culture is practical, generative and diverse rather than 
abstract or typological. These are the distinctly political cultural motivations behind 
systems of punishment. This reveals the patterns of ideas, beliefs and strategies 
which determine the political outlooks held by government functionaries, how they 
understand the subject of imprisonment – those places and people over whom 
forms of penal authority are deployed. Bringing these literatures together to 
develop the concept of political culture may advance our understanding of penal 
politics.  
These intertwined dynamics of political culture can better explain some of the 
incongruent and contradictory actions by governments. Like any conceptual 
framework both the cultural and the governmental have limitations, but the 
limitations of one is alleviated, complemented or extended by how it has been 
combined with the other, showing how the seemingly incompatible character of 
expressive and instrumental are counterparts in political culture.These ideational 
forces are mutually limiting, revealing why strategic ends are, for the most part, 
never fully realised and why emotive sensibilities do not always dominate political 
decisions; as sets of governing practices they propel, sustain and mitigate each other 
in ways that give penal politics its general habits of thought and action. The political 
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seeks always to make routines and reason out of the endemic morality and tragedy 
which crime and punishment evokes. As Sarat has written, ‘modern legal orders are 
built on the edge of fear and anger’ (Sarat 1997:181-182, in part referencing Dumm 
1990), as well as the wider gamut of emotional feelings, including hope, empathy 
and tolerance. In striving to create rational, control-orientated penal systems 
governments can never disconnect themselves from the systems of meaning that 
often contradict the demands of instrumental rationality. 
 
Political culture ‘has to be understood as a category of thought and affect’ (Loader and 
Mulcahy 2003:39 original emphasis); it is animated in relation to practical problems 
and struggles. Political culture is embodied, enacted and performed, it is evident in 
the practice of habits and routines of government (Biernacki 1995; Garland 2006; 
Swidler 1986; Sewell 1996; Carlen 1983; Schalet 2011). Actions are taken and 
decisions made in response to particular problems as they are encountered in reality 
(Bourdieu 1990:86). The cultural forces which shape penality can adapt in response 
to the problems and threats over which governments attempt to gain control. These 
can be political (changing nature of liberalism, decreasing conservatism, demands 
for greater/fewer government interventions, economic circumstances), social 
(changing crime patterns, poverty, shifting demographics or urbanisation) or penal 
(riots, overcrowding, extreme prison harshness, lenience or dangerousness). Of 
course, these problems usually overlap, one invoking and exacerbating the 
problems of the other in unpredictable ways.  
This kind of ‘practical logic’ means that a government ‘never ceases to sacrifice the 
concern for coherence to the pursuit of efficiency’ (Bourdieu 1990:262). In desperate 
situations ‘the threshold of logical requirements [are] lowered even further so as to 
exploit all the available resources (ibid.:264, see also Sewell (1996) on ‘emotional 
ruptures’ and Vaughn (1996) on normalisation of organisational deviance). Each 
problem, dependent on its context and object, will invoke different governmental 
ideas about what is culturally and strategically appropriate, meaning a policy 
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portfolio may only loosely cohere.10 Political culture is not just habits of thought. It 
is also the terrain of ideas upon which substantive penal agendas are mobilized, 
governmental struggles are bound and problems resolved, albeit within the existing 
remit of power and resources (Sewell 1996).  
Political culture then is solidified in practice, but is also bound to the particular 
‘social ground’ (Geertz 1973:9) in which it is rooted. Political culture mediates social 
distinctions, transforming them into concrete government actions and practices of 
imprisonment, while reproducing social norms and sensibilities of what is worthy, 
valuable, troublesome, distasteful and repugnant. By taking seriously the social 
meanings of personhood, place and incivility, justice and legitimate political 
authority as they appear in a political culture, it will be impossible to avoid tracing 
our way back to the wider social stratification and structural forms ordering 
everyday life which support these practices. Political culture is thus relational and 
cannot be cabined away from the vital social sources in which it is grounded. These 
political visions of prisons, prisoners, government and crime are inescapably 
entangled with other social norms, such as family, community, nationality, gender, 
race, poverty, class and so on. The balance of recognition that is struck between 
these ideas will also vary depending upon the social context, and how these other 
social issues have been rationalised as an object of governmental intervention. As 
Mills wrote, every imputation of reason each of us gives is not itself without a social 
reason (Mill 1940:904).  
Additionally, prison operates in a field of social control. Decisions to alter the shape 
of the prison will also reflect ‘correlative transformations’ (Garland 2001:5) in other 
kinds of social control institutions. Changes elsewhere in the social control field can 
place new pressures or demands on those in government as the effectiveness of the 
prison comes to appear imbalanced. In these circumstances government may 
																																																						
10 This is what Bourdieu means when he describes, in typical Bourdieusian paradoxical prose, how the logic of 




attempt to realign the prison while they seek out a new equilibrium in the social 
order. In grasping this point, we better understand political culture and the 
decisions that are made about how people are imprisoned by illuminating the social 
conditions that generated their actions and decisions. This relationship of the penal 
state to social forces and social controls gives government its dynamism. As 
governments attempt to tame the social world political culture ‘is continually 
producing, altering or adapting its governing practices and institutions’ (O’Malley 
et al 1997). Political culture has a patterned solidity, but rests upon potentially 
shiting social order, and during times of social upheaval the dynamics of political 
culture can alter accordingly. 
The comparative view of political culture espoused here is inherently relational, 
situated and pragmatic, revealing how control and management of the prison 
system and the prisoner become embroiled in the political attempts to ameliorate or 
chastise social and political dilemmas (Douglas 1992:99). The work of penal politics 
then is not a pure expression of political culture upon the world. It is the logic 
enacted and embedded in government conduct, responses and inactions as they 
attempt to negotiate populations and places. What we as outsiders (or as experts) 
may view as excessive, ill-advised and unsubstantiated penal policy choices come 
into existence because they find purchase in the overlapping sections of the 
community which constitute the wider social world. Governments draw their 
interconnected knowledge of and emotional in/sensitivity to places, people, 
problems, sense of insecurity and carceral necessity from the social world. Viewed 
this way it becomes difficult to uphold statements in which we may situate the 
blame for increasingly punishing and discriminatory imprisonment tactics upon an 
autonomous political environment (Green 2009). 
For these reasons, I have chosen the term political culture rather than government 
culture. I understand that latter term as being closer to a bounded organisational 
culture, organisational tradition or the ethnography of office life and policymaking 
(Annison 2015; Souhami 2014; Stevens 2011; Windelsham	1987, 1993, 1996, 2001; 
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Jones and Newburn 2005). Political culture, as will be made clear, is more 
foundational because of its relational dynamics, affecting aspects of organisational 
culture (i.e. the right way to go about things and tasks). Political culture is always 
produced within ‘larger societal set of stories, conflicts, troubles and insecurities’ 
(Sparks et al 2001:889) and has meanings which stretch beyond the organisational 
borders and routines. 
 
This is an inherently pluralistic view of political culture. What Sparks (2001) has 
described as the narrow and sometimes ‘skimpy’ view of political culture as lenient, 
punitive, populist, corporatist, neoliberal etc. is at odds with the complex meanings 
and circumstances that determine the ordinary business of penal administration and 
policymaking. Thinking about crime and punishment as something semantically 
dense, pragmatic, meaningful, politically coherent and socially contingent captures 
some of the enduring tensions and demands of penal politics. In developing prisons 
governments must administer services to living people to whom they are charged 
with immense responsibility of care. At the same time, and in the very same actions, 
they must attend to the complex demands of punishing, using it as a solidifying 
expression of political power and an act of social good. All of these concerns are 
coloured by the visions of justice/injustice, insiders/outsiders, citizenship/exclusion, 
fear/empathy which shape the kind of place or country which governments are 
involved in creating and contesting. Political culture does not provide solutions to 
the problems; it is the ‘bounded rationality’ (Vaughn 1996) which provides the 
value and political framework in which problems can be identified, made 
intelligible and legitimately acted upon.  
 
5. Lessons for Comparative Criminology 
	
Why might comparative penology require a conception of penal politics which is 
dynamic, relational, pragmatic and built upon the seemingly incompatible inter-
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subjective fault lines of political instrumentality and cultural sensibilities? This 
conceptualisation captures those political forces which tend to escape apprehension 
in more general depictions of penal power. The potential of political culture 
conceived as such overcomes other gaps in current comparative penal politics of 
abstractness, mechanistic and overly unified political narratives; which tend to 
efface localised social conflict and political actions. The benefits to comparative 
penality of an inductive comparative concept such as political culture is that if 
conducted on a small scale it is (1) a bounded concept which allows for cross-
national comparison of rich empirical detail; (2) has a denaturalising effect upon our 
understanding of governmental actions; (3) tempers often overzealous claims of 
national uniqueness; (4) prevents false universalism; and (5) yields comparative 
explanation for divergent imprisonment regimes. 
Set in comparative contrast, who makes-up the penal state? What techniques do 
they use to govern prisons? What kinds of characteristic ‘facts’ are used by 
governments to describe political uses of imprisonment (Melossi 2000:303)? In his 
historical comparative study of the differences in the factory systems in Germany 
and Britain, Biernacki (1995) describes how the payment practices and routines of 
factory life reflected the different value-laden working conceptions of labour power. 
Similarly, Schalet’s comparative research (2011) examines how parents chastise, 
encourage, dissuade, punish and shame their teenagers in relation to their emergent 
sexuality. By setting these concerns in comparative relief of The Netherlands and 
America, Schalet illustrates through empirical research and contrasting comparative 
analysis how culture – particular meanings of adolescence and adulthood, 
appropriateness, and political concepts of individualism – came to shape what is 
among the most intimate challenges of parenting and governing family life. These 
comparative studies show how basic routines of governing are constituted by 
distinct and situated political and cultural meanings. 
Like these examples, the expressive and instrumental political concerns can become 
sublimated beneath the routines of everyday life and not explicitly acknowledged 
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by government actors – though they are no less vital to penal politics. Thus, instead 
of the usual units of analysis, namely policy (Jones and Newburn 2002, 2005; Rogan 
2011; Annison 2015) or political structures (Page 2011; Barker 2009), what is so often 
taken for granted as the seemingly ineffable and allusive stuff of politics will be the 
object of comparative political analysis and research throughout this thesis. 
Comparatively, this means we must look to identify what people mean when they 
utter these political cultural terms and examine how they use these ideas to justify 
actions in relation to what kinds of problems.  
 
The denaturalising effects of studying comparatively embedded ideational forces 
may drain some penal terms of their generic force, and while they are still broadly 
comprehensible we cannot disregard their distinct local usage. The objective 
terminology of prison programmes such as education, parole, labour, training and 
rehabilitation are deprived of some of their general meaning as we begin to look at 
how they are deployed (to educate? to make employable? to aid? to exclude? to 
normalise?). Biernacki has emphasised that this is precisely what comparative 
research should strive for, unpacking seemingly objective terminology to reveal the 
context of their definitions (1995:2).  
 
A generic term such as ‘prisoners’ now must be understood as having condensed 
within it a diffuse array of culturally and politically appropriate ideas, visions and 
meanings. For example: an implicit cultural and social biography which is invoked 
every time this is stated, with a related moral and emotional quality, feelings of fear 
and/or sympathy, an implied understanding of criminal acts, their motivations, 
varying degrees of tolerance of these acts and the people who commit them, an 
express view on the nature of social disorder. How is the person in prison valued or 
appraised by governments? What sorts of stances of antipathy or empathy do those 
governing authorities adopt in relation to the imprisoned? What sort of social 
proximity or distance do they exhibit? In addition, when people invoke ‘the 
prisoners’ in their commentary, justifications, work practices, assessment of needs 
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and cultural narratives they are also always inflating that vision with often implicit 
views of the perceived obligations of government. The prison is fine-tuned to 
engender particular political traits in these deviant subjects. But it must attempt to 
achieve these ends within the limits of government, be they demarcated by 
conservative, liberal or pastoral rationalities, and with a knowledge of the penal 
pains which are permissible to achieve those ends. It is this array of political cultural 
resources that government actors employ each time they identify a problem, 
propose a penal mode of redress or suggest an adjustment to penal sanctioning.  
 
This mix of views, strategies and sensibilities is often inchoate, but these elements 
are always embedded in and enacted through each statement of this kind, which 
seeks to regulate and control prisons and prisoners, allowing for forms and 
functions of imprisonment that are culturally coherent but potentially diverse in 
practice. Arguably, current accounts of politics in comparative penology tend to 
overestimate the coherence of a political style or the directive capacity of 
institutions. As a consequence, they lack the dimensions that can show how and 
why governments create penal systems which simultaneously use excessive 
punitiveness, progressive welfare programmes, formulaic administrative and 
morally indifferent financial penalties such as fines. Insidious images of a cohort of 
capricious prisoners will put restraints on and filter anxiety into the most 
instrumental agendas, instead intuitively justifying extra-control regimes. Even 
political systems committed to the wise restraint of liberalism, therefore, can employ 
penal tactics which are tempered by an expressive and seemingly incoherent 
illiberal character.  
This applied conceptual comparative approach will likely present a challenge to 
some of the false universalism that presents itself as theory of late modern or 
Anglophone penality (Zedner 2002; Matthews 2005). As a result of the entrenched 
hierarchies of knowledge – in which the UK or USA are often cast as criminology’s 
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capitals – other national cases are sometimes described as ‘exceptional’.11 That these 
studies find differences in their national and regional territories is welcome, but 
‘exceptionalist’ analyses are not without their inherent limitations. The term 
exceptionalism is often an ‘empty signifier’, which lacks ‘a fixed core meaning’ and 
that perhaps as a result of this ambiguity ‘such an “empty” concept may become 
politically and intellectually hegemonic’ (Offe 2009 n.23). Exceptionalism tends to 
conceptualise empirical findings by negation, namely, defining findings by what 
they are not. These conclusions can cast research studies outwith prevailing 
theoretical debates rather than entering into dialogue with them and challenging 
some of the presumptions that undergird the often ethnocentric character of the 
comparative penological imagination.12 Moreover, they can (though certainly not 
always) gravitate towards essentialising and/or idealised visions of national culture, 
leaving less room to map the contingent social forces, events and political decisions 
that gave rise to and buffer penal politics. 
Thus, denaturalising problems should not result in generating an artificially 
parochial view to the exclusion of general political qualities; comparative study 
should have greater aspiration than cataloguing the ‘uniqueness and difference 
between jurisdictions’ (Nelken 2010b:18). Paradoxically, while disentangling the 
ideographical reasoning of political action this study aims to do so without 
entrenching claims of false uniqueness (Rose 1991:450). 
This is because the concept of political culture is one with ‘bounded variability’, 
which are ‘functionally equivalent’ ideas with similar attributes and which permit 
description and analysis to travel the borders of our comparative research sites 
(Rose1991:447-448). A prison is still a prison; a government is still a government. 
These terms yield an instantaneous and almost universal intelligibility, but in 
																																																						
11 Currently one can observe Irish exceptionalism, Scottish exceptionalism and Nordic exceptionalism – though Irish 
and Scottish exceptionalism seem to be the least contentious of the exceptionalist claims, though this could be 
because Nordic exceptionalism has been subject to comparative support and critique (Barker 2013, 2017; Ugelvik 
and Dullum 2011; Pratt and Erikson 2013; Downes 1988; Green 2008). Also, to complicate matters American 
imprisonment is often described in terms of exceptionalism. 
12 See Lee and Laider (2013:141) on expanding ‘criminology’s geopolitical imagination’.	
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practice they are not understood entirely objectively. Their characteristic forms and 
practices can only be grasped in their practical sense. It is well-attuned concepts 
which allow us to report local histories and political processes in a manner that 
reveals something about the general dynamics of penal politics. Otherwise what we 
have are unbounded inventories of political spectacles, watershed policy moments 
and key speeches ‘assembled together but [with]…no basis for relating one country 
to another’ (ibid.). Political culture captures the general patterns which inform penal 
politics and the uses of imprisonment. Those general features allow for locally 
attentive comparative analysis which challenges ‘sweeping assertions of either 
difference or sameness’ (Newburn and Sparks 2004:7), avoiding the extremes of 
universalism and particularism. 
This helps us rethink the prevailing conceptual models for comparative political 
processes. Comparative reflection of political culture admonishes the tendency to 
take for granted what political actors do and why they do it. Each case can provide a 
source of intellectual stimulation for its comparator, providing a contrasting 
analytical light that can reveal the prohibitive moral boundaries, oddities of outlook 
and characteristics of penal politics which may have previously gone unremarked.  
There are of course limitations. Because of its small scale and middle-range nature 
(Merton 1968) the concept of political culture outlined here does not yield enough 
abstract space to develop typologies or general theories. This framework serves as 
an alternative route to comparative knowledge, however, which can challenge and 
extend, rather than undo, existing comparative penal narratives as well as diversify 
– particularly Anglophone – criminological theory and history. 
 
In contrast to other models of comparative penal politics, comparative political 
culture is not only the property of a sovereign minister, the structured outcome of 
institutions or the result of a risk society, a neoliberal ideology or a lenient or 
punitive collective culture. Political culture does not provide a grand teleology (in 
say the way risk, neo-liberalism or a de-civilising process are sometimes employed 
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to do) but involves chance, events and uncoordinated circumstances that defy grand 
or neat abstraction. It is a complex and variable form of political reasoning done by 
group of actors inside the penal state, their expressive reactions and moral 
judgements, all of which inculcate a particular vision of society, government and 
citizens which demand different modes of penal response. Political culture allows 
us to understand how government works, and through detailed rather than abstract 
analysis understand the divergent uses of imprisonment and character of penal 
politics. This, I believe, gives political culture greater explanatory power, because 
imprisonment regimes are the practical outcomes of these activities.  
 
Political culture is the inter-subjective dispositions which constitute the power to 
punish, a definition which allows us to better comprehend how political culture 
‘works’, turning social, cultural and political forces first into political culture and 
then into practical means of punishment. Political culture is embedded in the 
routines of government organisations, departments and civil servant work, such as 
legislative decisions, report writing and the daily chores of administering. 
Imprisonment regimes, those systemic patterns of incarceration, are the material 
realisation (in the architecture, rules, prison classification systems, organisation of 
prison space, programmes, institutional functions etc.) of how these competing 
frameworks of meaning resolve problems of prisons, prisoners, crime, government 
responsibility and social disorder as they arise. 
 
Why do some prison regimes emphasise exclusion, while others seek to improve the 
lives of incarcerated people? Or, if two prison systems espouse same general aims, 
say reintegration, a measure of last resort, why do they attempt to achieve these 
ends through different penal means and techniques? How can we explain the 
variation not just between but also inside national prison systems? Political culture 
provides the modes of reasoning which produces certain kinds of prisons and the 
knowledge which makes prisons governable. It would therefore make sense that we 
will see correspondence between the characteristic practices of political culture and 
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the characteristic means of imprisonment regimes. Therefore, it is the nature of 
political culture that we must research and decode if we are to begin to explain the 
divergent cross-national modes of imprisonment that continue to perplex 




I have argued that the view of politics in comparative penology is often too 
restrictive. If we are to better understand penal politics and their consequences 
upon punishment we must take a more sociological view of government, one which 
attends to the meanings, emotions and the strategic political ideas which shape 
political actors’ mental dispositions and habits of action. Political culture and its 
study do not simply entail a description of meanings and intentions, but require us 
to get to grips with how they form a logic of practice, and direct the conduct of 
government. Political ends and cultural sensibilities are embedded in every penal 
dispensation. Examining punishment via political culture, as presented in this 
chapter, helps illuminate the multi-dimensional nature of imprisonment, which is a 
complex political and social institution. Moreover, it helps advance a comparative 
penology which can explain the cultural and political foundations which give rise to 
divergences in cross-national penal politics. 
 
This concept of political culture as being both embodied and enacted, practical and 
relational, will be used throughout the thesis to: (1) better understand penal politics, 
the kinds of ideas, techniques and meanings which constitute it; and (2) explain how 
imprisonment regimes acquire their particular routines, programmes, penal 
classifications and systems of control. Political culture is employed as a descriptive 
empirical category as well an explanatory one. With this interpretive conceptual 
framework, I offer a potentially better way to understand political culture and the 
ways in which it works to create and maintain imprisonment regimes. At the same 
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time, this framework provides the comparative lens necessary to explain the 
difference between cross-national imprisonment and penal politics. 
 
As a bounded concept, this allows us to track changes in political culture over time 
and observe how this affects imprisonment. However, conducting comparative 
sociology of punishment historically requires other specific methodological 













1. Introduction  
 
 
In Chapters Two and Three, a conceptual framework was sketched out for the 
analysis of comparative penality. This chapter proposes an approach to researching 
political culture and imprisonment regimes which, while being descriptive, 
comparative and explanatory, also takes an historical turn. By investigating politics 
and punishment over time – their changing form, categorisations, diagnoses of the 
crime and social problems – we can establish a fuller analysis of their 
correspondence. In addition, by pursuing these matters historically we can 
empirically establish the combination of historical processes, choices and events 
which underlie penal transformation.   
 
This chapter first introduces the two comparative sites, Ireland and Scotland. I 
highlight the most prominent and characteristic conventional wisdom which shapes 
historical understandings on punishment and penal politics in both jurisdictions. In 
a broader comparative view, I point out the way both countries have been side-lined 
in Anglophone criminological imagination. The limitations in these accounts are the 
justifications for a comparative and historical study of Ireland and Scotland in 
particular. Historical recovery is important for potentially correcting the historical 
record in both Ireland and Scotland and as a direct result, improving our analysis of 
Anglophone penal politics in the late twentieth century in general. 
 
The chapter then makes a shift into describing the usefulness of a number of 
methods: oral historiography, archival retrieval, interpretation and documentary 
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analysis. The thesis employs the critical archival work of Stoler (2002): What kind of 
form did governmental material take? Using Vaughn’s (2004) historical 
ethnography of the archives the thesis asks: what meanings did actors employ to 
make sense of their work? I draw on Loader (2006), Schalet (2011) and Girling et al 
(2000) in their respective uses of oral historiography and interviewing to reconstruct 
governmental dispositions: what were the eclectic logics and myriad views held by 
the agents of penal power? These methods are situated alongside Foucault’s (1977) 
interest in grounded practices: how was power exercised? As well as assembling 
tools for an historical comparative approach to political culture and punishment, the 
chapter also suggests means to tether the insider perspective of oral history and 
archival material within its social landscape (Hall et al 2013). To do this we must 
rely on pertinent secondary literature to expand our historical understanding of 
penal culture in both places. 
 
The chapter will also describe how I sought do this, namely, when and where the 
research took place, is braided into the relevant sections throughout this chapter. 
The final section outlines how these materials were analysed. Combined, these 
methods and tools provide a means whereby the thesis can draw an analytical line 
between political culture, social context and imprisonment. They provide the 
empirical base to track these changes over time and, as a result, develop a more 
comprehensive comparative and historical account of Irish and Scottish penal 
culture. 
 
2. Why Ireland and Scotland? 
 
Understanding comparative differences in political culture and imprisonment 
regimes, as I have set them out in the previous two chapters, requires a grounded 
context in which they can be explored and their differences understood. The 
empirical setting of this study is Ireland and Scotland from 1970 until 2000 in 




Why undertake this kind of inquiry in the English speaking west? The north 
Atlantic nations have been the base in which some of criminology’s key concepts 
have been produced, and there is a need to look elsewhere to extend these ideas and 
to reduce the epistemological inequalities in our knowledge production (Aas 2012; 
Lee and Laidler 2013). Even what is referred to as ‘Anglophone’ criminology might 
be better categorised as ‘North Atlantic’ criminology, as Aas (2012) does, given that 
it excludes post-colonial Anglophone sites (such as Singapore, India or Hong Kong, 
to name but a few). Cognisant of these inequalities, the thesis focuses its 
comparative lens on Ireland and Scotland for two important of reasons. The first is 
conceptual. The second and more prevailing rationale is empirical.  
 
The first priority was to reconsider and extend what we think of when we refer to 
Anglophone penality in the latter part of the twentieth century. Ireland and 
Scotland are rarely included in their own geo-political criminological context (e.g. 
Garland 2001; Pratt and Eriksson 2013; Whitman 2003; Lappi-Seppa ̈la ̈ 2008). Both 
Ireland and Scotland’s absence from what we imagine when we tend to discuss 
Anglophone, Western or European penal history diminishes the breadth and 
purchase of our analytical insight and, more critically, flattens our memory of 
punishment in this small part of the world. The source of this semi-exclusion does 
not just reside with those working outside Ireland and Scotland, however. Within 
both Ireland and Scotland, scholars entrench this separation. It has been argued that 
general trends and transformations in Anglophone crime control do not precisely 
mirror or explain Irish and Scottish penal trends, discursive shifts, historical forces 
and penal politics. Ireland and Scotland, implicitly or explicitly, are presented as 
‘exceptional’, with the term ‘Hibernian exceptionalism’ gaining some traction in 
recent years (Hamilton 2016; Griffith and O’Donnell 2012; in Scotland see Duff and 
Hutton 1999; McAra 2008). Thus, by omission, but sometimes by design, scholars 
present these two north Atlantic countries as largely outwith general patterns of 
penal transformation in the late twentieth century. At the very least, an historical 
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investigation of these two jurisdictions may expand the historical horizon of this 
geo-political territory.  
 
Secondly, is the matter of historical recovery. Imprisonment and penal politics in the 
late twentieth century in both Ireland and Scotland have been subject to only 
marginal historical investigation. Consequently, there are lacunae in what we can 
say we know about these places. This thesis aims to use historical and sociological 
research strategies to fill the historical gaps in both jurisdictions.  
 
To provide a backdrop for the claims made in substantive chapters of this thesis I 
briefly outline the most prominent criminological conventions regarding the 
contemporary penal history, first, of Ireland and then of Scotland. 
 
Ireland 
Until the turn of the twenty first century criminology was described as Ireland’s 
‘absentee discipline’. That is certainly no longer the case and the historical research 
field has expanded to allow an established history of penality to develop which 
tends to have the following assertions:  
 
Irish political culture has been characterised by an ideological vacuum: The single most 
dogmatic narrative in Irish penal historiography is that the Department of Justice, 
the Irish ‘penal state’ (Garland 2013), totally lacked in ideology, principles or 
philosophy, essentially operating in a ‘vacuum’ (Rogan 2011, 2012; O’Donnell 2005; 
Hamilton 2014b; Griffin and O’Donnell 2012). Instead, it is argued, Irish civil 
servants engaged policy with what Rogan has referred to as ‘gut instinct’, 
‘ignorance…or on nothing particularly substantial at all’, making it all but 
impossible to discern any principles in Irish penal policy (Rogan 2012:306). 
Kilcommins et al (2004:292-293) make this most explicit when they assert that a 
‘culture of control’, for instance, is replete with characteristic political rhetorical 
claims around crime control matters, and thus an interested and attentive observer 
	
77 
is made aware of the moral principles upon which punishment rests. They write 
that ‘In the Irish case, the hope for such clarity is defused by the imperative to 
respond’ and that ‘Irish penal practice is rarely supported by reference to a set of 
clear principles’. In lieu of political principles, Irish penal policy, it is claimed, was 
led by rational pragmatism.  
 
We need a corrective to this charge of ignorance and absence in Irish political 
culture. No decision is ever merely pragmatic – even the most baldly 
straightforward choice is in fact a constellation of ‘principled positions often 
unintelligible to their promoters’ (Freeden 1996:18). To understand what civil 
servants thought and did about prisons, the problems they raised, the solutions they 
had to choose from, we must think of them as socially situated actors with a taken-
for-granted know-how that can be revealed through a close reading of historical 
materials.  
 
Irish penal politics was epitomised by crisis management: From 1970 prisoner numbers 
began to rise beyond capacity levels the government had no choice but to release 
prisoners or build prisons to maintain enough space. From 1970 into the 1980s 
imprisonment has been characterise as an unimaginative and pragmatic supply and 
demand mentality. Pressure upon prison space was acute (Kilcommins et al 2004) 
and the government continued to lack a ‘forward-looking approach’ (Rogan 
2011:212). While this outlines the difficult context in which the government and the 
prison operated, and critiques an absence of innovation, these accounts do not 
clarify the substance of those penal choices and their permissibility. 
 
Penal policy change in Ireland in the late twentieth century has been led by ministerial 
interest, without this policy has stagnated: This has been put most forcefully by 
O’Donnell (2008), who describes the era from the 1970s until the mid-1990s in 
Ireland as one defined by ‘stagnation and change’. ‘Stagnation’ has been taken-up 
by other researchers who argue that it was the central feature of Irish prison policy 
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history (Rogan 2011; Hamilton 2014b; O’Mahony 1993). It is easy to show that 
formal or programmatic policy in Ireland was largely inert from 1970. Apart from 
the annual prison reports, it was not until the 1990s that any prison policy 
documents were produced. Unlike their counterparts in Westminster, Irish Justice 
Ministers rarely made political capital out of punishment. But when they did it 
came with great consequence (Rogan 2011; O’Donnell and O’Sullivan 2001). 
However, it would be a mistake to look only to publications and ministerial 
statements as evidence of governmental activity and penal practice. Prisons operate 
on a 24/7 cycle; they require constant oversight, maintenance and adjustment. When 
we use history to illuminate only penal transformation we truncate the past, skirting 
over the history of penal reproduction. The government are always working on 
prisons - if little changes then our questions should instead be concerned to recover 
what sorts of prison order and kinds of regimes the government sought to maintain 
and perpetuate? Prisons have also endured historically, their programmes will 
likely have adapted in subtle ways to reflect new demands of a changing social 
context, whether or not that is stated in policy documents. The absence of policy 
documents does however beg questions about Irish political culture rather than 
Irish prison practice, a distinction that is better addressed when both issues are 
made more discrete, as they are throughout this thesis. 
  
Rehabilitation only existed at the rhetorical rather than practical level: One of the major 
points of distinction between Ireland and other Anglophone nations was that Irish 
pragmatism, combined with the absence of ideologies, meant that corrective and 
rehabilitative policies never animated Irish prison regimes (Kilcommins et al 
2004:287). But as rehabilitation waned elsewhere in the 1970s (Garland 2001) Ireland 
began to employ the rhetoric of rehabilitation, though it did little more than mark a 
discursive shift in legislation (Rogan 2011). This is a point of distinction about the 
Irish penal story that is of clear importance, but this unfortunately does not 
represent a satisfying conclusion. If Irish prisons did not treat or cure, then in what 
ways were people imprisoned? What sorts of programmes and regimes were 
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prisoners subject to? What expectations were made of prisoners, prisons and the 
government? These are significant questions that remain to be answered and would 
yield new insights if subject to a fuller historical recovery and a more searching 
social analysis.  
 
Scotland 
Scotland, unlike Ireland, has enjoyed a longer established history of criminology 
(McAra 2008), and yet there has been curiously little engagement with penal history. 
That said, however, there is still a strong sense of Scotland’s penal past, but its basis 
in systematic historical research is open to doubt.  
 
Scotland remained a paragon of penal welfarism: The Scottish Office, where the civil 
service was based, was said to have been imbued with a strong welfarist ethos 
which shaped the wide vista of penal policy (McAra 1999; Croall 2006: Tata 2010; 
Hamilton 2014b). When the rest of the UK saw a rise of penal populism, penal 
welfarism endured in Scotland. But the empirical foundation and historical 
consistency of these claims, in relation to the prison at least, are less than clearly 
established in the 1970s and 1980s, with McManus (1999:231) describing the impact 
of welfarism upon imprisonment as having been only ‘piecemeal’.  
 
Within the contemporaneous writing of the time there was an acknowledged 
harshness, a dichotomy in the character of Scottish punishment (Young 1997, 1999; 
Coyle 1991). Scotland has had historically high per capita imprisonment rates and 
the use of infamous sites of segregation (Sparks 2002). This historical dichotomy 
between welfarist Scotland and high and sometimes harsh use of imprisonment has 
never been fully reconciled. While others acknowledge that Scotland has always 
relied heavily upon imprisonment (which in other contexts is usually the proxy for 
penal harshness) it can be minimised as an historically anomalous trend in an 
otherwise generally welfarist tradition (Hamilton 2014b; 2014a). There are clear 
empirical gaps in these accounts of Scottish imprisonment and penal politics as 
	
80 
there has been very little sustained attention given to the historical shape, character 
and practices of Scottish imprisonment across this period.  
 
Scotland’s penality was defined by a distinctly Scottish cultural tradition: Following the 
welfarist argument, a reader familiarising themselves with the Scottish socio-legal 
context will also be confronted with claims that the Scottish criminal justice system 
can be characterised as: ‘England and Wales it isn’t!’ (Tata 2010). These kinds of 
statements refer as much to technical differences in the system as they do to 
something much more essential. Scotland is different. Its criminal justice culture 
reflects Scotland’s idiosyncratic civic identity as somewhere with an impregnable 
collective sense of fairness and communitarian values (Hamilton 2014b, 2013).  
 
As Cavadino and Dignan described the situation, Scotland has remained ‘relatively 
immune from the populist tendencies that were rapidly infecting its southern 
neighbour’ (2006:231). And while there is the evidence in the literature that 
Anglophone trends such as managerialism made inroads into Scottish criminal 
justice practice, these ideas have been adapted such that they reflected the Scottish 
welfarist sensibilities (McAra 1999). Therefore, unlike England and America, it is 
claimed, there was little evidence of a punitive shift in Scotland in the 1990s, where 
the distinct national culture buffered these negative forces (Smith and Young 1999; 
Duff and Hutton 1999; Hamilton 2014b).  
 
Such strong claims of national distinction remind us to avoid the coterminous 
claims that there is a British or UK penal policy. On an explanatory level these 
cultural assertions may make broad implicit sense, but there is very little detailed 
empirical work which identifies these distinct sets of cultural norms and social 
relations and maps their practical and patterned consequence upon Scotland’s 
prison system. The disjuncture in Scotland’s historical narrative suggest that there is 
a risk that those who were subject to penal interventions in the late twentieth 
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century have been ‘doubly marginalised’ (Delaney 2011:600).13 People who were 
first marginalised by the actual penal practice of social work support (Carlen 1983; 
Moore 1978). Then, arguably, they now risk further marginalisation by criminal 
justice scholars and criminologists who may unconsciously construct a historical 
and comparative Scottish penal welfare success story, in what E.P. Thompson once 
called the ‘enormous condescension of posterity’. 
 
History Still to be Written? 
For both Ireland and Scotland these conventional accounts do not feel satisfyingly 
complete or entirely persuasive. The kinds of descriptive demands and interpretive 
questions posed by imprisonment regimes and political culture would ask what 
kinds of prisons were built? What other ways were rises in prison numbers 
responded to? What sorts of meanings and intentions made some prison choices or 
decisions pragmatic? As of yet, we still do not have a thorough historical account of 
penality in either Ireland or Scotland from 1970. Within both the Irish and Scottish 
cases there are considerable lacunae in our historical knowledge of the shape of 
imprisonment, the character of penal politics and the forces that constituted it. This, 
I suggest, justifies focusing on the history of Ireland and Scotland while also 
developing the comparative penological project.  
 
Regarding the dates which frame these histories, both begin at the same point in 
time but end in different years. There is no clear analytical moment in which 
momentous change truly happens or historical origins can be identified, the point in 
which the study begins and ends its history must be chosen for theoretically and 
methodologically refined reasons. The thesis is limited to the latter part of the 
twentieth century for practical reasons of methods, particularly in conducting oral 
history and key actors still being alive. The initial rationale for the timeframe was 
inspired by the many prominent Anglophone sociology of punishment projects 
																																																						
13 Delaney writes that history which tracks the exceptionalism of a nation state can leave those who did not fit ‘in a 
curious state of purgatory’ (2011:600). 
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which have persuasively identified the 1970s until the 1990s as a period of change 
and sometimes volatile penal transformation (Garland 2001; Pratt et al 2005; 
Wacquant 2009a; Loader 2006; Bottoms 1995; Feeley and Simon 1992; Simon 2007; 
O’Malley 1999; Liebling assisted by Arnold 2004; Newburn 2007; Young 1999).14 For 
valid and well-founded reasons, some scholars oppose the emphasis on the 1970s as 
mistaken because it implies a critical and artificial break in history (Gottschalk 2006; 
Barker 2009; Goodman et al 2015). However, I broadly accept that this decade 
marked the beginning of a process of a change in contemporary history, though not 
one that was an historical rupture (Zedner 2002), which continued (albeit it an an 
uneven pace) into the 1990s.  
 
The reasons for the different end dates is more empirical and emerged through the 
research process. 1998 was the initially proposed end-date. But it transpired that 
penal change in Ireland came to fruition, or was at least more settled, by 1999.  To 
more fully map the form those changes took required some additional years so that 
the trajectory of the analysis and narrative did not feel truncated. The account of 
Scotland ends in 1995 as the major penal changes which took place were more 
established by that time. Scotland gained a devolved parliament in 1998 (which had 
been the original reason for limiting the study to that year), significantly altering the 
political context. To look at the penal issues thereafter would require a longer 
perspective to track their evolution and would bring the study of Scotland closer to 
the present day. Bringing the study from the 1970s to our contemporary time would 
minimise the descriptive and analytical depth of the late twentieth century history. 
Having less years to cover allows for a more grounded detailed and a continuous 
chronological history, which avoids depicting penal change in dramatic epochs. For 
these reasons I forgo some of the academic neatness and symmetry of beginning 
and ending at the same year and instead allow for a more organic conclusion. 
 
																																																						




3. History and Penal Change   
 
While this thesis is avowedly historical rather than a history of the present (Hinton 
2016; Garland 2001), we still must be careful about how we extend the claims of 
historical causality. While punishment may be the product of entrenched cultural 
history Mary Douglas warned that we should not ‘wheel in culture’ in a way which 
implies it ‘works because of what it can say implicitly, drawing upon the reserves of 
understanding’ (1992:167), and the same cautionary critique can be directed at 
assertions of historical legacy. Convincing claims of essential foundational cultural 
legacies and historical contingency (Hamilton 2014b; Tonry 2007b; Whitman 2003; 
Pratt 2008; Pratt and Eriksson 2013) are best explored and substantiated through 
grounded and sustained historical research which establishes cultural narratives via 
meanings-in-use and follows their practical evolution across time. In addition, such 
a project is not an end in and of itself; we must the identify mechanisms and process 
through which meaning is attached to action and translated into routine penal 
practices. In doing so we can avoid over-emphasising the historical legacy of penal 
outcomes.  
 
Rubin has remarked that penal changes are ‘less a product of their times than the 
result of years, decades, or even centuries of thought and experience’ (Rubin 
2017:2). However, this is only partially true. Penal practices and political culture 
evolve and always adapt to their ‘contemporary habitat’ (Garland 2010:18). Political 
actions are also made in reference to the contemporary situations and extant 
anxieties which confront governments. To think historically about political culture 
is to explore how pre-existing meanings and present predicaments coalesce in the 
activities of government and shape new material and cultural outcomes. Moreover, 
if there are dramatic changes in contemporary social and political forces, or there 
are significant events, we will likely see imprisonment and the penal state 




But this is not to dismiss historical contingency, only to provide a slightly more 
nuanced way to research and account for what is historically contingent and what is 
contemporary. The long-term perspective is particularly useful in this respect. It 
yields greater empirical depth and allows us to make better assessments of what is 
novel and innovative in penal practice in times of penal change, and identify what is 
inherited or modified for new practical circumstances. To research the evolution of 
penal practices over the time-frame of the late twentieth century will temper our 
ability to find either historical ruptures or historical determinism.  
 
The penal transformations that occurred in Ireland and Scotland in the 1990s (Rogan 
2011; O’Donnell and O’Sullivan 2001; McAra 1999; Coyle 1992) can be reassessed in 
light of a proper account of the immediately preceding decades. Assessments of 
what was lost and what was gained in moments of transformation may change 
when viewed through the historical lens. Furthermore, in understanding these 
historical social, political and cultural forces we will better understand what is at 
stake at moments when prisons and penal politics are subject to debate, dispute and 
transformation.  Comparatively, it will also be easier to assess how penal 
transformation differs between places, even if they may appear similar at the level 
of policy (Jones and Newburn 2002, 2005). How these historical comparative 
questions were researched is what we turn to next. 
 
4. Historical Sociology 
 
History in this thesis is therefore not considered only a ‘prelude’ to the present 
(Gottschalk 2006). Historical political culture and imprisonment studied herein are 
recovered as an enduring and perpetual present in which people lived. Following 
Bourdieu’s incitement to empirical recovery research must seek out ‘the deepest 
logic of the social world’ which can be recovered ‘only if one plunges into the 
particularity of an empirical reality, historically located and dated’ (Bourdieu 
1998:2). This study continually asks: what were the penal and political practices at 
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that time? Why were they deemed appropriate and possible? Have they changed? 
History is used here as a vehicle to recover and enliven the immediacies in which 
penal politics were experienced, rather than as an explanatory strategy to reveal the 
source of our present penal predicaments. To undertake an historical study which 
wishes to comparatively recover and reconstruct penal politics across the late 
twentieth century necessitates sources and analytical tools which can reveal the 
sensibilities, fears and hopes, social and political imagination, cultural criteria and 
ideological rationalities of political culture. The second aim of this thesis is to map 
the practical carceral consequences of political culture. This requires material which 
can similarly illuminate the forms and uses of imprisonment regimes. To achieve 
these demands, history was viewed ethnographically (Vaughn 2004), and I collected 
an array of diverse materials to support the historical reconstruction of penal 
politics from inside the penal state in ‘an attempt to elicit structure and culture’ 
(ibid.:321). These included oral history interviews, archival research and a 




Oral History Interviews 
 
To begin the process of historical recovery oral history interviews were conducted 
with (mainly retired) civil servants who had worked in the penal state or criminal 
justice in both jurisdictions. The interviews began in Scotland in January 2014, 
where I interviewed eleven people. They appear under the names Euan, Henry, 
Philip, Douglas, William, Alistair, Robert, Adam, Ken, Derek and Peter (see 
Appendix 1 for a note on anonymity). I made contact with the first interviewee by a 
fortuitous meeting at a conference, then a fairly brief google search led me to the 
contact details for a number of people whose names appeared in the archival 
material. Two respondents in particular did some advocating for me, and sent 
emails, on which I was cc’ed, to their former colleagues whom had been hard to 
	
86 
track down. Each interviewee signed a consent form (Appendix 1) and interviews 
lasted between 90 minutes and three hours and all were recorded and transcribed.  
 
The limits of this snowballing method confronted me early on as I interviewed two 
additional people who were considered to be of interest by others, but I found that 
their work had been too distant and thus their accounts too anecdotal. Having 
transcribed the interviews later I decided to accept that these had been “failed” and 
to leave them aside. However, looking back I would still advocate that it is usually 
useful to interview people who you are put in touch with. You are unlikely to know 
someone’s full CV trajectory and they might have had worked on penal matters in 
some other way which you might not have been previously aware of or could not 
have anticipated.   
 
In Ireland interviews were conducted across the summer of 2015 and one was 
arranged later in 2016. Conducting the fieldwork in Ireland I also relied initially on 
a snowballing method, as a former penal state civil servant whom I knew already 
put me in touch with his former colleagues who had remained friends. It became 
clear that this meant I was getting views from a small group who, while certainly 
not entirely aligned, I suspected were in broad agreement about what was good or 
bad about the past. I spent time seeking out a number of others whose names I had 
from the archives and who I could tell had been influential and/or in senior posts. 
The last interviewee in 2016, for example, had been hard to track down. I got in 
touch with one of the more senior of the interviewee cohort to ask for some advice 
or assistance. Upon hearing this predicament, he got in touch with the Department 
of Justice and told them to call this other former civil servant and ask them to call 
him. He then sent me an email to say that this other person was now expecting my 
call. A pre-existing friendly contact inside the Department of Justice put me in touch 
with other people who brought their own perspectives. In the end, I felt that I had 
managed to gather a greater variety of views. I conducted nine interviews, who are 
named here as Cormac, Jim, Liam, Seamus, Gerard, Pádraig, John, Tom and Niall. 
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Following the same format as I did in Scotland, all interviews lasted between 90 
minutes and three hours and all but one was recorded. The unrecorded one took 
place on a breezy cliff walk despite of my polite attempts to cajole them into a café 
(or really any location in which my dictaphone was not powerless). From this 
interview, I made immediate notes afterwards and while the interviewee did not 
sign a consent form he gave full oral consent to be quoted. 
 
In conducting interviews, I sought to follow the example set by Girling et al (2000) 
in Crime and Social Change in Middle England, looking at matters of punishment and 
politics intensively and in situ, as something empirically grounded, lived and 
expressed in relation to ordinary situations. Undertaking that task politically and 
historically Loader’s Fall of the Platonic Guardians (2006) advances the interviewing 
and research approach he employed with his collaborators in the Middle England 
project and wrote about elsewhere with Sparks (2004). People often reference 
Loader’s Fall of the Platonic Guardians for its findings but rarely copy how he 
achieved its insights via in-depth qualitative interviews (a point about methods 
Loader pointedly identified as being critical). In those works, one sees the value of 
long digressionary interviews in which the interviewer understands that politics 
and penal sensibilities are not composed of fixed ideas, but are myriad and often 
contradictory. This, as seen in the previous chapter, is central to how political 
culture is conceived herein.  
 
Each interview conducted began with an inquiry about how they came to work in 
the civil service. This approach immediately de-intellectualised the interview, 
avoiding abstract or sociological questions which detached the interviewee from 
their lives (see Sacks quoted in Jefferson and Holloway 2000:35). This first response 
could go on for quite some time as people told me about their family background, 
their educational achievements or unrealised aspirations. It also elicited their first 
impressions of the civil service – their nervousness, mistakes they made, processes 
they did not understand. For example, one respondent told how much they hated 
	
88 
their first year in government and how long it took them to learn to speak civil 
service English. Others described to me their pride in working in the government 
and lessons they were given in their first days, all which later became valuable 
research evidence in reconstructing Irish and Scottish political culture. I always 
concluded by asking interviewees a more ‘appreciative’ question, usually what had 
been the best features or best memories of their work (Liebling 1992; Liebling et al 
1999; Liebling et al 2011). I did this because I wanted to hear what had kept them in 
those prison and criminal justice occupations, what motivated them in doing 
government work. Otherwise, the trajectory of the interview followed principles of 
practice from Holloway and Jefferson (2000:34-37). First, I used open-ended 
questions so as to track people’s sensibilities within their own ‘meaning-frames’ and 
how it related to their governmental life. Second, I sought their stories. These 
recollections also avoid abstraction and allowed respondents to use their own terms 
to describe events and routines. What did they do, how did they do it, how did they 
find it etc.? They explained what positions they were promoted to; the general order 
of their daily workload, how they did their work, how it changed and also how they 
felt about those changes. They told me gossipy titbits but also on occasion brought 
me into their confidence, they confessed as much as they defended. People spoke 
about contentious policy issues they supported or disdained about colleagues they 
respected, others they opposed (mainly privately and on occasion more formally). 
Third, I would try and use respondent’s own terminology in my responses. While I 
never brought a formal interview schedule I did have my notebook to jot down 
these words or points so I could come back to them later in the interview or use 
them as prompts to get them to carry on with a story. This has the advantage of 
curtailing the imposition of too much of my thinking upon their narrative. 
Therefore, avoiding the tempting menu of pre-set terms from criminology’s lexicon, 
such as ‘punitive’ or ‘lenient’ and avoided the temptation to ask respondents to 
reflect comparatively on why their country and penal arrangements were either 
greater or less than those elsewhere. Fourth, I relied on free association. In my 
notebook I also had jotted down a couple of the key moments that would have 
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occurred during their career, such as a new prison opening or a prison closing. If 
appropriate, I would ask what they recalled, what comes to mind? Though this 
could be followed by an inquiry about how directly they were involved or had 
experienced it. This way I heard about their concerns and aspirations regarding 
various changes. This means the interviewer should not interrupt to either 
investigate the relevance of the account or to move it along if it seems insignificant.  
 
Respondents spoke with emotion, recalling success as something enthralling, and 
remembered with relish attempts to improve punishment – though ideas of 
improvement both differed between Ireland and Scotland and changed overtime. 
Failures and fractious incidents were often summoned with expressions of pain, 
anger and panic as well as feelings of victory and success. Free association and 
personal stories allowed people to digress and switch between personal accounts 
and wider social narratives. Finally, at the end of each interview I summed up in a 
couple of words or short sentences what I understood the main thrust of what an 
interviewee had told me, identifying what I felt had been the key themes they 
described. This always yielded some extra and useful commentary. Interviewees 
would often respond enthusiastically, with ‘Yes!’, ‘Exactly!’, then expand a little 
further on the broader themes I had presented back to them. On one occasion a 
person who had provided a rather positive account retreated slightly, appearing a 
little regretful at this, having heard my summing-up and a feeling that perhaps he 
had over-remembered the good at the expense of the more troubling. That interview 
then continued for another hour in which more critical and contrasting stories and 
issues were recalled. 
 
This complexity reflects Mills (1959), insight that social structure can be observed at 
the intersection between history, society and biography. In her comparative study of 
culture and class, Lamont reflects that interviewing leads ‘the researcher towards 
the most appropriate analytical categories’ for comparing cultural life (Lamont 
1992:15). However, interviewees were not expected to be able to fully account or 
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‘understand completely their own actions’ (Holloway and Jefferson 2000:43; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
 
Engaging with penal politics through this kind of interview means the information 
being privileged is meaning, symbolism, rhetoric and explanation, not truth and 
facts. Both Bruner (1987) and Josselson (2004) have written that interviews do not 
serve the purposes of ontological verification; rather what we must do is use 
interpretive analysis to reveal their meaning. People’s stories provide thick 
descriptions of how they felt in conducting their work. Rather than judge them for 
their factual precision, then, we can consider them as providing vital illumination of 
their thinking, their construction of the penal problem, and the pattern of taken-for-
granted considerations which governed their actions (Portelli 1991; Schalet 2011). 
Interviews then are not about facts, but about the ‘social perception’ of those facts 
(Thompson 1978:96 quoted in Briggs 1986). Oral history deepens our understanding 
of government actors, guiding us towards what they ‘were concerned about, and 
committed to’, revealing their penal, cultural and political sensibilities (Loader 
2006:571).  
 
Oral history is often used as a means to give a more phenomenological quality to 
research, particularly potent in illuminating the lives of those whose voices and 
experiences have been marginalised by making big issues of policy, economics and 
politics the focal point of history (Thompson 1988). Such matters are regularly 
represented through aggregate statistics such as unemployment, population sizes, 
demography, crime figures and recidivism rates, for example. Thus the lived 
experience of the working class, the poor, women, people of colour and the 
imprisoned are all regularly marginalised in public policy and grand narrative 
history. The in-depth interview is seen as a critical method which can address the 
inequities in social representation (Presser and Sveinung 2015) and bridge the gap 
between normative criminological theory and the lived experience of punishment 
(Schinkel 2014; Nugent and Schinkel 2016). However, I suggest that a similar 
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problem of abstraction surrounds how government tends to be represented in 
criminology, as highlighted in the previous chapter. Moreover, criminal justice 
officials in government are not often sympathetic figures in such accounts. They 
make policies we might oppose, fail to produce penal changes that we might deem 
more humane and can make vitriolic pronouncements and stoke public fears. I do 
not propose to make government officials sympathetic, however, but hope to 
develop an account of political culture which bases its analytical assessments on a 
willingness to try and understand it from their point of view (Skinner 2002:6); using 
oral history as a tool to yield insight into the lived experience of doing political 
work and thus reveal something of the broader nature of government. In doing so I 
try and address a gap in punishment and society identified by Liebling when she 
asked: ‘Why is sympathy reserved for the offender and denied to those who 
(sometimes in good faith) work in criminal justice, with their own lives, stories, 
pains, motives and understandings ...?’ (2001: 476). As Thompson has written, ‘Oral 
history by contrast makes a much fairer trial possible…It provides a more realistic 
and fair reconstruction of the past, a challenge to the established account’ (1988:6). 
This generosity should not be mistaken as ‘indulgence’. This more charitable 
sociological approach allows for a fuller historical reconstruction and provides 
stronger grounding from which to build both critique and comparison (Bourdieu 
2000:61). It is a humane and qualitative way to recover the past, to think about penal 
politics and political culture and what it is we mean when we draw on these terms 





To make the critical link between culture and practice required an additional 
empirical base. As already stated, interviews were not conducted as fact-gathering, 
but to gain historical insight into political subjectivities – how people thought, 
discussed and constituted penal subjects and objectives. But when we are dealing 
with matters of punishment and the deprivation of liberty in particular, this also 
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seemed like an exciting place to begin to explore how culture affects action (Swidler 
2001). What sort of material consequences were wrought upon punishment by Irish 
and Scottish political culture? Also, at the very least, I found myself craving some 
facts, like timelines of key events and a chronological narrative to foreground the 
interviews. Moreover, what had become clear during the initial stages of the PhD 
was the absence of contemporary prison and political history in Scottish and Irish 
criminology. In addition, I had seen how secondary readings of Scottish 
criminology now perpetuated the idea of Scottish penal welfarism, and perhaps in 
each re-telling expanded its borders (e.g. McNeil 2004; Croall 2006; Hamilton 2014b; 
Halliday et al 2009).  
 
This demanded a return to the source of this evidence and in order to generate my 
own data and questions in a more detailed historical recovery (Loader and Sparks 
2004): fundamentally, this required original archival fieldwork. I went to the 
National Records in Edinburgh in spring 2014. In the same year I contacted the 
Scottish Prison Service to arrange access to their files. I completed an ethics form 
(see Appendix 1) which was quickly approved. There, I had access to several large 
filing cabinets containing notes, letters and drafts from the 1990s which had been 
largely untouched. The Irish leg of the archival work did not begin until summer 
2015 when I went to the Irish National Archives in Dublin to begin the process over 
again. In both locations, I searched the on-line catalogues for any documents I could 
retrieve regarding ‘punishment’, ‘prison’, ‘offender’, files on individual prisons and 
any Prison Division and Department of Justice files. Ireland, however, has a 30-year 
rule on government files so I could only access files up until 1985, and for various 
reasons of administration at the archives a number of Department of Justice files 
from 1985 had been temporarily removed from circulation. However, a contact 
inside the Department of Justice who was supportive of the project arranged for me 
to visit the Prison Division for three days. They retrieved some files from storage 
they thought might be relevant as they pertained to the later period of the 1980s. 
Numerous files and boxes were set up in a boardroom for me. While I sifted 
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through them, a civil servant (who was not a junior member of staff and certainly 
had much better things to do) had to sit at the other end of the boardroom table 
each day for the full day, a standard precaution on such occasions in the 
Department. Also, thanks to other Irish interviewees who were willing to share their 
spoils of retirement with me, I also rooted through a few attics and found material, 
particularly minutes and report drafts from the 1980s as well as one unpublished 
autobiography by a former Irish Department of Justice civil servant, all of which 
were otherwise unavailable to me. The statutory restrictions are obviously an 
unavoidable limitation on the Irish archival material from the 1990s, and future 
research in the late 2020s will be able to assess and refine my claims about this 
period.  
 
In undertaking this archival approach to history, I read and photographed memos, 
meeting minutes, letters, press releases, unpublished working group reports, inter-
departmental communications, standing orders, any pertinent marginalia, research 
trip reports, organisational maps, and on one occasion some unfulfilled prison blue 
prints. There were also a number of valuable unpublished research reports and 
notes, several of which have not been analysed before as far as I am aware. 
 
Government work is largely publicly communicated via documents, such as policy 
reports, green papers, white papers, accounts, press releases. Government work is 
also internally conducted using memos, minutes, notes and letters. These archival 
documents are not ‘neutral or innocent’ (Manoff 2004:14), seemingly objective 
numbers and statistics are representative interpretations from the political culture. 
Also, official material, such as minutes, written by a notary, present an officially 
acceptable and formalised account of a meeting. Despite these reservations, these 
materials are widely used in history and have been shown to ‘open a window onto 
the minds, emotions, and experiences’ of those they are reporting on, and illuminate 
prevailing ‘cultural mentalities’ (Kounine 2017:220). With this in mind, I approached 
reading archival documents in a similar way to the interviews and the transcripts. 
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What was it they identified as problems? What resources did they use in addressing 
these matters? What did they aspire to do? Who was involved in management and 
decision-making – with what express or implied expectations?  
 
While remaining cognisant that archival material and government reports are 
constructed within a particular set of power relations – and that these 
representations and distortions are what should be interpreted, not their accuracy 
(Stoler 2002; Manoff 2004; LaCapra 1985) – it would be a mistake to deny the factual 
material that is also within the archives. The archives have been subject to 
‘postmodern scepticism’ (Bradley 1999:119), but the archive does give access to 
facts, such as dates and times, names, department titles and office addresses. Who 
constituted the penal state and where it was (which turns out to not have been 
inconsequential), could also be more easily mapped and tracked through archival 
material.  
 
Documents are therefore a vital resource in reassembling the political culture and 
imprisonment regimes that prevailed from 1970 in Ireland and Scotland. With this 
material, the research also began to take on a chronological shape. Propelled by the 
desire for historical insights I decided to forgo a more particular focus on the 
landmark moments of change. Instead the history of the entire period was 
conducted in the mode of a grounded researcher, allowing the sum of the findings, 
argument and conceptualizations to be ‘discovered, developed, and provisionally 
verified through systematic data collection’ (Strauss and Corbin 1990:23).  Barker 
proposes that this long-term perspective provides a more thoroughgoing way to 
research comparative penal politics as ‘the work of governance is made up of 
ongoing activity, small moments: small movements, repetitious and mundane’ 
(2006:7). The study of history here is thus undertaken as the study of both social 




The welter of documents and sheaves of paper together provided the first 
transportation back to the inner-world of the penal state, like the process of 
becoming fluent in the thinking of another time. It has to be said, on occasion the 
archives can be monotonous, because office work can be mundane. When a 
particularly vivid, snappy or cutting comment appears it is unbelievably refreshing 
for the parched mind. However, to take seriously the routine and ordinary, 
reconstructing what constituted that normal order of things means one must resist 
the allure of hit and run sound-bites and ‘anecdotalism’ in lieu of analysis (Bryman 
1988). Historical materials and transcripts can be read for their ‘regularities, for its 
logic of recall, for its densities and distributions, for its consistencies of 
misinformation, omission, and mistake’ (Stoler 2002:100), capturing the dimensions 
of political culture. To read the archival material ‘is to pause at, rather than bypass, 
its conventions, those practices that make up its unspoken order, its rubrics of 
organization, its rules of placement and reference’ (ibid.:103). 
 
To try and develop an understanding of the archival material during the data 
gathering period I wrote ‘theoretical memos’ (Corbin and Strauss 1990:421). On one 
occasion when going back over journal notes made at the end of an archive day and 
after interviews, one prominent repetitive matter emerged: ‘the prison’ is not the 
same. The system contained so many kinds of prison, and those prisons were spoken 
about differently; their functions varied depending on the kind of prisoner 
presumed to be held there. This is a lesson so obvious to anyone interested in the 
sociology of imprisonment that it is almost embarrassing to describe it as an insight. 
But from the comparative perspective, this returned me to the belief that for culture 
to have a useful purpose for the study of penal politics it had to be clearly and 
explicitly connected to action (Garland 2006). By recovering different kinds of 
political cultures, can comparative penology also explain the different kinds of 
imprisonment between, but also within, Ireland and Scotland? This revealed a huge 
gap in the comparative penology literature. The prison was regularly compared at 
the quantified level, using mixed inventories of penal stuff to show how different or 
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exceptional a place was or is (Tonry 2001a, 2001b, 2007; Hamilton 2014b; Cavadino 
and Dignan 2006) or relying on a mixture of both of these approaches with the 
addition of observation (Pratt and Eriksson 2013); a prison system is often a black 
box in comparative research. As a result of this realisation, I returned to the national 
libraries in Dublin and Edinburgh in early 2016 to re-read all of the Annual Prison 
Reports and official publications to develop a more precise map of what came to be 
called the imprisonment regimes. This material provided information on 
imprisonment regimes: what prisons, how many, serving what function, 
fluctuations and increases in the number of prisoners, the number of prisons, 
changes in a prison regime, increase or decrease in access to certain programmes of 
work, education or parole and release.  
 
There is obviously a persistent overlap between these sources of information 
regarding imprisonment regimes and political culture. Using these methods, this 
thesis builds an historical and sociological account of government and an 
institutional account of imprisonment. Imprisonment regimes are an ‘analytical and 
expositional device’ (Garland 1985:x) and the prisoner here appears only through 
the eyes of those in the penal state. To compare prison regimes cross-nationally 
requires a slightly broader canvas if we are to understand the imperatives and aims 
behind each prison and how the system operates. We better grasp a prison’s 
function if we understand how it fits into its national network of incarceration. 
Additionally, those decisions are made by government officials, and yet we have 
very few comparative studies of prison systems and sociological accounts of 
government (though see Downes 1988 and Barker 2009). Thus, the thesis makes no 
claims to represent the prisoners’ experience of imprisonment. I try to be careful not 
to overemphasis official government records as ‘firm evidence’ of imprisonment, 
but see those accounts instead as reflective of what government’s were trying to 
accomplish (Atkinson & Coffey 1997:47). However, these issues are also not 
mutually exclusive. Who political agents believe prisoners to be informs the shape 
and use of imprisonment, its punitive force and supportive regimes, and thus 
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informs how prisoners experience prison. An oral history of the perspectives of Irish 
and Scottish prisoners could complement or extend this work and presents future 
avenues of development from this project. 
 
The documents used here to research Ireland and Scotland thus include publicly 
available parliamentary debates, annual prison reports, crime control and penal 
policy documents. When relevant, supporting political statements from ministers 
are also included. Though often these have been elevated as epoch defining in the 
history of imprisonment (e.g. ‘Prison Works!’, ‘Zero Tolerance’). These ministerial 
moments can be given a not always justified causal weight, which can ultimately 
impoverish our understanding of government and its intersection with cultural and 
social forces. The political leader occupies a major and influential role in the penal 
state, but they do not hold all of the penal power. History of the kind outlined here 
is fuller in the sense Thompson imagined (1988:21), as it does not focus only on 
insights from ‘leaders, but from the unknown majority of people’ inside 
government. As suggested in the previous chapter, ministerial actions are tethered 
to the political culture; however, they hold one powerful position in a network of 
circulating power, ideas and people. The research design as it evolved was an 
attempt to take forward, through evidence, an understanding of the government 
that is less top-down, a collection of mavericks, villains and named individuals. 
Instead government was researched as something which has its own perpetuating 
‘force field’ – to borrow a metaphor from Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) – 
with its own logic and regularities. Any use of those critical political statements 
must be copper-fastened to that political cultural context.  
 
Extractive and Interpretive 
The formal political document is not merely a ledger of information, and to 
reconstruct the past, specifically through publicly available publications, we must 
see the documents and reports also as artefacts of political culture, products of their 
practice. The annual report is precisely where political culture and the 
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imprisonment regime are regularly reiterated – and as a result, the annual report 
receives a renewed prominence in this analysis. Annual reports produce as much as 
they record, in reporting the system it contributes to its political ‘ethos’ (Hacking 
1985:169), they are among the key assets a government has to establish its agenda 
and authority. Political culture, as was outlined throughout the previous chapter, is 
not hidden, it is embedded in every aspect of administration – it is the world of 
meaning, categories and rationalities which actors act within and reproduce. And 
while publications for public circulation, such as the annual report, will be 
organised in a way which has a certain acceptable tone and careful omissions, 
perhaps over emphasising success or downplaying problems, those are the 
narratives which need to analysed to reveal culture and intention. 
 
Annual reports are the practical legacy of political culture. They are historical 
artefacts from which intentions and ideational forces behind penal practices can be 
inferred. Facts are inseparable from representation; the most pragmatic decision is 
also always meaningful (Garland 1990b). For comparative and analytical purposes 
this means we must read routine documents, texts and governing practices as 
carriers of political rationale and not just depositories of factual information to be 
mined. How are prisons reported, for example? Using annual reports? How are 
those annual reports framed? Do they rely on storied narrative, audit overview, 
business reports etc.? How are problems reported and successes disclosed? Or are 
financial and capital spending documents the main avenue of reportage? Are 
prisons rendered public via population surveys, and if yes, what measures are used 
to frame and calculate those penal subjects? How are prisoners made visible: as 
customers, risky, dangerousness, or as patients with needs or vulnerabilities? 
Documents and reports are profiles and enactments of government, mapping them 
empirically can evidence the character of governmental thinking, its aims and 
objectives in relation to prisons. Undertaking a task such as this comparatively can 
begin to better denaturalise punishment and uncover government’s banal routine 
practices, illuminating the edges of penal acceptability and rectitude, finding the 
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outer limits of political permissibility. The annual report implements political 
culture through categories and diagnosis, which are then fundamental techniques in 
structuring and maintaining imprisonment regimes (Foucault 1977; Freeman and 
Maybin 2011). The welter of documents – be they public and private, routine and 
momentous – represent the making of penal taxonomies, codified beliefs, the 
construction of facts, clusters of moral codes, the preservation of penal authority 
and the affirmation of the national prison narrative (Stoler 2002:91).  
 
 
The Political Life of the Policy Document 
 
Annual reports and policy papers also serve political as well as penal ends, 
therefore. The historical perspective reveals the necessity for a further interpretive 
angle on the formal document, one that looks at its character and form. The 
document can be taken seriously as both a declaration and a material representation 
of state power – a process I interpret in two ways.  
 
First, while the penal policy document is ubiquitous feature in contemporary Irish 
and Scottish political life this governmental practice should not be presumed to 
have been an omnipresent political technique. Indeed, if there is one core general 
message history can demonstrate is that ‘we should take nothing for granted’ 
(Dobbins 1994:140). Changes in Irish and Scottish political culture can also be traced 
by pursuing the evolution of the ‘print culture’ of the penal state (Eisenstein 1980). 
We might say that the flood of documents we see from governments these days on 
penal policy, evidence-based policy, financial reviews and strategies are a 
particularly hyper print culture, which can be interpreted as one clue as to the 
character of political culture. Transformations in the frequency of governmental 
print culture, therefore, can be interpreted as a reflection of changing political 
practice. What is the character of the print culture which communicates matters of 
prisons and penal authority to the public? How often, and with what kinds of 
standardised regularity, does the government publish reports and documents? Does 
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public material increase over the years? If yes, what new strategic ends does that 
print culture serve? What public demands doe sit seek to address/ What changes in 
the character of governmental authority does it represent? Thinking about the 
augmented way in which political culture is disseminated, the evolution of political 
print culture opens up a new space to consider how the power to punish was 
deployed and how it transformed from 1970. For example, in Irish criminological 
scholarship, the ‘vacuum’ argument outlined above tends to rest on the absence of 
prison policy documents from the Department of Justice until the 1990s. The 
archive, however, can reveal policy documents and research reports which were 
produced but never published, instead they were circulated in-house. Using both 
the archives and the publicly published documents means we can better track the 
changing nature of Irish and Scottish political print culture. This methodological 
approach, taking print culture as evidence, means we may develop a less 
pessimistic reading of the past, potentially drawing analytical correspondence 
between public and confidential political print culture, seeing this as evidence of 
political culture rather than – as others have mistakenly read it – as an absence of 
political culture or principles (Rogan 2011; Kilcommins et al 2004) or as an 
uninterrupted continuation of historical penal practices (Croall 2006; Halliday et al 
2009; McAra 1999). 
 
Secondly, what form does the policy document take and how does this change? The 
policy document also serves to enforce (or at least attempts to do so) an image of the 
state. The policy report may be a relatively standard feature of modern 
governments, but how it looks and the order it takes will not have been static across 
the twentieth century. This analytical perspective is perhaps more obvious in 
longitudinal historical research, yet it has been rarely done in historical criminology. 
While we may mine reports for content and concepts, as part of the historical 
recovery, the material form of official documents is seen as a site of state power and 
production. By form I mean size, paper, how standardised these things are across 
the years. The document’s form can embed the image of the state into social life, 
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suggesting, to paraphrase Godson, who researched the proliferation in Catholic 
material culture in nineteenth century Ireland (2015:1), creating a new uniform 
image for documents may have been significant in regularising political expression 
and demonstrating new understandings of political authority.  
 
Following the changing print culture and material form of these ‘policy products’ 
(Souhami 2014) –  their size, standardised order, paper and prevalence – the 
document can be critically reinterpreted as a product of the political process. It is a 
material object required to propagate, disseminate and standardise political and 
penal authority. While still using reports as sources of both prison facts and cultural 
insight, this thesis, following Stoler’s (2002) general point, also engages with the 
publication-as-subject, in which the paper trails of government are sites of political 
cultural production (to paraphrase Stoler 2002:87). Reports and policy documents as 
government acts are attempts to express and thus entrench political power, culture 
and identity. The character of the print culture and form of the documents mean we 
can interrogate the historical process of political knowledge production. In sum, 
documents are ‘monuments of states as well as sites of state ethnography’ (ibid.:90).  
 
This may seem a slightly left-field approach to archival material that is interested in 
creative analysis for its own sake, but that could not be further from the case. When 
sourcing and looking at these publications from across a longer period of time and 
between two different political contexts, changes and contrasts in the documentary 
form physically display transformation in political culture. This added important 
empirical support to the reconstruction of political practice. Political culture is 
communicated, it is in public dialogue, it must be represented. Taking the 
documents’ material and narrative form seriously, as dimensions of the historical 
sociological research strategy, allows further access to what is being represented, 
gaininf insights into changing visions of political order and uses of authority. By 
extending our analytical eye to include new and changing forms of political print 
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The critical relationship between political culture and imprisonment regimes are 
researched in empirical detail in this thesis. A history of the kind proposed above 
must be grounded in evidence but also, as Braun and Clarke wrote (2006:94), 
succeed in going beyond description of the themes and fully analyse data in its 
wider social and cultural context. Here we must make a scale shift, situating the 
currents, thinking and actions of political culture and practices of imprisonment 
within the social dynamics which supported and conditioned them. Hall et al (2013) 
employed this perspective to powerful critical and empirical effect. They wrote that 
if we want to recover and know a social world, we may begin by ‘reading masses of 
secondary material in the form of books, articles and commentaries’, which while 
not participant observation is still informed by an ethnographic sensibility (Hall et 
al 2013: xi-xii). We should research ‘concrete events, practices, relationships and 
cultures’ by also ‘locating them in the histories taking place behind all our backs’ 
(ibid.). Following this example, while studying the fabric of government through 
documents, archives and oral historiography, I aimed to do so without neglecting 
the social context from which penality draws its force and urgency. Finding 
connections between changes in the penal state and imprisonment is fruitfully 
supplemented by a ‘break out’ from the narrower empirical focus (Skocpol 1987:27), 
and employing a wider perspective which links structural transformations to lived 
experience of penal politics.  
 
The prison is fundamentally a social institution and a form of social control (though 
how that manifests in practice is dependent upon the political actions which 
support and produce it). The prison thus should be identified in its relationship to 
other social forms which give it its sense of necessity, imperative and distinctive role 
in society. This sociological historical perspective shows that ‘crises in penality do 
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not arise primarily from the internal problems of punishing offenders but from 
transformations in social and political structures’ (Simon 1993:5). In conducting the 
analysis in tandem with the secondary literature I followed the complementary 
agendas set out by Garland (1990a, 1990b) and Carlen (1983) in the sociology of 
punishment and Vaughn’s (2004) archival research. Combined, these perspectives 
suggest that social meanings, political intentions, and cultural resonances are often 
submerged and rationalised into the working patterns of the prison. The job of a 
sociologist of punishment is to interpret those diverse strategies to reveal their 
embedded sources of common-sense and rationality. Using historical material, the 
researcher can also ‘track’ actions and the attendant ‘cultural constructions’ of their 
supporting ideas, prerogatives and meaning-making to wider structural matters 
(Vaughn 2004:321-322). 
 
An example of these qualitative methods and analysis done in a rigorous 
comparative way can be seen in the work of Amy Schalet (2006), who researched 
differences in the parenting styles of Dutch and American families, particularly with 
regards to their adolescent children’s burgeoning sexuality. Using interviews with 
parents and their children, Schalet reveals the different ways parents police, chastise 
and govern these most intimate and fragile familial relations. By listening and 
analysing people’s own words and understanding that those words are tied to 
wider social, political and cultural concepts, Schalet discloses a much bigger story 
about the relationship between our domestic rules, our desires for orderliness on the 
personal level, and the social order and political system which we inhabit. American 
parents ‘dramatized’ approach to sex education was conditioned by cultural and 
political ideas of American volunteerism, individualism, and was further curtailed 
by the limited character of the American welfare state. Their Dutch counterparts’ 
‘normalising’ style was informed by a consensual sense of collective principles and 
supported and reinforced by a more extensive welfare provision. Though different 
situated cultures may use generic words – parenting, governing, rehabilitating, 
modernising – what each of these mean will be freighted with its own local 
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meanings and distinct social resonance.  It is a means of explaining cross-national 
differences by showing, as Mills did, how our personal troubles reflect public 
problems. 
 
Following the examples of Schalet and Hall et al, analysing and explaining changes 
in imprisonment and the character of penal politics therefore must also look to the 
social grounding that conditions ideas and expectations of state intervention, and 
generates new demands for imprisonment. Throughout the substantive chapters 
that follow, the insider perspective of the historical ethnography is woven together 
with secondary data and government reports. These illuminate the shifting 
quantities and forms of such issues as crime, employment, family structure, class, 
demographics, emigration, economics, religion, political dissent, social 
discrimination etc. when they are directly relevant. The social frame allows us to 
locate some sources of change that exist beyond the struggles and administrative 
patterns of the prison administration. In addition, examining social order within the 
longer trajectory of historical social change provided both new explanations and 
improved assessments of penal transformation. We should never forget that 
political demands made of imprisonment do not only reflect matters of crime and 
punishment, but their shifting place in wider cultural sensibilities. Set in the wider 
social topography and longer historical trajectory, we might see, for example, that 
negative or more punitive prison practices can in fact be the result of more generally 
positive or progressive social changes, and vice versa.  
 
 
5. Analysis of the Data 
	
Chapters Two and Three outlined the interpretive comparative framework of 
imprisonment regimes and political culture, the preceding sections of this chapter 
have addressed how the thesis data was gathered and recorded. Here I will address 
how that material was then analysed. The arguments and insights in this thesis are 
not the product of theory testing but the result of an inductive approach which 
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allows the researcher to simultaneously develop theoretical concepts through the 
interpretive analysis of data (Mason 2002:180-181). The data was analysed 
thematically, identifying patterns of meaning, latent concepts and ideologies in the 
data (Braun and Clarke 2006) and also supporting the historical research agenda 
(what happened?). Loader’s Platonic Guardian essay provides a useful example of 
how to analyse such cases, describing the kinds of political ideas embedded in 
governmental talk, such as responsibility, power, justice and fairness. In the same 
way Girling et al (2000) show that analysis of these kinds of digressionary 
interviews contain within them beliefs about bigger issues of exclusion and 
inclusion, welfare, the proper role of government, and a sense of appropriate ways 
to maintain their local order. A close thematic and analytical reading of this kind 
can bring to the surface the grand ideas of legal and political theory, social concepts, 
and show penology writ small and made workable, informing people’s habits of 
thought and action.  
Thematic coding was part of the analytical strategy. Themes became the heuristic 
devices to reflect upon the data from which they were drawn, and used to make 
larger sociological arguments, generate new explanatory theories and develop 
broader insights therein. To describe the process as ‘coding’ makes it sound simple 
and linear, but it is more iterative and sometimes a meandering process of 
discovery. Creating codes from the data ‘is also about conceptualizing the data, 
raising questions, providing provisional answers about the relationships among the 
data, and discovering the data’ (Coffey and Atkinson 1996:31). I did not use 
software packages to support the analysis of the data and instead used word 
documents and folders to organise material. In undertaking this process, I 
transcribed all the interviews, but also engaged in a process of re-listening to the 
original recordings, re-reading the transcripts on numerous occasions and 
continuously returned to read and re-read my archival material and documentary 
sources. What themes emerged also had to be mapped over time to see how their 
patterns evolved.  
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But this all-too-clear account of a central thematic finding is a ‘chronological lie’ 
(Bosworth 1999:83). At first I found myself coding everything and soon was 
overwhelmed by a messy semiotic over-abundance. But in the lengthy and iterative 
process of transcribing and re-reading the primary data my familiarity with the 
patterns and events grew and I managed to merge small disparate themes into 
larger relevant thematic groupings. But that is part of the thematic practice which is 




This chapter suggests that taking an historical turn provides comparative study 
with both additional empirical depth and analytical leverage. It provided an 
overview of how the research material was collected, recorded and analysed. The 
historical research design tempers the study’s capacity to make sweeping 
conclusions about penal change. That grounded historical context significantly 
improves the comparative perspective. We can examine the relationship between 
political culture and its effects on imprisonment by looking at it in depth, overtime 
as well as between place.  
 
Narratives can achieve ‘a certain education of memory’ (Ricoeur 1999:8). This thesis 
favours a chronological history, one which can reassess, confirm and complicate 
standard narratives of Anglophone, but particularly Irish and Scottish penal 
politics. The histories presented in the following chapters are situated in their 
contemporaneous political and social milieu. Herein, the thesis tracks the changing 
penal sensibilities and governmental techniques in order to (1) understand how 
imprisonment was situated in those political cultures, (2) examine why that differed 
between jurisdictions, (3) with what divergent consequences for offenders after the 
moment of imprisonment in Ireland and Scotland, and (4) using a wider sociological 
perspective, explain why these patterns changed over time.  As a result of the 
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methods and interpretive framework developed in this section, the accounts of 
Ireland and Scotland outlined in the sections which follow might be best described 
as revisionist. They will, to some degree, modify and extend what we think we 













The History of Irish Imprisonment and 















Pastoral Penal Culture 
 
	
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter is the first of three, and shall begin the recovery Ireland’s penal history 
using archival material, documentary data and interviews with Cormac, Jim, Liam, 
Sean, Gerard, Pádraig, John, Tom and Niall, all of whom worked inside the 
Department of Justice in Ireland in relation to prisons. This chapter discusses Irish 
penality from 1970 to the early 1980s, using the historical methods, and concepts of 
imprisonment regimes and political culture as set out in the previous Section. 
Employing a narrative form, the chapter first provides a textured understanding of 
the contours of social life, anxieties and political norms in 1970s Ireland. Using 
secondary sources, this chapter shows Ireland as a nation defined largely by its 
religious and cultural homogeneity, shaped by collective values and where family 
life was paramount to the national order. Ireland had been a poor country and 
emigration was a pervasive phenomenon and a major social concern. By the 1970s a 
new modernising impulse was being felt in Ireland, but there was also violence and 
civil war in Northern Ireland. These emergent progressive and disruptive forces 
provided the motor for Irish penal development in the 1970s to beginning of the 
1980s. Though they merged with the traditional social practices and political 
outlooks which were embedded in the Irish penal state, it is the relationship 
between these forces, and their impact upon imprisonment, that this chapter will 
explicate. 
 
The chapter draws on annual reports, archival material and interviews to recover a 
map of imprisonment regimes for ‘ordinary’ and ‘subversive’ prisoners in Ireland in 
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this period. I suggest that Irish imprisonment was produced and maintained by the 
political culture of this time, defined by a pastoral conservatism. Characteristic of 
pastoral conservatism was a commitment to state restraint, motivated by the totemic 
image of the Irish nation as familial and communitarian. There was an 
acknowledgement of the pains of imprisonment and a tangible empathy with the 
plight of the prisoner, informed by humanitarian and indulgent sensibilities. But 
also, in what might appear as a paradox, pastoral conservatism had a capacity for 
authoritarianism. 
 
Finally, this chapter also makes a broader argument: that Irish political culture (and 
thus imprisonment regimes) were embedded within Ireland’s distinctive social 
field. Building on the themes highlighted in the extended introduction, this chapter 
argues that the reliance on emigration, collective efficacy and the importance of the 
Church in maintaining social norms meant that prison was only a secondary 
mechanism in responding to transgressive behaviour. Moreover, criminal behaviour 
barely pierced the consciousness of the political culture. The confluence of these 
social forces opened up the space for the development of more indulgent and 
pastoral forms of imprisonment.  
 
 
2. Irish Historical Landscape  
 
 
The Irish State  
 
Until 1922 Ireland was part of the United Kingdom. While Irish MPs sat in 
Westminster the history between these two nations was fraught with resistance, 
oppression and alienation. After a prolonged campaign of guerrilla warfare against 
the British in Ireland from 1919, the Anglo-Irish treaty was signed in December 1921 
and Ireland became the Irish Free State in 1922. While Britain relinquished its 
control of a part of Ireland, the Irish made concessions, in particular allowing the 
British to keep the six northern counties of the island which became the British 
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political territory of Northern Ireland, often referred to as ‘The North’ (Whyte 1974). 
The new Irish government, and many governments thereafter, retained their hope 
of retrieving the North from the British and a strong nationalist streak persisted in 
Irish politics.  
 
The Catholic Church  
Irish cultural, political and social life had been dominated by the Catholic church.  
In the 1970s Ireland was an exceptionally homogenous nation, with over 90% of 
people identifying as Catholic (Ferriter 2012:5) and almost all of those practicing 
rather than nominally Catholic, with 91 percent of Catholics attending weekly mass 
(Nic Ghiolla Phádraig 1986). We also need to think of the Church in terms of the 
power and control it exercised over Irish social, cultural and political affairs from 
the formation of the State in 1922. Successive government implemented policies 
which aligned with Catholic teachings, and on occasions they capitulated to the 
Hierarchy’s oppositions to government policy.15 
 
For example, when Irish political leadership sought to replace the 1922 Free State 
constitution, the Irish Catholic Hierarchy provided direct input.16 The 
implementation of the subsequent 1937 Constitution declared a particular narrative 
and image of Irish life, giving the Catholic Church a formal seat at the centre of Irish 
life: it was recognised as having a ‘special position’ as the faith of the Irish people. 
The Church and the Government often supported each other, a relationship Inglis 
(1998:77) characterises as ‘peaceful coexistence’, in which each publicly upheld and 
supported the other (see also Larkin 1975). 
 
The Church advocated an anti-statist view on matters of social and moral life, 
reflected in much of the contemporary political legislation, particularly on health, 
																																																						
15 There was often adherence to Church status and ethos, even if politicians did not agree with it (Inglis 1998:75). 
16 According to Whyte (1980:51) the original constitution was viewed it as a product of a bargain with the British 
and wanted to replace it with something ‘indisputably Irish’. 
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education and family (Whyte 1980; Inglis 1998; Fahey and McLaughlin 1999; 
McDonnell and Alison 2006). The Church was against schemes which threatened to 
contravene its sovereignty over these matters. For example, the Catholic Hierarchy 
opposed what it felt were overly intrusive welfare programmes such as free access 
to health care for certain groups (what came to be known as the Mother and Child 
scheme).17 Instead, they supported and contributed to the alternative 1953 Health 
Act; they supported the implementation of ongoing censorship with their 
prominent presence on the Vigilance Committee (sometimes referred to simply as 
the ‘V committee’), a small group responsible for banning what was considered to 
be morally improper books, films and magazines deemed morally improper 
(Cooney 1999). Marriage and family were closely regulated, with total prohibitions 
on contraception and divorce and legislation banning inter-religion adoption 
(Cloatre and Enright 2017). Their power also extended into Irish schools, health, and 
social welfare which were largely controlled and staffed by the Catholic Church 
(Whyte 1980; Inglis 1998; Chubb 1992; McDonnell 2006 et al; McDonnell and Alison 
2006). The weekly (sometimes daily) mass services also served as a mode of 
maintaining social control as priests had a powerful platform from which to preach 
moral and behavioural community conformity and loyalty to the family, reinforcing 
values and denouncing deviance from the pulpit (Nic Ghiolla Phádraig 1986). The 
confluence of mass, Catholic conformity, social control and politics are evident in 
the story of Mary Robinson, who was soon to be President of Ireland. Robinson, 
then a Senator, was denounced from the pulpit in the 1980s at her family Church for 
supporting the “anti-social” legislation of contraception. Ultimately the bill did not 
even receive a first reading in parliament as it was blocked by the Government. She 
has described the pervasive ‘authoritarian orthodoxy’; ‘the degree of fury and 
venom’, and the hate mail she received in response to her political work which was 
perceived as an offence to Ireland’s ‘Catholic ethos’ (Robinson 2012:72-73). 
																																																						
17 The Minister who had tried to implement the health scheme had to step-down as a result. In his parliamentary 
resignation statement, he was clear about the Church’s influence upon the policy: ‘the Hierarchy has informed the 
Government that they must regard the mother and child scheme proposed by me as opposed to Catholic social 
teaching.	This decision I, as a Catholic, immediately accepted without hesitation.’ (Dáil Éireann Debate 12 April 




There were two important consequences of this in relation to this study. First, 
Ireland was gripped by a censorious, conservative and even authoritarian approach 
to social life. Sexual and cultural repression, the absence of alternative ways of life, 
gave rise to – according to McDonagh – a ‘poorly understood distinction between 
culture and religion’ (quoted in Robinson 2012.; see also Inglis 1998). Second, the 
Church operated as a shadow authority structure in Ireland, and ‘while the rest of 
Europe secularized its institutions and culture the Irish commitment to religion was 
sustained and even intensified’ (Girvin 1986:62). Arguably, the state’s sovereign 
power was underdeveloped in comparison to other Anglophone democracies. In 
Ireland, the Catholic Church were a colossal power bloc (Inglis 1998), which 
controlled health, education and welfare. And while it supported the government it 
also advocated against any state intervention in its perceived social moral realm, in 
which the Church felt itself ‘responsible for the moral well-being of the nation’ 
(Larkin 1975:1274).18 As a result of this division of governing power between 
Church and State, and the very clear anti-statism propounded by the Church, a 
political culture of non-interventionism and minimalism manifest inside the 
government. The state, its deployment of power, was curtailed and informed by its 
symbiotic relationship with the Church. 
During the 1970s the Church’s power and status was subtly waning, however. In 
the face of chronic poverty, industrial and economic stagnation, the Irish 
government began to introduce new welfare provisions for citizens in the 1950s 
(Fahey and McLaughlin 1999). The Government also began to develop policies 
supporting industrialisation and modernisation (Inglis 1998). Then in 1972 the 
Church lost its special place in the constitution via referendum. There was also an 
easing of censorship laws (Chubb 1992; Whyte 1980); the lifting of a Church ban on 
Catholics attending Trinity College Dublin in 1970; and in 1972 and the Supreme 
																																																						
18 Though Whyte (1980) writes that this only occurred on a few occasions. Inglis argues that the indirect influence of 
the Church power was considerable, as displaying ‘religious capital’ was essential to advancing in Irish social and 
political life (Inglis 1998).	
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Court ruled that married couples should be allowed access to contraceptives 
(Ferriter 2012). There were changes afoot in the dynamics of Irish political and social 
order.  
 
Loyalty to Family and Community 
 
The investment of the Catholic Church and the state in regulating contraception and 
preventing of martial breakdown as mentioned above, as well as preaching about 
the importance of premarital abstinence, were both underscored by the totemic 
image of the traditional family (Whyte 1980; Canavan 2012; Mohr 2017).  When the 
Irish Free State government banned divorce, Cosgrave – the political leader of the 
government – stated that: 
‘I consider that the whole fabric of our social organisation is based upon 
the sanctity of the marriage bond and that anything that tends to 
weaken the binding efficacy of that bond to that extent strikes at the root 
of our social life’ (quoted in Mohr 2017:222).  
 
Like the Church, the centrality of the family unit to Irish social life was made official 
in the Constitution which declared: ‘The State recognises the Family as the natural 
primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution 
possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all 
positive law’. It went on: ‘The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its 
constitution and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as 
indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State’. The constitution also 
declared women’s social role as domestic and familial and reiterated the prohibition 
of divorce (Seward et al 2005).This the Constitution shored up Ireland’s socially 
conservative national narrative (Berezin 1997). 
 
In matters of education, the Constitution accorded primacy to the family rather than 
the state: ‘The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the 
child is the Family and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of 
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parents to provide…for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social 
education of their children’. In general, the privacy of the family was deemed 
paramount and the family unit was sacrosanct, and it was to be protected from state 
intervention (Kennedy 2001; Fahey and McLaughlin 1999; Mohr 2017; Seward et al 
2005; though see Earner-Byrne (2017) for a class critique of this non-interventionist 
argument). The cultural image of the Irish family gave impetus to Irish political and 
Church activities. The common good of the nation was generally based around the 
family, which took precedence over the individual (McDonnell and Allison 2006; 
Lee and O’Tuathaigh 1982; Kennedy 2001).  
 
Families were not autonomous units, however: they existed in community 
networks. Ireland was considered by historians to have communitarian class 
relations, which were less rigidly hierarchal, supporting that strong sense of 
nationhood (Coakley 1999:50-51). Chubb (1983) has written that paramount among 
the dominant traits in Irish cultural life was loyalty to family but also community 
and neighbours. Emphasising a similar point, O’Dowd has written that Ireland’s 
‘sense of place, community, kinship and mutual aid’ are what shaped Irish identity 
and life (1987:44).  Even economic change during the 1970s was framed in 
nationalist rather than individualist terms. Left wing politics and trade union 
movements did not have a class based ideology and there was a general ‘absence of 
class based cleavages’ which allowed traditional communitarian values to prevail 
(Chubb 1992:33). The national question muted Irish class consciousness, creating 
instead a national ‘culture of community’ (Hazelkorn and Patterson 1994:52); social 
relations which continued into the 1980s (Fogarty et al 1984).  
 
From the formation of the State until the 1970s the role of collective morality and the 
family were central to the Irish ‘nation-building project’ (McDonnell et al 2006:820). 
Community, the family and the nation were intertwined in the Irish imagination, 
and any political campaign for smaller group identity politics, such as class or 
gender, were rebuffed as threats to the interests of the community (O’Dowd 
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1987:45). Lee and O’Tuataigh (1982:15) maintained that ‘no society in Europe so 
exalted the ideal of the family in its official rhetoric’.  
 
Crime and Deviance  
The image of a cohesive Irish community was partially supported by Ireland’s very 
low crime rates and the fact that crime was not considered a social problem – 
Ireland was described as a ‘policeman’s paradise’ (Brady 1974:240). Crime was 
statistically low, but a broader perspective on deviance needs to be outlined in order 
to fully understand the penal landscape that subsequently emerged. While crime 
held little sway in the Irish national imagination there was a steady preoccupation 
with moral issues rather than legal transgressions. As O’Sullivan and O’Donnell 
(2007, 2012) have persuasively argued, fears about moral deviance and sinfulness 
were major social forces. 
In an important work of historical recovery O’Donnell and O’Sullivan (2007, 2012) 
have illustrated the novelty of imprisonment in modern Ireland. They demonstrate 
Ireland’s staggering ‘carceral archipelago’ (Foucault 1977) of largely Church run 
institutions, such as Mother and Baby Homes, Industrial and Reformatory Schools, 
Borstals, Magdalene Laundries but also state-orientated Asylums, which in 1951 
held 1% of the Irish population (more than 1,000 per 100,000). At the same time, 
prison had a per capita use of 16.5 per 100,000. These were places for ‘the difficult, 
the disturbed, the deviant and the disengaged’ (O’Sullivan and O’Donnell 2012:5). 
The monopoly on legitimate violence was not entirely controlled by the democratic 
state, instead the penal culture prior to 1970 had cohered around matters of morality 
and deviance which empowered non-state actors. The capacity to punish, chastise, 
stigmatise and control deviant Irish populations was largely invested in the Catholic 
Church, with support from the state, community and family activities. 
This level of incarceration beyond the state reveals a deep vein of authoritarianism 
in Irish political life – one which favoured moral institutions over governmental 
ones, and sought to suppress social transgressions and immorality rather than legal 
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infractions.  In fact, while coercive confinement expanded in Ireland, the 
government was actually closing prisons before the 1970s (Rogan 2011). However, 
from the middle of the century state actors began to displace non-state actors in the 
confinement of Irish citizens (O’Sullivan and O’Donnell 2012). In the 1970s, the 
prison was slowly gaining more traction as a social institution. But its demoted 
position in the diverse network of social control architecture was long established. 
 
Rural Fundamentalist to Burgeoning Modern State 
The image of Catholic and communal Ireland was founded upon and intertwined 
with the ‘rural ideal’ of Irish national life (O’Dowd 1987:43-44). Ireland was an 
outlier in the Atlantic Isles and Western Europe, as it had not experienced an 
industrial revolution (O’Connell 1999). This vision of Ireland has been characterised 
as ‘rural fundamentalist’; it rejected industrial work and demonised urban secular 
life (ibid.; O’Sullivan and O’Donnell 2012; Commins 1986). The Irish state had tried, 
from 1922 until the 1950s, to make Ireland a self-sufficient rural Catholic nation of 
family-based farms (Fennell 1986:395; Fahey and McLaughlin 1999). Rural life was 
the idealised end-goal of the nationalist project. It was reported that prior to 
Ireland’s liberation from British colonial rule, a free Ireland would have ‘no 
Glasgows and Pittsburgs’ (Padraig Pearse quoted in Fahey and McLaughlin 
1999:122). In 1926, when Ireland was a newly minted state, only 32 percent of the 
population lived in towns, with only 13 percent engaged in industrial work 
compared to the 51 percent working in agriculture (Whyte 1974). 
 
The 1960s and 1970s mark a period of transition, however (Girvin 2008; Ferriter 
2005; Beatty 2013). Rural fundamentalism began to give way to new modernist ideas 
regarding economic development, which shifted the focus from a self-sufficient 
nation based on a network of small family run farms to international trade 
(Commins 1986). By the 1960s the Irish government was becoming more 
interventionist, and began to develop new economic and social welfare policies. At 
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the end of the 1950s the government moved away from its policies of agrarian 
protectionism (Kilcommins et al 2004; Fahey 2002) as a new ‘pace of change 
accelerated from the late 1950s with a paradigm shift in economic planning and a 
policy focus on attracting inward investment and export-led development’ 
(O’Sullivan and O’Donnell 2012:7). 
 
Excitement around the potential of prosperity grew during the latter half of the 
twentieth century. The 1958 Government publication of the Programme for Economic 
Expansion was a seminal moment. It is widely considered to mark the beginning of 
Irish industrialisation as well as tentatively increasing governmental intervention in 
social and economic development (Chubb 1992; Breen and Whelan 1998; Commins 
1986). By 1966 almost half of all Irish people lived in towns or urban settings, and 
the agriculture workforce had fallen to 31 percent of the labour force, while the 
industrial sector had increased to 26 percent of the work force (Whyte 1974). From 
1961-1970 Irish industrial production began to expand, which saw the population 
migrating from rural settings to towns. Belatedly, thus, Ireland began to 
industrialise and modernise (Breen et al 1990) and declining agriculture was 
accepted as a consequence of Irish economic and social development (Commins 
1986:53).  
 
The 1960s also marked the beginning of an expansion of a government-supported 
welfare state. An old age pension, an unmarried mother’s allowance and a 
children’s allowance were introduced. While other European nations were facing 
financial adversity due to the oil crisis in the 1970s, in Ireland the welfare state was 
just beginning to flourish (Kilcommins et al 2004:283).19 
 
Then in 1973 Ireland joined the EEC. Until that point Ireland had been largely 
insulated from Europe (Coakley 1999). Now Ireland was more exposed to 
																																																						
19 Kilcommins et al report that the in 1965 government spending in Ireland was 36 per cent of GDP but grew to 70 




international markets and modern ideas of industry, politics, economics and 
statehood. Ireland lagged far behind the rest of the EEC in economic terms (Coulter 
2003) and was the first country to apply for aid from the EEC regional fund (Ferriter 
2012). But Irish wage increases in the 1970s were unprecedented, and outstripped 
comparative EEC wage growth (Seward et al 2005). From the end of the 1960s, the 
economy grew at more than 4% per annum (Norris 2016:158). This was an era of 
promise and change. 
 
Emigration 
The ‘evils of emigration’ was another critical political and social issue that shaped 
and regulated Irish life (Delaney 2000:4), described as the phenomena of ‘the 
vanishing Irish’ (O’Brien 1953). By the time the state had formed in 1921, Delaney 
argues, ‘migration was an established stage in the life cycle of young Irish people’. 
This remained the case until the 1970s (2000:29-30), and ‘growing up in Ireland 
meant preparing oneself to leave it’ (Fitzpatrick 1984: 2), with parents often raising 
their children preparing them for emigration (Inglis 1998).  
 
While always publicly interested in solving the emigration problem, Delaney has 
found that the Irish government did little to prevent Irish emigration, as it reduced 
the unemployment levels.20 Though the flow of emigrants fell in the 1960s, 
emigration remained a ‘structural feature’ of Irish social landscape (Delaney 
1998:46). Rather than seeing mobility as undermining Irish conservative and 
Catholic morality, these dynamics supported it, relieving the country of its morally 
wayward and economically idle citizens. Brewer et al (1999:177) suggest that 
emigration served to subdue crime rates as young adults left Ireland. Migration 
functioned as an important form of social control, maintaining the quotidian image 
																																																						
20 When WW2 broke out the British implemented an identity card system as a security procedure for people 
traveling into Britain. In response, the Irish Department of External Affairs began to issue the necessary identity 
cards. As the war worsened and France fell travel security in Britain was tightened; however, this began a period of 
cooperation between Irish and British governments, negotiating under what conditions emigration to Britain would 
be facilitated by the Irish government (Delaney 1998). Revealing the Irish dependence on emigration as a tactic 
against unemployment and stagnation. 
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of Irish social life as homogenous, Catholic and family-focused. Emigration and 
Irish mobility ‘swept social problems aside’ (Fanning 2007:1) and maintained the 
image of national purity. Besides economic reasons, however, Irish people also 
emigrated as a form of liberation from the moral rigidity of the Irish community and 
political life. Britain and other foreign countries offered the chance of a more 
intellectually stimulating and less deferential atmosphere (Chubb 1992). 
 
Just as with other major social forces at this time, the 1970s also marks a brief 
reversal in the pattern of migration, with the population actually experiencing net 
inward migration for the first time: immigration was largely made up of returning 
Irish, landing back in a country then experiencing economic expansion (O’Sullivan 
and O’Donnell 2012). 
The Troubles 
 
Although the 1970s was a time of economic renewal, there were problems that could 
not be ignored or deported. The violence and oppression in Northern Ireland began 
to escalate in the 1960s and into the 1970s as the social divide between Catholics and 
Protestants deepened (Whyte 1991). Catholics were subject to discrimination by the 
local government, leading to the emergence of a civil rights movement, which on 
one early occasion, October 5 1968, sparked a violent response by the RUC (Royal 
Ulster Constabulary). Shocking and graphic footage of the event led to an ‘explosion 
of anger’ among the Catholic community and has been seen by some as the 
‘moment’ ‘The Troubles’ began (McKittrick and McVea 2000 41-42).21 There were to 
be more protests which ended in conflict in 1969, such as a number of electricity and 
water utilities were bombed. Soon thereafter, the North began a ‘descent into 
violence’ as sectarian relations deteriorated into a sustained, violent revolt from 
1969. The majority of casualties and of the destruction to lives, communities and 
homes were among the Catholic communities. There was a feeling among some 
Catholics that the IRA (the Irish Republican Army) were not properly prepared to 
																																																						
21 ‘The Troubles’ is the euphemism for the period of conflict in Northern Irish history. 
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protect the community against Loyalist and British incursions. In this context, a new 
and more aggressive IRA movement was born (ibid.:60) and a full scale and brutal 
civil conflict broke out.22  
 
 
Catholic Conformity and the Modernising Impulse  
 
This section has sought to outline the major structural dynamics, cultural meanings 
and political outlooks in Ireland until the 1970s. The nature of Irish social life and 
political culture reflects the complexity and heterogeneity of any nation. The Irish 
state had promoted and supported pastoral values (Fahey 2002), imbued with an 
idealised vision of rural and family life underpinned by a conservative ideology. It 
was a society organised around collective national identity, shaped by moral 
prudery, religiosity and social conservatism. The dynamic between the Church and 
the state allowed the Catholic Hierarchy to wield considerable power and control.  
 
As a result, until the end of the 1960s, Ireland was blighted by an oppressive social 
conformity. While crime was not a major social matter, deviance was – and a 
network of places for confinement operated to combat social non-conformity. 
Emigration and morality, rather than crime, were serious political issues 
(McCullagh 1996).  At the same time, emigration also controlled and help alleviate 
any insurgent feelings or discontent about poverty and unemployment. It relieved 
the country of its wayward citizens as well as providing an escape route for those 
wishing to flee stifling social relations.  
 
However, the 1970s was also a formative period in contemporary Irish social and 
political life. The ‘coherent vision of society’ (Fahey 2002:53) which had informed 
Irish governmental action began to change in the 1970s, due to Ireland’s economic 
																																																						
22 Hayes and McAllister (2001) have written of the extent to which the population of Northern Ireland were exposed 
to violence. One in seven people in Northern Ireland reported being a victim of violence. Another one in five had a 




and political advances. The 1970s was a time of transformation and transitions 
(Ferriter 2012); what had been a very settled social order was slowly and steadily 
evolving (Inglis 2005).  
 
We will return to these matters towards the end of this chapter. For now, we must 
move closer to the history of Irish political culture and the use of imprisonment – 
the development of which became embroiled in these historically embedded mores, 
power dynamics and the emergence of new political and social forces. 
 
 
3. Ordinary Imprisonment Regimes  
	
In the 1970s Irish prisons were managed by the Prison Division, a small centralised 
group of civil servants based inside the Department of Justice in Dublin. 23 They 
were responsible for just over 700 prisoners, about 500 of whom were adults.  The 
majority of those adult prisoners were categorised as ‘ordinary’ prisoners, and were 
held in Ireland’s three adult prisons: Mountjoy (Ireland’s largest prison),24 Portlaoise 
and Limerick. These prisons had little in the way of routine work, and there were 
long lock-up times with an almost total absence of programmatic prison activities 
(Behan 2018). While Portlaoise had a farm, sewing mailbags was one other activity 
available, and basic domestic chores were performed by prisoners. There was little 
to inspire in these old and dilapidated prisons, and the lack of systemic 
programmes and prison-wide activities persisted throughout the 1970s into the 
1980s (Rogan 2011). Nonetheless, the 1970s also saw significant prison 
modernisation, when the character of Irish ‘ordinary’ imprisonment regimes 
changed and the routines within these prisons became more permeable, educative 
and supportive.  
 
																																																						
23 I will use the term ‘Department’ and ‘the Division’ interchangeably to refer to people who I spoke to who worked 
on or around these matters.  




Prison numbers were historically low in Ireland, and they had been falling further 
through the middle decades of the twentieth century (Rogan 2011). The prison 
population began to grow in the 1970s, however, and by 1980 the number of adult 
prisoners had doubled in comparison with 1970. While the prison population was 
still strikingly tiny by international standards the relative rise requires a close 
investigation of the Prison Division’s response this sudden change. For the first time 
since the formation of the State the Irish government set about expanding the prison 
system. Four new adult prisons opened in the early 1970s – Cork, Arbour Hill, The 
Training Unit and Shelton Abbey, marking a remarkable expansion of prison space 
and infrastructure.  
 
Rising prisoner numbers led to concern inside the Division, and there was a desire 
to ameliorate the new phenomenon of prison overcrowding (JUS/2002/2/66). Two 
new closed prisons, Cork and Arbour Hill, were established. Both were former 
military detention barracks. The pressure the Division felt to provide more prison 
space resulted in Cork (on the south coast) opening early in 1972, even though some 
wings were still being reconstructed. Instead of its intended capacity of 90 prisoners, 
Cork prison’s initial population was 49 prisoners. The second prison, Arbour Hill, 
was opened in 1975, though it had a more specific operational designation as 
accommodation for long-term prisoners, which at the time meant two years or 
longer. Arbour Hill held between 40 and 90 prisoners during its first years. The 
regime at Arbour Hill also provided printing workshops designed to produce 
braille education materials (Annual Report 1976; Department of Justice 1981a).  
 
Thinking about the dynamics of the imprisonment regimes rather than increases in 
numbers reveals a more complicated story than the alarmist one that tends to be 
summoned in response to a rapid rise in prison numbers. For example, in the 1970s 
women prisoners were held on a landing at the juvenile prison, St Patrick’s, and 
creating a designated women’s prison was foremost in the Division’s expansion 
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plan. The conditions for women in St Patrick’s were seen as ‘old’ and ‘unsuitable for 
women prisoners’ (TAOIS/2012/90/354). A site had been purchased in Dublin for the 
construction of a new prison specifically for women and juveniles, but the plan was 
abandoned after sustained local opposition. Shortly thereafter another site was 
purchased at Wheatfield in west Dublin. A new commitment and resolve was 
evident: ‘having been forced to back down from an earlier site…there is no question 
of rescinding plans to go ahead with the above development [at Wheatfield], despite 
local opposition’ (ibid.).  
 
Until this time all of Ireland’s prisons had been inherited from the British, and it 
was during this period of expansion that the government embarked upon the 
construction of the first Irish purpose built prison which would be named the 
Training Unit (Annual Report 1972). The Training Unit was developed with a very 
distinct set of criteria. Housing between 90-96 prisoners (serving long or short-term 
sentences) it was lauded as ‘a fully modern environment’ (Annual Report 1976).25 The 
Division was explicit, the aims of the Training Unit were, first of all, to improve the 
employment prospects of prisoners via accredited courses provided by the 
Industrial Training Authority (known as AnCO) (Department of Justice 1981a:3). 
AnCO had only been established in the late 1960s by the government which was 
trying to support the development of skilled workers for new modern industries 
(O’Connell 1999), reflecting the modernising fervour. In addition, the Training Unit 
operated what was described as a ‘liberal regime’, intended to be less incapacitative.  
Within the Unit, the regime was designed to mimic normal working, living and 
domestic routines. It had an open ethos. Internally there was open association – 
meaning prisoners could move around the prison without supervision, and could 
wear their own clothes. Perhaps most significantly, many Training Unit prisoners 
went out to work during the day and returned at night.  
 
																																																						
25 The Training Unit was originally established in 1962 after a recommendation from a Departmental working 




The fourth prison opened in the 1970s was Shelton Abbey, Ireland’s first fully open 
prison for adults, with an average of 35 prisoners, opened in 1973. The building 
itself was a former stately home which had been acquired from the Department of 
Lands (Rogan 2011). Shelton Abbey was a grand country manor – which was 
referred to as the ‘big house’ within the Division26 – and the building retained its 
historical name rather than being given a new carceral designation. The annual 
prison reports showcased the grandeur of the interior décor, impressive common 
spaces with high ceilings and chandeliers, the stateliness of the building’s exterior 
and the extensive grounds. The regime for prisoners at Shelton Abbey was 
primarily oriented around renovation and repair of the building itself. The annual 
reports proudly state that the institution was ‘in beautiful condition and the 
improvements are in keeping with such a lovely building’ (Annual Report 1979:50). 
There was no apparent concern that this was too good for prisoners, or that such 
conditions would generate any kind of public outcry.  
 
The benefits of Shelton Abbey lay in its use of trust: ‘[prisoners are] likely to benefit 
from an atmosphere of trust’ rather than coercion or rehabilitation (Department of 
Justice 1983:15). Similarly: ‘The fact that the prisoners are grateful for the trust 
placed in them can be seen from the diligence with which they approach their work 
and the very high standard achieved’ (Annual Report 1983:21). The peculiarity of a 
prison system without trust was put explicitly in an earlier notation: ‘Rationally, if 
iron bars, locked doors and constant watchfulness are necessary to keep a person in 
line even in prison, then he should never be released’ (JUS 93/182/17 quoted in 





26 The term big house here is a literal description and obviously means something significantly different to those big 





The concept of rehabilitation was formally attached to Irish prison policy discourse 
in the 1970s Prisons Act, which declared that among its tasks, prisons should also 
promote rehabilitation (Rogan 2011). The practical rationale behind the Act was to 
provide legislative support for imprisonment in places other than prisons, 
specifically, open centres. Thus from 1970, a new kind of confinement had statutory 
support in Ireland.  
 
Yet concurrently, the Minister for Justice proclaimed the prison environment was 
‘basically unsuitable for encouraging individuals to become adequate and 
responsible members of normal society’ (Dáil Debates, vol 247, col 101, May 26 
1970). Rehabilitation had a more ambiguous role in the shape of imprisonment 
regimes. In an unpublished internal document, the emergent matter of 
rehabilitation was tackled directly, 
‘The perennial questions what is the purpose of imprisonment and this, 
what should the policy of “the administration” be is not one which the 
Department of Justice can answer readily and is, perhaps, not one that is 
for the Department to answer, or, at any rate primarily…The notion 
sometimes expressed directly or by implication, that a great deal more 
could be done to motivate prisoners and, as it were, morally sanitize 
them, if only the Department would bestir itself and take some, 
presumably self-evident measures, is grossly misleading’ (Department 
of Justice 1984d:7).  
 
Notwithstanding this, during the 1970s welfare support in prisons was expanded. 
For the first 40 years or so of the state, welfare support inside the prisons was mainly 
provided by the chaplains. In 1972-1973 the first Directors of Probation, Education 
and Co-ordinator of Work and Training and four full-time psychologists were 
appointed (Annual Report 1973) and the Probation and Welfare Service increased 
from eight posts in 1970 to 150 in 1979 (Annual Report 1979). The development of 
release, education, psychology, welfare and training allowed the Division to engage 
with prisoners with what they described as a ‘more individual and personal 
approach’ (Department of Justice 1984a:2). The job of Psychological Services was 
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focused on the assessment of prisoners so as to counsel them and ‘assist them in 
coming to terms with their imprisonment and with life in the community after 
release’ (Department of Justice 1981a:10).  
 
Welfare services were thus not connected to criminal rehabilitation or reducing 
reoffending. Liam explicitly addressed this when describing his work in 
psychological services in the Division. Recalling that prisoners were understood and 
judged within a much fuller conception of their personhood:  
‘In the early days we were holistic and took the person in their totality, 
but in the early days the last thing you would talk about was the crime. 
It was the well-being, how were they getting on?’.   
 
Permeable Imprisonment 
Incarceration in Ireland had another important feature that was being developed 
during this time: the use of temporary release (hereafter TR). Prisoners were 
released for either short periods of time or fully released before their sentence was 
complete. TR included both ‘special leave’ and ‘daily temporary release’. There 
were also mass releases at Christmas and Easter across the prison estate (Annual 
Report 1976).  
 
Use of Temporary Release 1976-1980 
Year Daily Average 
Prison Population 
Total Number of 
Temporary Releases 
1976 1,049 1,252 
1977 1,029 2,720 
1978 1,179 3,587 
1979 1,140 2,842 
1980 1,215 3,525 




A feature of the Irish release system was that the decision-making was not fulfilled 
by a parole board. While the Minister of Justice was formally charged with the 
responsibility for granting each use of TR, in reality the Minister was rarely actively 
involved. Instead, Prison Division officials were authorised to grant release 
(Department of Justice 1981a; Griffin 2015; Griffin and O’Donnell 2012).  Ideally, TR 
was decided upon at monthly meetings in the prisons (weekly in Mountjoy) with 
staff from the Division, the Chaplain, a Welfare Officer and sometimes teaching staff 
present (Annual Report 1976).   
 
These informal and individuated practices were perceived to be among the core 
strengths of the Irish penal system. At the beginning of the 1980s, a draft ministerial 
address, described the way release was organised as beneficial due to its ‘unfettered 
discretion’ which ensured individual cases could be addressed in a ‘speedy, flexible 
and relatively unbureaucratic’ manner.27 In the perception of the Division, 
discretion kept the system fair and flexible: ‘The system [of TR] has been developed 
gradually over the last fifteen years and it is fair to say that we now have a well-
developed, flexible system which is geared to the speedy consideration of cases’ 
(Annual Report 1980:32). The use of TR was seen as emblematic of the Irish way of 
imprisonment. When reporting back to the Department after an international prison 
conference in Switzerland, it was emphasised that no other country seemed to use 
release quite as liberally as the Irish prison system. It was concluded that the heavy 
use of release ‘compared favourably’ with elsewhere and that in this regard the Irish 
system ‘was particularly sound’ (Treatment of Offenders Minutes, 3 October 1979). 
Overcrowding may have been an international problem but the Irish system was 
felt to be superior because of how it arranged permeable imprisonment regimes 
(ibid.). TR was positively described as having seen a ‘noteworthy increase’; in 1977, 
almost 3000 Temporary Releases were granted and they expected, and hoped, it 
would grow further still in use and ‘variety’ (Annual Report 1977:7).  
																																																						
27 This file has no formal reference as it comes from a folder in the Department of Justice storage rather than the 




TR was a process shaped by informality, pragmatic need and personal discretion. 
Describing the main kind of insight used to make daily penal decisions, Seamus, 
who worked in the Division throughout this period, said that ‘everyday you were 
dealing with human stories’ of the prisoners. Prison Division officials had to carry 
out their work using their discretion on a case-by-case basis. This was 
acknowledged in official documentation and it was reported that: ‘there was no set 
pattern in the granting of temporary release as each case was considered on its own 
merits’ (Annual Report 1979:46). John, whose first job in the Division in the 1970s was 
to support the TR process, described it similarly, as something highly discretionary 
and based on the merits of each case: 
 
‘[The Prison Division] was a very busy section because even then there 
was overcrowding. So, Governors were ringing up with lists of 
prisoners who maybe could be released early and that kind of thing.  
But also, there was, in those days, a structured approach to sentences; it 
mightn’t be structured in today’s terms. We used to go to review 
meetings in the prisons. Which kind of basically involved reviewing the 
sentences of prisoners. How are they getting on, should they be 
forwarded for temporary release? Should they be, was there any chance 
of them, you’d be checking with the probation and welfare officers. 
There was also liaison meetings with the various services, including the 
psychiatrists and other professionals. It’s all kind of vague and in the 
past now. So what was it like to work there? It was fascinating. It was 
very interesting to be looking at reports from welfare officers or 
whoever, other professionals who were coming in for services, and 
make recommendations about how prisoners’ sentences should be 
managed… There was a list up [of prisoners], we would basically try 
and make sure there was no adverse Garda report’. 
 
Placing great emphasis on tools of informal discretion and the deference to the 
authority of the ‘Garda report’ Liam, who also worked in the Division, described its 
pros and cons as being either incredibly progressive or authoritarian: 
‘it was much more informal, there were no systems. They were much 
more dependent on the Garda view, [to LB] do you know the Garda 
view?...So, if you were [letting] somebody out, well what do the Guards 
think? And they used to have these comments from Guards. They used 
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to ring up the local Garda station and say what do you think of [this 
person] and they may say he’s a bollix, don’t let him out’. 
 
There were few crimes which excluded a prisoner from being considered for some 
form of TR. Internal decision-making documents on release for the most heinous 
crimes illustrate the evaluative distinction between ‘complicated’ and 
‘uncomplicated’ lifers.  A murderer suitable for TR could be distinguished by a 
relatively straightforward appearing calculation. If it was, as they described, a ‘once 
off murder (often with the family)’ then they were regarded as an ‘uncomplicated 
life sentence’, meriting consideration for release. The converse of this was the 
‘complicated lifer’ – someone who had committed murder as part of a longer 
criminal career, and thus presented a danger (Department of 1984a:1-6). In 
addition, when someone was released they were not subject to the kind of onerous 
supervisory measures with which we are now familiar. There was a relatively small 
group of probationary social workers who were tasked with supporting a prisoner 
with post-release employment or family matters, rather than recidivism. The sticky 
grip of the prison did not follow the prisoner out into the community. This 
discretionary and individualistic nature of penal decision-making was a key feature 
of Irish imprisonment regimes.  
 
During this period, the Prison Division also developed the Intensive Supervision 
Scheme (established in 1979) and the Community Service Orders (CSOs), which 
they developed as a way to stem the flow of people being sent to prison (Treatment 
of Offenders Management Meeting, Minute, May 1979). Having been involved in 
planning these new penal practices, Seamus spoke with pride at how Ireland was 
among the first countries to introduce CSOs ‘to stop people being sent to prison’. 
The CSOs were devised by the Division to address the rapid rise in prisoner 
numbers at the sentencing stage, but they were also developing the imprisonment 
regimes in a way which would increase the number of prisoners who could be 
released after sentence (Annual Report 1982). It was a highly permeable mode of 
imprisonment. Prisoners moved in and out of the prison more freely, or served a 
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much shorter sentence than the court had stipulated. In an inversion of the 
principles of confinement, it was during this time that release became the most 
consuming aspect of the work of managing incarceration, and featured among the 
central aspects of Prison Division work. 
 
These prisons were only for ‘ordinary’ prisoners, however. Ordinary was a formal 
category within the penal administration. Informally, they were sometimes light-
heartedly referred to as ODCs (ordinary decent criminals). The category emerged to 
set them apart from ‘subversives’, who were those prisoners linked to the Troubles 
in Northern Ireland. 
 
 
4. ‘Subversive’ Imprisonment Regime 
 
As mentioned the outset, the 1970s was an incredibly tumultuous time in Irish 
history, with the violence and instability of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Other 
new meanings of imprisonment – its functions, its capacities, its aims – developed at 
this time were the consequence of violent events and pressing threats to state 
security. 
 
The Republic of Ireland was suddenly the site of what was known as ‘subversive’ 
activities, including a bombing campaign, the murders of public and political 
figures and Gardaí as well as the assassination of the British Ambassador in 1976 
(See Appendix 2 for a fuller list of incidents). Ireland found itself in a state of 
‘emergency’. The Irish government took firm steps to quell and contain the 
dissident activities in the Republic and hastily mobilised a series of authoritarian 
criminal justice responses. In 1972, the government established a nonjury Special 
Criminal Court where cases of subversive violence were held before three judges.28 
																																																						
28 These extensions of state power during the 1970s were not newly invented but rather a reactivation of once 
retired acts and practices (Mulcahy 2002:284)  
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The Government also passed emergency legislation in the Offences Against the 
State Act and Emergency Powers Act of 1976.29 Shortly thereafter Ireland formally 
declared a State of Emergency and derogated from the European Human Rights Act 
(Mulcahy 2002:284-285; Ferriter 2012:345). Criminal justice became a central tool in 
maintaining Ireland’s national security and stability. 
	
As subversives found their way into the prison system, that sense of emergency 
took hold there as well. The Prison Division was now faced with a new task: 
upholding state security. ‘Subversive’ numbers among the prison population 
continued to multiply during the 1970s, now formally categorised as ‘subversive’ 
prisoners.30 Osborough described them as presenting ‘an array of daunting 
problems: difficult to house, awkward to handle, not simple to occupy, not cheap to 
guard’ (1985:187, quoted in Mulcahy 2002:290).  
 
The Department was at the very least intimidated by the IRA’s strategic capacity 
and destructive capabilities, describing them as ‘highly organised and disciplined 
and well supplied with funds’ (Department of Justice 1973:1-2). But they also felt 
frustrated by them. There were on-going hunger and thirst strikes by Republican 
prisoners, tactics deployed to coerce the state into assigning them the status of 
political prisoners (Ferriter 2012), which they were denied. The disruption tactics of 
paramilitary prisoners stymied penal modernisation (Annual Report 1973:9). The 
construction of The Training Unit was briefly discontinued for ‘accommodation and 
security reasons’ (Annual Report 1972:9). The IRA’s campaign inside Mountjoy at the 
beginning of the 1970s was supported by public protest outside the prison (Mulcahy 
2002). One Prison Division official recalled that the arrest of the IRA Chief of Staff in 
1972 in Dublin generated a large public protest outside the hospital (where he had 
been moved after a three-day hunger strike) and a failed rescue by armed 
																																																						
29 The Act allowed a person to be detained without charge for up to seven days, as opposed to 48 hours. 
30 ‘Subversive’ became a category in Irish prisons during the 1970s, though had been used with less formality in the 
1930s (Rogan 2011), though it has no formal meaning in law. Perhaps suggesting a turn of phrase which captures 
the paramilitary character of their criminality but as a formal category also does not betray the Republican currents 
in the Irish government by naming them as terrorists. 
	
135 
Republicans (Terry 2012:218; see also Ferriter 2012), suggesting at least some wider 
public support for the IRA. This created what was described as a ‘siege’ atmosphere 
inside the Division (John; Jim; Rogan 2011). John, for one, was reluctant to discuss 
this time at all. Giving this one short anecdote encapsulating his anxieties:  
‘I never felt fearful, just, you know, wouldn’t be advertising where I 
worked. Close friends knew, but I wouldn’t be advertising it. If I was in 
a taxi and I was asked where I worked I would have said the 
Department of Agriculture’. 
 
 
The subversives were mainly held in Mountjoy until a major riot occurred there in 
May 1972. Organised by Republican prisoners, the riot ‘lasted almost six hours 
during which several prison officers were held hostage and an enormous amount of 
damage was caused’ (Rogan 2011:138; Annual Report 1972). The Division was beset 
by panic; one civil servant wrote of the time:  
‘Fires had been started, the doors of cells had been ripped off, toilets 
were being wrecked and some highly dangerous prisoners were 
roaming the prison and terrifying the ODCs (ordinary decent 
criminals)’, it was what felt like a ‘life or death’ situation (Terry 
2012:212).  
 
Along with cell doors, the new dentist surgery, the plumbing, records, new cooking 
equipment, bedding, the school and library were all destroyed. The Division was 
under immense pressure but were also disheartened:  
‘The work programme of modernising the prison and providing new 
amenities which was in progress for some years was brought to a halt 
and much work already completed was destroyed. The efforts of the 
trades staff were concentrated for the rest of the year on repairing the 
damage caused’ (Annual Report 1972:9) 
 
Mountjoy now had significantly reduced capacity, and roughly 200 prisoners had to 
be dispersed throughout the system (Rogan 2011:138). Up to 40 prisoners, largely 
drawn from the subversive prisoners but also including some ‘ordinary’ prisoners, 
were transferred to the Curragh (which already held a small number of paramilitary 
prisoners), a military barracks which was operated by the Department of Defence 
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and therefore outwith the remit of the Prison Division (Mulcahy 2002). The use of 
the Curragh was a quick response by administrators in the Prison Division, and was 
given formal footing via the hastily passed Prison Bill of 1972. The Bill provided 
temporary legislative support for the transfer of civilians into military custody. This 
allowed the government to respond to subversives as a special class of prisoner, but 
it protected their public claim that subversives were indeed fundamentally 
‘ordinary’. 
 
To those in the Division, the campaign of protest by paramilitary prisoners 
illustrated that prison was not secure enough for subversives. An internal report 
into security in 1973 expressed serious misgivings within the Department. Civilian 
prisons were seen as too permeable; structurally incapable of achieving maximum 
security. Even the Curragh would prove to have exploitable chinks. Soon after 
prisoners had been resituated there in 1972 seven subversives tunnelled out of the 
prison (Department of Justice 1973). Even more dramatically, soon thereafter three 
Republicans escaped from Mountjoy prison yard via a hijacked helicopter which 
landed in the prison yard (ibid; Lonergan 2010). Internally it was argued that the 
prisons had failed to prevent the escape because they were designed for ordinary 
prisoners, who did not require high security: ‘It has all along been the view of those 
in the Department of Justice concerned with the prisons that civil prisons are 
unsuitable for holding members of the IRA’ (Department of Justice 1973:1-2).  
 
With state security at stake and Republican imprisonment registering on the public 
and political radar, the Division was faced with the daunting task of ensuring that 
escapes, hunger strikes and protest did not become a recurrent feature of Irish 
imprisonment. A new penal prescription was required for subversive prisoners. 
What developed was a ‘two-tier’ prison system (Lonergan 2010), which deployed 





An Armed Prison 
Prison was now charged with an additional mandate. With the urgent need to 
tighten control over the paramilitary prisoners and respond to insurgency, 
Portlaoise prison – where the regime was largely focused on farm work – was 
redesignated as the central prison for subversives (Mulcahy 2002:290). From 
November 1973 it was the ‘Security Prison’ with about 175 subversives and 40 
ordinary prisoners (Department of Justice 1981a:3, 1984b). The walls of the prison 
had to be impenetrable to escape and invasion. Portlaoise exerted a new and 
strikingly authoritarian display of state power as the Irish army were appointed to 
guard the walls of the prison (Lonergan 2010:114), and often the Gardaí supported 
prison officers inside the prison.  
 
But describing it later, Niall explained in pragmatic and understated terms why 
such drastic measures were justifiable. Paramilitary prisoners were different – 
subversives were ‘lethal’: 
‘They required a different approach, you know, they’re a much more 
resourceful and dangerous group of people to manage…they can be 
lethal. If they get the opportunity they will act. So that kind of tended to 
shift a lot of emphasis to high security arrangements, and that affects 
people’s thinking in relation to prison… [Portlaoise is] run by the 
Department of Justice but the military has a presence there and their job 
is a military job, that’s clear. If there’s an attack on the prison, as there 
was, but if you try to escape they will shoot you, it’s a very clear 
message’.  
 
At a time when state security was paramount, the use of military force on the outer 
perimeter of Portlaoise provided a visual reminder of its commitment to 
maintaining the authority of the State. The presence of the army was particularly 
striking because of the distinct relationship between criminal justice and weapons, 
as well as the proclaimed neutrality of the national Irish army.31 Weapons may be a 
ubiquitous feature of American, European (and latterly) British policing, but the 
																																																						
31 Though neutrality was, it has been argued, bound to insularity, nationalism and sovereignty, rather than 
ideological principles of pacifism (Fanning 1982; FitzGerald 1998). 
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same is not the case in Ireland. The Garda Síochána (the Irish police) directly 
translates as ‘guardians of the peace’; one way in which this ideology manifests is 
that apart from a small number of specialised regiments, the Guards do not carry 
firearms (Connolly 2002; Conway 2014). Yet at Portlaoise military arms became a 
tool of incarceration.   
 
During this period Portlaoise and not Mountjoy came into focus as – in Liam’s 
words –  the ‘the centre of gravity of the prison service’; Portlaoise required constant 
vigilance due to on-going prisoner protest and escape attempts (Annual Report 1975; 
Behan 2018). In 1978, nineteen prisoners escaped when the perimeter gates were 
blown up. Reportedly, the escapees wore imitation Prison Service uniforms (Annual 
Report 1978:29, see also RTÉ 1974). Prison authorities discovered four ounces of 
explosive plastic gelatine during a search and more explosives were found in the 
heels of shoes sent in for prisoners. On another occasion, an explosion went off at 
the outer door of the recreation hall, and a steel tank was used to ram the side gate 
of the farmyard (Annual Report 1978). When Portlaoise became the subversive 
prison, it was reported (Annual Report 1973) to be full of tension and agitation, 
assaults, numerous subversive escape attempts: 
‘The conduct of the main body of [subversive] prisoners during the year 
was poor. The following is a list of the main incidents. In January a cell 
bar was found cut. In February a Solicitor was discovered attempting to 
smuggle a document out of the prison concealed in the fly of his 
trousers. During the same month a number of Gardai [sic] and Prison 
Officers were attacked by a group of prisoners and on another occasion 
during the months there was a minor riot. In April escape equipment 
was discovered. In the same month a concerted effort was made by 99 
prisoners to burn down the prison by setting fire to the bedding’ 
(Annual Report 1976:7).  
 
Subversives protested against strip-searching, and staff brutality was alleged to be a 
regular feature of Portlaoise prison life. Bombs were found beneath the governor’s 
car and one prison officer, Brian Stack, was murdered by paramilitaries (Mulcahy 
2002:291). The subversive regime was initiated by a state security rationale and 
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justified by fear and anxiety of probable violence. In many ways, the frontline of this 
war was, in the Republic at least, concentrated on the paramilitary imprisonment of 
Portlaoise. 
 
‘The Guarantee’  
Behind the austere exterior of Portlaoise a more peculiar set of officially sanctioned, 
pragmatically developed but informal and sometimes surreptitious compromises 
evolved (ensuring their political deniability) after the initially fractious period 
during the 1970s. Subversives gained privileges that were denied to ordinary 
prisoners (Lonergan 2010:118). For example, they were allowed wear their own 
clothes. Trivial enough, but certainly a matter of serious contention for subversives, 
who wanted to distinguish themselves from ‘ordinary’ criminals. In 1978 two 
Republican prisoners, Rose Dugdale and Eddie Gallagher, who had a child together, 
were allowed to marry – becoming the first prisoners to do so in the history of the 
state (Ferriter 2012). Reportedly, at Portlaoise prisoners were allowed to order take-
away food, which the prison staff would collect (Lonergan 2010). One interviewee, 
Niall, mentioned in passing that the subversives held military parades in the yard to 
mark Easter Sunday.32 And those 40 ordinary prisoners who were also resident at 
Portlaoise played a particular support role within the regime: housed in a totally 
separate building they were known as the Portlaoise Work Party. They transferred 
there to provide the sorts of housekeeping services that the Republicans were not 
allowed to do due to security considerations, or simply were unwilling to do – 
ordinary prison work was the preserve of ordinary prisoners (Annual Report 1976; 
Mulcahy 2002; Lonergan 2010).33  
 
Subversives represented a clear danger. Committed to escape and driven by a 
political agenda they had proved that even within the prison they posed a genuine 
																																																						
32 Easter Sunday of 1916, the Easter Rising, is considered to be the uprising which set in motion the series of events 
which saw the demise of British rule in Ireland by 1921.	
33 In exchange for their assistance in going to Portlaoise the members of the Working Party were given a greater 
percentage of remission. 
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threat to state security. This makes it all the more remarkable to discover that 
subversive prisoners were also granted TR. Lonergan, a former governor of 
Portlaoise and Mountjoy, maintains that subversives were in fact more likely to 
receive TR than ordinary prisoners. This was done slightly differently, however, 
using a system known as ‘The Guarantee’. The Guarantee was an oral agreement of 
trust between the governor (and thus the Prison Division) and the official 
Commanding Officer, the ‘OC’ (reflecting the Irish: Oifigeach Ceannais), in charge 
of the subversive faction inside Portlaoise. The OC would ‘give their word’ that a 
prisoner would adhere to the stipulations of their TR, mainly the time of their 
return, and once given it was known that ‘they always honoured it’ (Lonergan 
2010:119).  
 
The OC/Governor dynamic became central to ordering life in Portlaoise (Behan 
2018). This system worked because paramilitary groups were also allowed to 
maintain their military structure inside the prison. Within Portlaoise they were 
permitted to act as soldiers and were granted ‘little fiefdoms’, in which each 
Republican faction was allowed to colonise separate spaces. While they were 
publicly denied political prisoner status, the government could evidence its firm 
response to subversive threat, demonstrating the government’s unwillingness to 
give in to paramilitary demands. But the informality and covert character of these 
arrangements clearly demonstrates the privileged political status of subversives 
(Mulcahy 2002:291; Terry 2012:156-157). As Pádraig added: ‘there was no such thing 
as a political prisoner, they were ordinary criminals who had committed a criminal 
offence. Anyway, they were political prisoners!’. 
 
5. Pastoral Penal Culture 
 
Ordinary and subversive prisoners were subject to different levels of security, but 
how they were both imprisoned can be characterised as pastoral pena culture. This 
definition is intended to capture the myriad and seemingly incompatible practices 
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which shaped Irish imprisonment regimes. Foucault’s concept of ‘pastoral’ (1981) is 
hybridised here with the penal because it ‘did not replace or exclude’ the prison, 
rather it was ‘integrated with it, often in an unsystematic and contradictory fashion’ 
(Valverde 1998:213 fn20).  
 
Firstly, pastoral imprisonment regimes were not addressing the wider social 
problems of crime. Pastoral power captures the individuated character of the 
imprisonment regimes. For example, regimented and rule bound parole lacked 
merit precisely because that approach prioritised the system to the detriment of the 
human need and the ‘human stories’, as Seamus put it, of the prisoners. The new 
prison techniques of psychology, training, the expanding presence of welfare 
officers and the importance of the chaplain allowed the prison to better engage with 
individual prisoners’ issues and problems. Prison regimes attempted to address the 
needs of the prisoners, their well-being, job training and education. The regimes 
were designed to also encouraging prisoners’ potential virtues, but also to guide 
their conscience about how to deal with life and imprisonment, rather directing 
them in how to desist from crime (Foucault 1981:238).  
 
Second, Irish pastoral imprisonment routines were shaped by an ‘indulgence’, in 
which a more lenient form of imprisonment developed (Pavarini 1994; Melossi 
2001). The new penal techniques developed during this time readily demonstrate 
this. The development of open and semi-open prisons, such as Training Unit and 
Shelton Abbey, were sites for a less total kind of social exclusion. In addition, the 
case-by-case system of deciding who should be released and why allowed for the 
imprisonment regime to curtail the court sanctioned prison sentence.  A more 
systematic or overly bureaucratic penal intervention might have removed the 
possibility of this institutionalised indulgence. In Ireland, what was being designed 




Third, Irish pastoral imprisonment regimes bore an authoritarian ethos. The prison 
was also used to repress issues that threatened national security and political 
stability. The practice of subversive imprisonment, while being small and 
permeable, is an explicit example illustrating that the prison always has an 
important function in maintaining social and political order.  
 
Pastoral imprisonment, with its systems of authoritarian control, individual support 
and permeable release, meant during the 1970s into the 1980s, Ireland had in 
practice a system of high and low security imprisonment that might otherwise seem 
entirely incompatible. But indulgent dimensions of pastoral imprisonment regimes 
also included a strain of authoritarianism, though implemented in a much more 
benevolent or ‘soft’ way (Melossi 2001:413). The centralised character of Irish prison 
power, controlled almost entirely by the Division, meant there were very few forms 
of redress or appeal against a decision to refuse to grant TR. The Division, and the 
Division only, were the prisoners’ only source of social and penal salvation 
(Foucault 1981). The fate of their release, whether they were considered 
‘complicated’ or ‘uncomplicated’, or if the opinion of a local Guard marked them 
out as bad, meant the difference between serving a very short or a longer prison 
sentence.  
Fourth, while pastoral forms of incarceration share a broad objective with penal 
welfarism (to support the prisoner), a pastoral penal culture differs significantly in 
how the prison is viewed. While still accepting the broad social use of the prison as 
a sanction, characteristic of and central to pastoral penal strategies is an 
acknowledgment of the prison’s destructive agency (Armstrong forthcoming). 
Pastoral imprisonment has a more sceptical view of programmes of prisoner reform. 
Rather than being a reformative or correctional institution, prison is seen as an 





6. Political Culture: Pastoral Conservatism  
 
Pastoral penality in Ireland, with its contradictions of open and paramilitary penal 
developments, emphasis on release and scepticism about rehabilitation, were the 
direct products of the political culture – which existed in the consciousness of those 
within the penal state and who produced and maintained Irish imprisonment 
regimes. The threads of reasoning which emerged from Irish cultural sensibilities 
and political rationalities within the Department of Justice can be characterised as a 
pastoral conservatism. This particular political culture combined historically 
embedded cultural presuppositions with the new modernising outlook, the pre-
existing restrained governing rationalities with traditional social images. These 
shaped the understanding of the penal state and feelings about the aims of 




As described at the beginning of this chapter, a modernising impulse had emerged 
in Ireland from the end of the 1950s. Those same ideas took hold in the Prison 
Division as penal problems were met with new and innovative solutions. This was 
most obvious in the justifications for the Training Unit. This first new prison was 
developed to create a pathway for prisoners into the new economic sphere of 
modern Irish industry that had emerged during the 1960s: ‘In the training of 
offenders to lead better lives, the importance of job opportunity and job placement 
is of the greatest importance…which will enable the inmate to secure employment 
in modern industry’ (Annual Report 1970:14). New social ideas were materialising in 
prison practices. The Training Unit was described, in Jim’s words, as ‘very 




In developing plans for the women’s prison the officials responsible for buildings 
went on international research trips to Denmark (DFA/2009/120/200). The ambition 
in the design of the women’s prison plans was recalled by John with excitement: 
‘[A]t the time we felt this was a totally modern prison. It was different to 
the Victorian radial design. This was maybe going to be the Brave New 
World of the prisons. It was designed one person per cell, loads of space, 
loads of workshops, and this could be the way the system could go, so 
that was an exciting time’.  
 
Ireland as a country was evolving, and these prison developments were 
contributing to that ‘Brave New World’.  
 
The modernising zeal was also steadily reshaping the public presentation of the 
prison system. By 1976 the Departmental annual reports began to include pictures 
(which had not been the case in the 1960s). The images showcased the renovated 
units and improved conditions – homely bedrooms, a modern dental surgery, men 
playing on bright badminton courts, men at work, corridors with glistening floors 
and industrial workshops, etc. Based on these images, one is left feeling these 
institutions were hardly like prisons at all, with very little evidence of standard 
prison iconography, such as barriers, bars and cells.34 The motivation was to give 
the public ‘some idea of the present-day conditions’ (Annual Report 1977:6). The 1977 
Annual Report opened with a strong statement of achievement and a confident 
public pronouncement:  
‘Over the past decade there has been a quiet, relatively unpublicised, 
transformation in the Prison System…Every institution now has a bright 
attractive education unit and, where possible, new modern workshops 
have been provided’ (p.5).   
 
Here the Department sought to persuade the reader that interpretation of prison 
regimes should be based on the internal organisation of a prison, not just the 
material conditions. Seen in this light, they wrote, the prisons: ‘may still look much 
the same from the outside but inside things are different’ (ibid.). The Division was 
explicitly demonstrating to the public that the thinking within the Department, what 
																																																						
34 Which, of course, were still part of the Irish prison design. 
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they aspired to, was embedded in the new material of the buildings, and the routine 
of the regimes. These impulses are captured in this extended quote:  
‘Side by side with the improvement in physical facilities there have been 
radical changes in outlook and in the management of offenders. Thus, 
for example, in every institution regular meetings of prison staff and the 
various groups who assist the Governor, e.g. Welfare Officers, teachers, 
psychiatrists, chaplains etc., are held to review the progress of prisoners 
and to draw up rehabilitative, including education and training, 
programmes. Prison Staff generally have been encouraged to adopt a 
new approach in the management of prisoners. Of particular 
significance is the development of the open centres and the Training 
Unit which demand of staff a quite revolutionary approach to the 
handling of those in custody’ (Annual Report 1977:6). 
 
The Training Unit and Shelton Abbey were both produced as exemplary evidence of 
‘revolutionary thinking’ and a new progressive ‘belief around prisons’ coming from 
senior civil servants (Liam).  
 
The Division was aware that they were establishing a new kind of imprisonment in 
Ireland, and they confidently reported on a ‘very significant development in the 
treatment of offenders in this country’ (Annual Report 1973:12). The modernising 
impulse that developed in the Department was a motor for many of these penal 
reforms, but it does not explain all forms of ordinary imprisonment, however. As 
Garland (1985:163) has written, it is not enough to say that ‘Reform was in the air’. 
Rather, we need to dissect the anatomy of Irish political culture and examine how it 
shaped penal practice. It seems that the desire for modernisation engaged, rather 
than displaced, historically embedded humanitarian and conservative 
communitarian sentiments in Irish political culture. 
 
Lenient Crime Sensibilities 
Among the key features of Irish 1970s penal modernism were its new open 
arrangements and release mechanisms. These practices of pastoral penality were also 
informed by the more lenient and tolerant orientation towards most ordinary crime 
inside the Division. Such permissive use of release could not have been feasible 
	
146 
without the distinct absence of crime from the social consciousness. When we think 
of prison in terms of culture and sensibilities we see that in the Irish case, crime had 
a direct impact on decision-making by its peculiar absence. In the archives, reports 
and interviews, crime – that act which had resulted in imprisonment – was largely 
absent from these accounts, rarely invoking rebuke or blame. 
 
When crime was discussed it was dealt with lightly.  Jim recalled fondly and with 
considerable amusement how Prison Division staff held  
‘meetings in each prison, meeting with the governors and staff and 
asking what we’d do with a prisoner. They’d say: “that guy is like a Fiat 
127, he’ll be fine for two months and then he’ll break down again!”’.  
 
This generous administrative strategy was not naïvely trusting, however, but 
ambiguous about crime, pragmatic about imprisonment and ultimately more 
tolerant (Pavarini 1994; Melossi 2001). In 1979 the Department advocated for an 
amnesty for 68 prisoners during Pope John Paul II’s visit to Ireland. While 
suggesting the release, they also ‘considered that it would be unwise to take the risk 
of releasing a large number of offenders during the first day of the visit when 
Dublin’s dwelling houses will be virtually empty and release on Sunday would 
pose staffing and transport problems’. Instead they proposed an alternative 
pragmatic suggestion that prisoners be released on the Monday, the final day of the 
Pope’s visit to Ireland (quoted in O’Donnell and Jewkes 2011:76-77).  
 
These more lenient uses of imprisonment in Ireland at this time were also 
predicated on a related view that those people imprisoned were not inherently 
criminal. In the outline of the deliberations regarding ‘complicated’ and 
‘uncomplicated’ lifers it is clear that even those prisoners who committed the most 
serious acts were not necessarily considered dangerous people. The prisoner was 
seen as potentially having legitimate and plausible mitigating circumstances. These 
crime sensibilities were caveated by other softening cultural currents within the 
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Division, however, such as poverty or complicated familial circumstances, which 
diminished a prisoners’ transgressive character. 
 
 There was a deeply held belief amongst many Prison Division staff that individual 
crimes were rooted in social causes. The conception of the ‘ordinary’ prisoner 
tended to be defined first by Ireland’s pervasive poverty rather than a criminal 
pathology. In conjunction with this, there was a sense of empathy.  Many 
respondents emphasised the tragic and unfortunate backgrounds of prisoners, 
generally seeing them as victims of chronic economic deprivation. John recalled 
being explicitly informed of this cultural ethos on his first day in the Division:  
‘I remember talking to the Principal Officer and he emphasized a few 
principles to me, which stood to me. Which was the people you will be 
dealing with, i.e. prisoners, are people you’ve never come across before, 
they’re from generally underprivileged backgrounds, they’re people 
who haven’t had the chances in life you had. And you know, you should 
bear that in mind in how you approach this work’.  
 
This kind of compassionate sentiment was typical. Niall described people in prison 
with similar empathy, as those ‘whose lives outside were absolute decimation and 
for whom prison was actually a break’.  Another colleague in the Department, 
Pádraig, recalled as the ‘down and out people’ who filled the prisons.  
 
This perceived adversity reduced the culpability of prisoners, rendering them 
subjects of sympathy as well as tolerance. Liam was clear that not everyone was in 
full agreement on this, however - but he and some other colleagues were motivated 
to continually campaign internally ‘[to] elicit a different perspective…the prisoner, 
their narrative, their history and the notion of socio-economic disadvantage’, and to 
make sure that this vision was at the centre of decision-making. Jim felt similarly, 
arguing that during the 1970s and right into the 1980s, ‘There was a sense of 
openness to do progressive things and I think it was based on how they [senior civil 




This kind of tolerance might be expected in a country so demographically 
homogenous and with few hierarchical social divisions. While interviewees never 
made this link explicitly, it is plausible to make this explanatory connection; 
particularly, as many penal state actors’ tolerant sentiment was also partially 
shaped by their own sense of identification with financial and employment 
difficulties. Several of the interviewees discussed getting a job in the civil service as 
a lucky break – a job for life in a country in which emigration was foremost among 
the chances for opportunity. Pádraig best illustrated this employment concern in 
terms that were pithy and explicit: 
LB: ‘What drew you to the civil service? 
 
Pádraig: Well, God bless your innocence! What drew me into the service 
was that I needed a job and that was the only job’. 
 
Ireland was poor and prisoners were seen as victims of circumstance; forces of 
chance and poverty, which many of the civil servants understood all too well. Three 
other interviewees told me similar stories, of how the civil service had saved them 
from a life working in a factory; while another person told of how it gave them a 
chance to return to Ireland from working abroad. Others had wanted to go to 
university, but lacked the financial means to do so, the civil service position was a 
way to do something interesting on a good salary. There was also the possibility of 
an alternative route to an undergraduate degree sponsored by the Department. The 
precariousness of poverty was therefore also part of many of these stories as well. 
 
The penal sensibilities that prevailed in the Division were informed by social 
imagery of poverty, which marshalled tolerant justifications for more judicious uses 
of incarceration. Jim described a steadfast commitment within the Division to 
release prisoners who were felt to have been imprisoned unnecessarily, which he 
believed motivated even the most conservative civil servants.  In going about the 
business of imprisoning, releasing, building and refining the prison regimes, there 
was an underlying recognition of prisoners’ fuller social backgrounds. In Ireland, 
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when it came to the prison, the Government tended to ‘rule through leniency’ 
(Melossi 1994) because of a deeply felt sympathy with the prisoners’ personal 
circumstances which overshadowed the view of a prisoners’ criminality. 
 
Humanitarian Sensibilities  
 
These lenient governing patterns were underpinned by humanitarian penal 
sensibilities. The term that people used to describe all of this thinking and decision-
making was humanitarian. John, like others, was insistent on this:  
‘One thing I should have said to you is that one thing that I think that 
our system would stand up to scrutiny on, and reflect the philosophy 
that there was a humanity in the Irish system…there was an inbuilt 
humanity in the Irish system’  
 
Others also stressed that there had been a ‘humanity about the system’ in this 
period (Liam). Staff in the Division generally saw prisoners as people – farmers, 
family men, tragic cases – rather than criminals. But they also understood the prison 
as individually and socially harmful.  
 
One of the cultural foundations of Irish pastoral conservatism was a humanitarian 
ethos in relation to the prisons. Identifying a humanitarian disposition is different to 
just saying the prison system was broadly humane. Humanitarian penal sensibilities 
are a distinct outlook which seek to reduce the pains of imprisonment, motivated by 
‘Decency, empathy’ and a respect for prisoners as people (Morris 1966:628). These 
feelings inspire the kinds of action which seek to reduce the pains of imprisonment 
(Garland 2013). The Division’s actions: devising ways to release prisoners and 
shorten sentences, along with their understanding of the social and individually 
destructive capacities of the prison fit with the argument that humanitarian 
sensibilities informed Irish political culture.  
 
In a political culture motivated by a humanitarian view there will be suspicion of 
the prison rather than the prisoners. Those in the Division often empathised with 
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the prisoners, shaped by solidarity and sympathy. But they also exhibited a 
scepticism of the positive claims of prison’s productive capacities, and they were 
concerned by its damaging effects. Motivated by their humanitarian moral ethos, 
the Division was working to improve Irish imprisonment, but in ways which sought 
to reduce the pains of imprisonment where possible. For example, concerned that 
the number of long-term prisoners might increase, it was felt that the Division 
would have to find ways to reduce the destructive and dehumanising aspects of the 
longer prison sentences. Such long-term stays of incarceration would make people 
violent, suicidal or vegetative, they believed. Within the Division it was suggested, 
quite radically, ‘The question of conjugal visits would assume a new importance if 
we had long term prisoners’ (Department of Justice 1981b).  
 
There was a curious juxtaposition in these practices of imprisonment. In line with 
these humanitarian sensibilities, prison was seen as a site with weak rehabilitation 
potential if all rehabilitation meant was to reduce crime, it was not accountable as a 
fixing institution. Yet, during the same period, the number and range of penal 
practitioners, such as psychologists, welfare officers and teachers, was increasing. 
These specialised agents were not designated with the task of rehabilitating 
criminals, however. Instead their job was to provide ‘advice and moral support’ 
(Valverde 1998:47) – as opposed to moral treatment. Instead of attempting to 
regulate prisoners’ criminality, reconstituting them as better citizens, the state used 
these services to assist prisoners coping with the pains of imprisonment. As Jim 
described it: 
‘prisoners have these needs, so let’s make life in prison bearable, it’s 
nothing to do with rehabilitation. So, more training, education, 
psychology probation and welfare, and the emphasis was on the welfare 
side’. 
 
Even psychology, that power-knowledge instrument so closely associated with 
prisoner reform, was described in terms of coping.  Probation and Welfare officers’ 
task was to ‘try to assist them [prisoners] through counselling to cope with their 
problems, some of which may arise from imprisonment itself (especially family 
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problems)’ (Annual Report 1982:38). Describing these ancillary prison professionals, 
Niall likened psychology to chaplaincy, a humane cushion to soften the blow of 
imprisonment rather than fixing people:  
‘meeting prisoners, discussing their problems, psychological stuff, you 
know psychologists play a big role, as do chaplains in the human 
relationships with prisoners and you know prisoners have all sorts of 
issues with their families, and which probation services guide, you 
know if they’re short of money, if they suspect children issues and so on 
so that’s where the psychological and probation services come in – keeps 
all that side of things, sort of prisoner focused’.  
 
Irish political culture operated as it did because it recognised the ‘destructive 
agency’ of the prison (Armstrong, forthcoming), and where possible, sought to curtail 
it. This pastoral penal philosophy was not entirely taken for granted. It was the 
often passed onto to staff as part of the informal orientation; a way of thinking that 
should guide their actions:  
‘I think in those days there was a more liberal approach than there was 
in more recent times. I told you at the outset about the guiding 
philosophy given to me… it was all about prison was necessary as a 
sanction under the criminal law, within that then we should be trying to 
the best we can…prison as punishment not for punishment…[that was 
the] guiding philosophy’ (John). 
 
Reflecting on his colleagues’ approach to their work in this period, a later staff 
member, Gerard, thought that there had been a peculiar ‘distaste for the whole 
business’ of imprisonment. 
 
The Sanctity of the Family and Community 
 
But the Division was not just releasing prisoners in response to the pains of 
imprisonment. Entangled with their humanitarian and tolerant ethos was a 
conservative social conscience and a sense of the limits of political power. The ever-
present conservative virtues of the stable family and the Irish traditions of 
community, so pervasive in other forms of legislation and social policy, also shaped 
normative understandings of the prison. The prison was a physical intrusion upon 
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the sacrosanct social unit of the family, thus the prison should be curtailed. Irish 
permeable imprisonment was firmly rooted in the socially dominant belief that 
family and the community were among the most important social institutions.  
 
This rationale was the most dominant justification given for TR. When it was first 
introduced in the 1960s the Minister for Justice declared that the release 
arrangements would prevent ‘the institutionalisation, psychological deterioration 
and disruption to family and individual life consequent on imprisonment’, better to 
have the prisoner ‘in his own milieu’ (JUS 2005/12/6 quoted in Rogan 2011:109).  In 
practice, this meant that TR for short periods ‘was authorised regularly on 
compassionate grounds or for very important family occasions’ (Annual Report 
1976:13). A prisoner might also be granted TR shortly after committal if his 
‘presence in the home’ was required (ibid.:8). For example, one prisoner was 
released to look after his family farm which was potentially being ‘run down’ while 
he was in custody (Annual Report 1979:49). The Division reported that it was 
gratifying to see an increasing number of prisoners receiving full TR before their 
discharge date because they had outside employment or to maintain their links with 
family and home (Annual Report 1971; Annual Report 1977).  Release was developed 
in a manner which sought to support and maintain the sanctity of the Irish family 
unit:  
‘Outings for important family occasions such as baptisms, weddings, 
etc. are a regular feature as are outings on compassionate grounds in the 
event of the death or serious illness of a close relative…The temporary 
release system ensures that an offender can return to the family at 
intervals during his sentence’ (Annual Report 1979:22).  
 
 
Niall told stories of prisoners getting release to attend their children’s communion, 
or even, on one occasion, a prisoner was release so he could watch his son play in an 
important Gaelic football tournament. The practice of offering amnesties for Easter 
and Christmas recognised that these were major family occasions in Catholic 
Ireland – during which the entire family would usually reunite, and in Ireland that 
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very often could include family members who were also imprisoned. Prisoners and 
their crimes were instead viewed within the social and collective forms of 
‘conviviality and the ethics of domesticity’ (Carlen 1983:15). Crucially, prisoners 
were understood to still be members of society; their social identities were not 
overturned, and the prison was adjusted in ways to preserve those ties and 
obligations. 
 
The generic idea of rehabilitation, namely to give prisoners opportunities and 
support, gained prominence at this time, and merged with this embedded local 
vernacular of family and community to create a distinct set of pastoral rationalities 
for prisoner recovery. Jim, among others, was adamant that while the Department 
had many flaws (too conservative and not ambitious enough), it was still the case 
that:  
‘the attitude to the prisoners was that we need to help these guys, not 
address their offending behaviour, not that narrow objective, we’ve just 
got to help them. What did we mean by rehabilitation? Maybe they’re 
just better with their family’. 
 
Ostensibly the prison was being modernised, but in fact the prisons were being 
adapted in a manner which reinforced the conservative heritage, cumulative social 
norms and values of the traditional Irish nation. Even in the extremely authoritarian 
prison setting of Portlaoise, a way was found to maintain subversives’ familial 
bonds (more on which below). By releasing prisoners, the Irish were doing 
something more than reducing the prison population. The people who worked in 
the Department, the feelings they had about the imprisonment regimes, were 
motivated by a conviction of the superior power of the ‘collective efficacy’ of the 
family and community in responding to the waywardness of the prisoners. They 
were sure appropriate behaviours would be better reinforced within in the 
community and by the family (Sampson et al 1997), rather than in the prison. The 




In an internal report, the aims of imprisonment rehabilitation were presented as a 
laudable but nebulous concept, one which they attempted to make compatible with 
their aspirations:  
‘While “rehabilitation” is not the primary objective of imprisonment it is 
nevertheless an important and valid objective. It is intrinsically good 
and should not be abandoned simply because evidence does not prove 
that it is “successful”. What is to be the measure of success? Is it to be 
that the prisoner never again engaged in criminal activity, or is never 
again caught, or is never convicted again, or is not convicted again 
within a certain length of time, or engages in criminal activity less 
serious in nature than his original offence? What about the qualitative 
improvement in the prisoner’s approach to living, his relationships with 
family and friends, his involvement in community activities, his 
willingness to help and support others, his physical and mental well-
being?’ (Department of Justice1981a:7-8).  
 
In this frank and straightforward report rehabilitation was deconstructed. The 
statement was not rejecting the possibility of rehabilitation, so much as de-
composing it, trying to render it less excessively demanding and hence more 
achievable. Rehabilitation as reducing crime was perceived to undermine more 
humanitarian and more important achievements, such as personal development but 
also the collective goals of cultivating social morality in prisoners. In addressing the 
matter of rehabilitation, we observe the ways in which it was made sense of for 
practical use in Irish penal practice, thus illuminating some of the main aims and 
aspirations embedded in Irish political culture.  
 
Political culture in Ireland at this time reflects to some degree the modernising penal 
advances elsewhere.35 Matters of punishment and government are never entirely 
local entities. This account illustrates the process of reinterpretation of a universal 
idea, translated into its practical working context. Punishment and penal 
philosophy were understood by governmental actors in terms which are both local 
and particular, as well as global and generic (Girling et al 2000). The prisoners 
																																																						
35 Rehabilitation was still an on-going project in the 1960s. For example, the opening of Grendon in the England and 
the penal welfare developments in Scotland.  
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retained their identities as members of families and communities; they were seen as 
sentient social beings. In addition, crime was petty and had social causes external to 
the prison and the prisoner. How could those matters be addressed inside the 
prison, away from community and family networks? This confluence of 
modernising desires and criminological concepts, on the one hand, and the 
embedded communitarian and conservative culture on the other, fused such that 
the best prison programmes were those that strived to support prisoners’ personal 
and moral development:  
‘to equip the offender with educational, technical and social skills which 
will help him to turn away from a life of crime, if he so wishes. 
However, even if the offender on release does not turn away from a life 
of crime, those services can be regarded as having achieved some 
success if they bring about an improvement in the offender’s awareness 
of his responsibilities to himself, his family and the community’ (Annual 
Report 1982:29).  
 
The Minister for Justice framed the rationality for release and the community 
supervision scheme as being beneficial because it: 
‘obviates the need for rehabilitation programmes and lengthy schemes, 
which sometimes have low enough success rates for reintegrating 
prisoners into the community, because here the people are not in prison 
in the first place. They live at home. There is also obviously a great 
advantage from the cost point of view. It is now costing an enormous 
amount of money to keep a person in prison, on average about £400 a 
week. By using a community service order the cost involved is only £7 
to £9 a week, which is a huge cost saving to the taxpayer. (Tuesday, 11 
June 1985 Dáil Éireann Debate Vol. 359 No. 6.).  
 
Here we see a utilitarian – but no less cultural – logic invoking the importance of the 
community, the superiority of the family home, further justified by the financial 
saving in directly dismissing the need for rehabilitation schemes. The minimum 





These thought processes which supported Irish penal indulgence, its rationalisation 
and implementation, reveals the more pastoral penal side of Irish political 
conservatism –illuminating the often overlooked humanitarian cultural frameworks 
that informed Irish political culture and punishment during this period. As John 
described it, ‘going back to the early days, there were people who were making 
decisions about prison releases and they always had the prisoners’ interests at the 
forefront of their mind’. Decisions on whether or not to release someone often 
depended on moral sensibilities and social obligation. Becoming a better family and 
community member was prioritised over what we would now describe as desisting. 
A moral social code was favoured over an academic agenda or political 
accountability (Blake 1999). Their primary objective was to bring prisoners back to 
the flock, to support or instil in prisoners collective Irish social norms of family. The 
logic underpinning Irish pastoral imprisonment regimes was to work upon 
prisoners’ familial and social bonds, their moral connections to the community, 
rather than treating their individual illegality or recovering them from criminality. 
That was who prisoners were believed to be by those in charge of imprisonment, 
and that is how they were inscribed into the imprisonment regimes.  
 
There was something missionary in how the Division went about their work. They 
were creating prison regimes which promoted what were the most valorised aspects 
of Irish nationhood: community and family. This pastoral view was also evident in 
the lengthy diarised narrative style which characterised the annual reports 
throughout this period. Year in year out it was reported that some prisons and 
prisoners had good years or difficult years. The tone was more intimate and 
humanising as was the narrative, which exalted the personal success of prisoners 
and commiserated with tough times.  
 
The Subversives: Authoritarianism, Ambiguity and Trust 
 
Within this modernising context, motivated by pastoral social goals, tolerant penal 
sensibilities and a conservative political agenda, was the development of an 
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altogether more authoritarian kind of imprisonment, one which expressed the 
power of incarceration. For authoritarian political rationality to be realised in 
practice, it must be seen as a legitimate form of reasoning within the minds of actors 
who occupy the penal state. But in doing so it will merge with other aspects of 
prevailing political and social culture, giving imprisonment regimes its often 
paradoxical character. In Ireland in the early 1970s, the development of Portlaoise 
was contingent on the state of emergency and the urgency to prevent conflict and 
disorder. But the peculiar character of paramilitary imprisonment in Ireland found 
ideational resources in other dynamics of Irish political culture. The IRA were 
treated in a manner that reflected the threat they posed to state and political 
stability. But their imprisonment also reflected recognition of the legitimacy of their 
political motivations. 
 
Republican subversives seemed to hold a more ambivalent, and not wholly 
condemnatory place in the people’s imagination, based on long-standing claims 
over the North but also more immediate concerns regarding the Troubles. In 1972 13 
peaceful Catholic protesters in Derry were killed by British forces, an episode 
known as Bloody Sunday or the Bogside Massacre. The anger and outrage 
resonating from the incident was felt in the Republic. A protest in response to the 
massacre resulted in the burning of the British Embassy in Dublin on the 2nd 
February 1972 (RTÉ 1972a). At the same time, the Irish Government had an ongoing 
legal case against the UK regarding the torture of Republicans interned and 
interrogated in Northern Ireland – the first inter-state case to appear before the 
European Court of Human Rights.36 The Taoiseach made a public call for the 
‘cessation of the harassment of the [Catholic] minority in the North’ by British 
troops and policies (RTÉ 1972b). But there was also an ambiguity in the Irish 
position, which was underscored by the Arms Crisis. In 1970 a sum of government 
money intended for the development of aid in Northern Ireland was surreptitiously 
siphoned off by a number of officials, including sitting Ministers, for the purchase of 
																																																						
36 The court found that the treatment was inhumane and degrading but not torture (Bonner 1978). 
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arms from German dealers for Republican groups in Northern Ireland. Legal action 
was taken against the Ministers, which met with considerable public and political 
protest (Ferriter 2012:141-151). 
 
Imprisonment regimes will generally have contradictory practices and strategies in 
simultaneous operation, reflecting the contradictory and ambivalent currents that 
constitute political culture and the nature of social relations and penal problems. 
The use of the army to prevent escapes at any cost and a discretionary code of trust 
to ensure subversives returned to prison is a most peculiar contrast in force. These 
aspects of trust reveal the ‘cultural resonance’ and ‘emotional supports’ which 
shaped prison practices in less rational ways (Garland 1990b:1). As Garland has 
written, ‘if punishment is exclusively a utilitarian means of control, it would indeed 
be difficult to account for many of its practices’ (ibid.). While the presence of the 
Irish army was a means by which to take command and exhibit control over a 
difficult prison population and publicly demonstrate severity; surreptitiously, 
however, other sentiments and ideas came into play.  
 
The cultural sentiment which shaped the practice of paramilitary imprisonment – 
with its high security measures and discrete system of privileges – was the distinct 
historically embedded, though certainly not full-throated, nationalism. This was 
evident in the de-facto recognition of the IRA as an army. Pádraig explained the 
relationship with the OC in straightforward, pragmatic and realistic terms:  
 
‘You had a Commander, a general, or whoever he happened to be, and 
everything was communicated through him. He ran the show really. 
That was the only common-sense way not to have too much trouble’.  
 
The pragmatism behind these informalities was best captured in this extended 
recollection from Niall: 
‘[The IRA] you didn’t mess with them, they didn’t get abused, they ran 
their own system, that’s where we differed from the Brits. They took a 
view over in England, and we said this to them, these are not tales out of 
school, we said all of this to them. They took a view that you had to 
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maintain control, basically you have to man the prison, that they had to 
conform to prison rules. That it was wrong to allow effectively the 
military command structure to survive inside prisons, and that they 
should wear certain clothing and all that sort of thing. We took a totally 
different view on all of that. We took the view that if they stayed inside 
the wall we don’t care if they wear civilian clothes we don’t care or if 
they march around. With the IRA prisoners you dealt with an OC, with 
all other prisoners you go and talk to prisoners. But with the IRA 
prisoners you dealt with the Officer Commanders, they maintained the 
structure inside, and as far as we were concerned that was fine. The Irish 
took a totally different view on that and that’s another part of history 
that could be looked at some time’.  
 
LB: Why was that? 
 
Niall: I think it was that we felt it was not, it was not as damaging as the 
British thought it was. The British I think felt it was like cocking their 
noses up at authority, that it was a bad thing to let them behave like an 
army. We just took a different view, so what?...I don’t understand 
it…Sometimes arguments are made, and sometimes if they don’t have 
substance – I mean, what does it matter if the IRA are marching around 
inside and having parades on Easter Sunday inside? Once they were 
inside and not outside, and we took that view. We also kept something 
that I don’t think they had in the British prisons and that was the army 
on the wall. So it was very clear, if you stay inside then we don’t have a 
problem with you, but if you try to go out we do’. 
 
Niall thought the British worked against the IRA, using the prison to ‘defeat 
terrorism’ (McEvoy 1998a; McEvoy 2001). The Irish, in contrast, worked with them, 
actively engaging them as an army. In this case pragmatism worked in coordination 
with respect and trust and it was a major tool in maintaining prison order. As Niall 
said: 
‘The Officer Commander came and said so and so’s mother is dying, he 
needs 24 hours and we’ll guarantee he’ll be back. In fact, a guy was left 
outside the gate one night, pissed drunk, because he had to make his 
time. They [the IRA] brought him back [laughs] and rang the bell. 
 
LB: That’s a lot of trust. 
 





Prison is always being modified to reflect the perceived character of the prisoner 
and the wider cultural and political norms. The peculiarity of subversive 
imprisonment was positioned along two key axes: authoritarian mentality and 
implicit respect. A kind of parliament style negotiation of sensibilities and 
rationalities – demonstrated by Jim when recalling the Portlaoise regime:  
‘The mentality was, even with security, they saw that these guys had the 
best brains in Europe and that made them a challenge and the challenge 
was to keep them in, and above all else we have to keep them in – 
because there were some escape attempts – but if you can provide 
something, great, then do it. But security was above all, but if we can do 
anything for them you should, and that we should modify 
imprisonment as such’.  
 
 
Descriptions of the subversive prisoners were couched in narratives which shared a 
general set of motifs, drawing upon references to army images: civil servants 
understood the IRA in relation to their order, their organisation, their discipline, 
their aims. Although the subversives had undertaken violent campaigns during this 
most turbulent era of the Troubles, they were accorded a subtle dignity and were, 
consequently, subject to a regime that pragmatically evolved to reflect precisely 
these seemingly contradictory sensibilities and strategies. The thing that unnerved 
the Department, the strategic capacities of the IRA and their unfaltering political 
motivations, were what inspired a degree of recognition. The IRA were not thugs or 
criminals. One official described the actions of the Republicans as having always 
been formally authorised by the IRA hierarchy. Their rebellion and protests were 
not wild and impulsive, but strategic, conforming to their army structure (Terry 
2012). That sense that subversives lived by an established order yielded a practice of 
trust, evident in the guarantee scheme. Another important reference point was the 
IRA Army Council Code, a written document by which the IRA maintained its 
hierarchy, its order and its unity as an army. Prison Division officials often knew the 
code, quoted it; for example, they knew the IRA would not turn a weapon on a 
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member of the army or Gardaí and they had been able to ‘trust’ that the IRA would 
stand by this code (Department of Justice 1973; Pádraig; Niall; Terry 2012).  
 
This was a time when the nationalist future the IRA was fighting for, the 
reunification of Ireland, had been embraced by many people across the political and 
social spectrum in Ireland right up until the 1970s.37 The Government certainly did 
not support the IRA or their tactics, but the state acquiesced to them for the sake of 
social, political and penal order. But to treat them as such was not entirely 
pragmatic. The Government’s treatment of the subversives was also reflected a tacit 
acceptance of the ‘political character’ (McEvoy 1998a) of the subversives’ identity 
and their activity. Their treatment of subversives, even the very use of subversive as 
a distinct prisoner categorisation, was ‘a mirror to the state's view of the conflict’ 
(ibid.:1574).  This is why the subversives were treated as de facto political prisoners. 
 
Moreover, rather than work against the subversives’ political identity, they used 
their identity as soldiers to find a way to give subversives access to TR, 
underscoring the importance of release and mobility in this period of Irish penal 
development. Subversives posed real risks. Yet, the Division also developed a 
system of trust with the subversives - trust tempered by fear, but trust and respect 
nonetheless. But within that state security context, they were still concerned with 
preserving subversives’ identities as members of families and communities. Pádraig 
described giving parole to one subversive prisoner, an example which draws out 
the interlocking visions of the family and political actor: 
‘He was a solider and he was fighting and the last thing he wanted to do 
was look for an extension of parole, but his wife was sick and he had six 
children and the neighbours were pressing him. Anyway, he was in and 
he got his extension’. 
																																																						
37 The violence in the 1970s dulled what had been longstanding irredentist aspirations. After the formation of the 
Irish Free State in 1922 the nationalist project was focused on restoration of the island as a single nation and the 
inevitable annexation of Northern Ireland, which was formally written into the 1937 Constitution which described 
the nation as ‘the whole island of Ireland’. Moreover, survey data from 1972-73 showed that 42% of Irish people 






Finally, and particularly evident by the example of the response to subversive 
prisoners, Irish conservative pastoralism was underpinned by pragmatism: an 
adaptive approach to government and imprisonment which modified itself in 
response to changing circumstances. The practical character of pragmatism reflects 
its cultural context as well as the immediate demands of the problems. 
 
Pastoral imprisonment regimes were not then the result of ‘strategic omniscience’ 
(Garland 1985:162), but realised in each TR decision, which were always dependent 
on the prisoner’s perceived identity; realised in the material design and function of 
the new prisons; and reinforced by the development of a less intrusive network of 
support agencies. Prisoners remained members of families and communities, or else 
they had the potential to be part of the regular ‘runways of society’ (Goffman 1963). 
The discursive frame in which the prison was fixed was shaped by those social and 
cultural concepts. But the aims of imprisonment were also understood within the 
political paradigm: its within the state’s conception of itself and the aims of social 
conservative outlook. The prison was a disruptive intervention which undermined 
privileged collective social norms and pushed the Irish state beyond the remit of its 
conservative and non-interventionist rationalities. 
 
	
7. Prison: At the Periphery of the Social Landscape 
 
A full appraisal of Irish penality requires us to think about these matters at a 
broader sociological level, to observe the social landscape in which prison operated 
and the social forces which conditioned political culture. This political culture of 
pastoral conservatism and the concomitant pastoral penal practices, were contingent 
on Ireland’s social control landscape. While the number of prisoners and prisons 
was expanding, it remained a peripheral social control mechanism. Ireland’s 
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traditional conservative political outlook had religion and morality as its ‘mainstay’ 
(Freedan 2003), rather than legal concepts and order. Ireland’s carceral archipelago 
of coercive confinement offers ample evidence of the primacy of other more 
explicitly morally attuned institutions charged with confinement (O’Donnell and 
O’Sullivan 2007; O’Sullivan and O’Donnell 2012). But even outside of these 
institutions, Irish collective efficacy was intertwined with religious welfare control 
(Beatty 2013; Ferriter 2009). A particular prescription of behaviour and values was 
being communicated, distilled and regularly reinforced through a web of other 
social relations – mass, school, the hospital, the media, family life, censorship, 
politics and legislation – stretching ‘out over the country like a giant sacred canopy’ 
(Inglis 2007:67).  
 
In addition to religious welfare control Ireland also relied on the ‘emigration 
culture’ as a ‘safety valve’ (Fitzgerald et al 2008:51). The numbers of people who had 
been disenfranchised by the Irish dream of small farm rural living, who faced 
unemployment and limited opportunities, took to the boat rather than to the streets 
to protest. O’Donnell (2005) has suggested that this also suppressed crime rates, but 
it may have also been an alternative to the prison. Russell (1964:146) wrote that 
often a Garda or even a Judge gave a person with ‘criminal aspirations’ a choice: 
prison or the boat (quoted in O’Donnell 2005).38  
 
Irish political culture of pastoral conservatism and its forms of imprisonment 
regimes were grounded in this wider social context. In a country that was otherwise 
often excluding and oppressive in how it enforced social conformity, how the prison 
operated was often more benevolent, mild and tolerant. The pastoralism of the Irish 
imprisonment regimes was not in spite of excessive and harsh Irish social control 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter, but was a result of it. Pastoral penal 
culture operated precisely in that form because of the extensive nature of 
																																																						
38 This remains a feature of Irish penal culture. In 2002 a convicted drug dealer receiving a suspended sentence on 
the condition that he left the country (O’Donnell 2005:118). 
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community discipline and Catholic social regulation which characterised Ireland’s 
social landscape in the 1970s. There is no doubt that Irish imprisonment regimes 
were modernising and expanding. Their forms of pastoralism, however, the 
necessity and urgency around imprisonment and government penal control, was 
minimised by the wider Irish social context. The Division could generally indulge 
and develop ameliorative imprisonment regimes because imprisonment was 
peripheral, it was not the main coercive means of social control and, in addition, 
crime was not a major matter. Meaning the norms of the family and the community 




This chapter has sought to demonstrate the complex social conditions, cultural 
sensibilities, historical and political forces which shaped Irish political culture, 
giving it a distinct and contrasting character of humanitarian and authoritarian 
motives, modernising ambition and traditional conservative views. We saw how the 
forward-looking modernisation impulse and state security concerns that emerged in 
the 1960s engaged, rather than displaced, the embedded humanitarian and 
communitarian sentiment in the Prison Division. This, in turn, materialised in a set 
of imprisonment regimes which were simultaneously permeable and paramilitary, 
reflecting the diverse perceptions of the ordinary and subversive prisoners’ 
personhood and the government’s own sense of responsibility. Officials adhered to 
the law, but within that, they also tried to deploy measures which reduced not just 
the pains of imprisonment but actually truncated prison sentences.   
 
However, this penal culture was conditional, dependent on a social control field 
which relied on the strength of Irish collective efficacy, Church control, and 
emigration to address any excess of social ills. Moreover, the view that acts of 
illegality were not so transgressive, and the very fact that crime was low, gave 




As a result of these social, political and cultural forces, this was a period of 
progressive penal reform. The Division hoped that the significance of the 1970s as a 
decade of development could be continued. It was stated that the ‘1980s promises to 
be another important decade for the Prison System’ (Annual Report 1980). However, 
transformations in the organisation of the Irish social field, particularly the 
economy, began to alter and degrade, shaping a radically different and much more 
difficult future for Irish imprisonment. It is to the unanticipated erosion of pastoral 


















In the early 1980s there was enthusiasm for pastoral penal change, but there was a 
reversal of earlier gains as Ireland entered a recession. Overcrowding in the prison 
system became severe at precisely the same time, and the Division lacked the 
financial resources to improve or expand the prisons. Crime also began to rise. 
These factors seriously undermined the prison regimes and the beliefs within the 
administration. This chapter charts the fraying of pastoral penality – its assumptions 
and orthodoxies – which had governed prisons in Ireland from the early 1980s into 
the 1990s. 
 
The first section of this chapter outlines the retrograde changes in the imprisonment 
regimes and the decision-making process behind them. This era was characterised 
by chaos, protracted struggle and panic that was experienced inside the Prison 
Division, all of which had consequences for imprisonment regimes. In some ways, 
the regimes became harsher; in others, even more porous and permeable than 
before. This, in turn, undermined both the Irish penal state and other pastoral forms 
of imprisonment. These changes ultimately made prisons more punitive. However, 
this was the combined result of macro-economic developments and a political 




Second, the chapter presents the conflict that began with the emergence of a 
powerful Prison Officers Association (hereafter POA). The POA did not desire to 
control the character of imprisonment. Theirs was a challenge to the nature of Irish 
political culture, its authoritarian and centralised character, which demanded 
deference from low-ranking prison officers, who became increasingly resistant to 
managers. 
 
Third, the chapter charts the rise of crime and social disorder, analysing the impact 
on penal sensibilities and thus the imprisonment regimes, preventing certain kinds 
of pastoral penal developments. This chapter adds an important dimension to the 
narrative of Irish penal history, showing how from 1980 to 1993 the view of the 
prisoner we saw in the previous chapter, as family man and community member, 
began to alter and diversify. Increasingly conceived of as potentially dangerous, 
needier, more recalcitrant, and incorrigible. The ordinary prisoner was no longer 
mostly framed by tolerance, lenience and hope. Prisoners began to exhibit new 
needs, ones which the system had not been set up to handle. Central to the aims of 
this thesis, this chapter further examines how broader social anxieties make their 
way into the material form of the prison and how the prison becomes swept up in 




2. Retrograde Regimes 
 
Ireland entered a period of economic decline during the 1980s. The promise of the 
1970s gave way to the harsh realities of the subsequent decade, realities shaped by 
economic crisis. Unemployment rose to over 17 percent, mass emigration 
recommenced, the deficit increased, and the currency was devalued (O’Connell 
1999). The number of people being committed to prison continued to increase into 
the 1980s as well, and there was an enormous daily struggle to manage the prisons. 
It became clear to the administration that the soon-to-be-implemented CSOs would 
not be able to alleviate the overcrowding problem as they had hoped. They 
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admitted now that: ‘No substantial relief to our accommodation problem could be 
expected from the use of Community Service Orders which it was hoped to 
introduce in Autumn 1984’ (Treatment of Offenders Management Meeting, 
December 1983). The Division now believed that they needed a ‘near instant prison’ 
to meet the demand for places. But in the face of major fiscal pressure, the penal 
state was now being denied any extra resources. The development of new penal 
forms and planning, for instance, were hemmed in by restrictive finances, and the 
Division was forcefully reminded of this by the Department of Finance:  
‘cost is a crucial issue’ … [new proposals would] ‘be regarded as out of 
the question – unless they can be clearly shown to involve no extra cost’ 
(emphasis in original JUS/2001/62/1).  
 
 
According to Seamus, the most pressing matters of this era were a demand for space 
and an absence of capital: ‘The biggest thing was the overcrowding. You couldn’t do 
anything without the resources’. In an internal note, the Division described the 
consequences of their financial predicament:  
‘[We have] been managing the prisons on the cheap and at the expense 
of not only the review of prisons legislation but other crucial tasks too: 
for example, general inspections, preventive security inspections’ (4 July 
1984).  
 
Lacking the finances to develop more concerted plans they developed a series of 
expedient expansions. There was no more time for planning; ‘everything was ad 
hoc’, according to Jim. Seamus told a similar story, describing how he would arrive 
into the office knowing things were spinning out of control: ‘Every day you 
wouldn’t know what to expect…[events] set the agenda’. The terms ‘chaos’ and 
‘survival’ were frequently used:  
 
‘There was chaos, it was organised chaos…it was moving pieces all the 
time. Being run by a very small section in the Department…I remember 
going in in the mornings and you didn’t know what was going to come 
at you that day, and that was the way it was every day. In terms of 






A second wing was added to Cork Prison, while Loughan House, which had been a 
juvenile institution, was given a new operational designation as an open centre for 
between 50 and 100 adults. At the same time, the Department opened the 
Separation Unit at Mountjoy to accommodate the prisoners who were now being 
transferred from military detention in the Curragh back into the prison system. 
Here we see the familiar mix of high security as well as the open and small closed 
units typical of the 1970s. 
 
Sewell has argued that in the study of history and transformation one cannot ignore 
the emotive currents that guide decision-making and action. He writes that ‘high-
pitched emotional excitement is a constitutive ingredient of many transformative 
actions’ (1996:865). As mentioned in Chapter Three, operating under duress 
compounds strain and this kind of tension gives a new permissibility to previously 
unthinkable and unacceptable practices for imprisonment regimes (Bourdieu 
1990:262). This was exactly what began to happen in the 1980s as the Department 




The first of these unthinkable changes was ‘doubling-up’. Until 1983 Irish 
imprisonment regimes were bound to provide each person in prison with their own 
cell, as per the 1947 Prison Rules. Removing this entitlement was considered an 
uncivilised and inhumane development, as acknowledged in management minutes: 
‘Doubling up of offenders would be considered a retrograde step’ (Treatment of 
Offenders Management Meeting, April 1980). Giving more prisoners early release 
using TR was seen as ‘preferable’ to doubling-up (Annual Report 1983:8) Moreover, 
the resistance to doubling-up was presented as a praiseworthy feature of the Irish 




The continuing rise in prison committals, however, ruptured the boundaries 
between what had been expressly felt to be a detrimental change. There was an 
awareness that something, albeit drastic and unpalatable, had to be done: ‘[The] 
accommodation problem in the prison had reached almost crisis proportions. Harsh 
decisions would need to be taken if the situation deteriorated any further’ 
(Treatment of Offenders Management Meeting, May 1982).39 The anxiety and the 
demands of the system served to lift the threshold on these inhibitions, and 
doubling-up was now seen as an available option, albeit the worst case scenario: 
‘The “doubling up” of offenders offered a possible solution and must be seriously 
considered, despite the dangers inherent in this course of action’ (Treatment of 
Offenders Management Meeting, October 1980). 
 
By 1983, however, doubling-up had already become a de facto practice in Cork 
prison, and a prisoner there brought a legal challenge against the situation and 
conditions. The court found in favour of the government, but only due to a 
technicality. As a result, internally it was reported that they had now been forced to 
an impasse. The Department had to either eradicate de facto doubling-up or 
changing the Prison Rules to permit it (TAOIS/2013/100/311). Given the immediate 
emergency of rising numbers and potential future legal cases, the Department 
formally authorised accommodating more than one person per cell ‘for as long as 
the accommodation continues to be insufficient’ (Memorandum for Government 
May 1983). What had been a covert and resisted practice was now a strategic 
dimension of Irish imprisonment regimes and ‘over-crowding received official 
sanction’ (O’Donnell 2004b:252).  
 
This is a serious moment in understanding the changing governmental 
considerations which underpinned imprisonment regimes. This change legitimised 
practices which would have increased the pains of imprisonment, making it a more 
onerous and difficult context for prisoners. As Tom lamented: ‘doubling-up was the 
																																																						
39 They feared the overcrowding but also that doubling-up ‘facilitates homosexuality’ (TAOIS/2013/100/311) 
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biggest scourge…a disaster. No space, no light’. The punitive consequences of this 
new practice were illustrated by the Mountjoy Visiting Committee in their 1985 
report:  
 
‘In May 1983 a statutory instrument was made allowing the prison 
Governor to permit “two or more” offenders to occupy a cell when he 
judged that prison accommodation was insufficient to allow single cell 
occupancy. This represented a most serious setback to the possibility of 
maintaining and developing a humane regime within the prison…This 
imposes additional strain/punishment to the basic penalty imposed’ 
(p.47-48).  
 
Many in the Division agreed with these sentiments. But doubling-up was an 
expression of the prevailing atmosphere of panic, and as a regime change, it was a 





The second example of these retrograde, albeit pragmatic, manoeuvres was the re-
designation of Wheatfield. A prison that had been long planned and carefully 
researched was opened in a whirl of panic. Developed to replace the old and 
outmoded women’s prison, the anxiety about space and resources that pervaded the 
Department led to the redesign of long-term plans were remade in light of this new 
crisis. The prison was originally planned for 150 prisoners (juveniles and women); 
was reconfigured in 1985, it was intended to hold 144 women and girls and 320 
juveniles (Dáil Debates, vol 359, col 107, 30 May 1985). When Wheatfield finally 
opened in 1989, it was a closed men’s prison which held over 300 prisoners. Despite 
the promise of a new prison, however, Division officials predicted that Wheatfield 
would still not meet the demand for places (Treatment of Offenders Management 
Meeting, April 1984). This was a dramatic volte face, and was still not a solution to 





Shedding – A Rolling Amnesty 
 
In the context of rising prison committals and lack of funding, TR was adapted to 
move people even more speedily through the prison system. This came to be the 
most significant practice in managing the Irish prison population from the 1980s, 
and continuing into the 1990s. TR used in this manner came to be known as 
‘shedding’, in which prisoners were not just released for family occasions. They 
were instead being liberated to serve their sentence in the community in order to 
free up beds for new inmates. Shedding was distinctive because the release was 
rarely temporary. Previously, TR was achieved on a case-by-case basis, though was 
not entirely formalised – it became ad hoc in the 1980s, a different more crisis 
management approach within a similar informality. Rather than being individuated, 
shedding was a means to directly target the daily average prison population. It was 
used to permanently decamp individuals from the system. All that was required – 
usually –  was for prisoners to sign-on at regular intervals at the Garda station or the 
prison. The 1983 Annual Report declared that shedding was justified within the 
existing humanitarian framework: 
 
‘Until additional accommodation can be provided, the present practice 
of releasing some prisoners in advance of their normal release dates to 
make way for committals will have to continue. It should be understood, 
however, that the practice of releasing some prisoners early has been 
followed for many years for resocialisation purposes’ (p.7)  
 
It was felt to be better to release people than risk acute overcrowding: shedding ‘has 
been accepted reluctantly as the lesser of two evils, the alternative being serious 
overcrowding’ (Annual Report 1982:5). Similarly, the Minister for Justice, speaking to 
the Prison Officers Association in 1983, justified the  
‘extent of “shedding”…[because] The alternative has been the sort of 
crowding that has been resorted to in other countries’ and ‘Up to now 
we just have not got enough space in our institutions to accommodate 
all committals in comfort’ (Minister of Justice Speech to Prison Officers’ 






The use of release was being justified ultimately as a means to maintain a semblance 
of humanity within the prison system within the stringent economic context. 
Shedding was the practical compromise that made the most sense – i.e. the prisons 
must accept everyone sent there, but the Division could not incarcerate them for 
long, increasing the permeability of the imprisonment regime. 
 
This practice also maintained credibility for the same reasons shown in the previous 
chapter, namely the widely held view that the men being released were not 
criminals. For example, Niall described the people who were ‘shed’, as more like 
nuisances, compelled by poverty and hardship, rather than a criminal compulsion 
Prison would prioritise space for ‘real’ criminals: 
 
‘You just had to get them out because there were no beds for people 
coming in. It’s kind of a fundamental of prisons that you take in from 
the courts, you don’t say house full. So you had to do that every day, 
and sometimes you’d be letting people out who maybe had come in that 
morning for things that, that’s why you have to look at courts policy and 
the judges. Sometimes judges putting people into prison for very little, I 
mean, the television licenses. And of course those people who were 
persistently refusing to pay them didn’t mean the judge was sending 
everyone without a television license, but there were people in prison 
who were not criminals at all. There were also another type of prisoner 
who unfortunately, a lot of those got out and that was people who were 
persistent offenders, they’re a different category, they’re a dreadful 
nuisance to communities and older people and so on. And some of them 
got out because their offences, they committed, were not so grave, 
knocking off handbags and that sort of thing. So you always had to keep 
room for the bigger players, the assault and battery people, the wife 
beaters who, you know, people who did real offences’. 
 
Here the criminal activity is explicitly disaggregated from the prisoner, they were 
‘not criminals at all’, and repeat offenders were mere ‘nuisances’. Moreover, the 
cultural codes and motifs which explained crime were those related to monetary 
matters, the TV licence, the handbag thefts, what one might consider the petty crime 
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of poverty. The judges publicly deployed the power to punish, following which the 
Prison Division discreetly deployed the power to imprison in a way that was highly 
discretionary and often, as evidenced by the latter quote, radically altered the 
sentence given. The judiciary in turn still tended to respect the Division’s discretion 
(O’Malley 2006). 
 
They also developed the more purposefully titled ‘home-leave’ which was 
described as: 
‘a form of temporary release, which was adopted largely as a matter of 
necessity because of the pressure on accommodation, has, interestingly, 
become reasonably “popular”. even [sic] with some Gardai, [sic] who 
appear to consider that it affords a reasonable degree of control over 
offenders and it is, of course, one of the cheapest methods of keeping 
down the prison population’ (Department of Justice 1984g:3).  
 
Here we see the motivating mentalities of economic pragmatism and prison 
population management, and the cultural touchstones of home and family. TR 
was still divided into different categories such as Christmas and Easter leave; 
daily, short-term or weekend leave; renewable special leave; and, full TR. The 
latter was divided into those released under supervision of a probation and 
welfare officer and those who were released not under supervision. In 1988, the 
Department stopped officially recording the distinction between 
supervised/unsupervised release when, of the 1504 prisoners who received full 
TR, only 32 were placed under supervision. Renewable Leave was also 
essentially full release, and it was these fully released prisoners that made up the 
majority of TR. So, for example, of the 11,663 people who received TR in 1993, 
7,335 of them were on Full or Renewable Leave. 
 
Shedding was controversial, described as ‘the most obvious and worrying symptom 
of the current chaotic state of the Irish prison system’ (O’Mahony 1996:92). But 
between the pincers of low economic resources and high committals there was still a 
culture – albeit in a mutated form – in which prison accepted offenders, but 
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remained more concerned with release than punishment. Moreover, as seen in the 
previous chapter, there was an ambiguous view of prison rehabilitation and a belief 
that release was better than long periods of imprisonment. 
 





Total number of 
Temporary 
Releases  
1976 1049 1252 
1977 1029 2720 
1978 1179 3587 
1979 1140 2842 
1980 1215 3525 
1981 1196 3292 
1982 1236 4850 
1983 1450 4375 
1984 1594 7238 
1985 1863 5746 
1986 1869 5685 
1987 1943 4883 
1988 1962 6018 
1989 2067 5830 
1990 2108 8095 
1991 2141 9038 
1992 2184 8974 
1993 2171 11663 
 




This was not without its consequences. Despite claiming that shedding worked 
within their desire to keep the system humane, its corrosive impact on other 
advances in the regimes and programmes was acknowledged; a disservice to the 
progress that had been made:  
 
‘The high level of early releases is a matter of grave concern both to the 
prison administration and to the Garda Síochána.  On the one hand, 
unplanned releases disrupt resocialisation programmes for offenders and 
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have the effect of negativing [sic] the significant advances that have been 
made over the last decade in the provision of education, work-training 
and other services for offenders who are now less motivated to make the 
best use of them’ (Annual Report 1981:8).  
 
Concerns were raised that education programmes were increasingly difficult to 
administer due to ‘the level of transfers and early releases’ (Annual Report 1982:21) 
and that fewer people were completing courses in the Training Unit or engaging 
with education because knew that they would be released without supervision in 
the near future (ibid.:24, 39). Gerard was in passionate agreement with this criticism, 
arguing that it impacted negatively on the prisoners and undermined the 
programmes:  
‘There was massive overcrowding, and shedding, it was chaotic, and 
people were left out at short notice with no preparation… it’s very hard 
to have reformist intentions, say to get a prisoner through state exams, 
his Leaving Cert, get him some qualifications, get a job get a life move 
on, how could you do that if that prisoner would be the top candidate to 
get out that day?’ 
 
Shedding became so extensive it severely curtailed the Department’s capacity to 
produce any long-term strategies. Plans for consolidating prison legislation and 
updating the prison rules were marginalised by the way the administration 
managed the system. As they reported in 1984:  
‘the work which employs the largest number of (junior) staff is the daily 
chore of sifting through the prison population to find “suitable” 
offenders for temporary release, “shedding” etc [sic] in order to cope 
with the pressure on accommodation…In practice it has been found that 
day-to-day pressure inhibit or preclude “long-term” projects such as the 
review of the Prisons Acts and Rules’ (Department of Justice 1984c:12).  
 
Shedding became the most dominant practice of both imprisonment regimes and 
prison administration. As a result, respondents spoke of how the nuance had been 
stripped from their discretionary use of release in order to keep the prison numbers 




Niall: ‘So a lot of the day was spent identifying who was going to be 
released this evening so that they can maintain control. The prisons 
were overcrowded so you had to everyday release ten or twenty people, 
maybe more. The Assistant Secretary, one of the things that he got every 




We might better conceive of shedding as a rolling amnesty which was organised on a 
day-to-day basis rather than en masse, in the same way amnesties were also used in 
France and Germany to relieve prison overcrowding (Nelken 2011:110). These 
retrograde regimes were a result of the Division having to ‘muddle through’ 
(Lindblom 1959), but apt as it is, that concept does not capture the emotional 
intensity of these decisions, nor the stress that was endured. Reflecting on how 
things were in the Division by 1990 John was solemn, stating that: 
‘nothing changed… the pressure on the prison system was 
unrelenting…‘[We were] on the treadmill running a system, just 
running…we didn’t have the in-built processes for reflection. There was 
no research capacity, there was nobody there, no system in place. What 
really, what we’re doing isn’t working’.  
 
The pastoral political culture in the penal state under pressure, and found wanting 
by even its most dedicated advocates. 
	
	
3. Authority Under Threat 
 
By the mid-1980s, the Prison Division faced another serious issue. The POA had 
grown significantly in power and size during the 1970s and into the 1980s, as 
numbers of prison officers had grown during that period and they gained Trade 
Union status, allowing them to go on strike. By the 1980s, they had been 
identified in the Division as having ‘a tendency to militancy’ (Department of 
Justice 1984e:2). Ostensibly, the contention between the Division and the prison 
officers was that the latter’s overtime bill had been growing and the state needed 
to curtail it. The POA engaged in unannounced strikes from the end of the 1970s, 
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demanding a Committee of Inquiry into the prison system, better working 
conditions, more staff, and increased pay and subsidies (Bray 2008) – a situation 
that worsened after the Government’s 1982 pay embargo. 
 
The punitive shift in the experience of imprisonment regimes during this period 
was, in large part, driven by the prison officers. There were occasions from the 
end of the 1979 into the 1980s where prison officers refused to unlock prisoners 
from their cells, banned visits, banned the supervision of education, use of 
workshops and evening recreation. An Irish Times article (Murtagh, 2 December 
1984; Bray 2008) described the POA tactics as using ‘prisoners almost as hostages 
in their war of attrition with the Department’ (see Appendix 3 for a full list of 
incidents).  Between 1981 and 1983, POA protests intensified as they rejected the 
Division’s centralised authority. 
  
Liam, like others, described how the Department lost authority to the POA: ‘I 
think the Department lived in fear of the POA. And ministers lived in fear of the 
POA.’ In 1983, the Government acquiesced and assembled a Committee of 
Inquiry into the Irish prison system, the first of its kind. In exchange, the POA 
suspended industrial action until the findings of the inquiry were published. It 
was these intractable industrial relations difficulties which gave rise to what 
became the Whitaker Committee, accorded a comprehensive mandate to 
investigate the prison system. Within the Division, however, people hoped the 
Committee would provide them with legitimate and objective leverage against 
POA dissent (AGO 2014/23/1103). The ‘main purpose of the inquiry’, the Division 
wrote, should be tackling ‘costs, increased committals and pressure on 
accommodation. It is obviously essential to the secondary purpose of winning 
public support for the prison system as such’ (internal memo, 16 August 1982). 
 
The Committee was devised as a battleground for control of the prisons. A 
feeling evident within the Division:  
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‘it was in the Department’s interest to ensure that he [Whitaker] had 
ample material to work on from the start. Getting in first with a 
submission would give the Department a psychological edge over the 
other contributors, convince the chairman of our business-like approach 
and perhaps be instrumental in determining the direction the 
Committee might take’ (10 February 1984,	Treatment of Offenders 
Division Management Meeting).  
 
The Division prepared numerous research reports and papers for the Committee 
(Department of Justice 1984a; 1984b; 1984c; 1984d; 1984e; 1984f; 1984g). While the 
documents analysed here may not have been publicly available, they depict a 
Department with a sense of penological purpose and know-how. In these 
materials, they suggest that the Committee might investigate the usefulness of 
decriminalisation of homosexuality, drunkenness and the possession of cannabis 
as well as the validity of international practices such as the Swedish day fine, the 
possibility of weekend prison, greater use of TR, reducing sentence length and 
the overall number of people being committed to the prisons. 
 
The Whitaker Committee released its report in 1985. Their report was rigorous 
and detailed and included the research material provided by Division. Its 
authors reflected much of what the Division advocated for and practiced, 
supporting the liberal use of release, the notion that prisoners were ‘ordinary 
human beings’ (Committee of Inquiry 1985:96), that crime had social causes. The 
prison itself was affirmed as incapable of tacking crime, but it was likewise stated 
that prison should have the capacity to ‘do something towards improving 
individual offenders’ (ibid.). They also recommended a host of measures to 
reduce the use of imprisonment which, if implemented, promised to remove 500 
people from the prison system (ibid.112).  
 
But it also told a much more critical story. The report included pictures 
cataloguing the dilapidated and grimy conditions inside the prisons, a very 
different visual story to what the annual reports had advertised over previous 
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years. The most damning part of the report was its verdict against the nature of 
Irish penal authority, which was deemed to be too centralised. Prison matters 
had, they wrote, ‘drifted into the political sphere through the involvement of 
Departmental officials in such matters’ as ‘prison management and discipline’ 
(ibid.:122). These were claims redolent of the POA accusations (and other people 
who made submissions to Whitaker, such as the Governors40 and the Prisoner’s 
Rights Organisation), and the Committee stated that it was ‘satisfied’ that this 
indeed was the case (ibid.:20). The prison system, they argued, rather than being 
squirreled away inside the Department, should have clearer public leadership 
with stated objectives and greater responsibility delegated to staff inside the 
prison (ibid.:126). In sum, Whitaker recommended that the control of prisons 
should be removed from the Department of Justice and instead devolved to an 
independent board.  
 
Many of the humanitarian demands made by the Committee were shared with 
many staff inside the Division, to a greater or lesser degree. But what seems to 
have been an intractable point of conflict was the authoritarian and centralised 
discretion of the Irish penal state. Tom, who worked inside the prisons but had 
regular contact with the Division, supported the idea of the independent board in 
the 1980s as being part of a shift away from a more authoritarian kind of rule in 
Ireland: 
‘Governors were all fucking terrified of staff from the Department. They 
had awful power, the bastards. They could transfer you in the morning. 
You had no rights, no appeals, no rights. So if they didn’t like you you 
were on the train to Portlaoise. We grew up in a society that was very 
subservient, the Church and all that’. 
 
They POA wanted more money and to protect their overtime. Their protest was 
also a form of resistance against Irish authoritarian culture and the forms of 
fealty it demanded (Chubb 1992). As Tom described it, people were growing 
																																																						
40 Governors were not part of the POA. They were often engaged in a daily battle with them (see Lonergan 2010) 
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weary of the nature of Irish social and cultural authority in general and within 
the penal state in particular.  
 
Inside the Department they also saw Whitaker and the problems in the penal 
system as being related to power: 
John: ‘The Department’s reaction was that the Whitaker Committee was 
being simplistic in thinking the prisons board was going to fix this issue 
when the fundamental issue is about power.’ 
 
LB: ‘How do you mean power?’ 
 
John: ‘The POA exercising power…and basically putting the gun to 
management’s head to say if they don’t get ten extra people on duty or 
get extra overtime they’re going to, they’re not going to allow 
management to manage’. 
 
Whitaker’s findings and recommendations were felt to be against the 
Department, which ultimately undermined the credibility of the entire report in 
the eyes of the Government and the administration. There was anger about how 
the report portrayed many of the Division’s ideas and aspirations as its own: 
‘The reality is that in many regards the findings of Committee endorse 
the policy already being pursued by the Government but without 
actually saying so. Indeed, the opinion is often created that the 
committee was breaking new ground’ (marginalia, Memorandum for 
Government, 1987, Establishment of Prisons Board).   
 
What had offended the Department most egregiously was the suggestion of 
removing power from inside the Government. The Department was not going to 
create a board; the concept of an independent board defied the conservative and 
authoritarian aspects of their political culture. For the Department, the existence 
of political prisoners was an unquestionably political matter. Moreover, and 
alluding to their broader political ideas, it was felt to be anti-democratic. But we 
might better understand this as a less egalitarian desire. A board would also 
dismantle the Government’s more authoritarian character, diminishing its 
centralised power. The Department wrote in 1986 that the deprivation of liberty 
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was ‘an area so fundamental to the way a democratic society organises itself’ that 
it would be an error to remove it from the political sphere (Department of Justice 
1986:2). Later in 1987 at a Cabinet meeting, the Minister for Justice raised the 
matter as the central contention, stating that ‘the diminution of control by the 
elected Government of the day should be approached with great caution’ 
(Memorandum for Government, 1987, Establishment of Prisons Board). 
Devolving the power to punish outside the state apparatus was unthinkable 
within Ireland’s conservative political culture. 
 
Rather than providing a way forward, the Whitaker Report ended up creating a 
stalemate between the POA and Department, with tensions remaining high 
throughout the remaining period of this study. Niall described how by the 1990s, 
‘Whitaker had further entrenched positions by this stage [the early 1990s]. And 
the spread of inertia’. However, the issues of penal power and governmental 
authority were now established as contentious political matters and, in addition, 
the Division had now been publicly undermined. 
 
 
4. A Prisoner with New Needs 
 
There were other anxieties being faced by the Department when it came to prisons, 
particularly about the types of prisoners being received into the Irish prison system. 
Crime had peaked at an all-time high in 1983, a peak which reduced slightly 
through the rest of the decade, but then rose again until the mid-1990s (Brewer et al 
1999).41 The Government’s panic was not exclusively about numbers (rising crime, 
rising committals), however. Punishment is always about people. The dominant 
governmental perception of the prisoner, so fundamental in giving precise 
expression to differing modes of incarceration, began to reflect the shifting 
dynamics of Ireland’s social landscape. Because of a tendency in comparative 
																																																						
41 Though the rate of crime growth occurring in England and Wales was double the rate of the Irish crime growth 
(Brewer et al 1999). 
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penology to compare punishment using per capita imprisonment rates, there is 
sometimes a tacitly universalised image of the prisoner. The implicit assumption in 
these analyses of penal transformation or differences between prison systems is that 
the prisoner remains the same, it is the reaction to the prisoner, the sense of public 
fear and political anxiety, that changed. However, this is the result of the 
decontextualized perspective, which does not fully account for the changing penal 
and social problems that a government is trying to resolve (Hall et al 2013). Or how 
and why the prison is mobilised to address those problems (a point explored in 
more depth in Chapter Seven). However, the social changes of modernisation, 
polarisation and urbanisation imposed new barriers and brought new afflictions to 
the poor, particularly in urban areas. This ushered in new problems among the 
prison population. The people received into prison had new needs, new issues and 
more entrenched difficulties beyond the previous matters of unemployment and 
misfortune. As Seamus explained, the changes were social: ‘the prisoner and the 
prison changed because the world outside changed. You see the prison is a 
microcosm of society’. It was how those changes were perceived and acted upon, 
within the existing political culture, that resulted in further alterations in the 
imprisonment regime, and new images of the prisoner inscribed in new systems of 
intervention. 
 
The prison system’s regimes were organised around helping prisoners cope, find 
employment, become educated, and be with their families. These regimes were not 
equipped for the more acute needs that prisoners increasingly presented. When 
drugs first began to encroach upon the prisons at the beginning of the 1980s (Annual 
Report 1982) there was a sense that this was not a penal issue. The drug related 
prisoner was not believed to be the type of problem citizen the Division was 
intended to manage:  
 
‘The abuse of alcohol and drugs is on the increase. In particular there is a 
marked increase in the use of the “hard” drugs such as cocaine and heroin…The 
abuse of drugs and alcohol are victimless crimes and it was suggested that 
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offenders in these areas might better be dealt with at a detoxification centre’ 
(Treatment of Offenders Management Meeting, October 1980).  
 
This attitude recalls the claim outlined in the previous chapter, that corrective 
rehabilitation was not an organising rationality for Irish imprisonment regimes. This 
logic goes some way towards explaining the more relaxed view expressed in the 
above quote. 
 
However, this complacent feeling did not last. By the mid-1980s there was an ‘opiate 
epidemic’ in Ireland (Dean et al 1985), and the number of opiate deaths began to rise 
in the 1980s (Kelleher et al 2005). Though this was generally seen as a Dublin 
problem (Butler 2002), more prisoners were presenting with opiate addictions. 
Compiling a sociological profile of prisoners in Mountjoy in the 1990s O’Mahony 
exposed the extent to which opiate addiction had impacted the prison system: 
‘From the point of view of the well-being of prisoners, the climate within Mountjoy, 
and the management of the prison, the increase in drug problems is without doubt 
the most far-reaching and important change’ (O’Mahony 1997:161). O’Mahony 
charted the changing demographics of prisoner need. For example, prisoners in 
Mountjoy who used drugs other than cannabis rose from 37 percent to 77 percent 
between 1986 and 1996, serious dependency on hard drugs doubled from 31 percent 
to 63 percent. 
 














As prisoners with addictions and related health needs became an increasingly 
significant cohort in the prison system, the logic of what sorts of imprisonment 
regimes could be developed evolved correspondingly, becoming more pessimistic. 
The reality of drugs atrophied some of the ambition, permissiveness and empathy 
of the previous decade. The benefit of a historical sociological approach is that it 
allows us to observe new practices emerging (and explain the conjuncture of forces, 
processes and events which gave rise to them), while also illuminating what 
practices fell out of favour, and why ideas lost their relevance. Respondents who 
were witness to and involved in these events recalled this transition, with Seamus 
stating that: ‘[Previously] the prisoners were more manageable…[then] the prisoner 
became much more dangerous. The gangs and then the drugs’.  
 
Concerns were also raised about the ability to maintain the existing progressive 
regimes in light of the changing needs of the offender. The Training Unit’s ‘unique 
spirit, espirit de corps’ was being eroded, the Division noted, because there were 
more prisoners in the Unit who were on drugs, meaning the Unit was increasingly 
for custody only. The Division duly stated that they had ‘lost ground’ with the Unit 
(Treatment of Offenders Management Meeting, April 1984). This pressure on the 
Training Unit was also related to the overcrowding crisis, which meant that the 
parameters of suitability collapsed when faced with the demands for space. The 
1983 Annual Report stated that people were being transferred to the Training Unit 
who would not normally have qualified for it and staff found it difficult to cope as a 
result (p.13). It was suggested that the change in the ethos and organising principles 
of Irish imprisonment regimes was partially due to the changing nature of the 
offender, and the reduced ‘quality’ of the prisoner: 
‘there was not the quality of offender to turn back a number of years. 
We had to use the Unit to hold short-termers unsuitable for open 
centres…Of course the choice of offender would never be as good as 




The 1970s had established a pattern in which open prisons and lower security 
regimes were a significant characteristic in Irish imprisonment. In this same 
rationale, efforts had been made at the beginning of the 1980s to secure another 
open ‘big house’ (Annual Report 1981:5) as a response to rising committals. 
Acquiring large homes, such as Shelton Abbey, as a solution was seen as less viable 
by the mid-1980s. There was now an acknowledgment that the Division could no 
longer use prison in the same way because who was in prison had changed, making 
justifications for open regimes were felt to be less sensible. The empathy which had 
enabled pastoral forms of imprisonment in the 1970s took on a harsher tone: ‘[We] 
may be reaching the limits in our use of open centres – the hard core of the offender 
population is increasing all the time’ (Treatment of Offenders Management Meeting, 
February 1984). Indeed, reflecting a growing animus in the Irish public for the ‘drug 
addict’ (MacGreil 1996) 
 
Over time, a more diversified view of the ordinary prisoner emerged, one who was 
still vulnerable, sad, unfortunate, and poverty stricken but, now, by the 1990s was 
also understood as addicted and more unpredictable. There was a consequent 
waning of empathy. Like the prison reports from the 1970s, the later reports 
continued to have an informal narrative arc, revealing the fortunes and difficulties 
of the prison system. By the 1990s, however, these reports also suggested a growing 
antipathy towards some of the prisoners. The perceived social morality of some 
prisoners was felt to be changing:  
‘The problem of drugs also continues to undermine the prison system. 
Many prisoners use prison to get off drugs. However, a small hard core 
do everything in their power to continue their abuse’ (Annual Prison 
Report 1993:37).  
 
There were now prisoners who the Division believed did not wish to return to the 
fold of Irish community life. 
 
By the 1990s, Irish prison system was fighting a new battle. In the 1990s, methadone 
had become a daily feature of the Irish imprisonment regimes. By June 1996 the 
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Training Unit was formally re-designated as a ‘secure’ ‘drug free unit’ (Alyward 
2002:583; Department of Justice 1997a) for prisoners who either did not have a 
background in drugs or had stopped taking drugs. A detoxification treatment 
facility was opened in 1996 in the healthcare unit of Mountjoy, which had capacity 
for nine prisoners. The problem of drugs in prison were accepted as a distinct prison 
issue. Here, in the changing dynamic of imprisonment regimes – in the problems, 
and in how these problems were identified and assessed – a significant 
transformation in the ethos of the penal state. The communitarian and non-
interventionist reasoning that had motivated the more reluctant approach to 
corrective welfare strategies had waned.    
 
Crime and the prisoner were no longer connected simply to misfortune of poverty, 
but seen as a new social outsider: the drug addict. A social distance emerged 
between Division officials and some more socially excluded prisoners, creating a 
new social ‘boundary’ (Lamont 1992), rendering some prisoners’ social history and 
background less relatable, less readily sympathetic, and sometimes more repugnant. 
These prisoners required greater forms of strategic intervention and control. By the 
1990s there had been an erosion – though certainly not an eradication – of the social 
proximity and attendant attachment to the prisoner. The prison administration was 
not just addressing the prisoner numbers, capacity and overcrowding. The Division 
were now working with prisoners with greater collective needs, who as a socially 
excluded population required intervention – helping to illuminate the logic behind 
Ireland’s interventionist regimes. 
 
	
5. The Emerging Problem of Criminality 
 
Crime had been rising during the 1970s (O’Donnell and O’Sullivan 2001). The 
paramilitary prisoners, while still a cohort within the prison system, were largely 
contained within Portlaoise (Mulcahy 2005:291). Despite a break-out attempt in 1985 
(Rogan 2011:160), they were quickly replaced by greater logistical concerns. The 
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binary categorisation of ordinary/subversive began to fade through the 1980s, 
unable to capture the diversity of new category considerations. In Ireland, there was 
a new urban crime problem: joyriding became, for a time, a huge public and 
political news story, and the prison was employed as an expressive political tool for 
crime control. Fort Mitchel, an island off the south coast of Ireland, and a former 
naval base only accessible by boat, was commandeered by Department of Justice for 
use as a prison in March 1985. The Department installed a new prisoner population 
while these buildings were still in a state of disrepair (Annual Report 1985:15). This 
was the first time the development of prison regimes was linked to crime. This 
prison catered for males between 16-25, an age category erasing the usual 
separation of juveniles and adults, a significant and serious development, but 
justified because this was a prison for urban ‘joyriders’, a new criminal category of 
prisoner. 
 
Recalling the authoritarian atmosphere at the time, Jim was exasperated at what he 
described as the divisive law and order atmosphere:  
‘In the 1980s there was a moral panic. As far as I remember it was the 
Evening Herald [newspaper] lambasting crime and a lot of joyriding. 
Sean McDermott Street [inner city Dublin] and handbag snatching was 
seen as a big thing. The Minister for Justice, Michael Noonan’s response 
was to open Spike Island and put the “young guerriers in there”’. 
 
This was a landmark moment in the transformation of how Irish imprisonment was 
governed. Spike Island was brought into use for the sole purpose of exclusion and 
punishment. John described his disapproval at the decision to open this prison, 
which he saw as a political intervention:  
‘There was a lot of just reacting to events, there was the joyriding 
problem and Spike Island was opened because the Department was told 
by the political system you have to find somewhere to put these 
troublemakers who were driving up and down and getting out of hand 




Those final words refer to the riot that ensued shortly after the prison opened, and a 
fire destroyed much of the accommodation.   
 
The Spike Island fiasco reveals a political concern regarding certain kinds of crime 
distinct because they were associated with certain kinds of places and certain types of 
people. These place-specific crime problems continued to percolate within the 
Department. The publication of Urban Crime and Disorder (1992) documented the 
shifting concerns about these new places and communities in the changing Ireland, 
what was again described as the new ‘hard core’ (Department of Justice 1992:23). 
The report was framed within a crime control paradigm. Bowden asserts that the 
state responded to this issue of place-specific crime problems by focusing on 
gaining ‘sovereign power over newly urbanized space’ (Bowden 2014:51). Spike 
Island was historically anomalous as a penal response to crime control; however, 
looking back John described this as the first signs of the erosion of Irish pastoral 





In connection with urbanisation, poverty, and rising drug use in Ireland, was the 
emergence of organised criminal gangs in Ireland, mainly dealing in drugs 
(O’Donnell 2005:110).  These gangs ‘introduced a climate of violence and 
intimidation new to the Irish crime scene’ (O’Mahony 2000b:23). The execution-style 
shootings between rival gangs became national news. Between 1972 and1991 there 
were only two gangland-related murders (Dooley 1995:16); in 1996 there were eight 
(Dooley 2001:17). Even more troubling was the perceived impunity with which 
these gangs operated; gangland gun homicides tended to have a much lower 
detection and conviction rates. Of the 15 gang-related murders between 1992 and 
1996, only three resulted in a conviction (Dooley 2001:16–17). Black writes that 
during the early 1990s the media instigated a moral panic, as newspapers discussed 
these ‘untouchable’ criminals (2015:403). 
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The opposition justice spokesperson in parliament, John O’Donoghue, described 
1995 as ‘the year of the criminal’. The new murder patterns were evidence not just 
of a crime pattern but also a signal of a changing Ireland. As he graphically 
illustrated, murder used to have a domestic or rural aetiology; now murders were 
the result of a more vicious urbanised Ireland: 
‘Until recently the State averaged approximately 20 murders per year 
and, while that was desperately tragic, criminologists considered it 
typical relative to the size of the population. The bulk of those crimes 
were rural crimes of passion or linked to feuds over land and families. In 
1994 the number of murders was approximately 25 but so far this year 
the number of violent deaths had increased to 40. 
It is fair to say that 1995 — the year of the criminal — has been marked 
by the emergence of gangland murders…Tragically, it is now a fact of 
life — a fact of Dublin underworld life — that criminals are settling 
petty feuds by murdering people’ (Dáil Éireann Debate Vol. 458 No. 8, 
28 November 1995). 
 






                                                          Source: O’Donnell 200542 
 
 
It is precisely these feelings, irrationalities, crime sensibilities and emotions that we 
must take seriously if we are to explain the changes in the way prisoners and 
prisons were governed. Crime had been rising and newly emergent crime 
sensibilities were translated into actual penal practices via the rational assessments, 
power and resources available to convert those social sensibilities into penal 
practices. As such, it is the translation of cultural conceptions of crime within a 
																																																						
42 O’Donnell’s original chart (2005), for reasons of analytical harmony, excludes the 33 deaths from the terrorist 
bombings in Dublin and Monaghan in 1974. I have included them in this 1971-1980 calculation.  
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particular social context and through a specific set of governmental actors and 
bodies which defines crime’s influence upon imprisonment practices. This 
argument adds weight to the point that crime does influence imprisonment and 
penal politics (Garland 2001; Hall et al 2013), though not in a linear way at the level 
of aggregate rates (Lappi-Seppälä 2008). 
 
The acknowledgment of crime as a new and serious social phenomenon was evident 
in the sort of value-laden descriptions of aggregate statistical crime rises offered by 
the Division: ‘what is not brought out by examining the gross figures for violent 
offences is the fact that vicious crime is now more widespread’ (Department of 
Justice 1994: 27). Increasing crime rates and violent crimes gave rise to new 
anxieties, raised questions about the role of government in addressing, ameliorating 
and controlling these issues.  
 
 
6. Revolving Door 
	
The use of shedding, highlighted earlier in this chapter, became more controversial 
in the context of rising crime, particularly the emergence of urban crime, gangland 
violence and drug addiction. There were shifting views of the prisoner as someone 
more dangerous and socially risky, which led to further criticism of the practice of 
shedding. It was in this context that shedding came to be seen as contributing to 
public disorder. The excessive permeability of prison regimes was increasingly 
connected to recidivism. This led to the third conceptual incarnation of TR: the 
‘revolving door’; a metaphor intended to capture the cyclical pattern of releasing 
prisoners who then reoffended, were re-sentenced, and perhaps shed again. The 
following quote from the Mountjoy Visiting Committee in 1988 captures the newly 
connected ideas of liberal release and social risk:  
 
‘It is quite distressing for us to have seen prisoners released knowing 
with almost absolute certainty that they would in a very short time 
assault, rape or possibly kill some innocent person. For ourselves, the 
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prison, and professional staff many of these crimes are predictable. 
Many could be prevented’ (p.47). 
 
Writing publicly about the factors contributing to the rising crime levels, the Garda 
Commissioner levelled partial blame at the use of TR (referenced in O’Donnell and 
O’Sullivan 2002:46). The revolving door ‘attracted considerable public opprobrium’ 
(Alyward 2002:575) and it became a target for political attack. At the beginning of 
the 1990s the government endured severe criticism for this penal practice from the 
opposition benches (Rogan 2011:13).  
 
The idea of the revolving door captures an emerging connection between release 
and ideas of injustice in Irish political culture. Arguments mounted that the 
problem was now more than a lack of prison space, the use of release was accused 
of bringing the idea of justice into disrepute (O’Mahony 2000b:13). A former Prison 
Division psychologist denounced shedding as ‘a travesty of justice…It is hard to 
imagine any policy better designed to subvert the intentions of sentencing and to 
undermine the authority of the judiciary’ (O’Mahony 1996:92). New staff in the 
Division saw release as being ‘grossly abused’ (Gerard). There was a new diagnosis 
of the problem that needed to be addressed, namely the abuse of state penal power. The 
revolving door as a metaphor reveals some sense of prison’s failure to contain and 
control crime and criminality. Thus, this was not just a failure of the prison system, 
but a failure of the government. The logic of practice – concerned with daily release 
and restrained punitive intervention – was increasingly viewed as perverse and the 
consequences of the state’s inability to cope, as Cormac recalled:  
‘You had the revolving door and prisons couldn’t cope and a big 
increase in crime and people going to jail and drug issues in prisons, 
and revolving door in the sense that prisons are not big enough to cope’. 
 
 
As the pressure to stem the flow of daily releases mounted, there was a new 
struggle to open another prison. In 1992 it was announced that Castlerea, an 
asylum in the west of Ireland, would be converted into a prison. In the end, lack 
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of funding meant that the project stalled after the prison wall was built (Rogan 
2011:182). In the same period, another set of plans for the new women’s prison at 
Mountjoy were also cancelled according to Gerard. The Prison Division was 
being denied access to the resources required to extend the prison estate. Despite 
the crime problem, building more prisons was not a priority in Ireland. 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
The chapter has shown how the political culture underpinning pastoral 
imprisonment regimes came under challenge and how, as a consequence, the 
imprisonment regimes themselves began to alter accordingly. It was not only 
pressure on numbers that undermined the operating assumptions of Irish 
political culture. It was now perceived that the ‘ordinary decent criminal’ was 
being marginalised by a new ‘hard core’ group of drug addicts, gang members 
and ‘real’ criminals. It was no longer a matter of working upon and engaging 
with their familial bonds. A growing number of prisoners presented new 
problems, and this challenged the previous forms of prison practices and control. 
Pastoral support duly heeded space to detoxification and medicalization. 
 
But what is evident here is also the resilience of the fundamental rationalities of 
pastoral conservatism, release was still among the basic working assumptions of 
the Division. Even in its hyperbolic form, the Division favoured using their 
power to establish a rolling amnesty to prevent even more overcrowding. 
Pastoral penality continued to provide the ideas to solve the problems of the 
prison system, though those ideas morphed and mutated in the pragmatic 
process of solving those penal problems. That in turn, however, undermined the 
practices of pastoral imprisonment, accused of now turning the prison into a 




The metaphor of the revolving door described in this chapter suggests the 
dissolving bonds of social trust. The type of criminality prisoners was engaged in 
was less likely to be tolerated. Tolerance and leniency were increasingly seen as a 
social risk. Release went into overdrive just when the communitarian ideas that 
had supported permeable forms of imprisonment began to loosen. Shedding and 
the revolving door brought the issue of containment and penal confinement into 
contention, and not just the absence of space. It also illustrates that there was a 
greater unease regarding recidivism and the state’s inability to control the 
emerging urban crime problem. These are important findings which help us 
explain the evolving nature of Irish penal culture. We see how Ireland ‘edged, bit 
by bit, to a “law-and-order mood’” (Hall et al 1978:272) by the beginning of the 
1990s.  
 
Despite these penal, political and social predicaments changes in prison practices 
were generally incremental and pragmatic in this period. However, more dramatic 
and concerted transformations in the imprisonment regimes and prison 
administration were to come, which were rooted in the destabilisation of this 
period. The changes charted in this chapter gave life to a new and more explicit 
debate about the appropriate use of state authority in the management of prisons, 



















The previous two chapters have made a number of distinct claims that suggest 
that Irish imprisonment regimes were the outcome of political culture. This, in 
turn, was embedded in the social context and cultural fault lines of Irish life and 
contingent on the events as they occurred. As a result of these historical, social, 
cultural and political forces, prison in Ireland had generally been moderate and 
maintained a humane streak; despite the difficulties of the 1980s, release 
remained the favoured tecnique of imprisonment. Yet, if that is the case, then 
changes in the underlying social landscape can bring new political pressures, 
cultural conflicts and unsettle even the most accepted penal sensibilities. This 
chapter charts precisely this kind of social transformation as it occurred in 1990s 
Ireland, arguing that Irish social change ultimately expanded the responsibility 
of the Government and altered the meanings of Irish imprisonment. 
 
The first part of this chapter provides an extended outline of the changing nature 
of Irish social and political authority in the 1990s, demonstrating that the social 
field in which prisons and Government operated was changing extensively.  
 
The second section, using mostly interview material, captures the clashes 
regarding the fundamental purpose of both Government and punishment within 
the Department. Some wanted to reaffirm pastoral imprisonment, which had lost 
ground. Others saw it as a lost cause, too informal, naïvely optimistic and too 
individualised; Ireland was changing, crime was rising, the prisoner was no 




Changes that followed in Irish imprisonment and penal politics were not 
inevitable, but context and events also directed the course of action, providing 
the raw materials for those espousing a more punitive vision of imprisonment to 
make their case more persuasive. The chapter illustrates this by describing the 
huge public and political outcry after a well-known journalist was assassinated 
by an equally well-known gangland figure. This murder tapped into the existing 
social insecurities and anxieties about growing crime and changing Ireland. The 
analysis in this chapter argues that as a result of the combination of internal 
Departmental conflicts, social changes, and a signal crime in mid-1990s, there 
was the emergence of a new political culture of sovereign authority, which gave 
rise to new penal practices, characterised as punitive imprisonment regimes.  
 
The evidence shows the cumulative impact this new political culture had on Irish 
imprisonment regimes. Incapacitation and control were the new imperatives of 
imprisonment, as well as an emerging belief in prison’s rehabilitative capacities. 
The prison estate was substantially expanded and made far less permeable. More 
people were imprisoned for longer. Ireland’s prisons underwent another phase 
of prison modernisation, but one shaped by punitive sensibilities and the 
expansion of political authority of the Irish penal state.	In sum, there was a move 
from penal restraint to penal repression as the organising principles of state 
rationality. 
 
However, these extraordinary penal and cultural transformations can only be 
fully explained when foregrounded against the social changes that were on-
going in Ireland. The traditional authority of the Church and the autonomy of the 
family had become undermined by forces of social modernisation. For the first 
time in its history, the State, and not the Church, came to monopolise the 
legitimate forms of violence. In line with these changes, and within the particular 
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context of events, prison in Ireland was reorganised as a tool of crime control, no 
longer on the periphery of social control machinery.  
 
	
2. Shifting Authority, Power and Control 
 
The 1960s into the 1970s marked the first in a small rise in Irish economic fortunes, 
although the 1980s saw a harsh reversal of these gains. By the 1990s, however, 
Ireland experienced unprecedented growth and the Irish social, political and 
cultural landscape underwent a remarkable transformation. The literature, the data, 
and documents from the 1990s are riven with stories of social revolution and 
breathless accounts of rapid change. The pace of Irish socio-cultural change by the 
middle of the 1990s seems to have been bewildering, and the ‘miraculous’ (Sweeney 
1999) economic situation of the 1990s have dominated accounts of changing Ireland.  
 
Ireland’s agrarian and rural image had become a marginalised reality. From 1961 to 
1991, agriculture gave way as the dominant industry as the rise in manufacturing 
and service industries continued to proliferate. There was also a growing number of 
people now with access to education (Hardiman and Whelan 1998:68-69). Another 
example of the move away from a traditional society was the shifting position of 
women in the Irish social order. By the 1990s Irish women were ‘abandoning the 
notion that their lot in life is to get married, to get pregnant and to beget a large 
family’ (Inglis 1998:238-239). One statistical marker of this change was the increased 
number of married women in the labour market. In 1961, a mere 5% of all married 
women worked outside the home, but by 1991, 37% did (Hardiman and Whelan 
1998:69). That reality of the Irish family, an image so valorised and protected, was 
fraying, diversifying and rapidly modernising.  
 
There was a sense of renaissance, Ireland – emerging from a long and stagnant 
history as an aspiring agrarian Catholic island (Keogh 1994:29) – now appeared on a 
global stage. This was the beginning of the ‘Celtic Tiger’, a time of unprecedented 
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economic prosperity. After being considered a ‘semi-developed’ (Ruane 2007:xi) 
and ‘third world’ country as late as the 1980s, the 1990s saw an average GDP 
growth of 7% per annum (Coulter 2002:3). Ireland was now in the throes of rapid 
modernisation and ‘radical’ social revolution (Crotty 1998:1). The ceaseless flow of 
people emigrating came to an end, and in 1996 Ireland began to experience net 
immigration (Central Statistics Office 2003). Another huge positive change was the 
IRA ceasefire of 1994. The ceasefire was broken in 1996, but restored again in 1997 
(McEvoy 1998b). This period culminated with the momentous Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998. It has been suggested that the 1990s might have been ‘the best of 
times’ for the Irish people (Fahey et al 2007). 
 
The literature is also divided on whether the social changes of this period were 
positive or negative. Coulter and colleagues (2003) have berated the undiluted 
optimism in analyses of Irish late-modernism. It may well have been a time of 
greater affluence but the spoils of economic success were unevenly distributed 
among different class groups. There were new opportunities for working 
professionals, particularly via increased education and access to higher paying 
occupations and greater disposal income. Ireland’s advancing fortunes created a 
more professional class (Inglis 1998; O’Connell 1999). Ireland’s once homogenous 
and horizontal social structure began to evidence division (Inglis 1998; O’Connell 
1999) as ‘The speed of change meant that many of the less skilled lost out in the 
process’ (Hardiman and Whelan 1998:69). O’Connell (1999) argues that those who 
lacked the skills and educational qualifications to access the new employment 
marketplace were excluded from the lifestyle offered by the Celtic Tiger (such as 
those people displaced from indigenous companies by the influx of foreign and hi-
tech industries (ibid.:220)). While both unemployment and long-term 
unemployment figures were plummeting, those who remained unemployed were 
an increasingly marginalised group, entrenching their social exclusion. While a 
newly empowered and financially endowed middle class may have been imbued 
with a greater sense of confidence by the end of the 1990s there was ‘a marginalised 
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working class characterised by long-term unemployment, poverty and fatalism’; in 
this period, Ireland saw ‘the emergence of an increasingly polarised society’ 
(Hardiman and Whelan 1998:68-70).  
 
Among the most significant of the changes during these years, was in the balance of 
social authority, which had been wicking away from the Catholic Church as it lost 
its status as a vital social institution (Ganiel 2016). Inglis (1998:13), in a compelling 
analysis, describes how the Church’s grip on Irish institutional, moral, political and 
economic life ‘helped maintain Ireland as a conservative, rural society and delayed 
its full modernisation until the second half of the twentieth century’ (1998:13). As 
we saw in Chapter Five, the State had been pulling away from its symbiotic 
relationship which the Church since the 1960s. In the 1990s, the Church lost much of 
its social power and influence as a series of sex scandals, public revelations 
regarding clerical sex abuse and the export of babies for adoption (children born to 
unmarried mothers in Laundries and Mother and Baby Homes) – the latter 
presenting a particularly harsh example of the Church’s control over citizens’ moral 
conduct (Inglis 1998). The move away from religious social control is also evident in 
the demise of the carceral archipelago that had formed Ireland’s network of coercive 
confinement, which had declined significantly from the 1950s, with the final 
Magdalen Home closing in 1996 (O’Sullivan and O’Donnell 2012). Church 
dominance of social control and penal mechanisms had dwindled and the State 
began to take its place as the central authoritative institution directing Irish social 
order. For example, Inglis maintains that during this period, in the 1990s, the social 
worker has taken over much of the power previously controlled by the priest in 
Ireland, like the right to knock to a home unannounced, gain entry and inquire 
about personal household matters (Inglis 1998:230-231; Skehill 2003). 
 
The oppressive Catholic consensus that had coordinated Irish political and 
community life began to collapse. Inglis (1998) writes that the easing of community 
conformity and tradition heeded some territory to modernisation. For example, 
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divorce passed into legislation via a referendum in 1995 (only nine years earlier, in 
1986, two thirds of citizens had voted against divorce, see Dillon 1998). Ireland was 
beginning to reframe laws in a manner which privileged individual rights over 
traditional religious doctrine (Dillon 1998). Contraception became fully legalised 
(Beatty 2013) and homosexuality was decriminalised in 1993. The 1990s was 
therefore a period in which changes in the law allowed a more pluralist lifestyle, 
that was less homogenously Catholic (Ganiel 2016). 
 
One would not want to overstate this as a revolution in religiosity, however. Indeed, 
Beatty writes that: ‘“Revolution” is one of the more abused terms in Irish 
historiography’ (2013:116) because it overstates the 1990s social change as a total 
break from the past, particularly in relation to religious values. Irish people retained 
their faith, but lost trust in the social authority of the Church (Peillon 1998a:119). 
Though increasingly, secular Ireland remains a country committed to Catholicism 
(Hirschle 2010). As per the 2011 census, 84.2 percent of people in Ireland identified 
as Catholic. This was an evolution not in belief and religiosity but in social 
authority, in which the Church had lost its purchase as an important governing 
power bloc, and it no longer dominated the legitimate use of violence. 
 
The shifting dynamics of morality and social control meant that Ireland’s social 
landscape was in the process of modernising as urbanisation and industrialisation 
accelerated, albeit considerably later than other Anglophone countries. In the 1990s, 
Ireland emerged as a ‘late moderniser’ (Tovey and Share 2003:42).  
 
	
3. Cultural Conflict 
 
Life within the Division remained chaotic. Reflecting the changing socio-economic 
and cultural norms in Irish life a new ideational conflict developed within the 
Division. The reliance on TR – shedding and the revolving door –  and conflict with 
the POA had brought the system into disrepute and it became the issue around 
	
203 
which the function of the penal state and imprisonment was debated. There was 
also a growing dissent in the Prison Division. Niall described the dissent in quite 
discreet and restrained terms, as a new superiority:  
 
‘[T]here were certain, certain attitudes within, in the situation within. 
Now within there was a couple of [senior officers] and then staff going 
down the line…there was a clique, a small senior clique of more senior 
people. Who, who I think were, they were a clique and had a slightly 
superior approach to other things and there was a bit of resistance there 
to some things [we were] trying to do’. 
 
People identified the period as a time of change. Those changes were largely 
defined in terms which evidence a shifting set of sensibilities and governing 
rationalities. Jim lamented the growth of a new law and order attitude in the office: 
 
‘[S]ome [senior civil servants] were very gung-ho, they loved this kinda 
stuff. [Other senior civil servants] remained marginalised and would 
have had deep reservations about it all. There would be deep divisions’. 
  
John also described a much starker ideological and cultural division emerging in the 
office. Saying that some people’s views ‘veered towards the primitive’ and that 
‘people really had to work hard that the punitive reaction didn’t take precedence 
over: we need to run a humane system here’. 
 
A rationality of security was emerging, calling into question the legitimacy of the 
current practices of the Government. Why was energy being expended releasing 
prisoners rather than containing them? Gerard was vociferous on this issue: 
 
‘[Y]ou lived with the risk all the time you were letting an axe killer out…But it 
made a travesty of the system and a mockery of justice because people weren’t 
serving anywhere remotely like the amount of time they can serve…It was a 
mess. It was a shambles … the system is too small to cope, we must build more 





This encapsulates a new oppositional undercurrent which manifested in the 1990s, 
challenging the processes, aims and motivations of the Prison Division, both their 
pastoral conservative culture and their support of pastoral imprisonment. What is 
also evident was that this security position was rationalised by the image of the 
‘dangerous prisoner’ – the prospect of the ‘axe murderer’. Gerard, like others, saw 
release as dangerous. The use of release and reducing imprisonment, and the 
extension of Probation and Welfare and CSOs, were seen by some within the 
Division to be exhausted as potential remedies. The previous sympathetic 
sensibilities towards the prisoner, rather than the victim, appeared to some as 
offensively misplaced. Why should the background of a prisoner justify Ireland’s 
rolling amnesty? Prisoners were criminals, as Gerard saw it. With an account replete 
with agitation, he described how the efficacy of the community needed to be 
protected from prisoners:  
 
 ‘[There were] people in communities who were being bullied and oppressed 
by criminals. Sometimes the narrative in the media about criminals is that 
they’re the true victims, but I don’t buy that. Absolutely, many of them have 
tragic histories but if you live in a high crime area, you’re at the mercy of people, 
however sad their lives might have been, they are the oppressor. They’re 
oppressing other people, and that gets forgotten. There’s a lazy left-wing 
rhetoric that puts forward offenders as the real victims. But if you’re living in a 
community where houses are being broken into all the time, old people mugged 
and there’s, you know, all kinds of depravity around drug misuse in the 
neighbourhood that’s a living torment to live in a community like that. And 
these people were truly their oppressors and we were releasing people like that 
onto the streets all the time and I found it appalling…They’re involved in street 
crime. The system has silted up a little bit with lifers, but the majority of people 
were not in for that kind of sentence but they were very active criminals, 
burglars and you know, a burglar in a life time, a proper career burglar 
probably gets detected and convicted of one tenth of their activity, it’s what 
they do, they rob houses, and they sometimes get caught, but most times they 
don’t. So they were making, they were feeding into our crime figures in a big 
way. And even street level drug dealers are a scourge, you know, they’re a 
serious menace to society’. 
 
This graphically visceral account alludes to new understandings of justice, inclusion 
and exclusion, making it clear that the prisoner was being viewed by some, not as a 
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member of society, but as dangerously detached, a persecutor. To have a potentially 
‘dangerous’ person in the community rather than the prison was morally wrong 
and harmful to neighbourhoods –  neighbourhoods the Government should be 
protecting from the figure of the addict and the career criminal. The prisoner was no 
longer a trustworthy member of society; trust and tolerance for some came to be 
replaced by a sense of threat. Here we see a new strain of conservatism, one which 
was still focused on community integrity and family values, but the prison was now 
being invoked as a way to protect those conservative Irish touchstones – a major 
inversion from the earlier view that the prison interfered with community and 
family. This was a less inclusive nationalistic kind of conservatism. Political 
authority, it was argued, should use the prison to defend rather than protect or 
enforce Irish conservative communitarian hegemony. 
 
These conflicting approaches led to what was described as ‘an internal battle there 
about where to go with it’ (Gerard), as the project of Government and the purpose 
of imprisonment now aroused debate and caused battle lines to be drawn. There 
was disagreement about who the prisoner was, how the prison should be organised, 
and what sort of responsibility the Government had in addressing crime – those 
fundamental features of political culture. John was more sanguine, describing this 
‘battle’ as a series of heated family fights. However, these disputes were also 
couched in terms of morality and ethics, these issues may have been concerned with 
best practice, but that required a debate about the fundamentals of prison and 
Government: ‘People on a personal basis didn’t agree. And people were of the lock-
them-up and throw-away-the-key. It’s like families, there was some serious 
disagreements about philosophies’. Others spoke about these new conflicts as 
‘clashes’ in which the individuals who were more steeped in pastoral mentality 
became side-lined and ‘marginalized’ because ‘[They] had very different attitudes to 




Though a cultural divide was becoming apparent within the penal state, the penal 
sensibilities that buffered and motivated the system were diversifying and evolving 
rather than being outright dismantled, as shown in the previous chapter. The 
annual prison reports, as late as 1993, continued to present a more humane image of 
the prisoner. They continued to be structured as a more affective and diarised 
narrative of the prisoners and their successes, which remained largely distant from 
social and governmental matters of crime control. These narrative sections could go 
on for pages, depending on who had visited the prison (charities, writers, 
community organisations, musicians, visiting speakers) what had progressed in 
terms of maintenance, or activities (newsletters, annual sports day), and what sorts 
of activities the prisoners had been engaged in (community projects, work and 
training). They spoke of how prisoners felt, success remained amorphous, more 
abstractly linked to prisoners’ personal achievement and development and the life 
of prison community rather than strategic ends of rehabilitation, deterrence or 
normalisation. Prisoners, for example, in Shelton Abbey were described thus: ‘The 
vast majority of offenders appreciate the opportunity to serve out their time in this 
Open Prison. Consequently they take a keen interest in the house and grounds’ 
(Annual Report 1993:23). While in Wheatfield ‘1993 was a special year for the Work 
and Training Area. It was marked by a succession of impressive achievements and 




4. Reaffirming Pastoral Imprisonment 
 
It was during this time of conflict in Irish political culture that saw the publication 
of The Management of Offenders – A Five Year Plan (1994, hereafter MofO); as the first 
policy document with a clear strategy for Irish prisons, this was a seminal 
development. Niall described how it had been produced, a process in which he had 
direct involvement. MofO had the clear aim of setting the future prison agenda, but 
it was also an attempt to take control of the direction of the penal state and Irish 
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imprisonment regimes, which had been lurching from one crisis to another. This 
was the first evidence of a more strategic rationale emerging in relation to prisons in 
Ireland.  
 
MofO was not ground-breaking in terms of ideas; rather, it was reaffirming. It 
reflected the political culture that had been dominant but was now under threat. 
The document was a means to publicly establish these penal sensibilities and 
rationalities as formal policy. Niall described it as reflecting: ‘A lot of what I felt 
about prisons at that time was in that [document]’. Others, like Jim, recognised that 
this was rooted in a particular set of pre-existing penal sensibilities and logics, and 
saw it as an attempt to reignite support for that ethos:  
‘people in prison [are] as much sinned against as sinning…[given] the 
deprivation most of them are coming from. There should be minimum 
use of custody and minimum use of security and normalisation of 
prison life; now that’s penal welfarism if ever there was. But you see 
some civil servants had that attitude and you can see it in the earlier 
document [Statement of Objectives (1981a)], and in The Management of 
Offenders in 1994’.  
 
After the years of protracted panic, industrial disturbances and overcrowding the 
document was an attempt to reclaim as well as publicly assert the logic and 
conventions of Irish penal practice. For example, the view of the system’s future 
success was described as regaining the view of the prisoner and resourcing the 
practice of imprisonment from the 1970s: 
 
‘In recent times the temporary release system under the Criminal Justice Act, 
1960 has been devalued by the perception that it is used only as a means to 
reduce offender numbers. It is not widely known that some (though not as 
many as would be desirable) of these releases are supervised and that in the 
1970’s [sic] a temporary release system with supervision provided a flexible 
system of parole which offered scope for the management of offender in the 
community with little risk to the public and with very much enhanced 
prospects of leading offenders towards a more constructive lifestyle in the 




The 1970s here was represented as an important era with distinct imprisonment 
regime; when practice operated more coherently, and was shaped by clear 
objectives. Some civil servants desired a return to that enhanced release system in 
which ‘those in prison remain valued members of society entitled on release to take 
a constructive place in society’ (p.22).  
 
In keeping with pastoral penal culture the future vision of prison propounded was 
one in which release remained absolutely central and which strengthened 
community-based social work, not carceral expansion. Such was the reluctance to 
increase the use of prisons that MofO advocated installing a formal cap on prison 
places, with a remit to build no more than 210 extra prisoner places. This suggestion 
was presented as credible because of that familiar idea that prison was 
inappropriate as a tool of social control, with rehabilitative capacities that were 
ambiguous at best: 
 
‘There have, on the other hand, always been questions about the long-
term value of imprisonment as a means of social control, about the 
success or otherwise of prisons in diverting offenders from a life of 
crime and about the possibility of developing more community-based 
sanctions and measures’ (ibid.:29).  
 
As crime was increasing during this period, the cap proposed by MofO may seem 
radical, but viewed within the history of cultural practices that had characterised 
Irish penal politics – CSOs, TR, open prisons – it was perfectly aligned with a 
general penal parsimony, and the high threshold of for long-term incarceration 
(such as subversives) that had defined the style of thinking and shaped how prisons 
and prisoners were managed.  
 
In MofO the prisoner was still an individual who exhibited a particularly 





‘The case of each offender usually presents a unique set of circumstance 
– up-bringing, family relationships, nature and circumstances of offence, 
willingness and capacity to make good’ (ibid.:40)  
 
This document, while attempting to create historical continuity in imprisonment 
regimes, was also reflective of the context in which it was written; political culture 
must adapt to the problems its faces. MofO accepted that the public and the victim 
were new participants and active spectators in policy decisions. This reflected that a 
new disdain for the prisoner-as-criminal were forces which must be considered. It 
was accepted that there were a new set of obligations owed to the public for their 
protection. As the below extended extract illustrates, they were concerned about 
prison being seen as successful because it contained bad people: 
 
‘While acknowledging the potentially harmful effects of imprisonment on the 
individual offender and sharing the doubt as to its prospects of producing any 
significant rehabilitative success in many cases, it has to be said that it is 
unlikely that the majority of people – especially those who have been victims of 
crime – would be inclined, now, to reject the value of the imprisonment option, 
or seriously doubt its value, on these grounds alone. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that most people, against a background where the viciousness of 
individual criminal acts has been the source of widespread revulsion, would 
tend to see imprisonment as a “success” once the offender is securely contained 
and thereby deprived – for the period of detention – of any further immediate 
opportunity of victimising his or her fellow citizens’ (ibib.:30).  
 
 
At a time when the administration of prisons was chaotic and in need of some 
forward plan MofO seems to have been well placed to provide a set of directions 
and formal strategies to help alleviate the stress within the penal state. So why 
did this first strategy statement for prisons in Ireland become ‘shelved’ 
(O’Donnell and O’Sullivan 2001:31)? Researched ‘from the inside’ – from the 
voices and experiences of those who were there in this time, and set against a 
historical backdrop – we see that the ideas perused and formalised in MofO were 
also an object of ideological and cultural conflict. Strengthening TR and 
maintaining the prison population numbers as low as possible no longer grasped 
the imaginations of the majority of key agents of the penal state. As a strategy it 
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failed to convince and persuade those who were demanding greater 
incapacitative penal power.  
 
The programme laid out in the document, rooted as it was in the pre-existing 
dominant logic of lenient communitarian sensibilities and pastoral practice, was not 
met with approval or support from all Prison Division colleagues. Tom described it 
in the most praising terms but was totally despairing when recalling how some 
colleagues rallied against it: ‘[MofO was a] tremendous document…[but] the 
number of fucking critics of that document, but the frustrating thing was not one of 
them wrote a line’. 
 
One critic – and former Departmental psychologist – writing at the time, excoriated 
MofO precisely because of its restated commitment to the dominant logic of the 
1970s, and as the continuation of an equivocating and dithering approach that had 
long defined the Department. In this light, it was viewed as no more than ‘an 
unquestioning adherence to the status quo’ (O’Mahony 1996:94). 
 
MofO as a set of ideas now only represented one side in the conflict in Irish political 
culture. Others set themselves in opposition to the views espoused in that policy 
document. It was argued that pastoral imprisonment as a way of thinking and 
organising imprisonment was no longer practical. Gerard was clear that he 
perceived MofO as not ‘realistic’, and challenged the vision of what had previously 
been considered pragmatic:  
 
‘[Pragmatism] means realism, being realistic. You have to respond to the world 
as you find it not the world as you wish it to be. A person who’s in front of you 
might have had a tragic family up bringing but they’ve also offended 
grievously against society and probably represent a danger at the moment to 
society…It’s like, you know, reality is at fault, [a senior civil servant] just 
couldn’t live with the reality that you can’t just turn a dial and tell the courts to 
stop sending people…it was a repetition of the same mistake and mantra…The 
mantra being cut the numbers and everything will sort ourselves out, we lock 
up too many people. Already in a country that was locking up less than 
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practically anybody else…We actually weren’t locking up enough people 
appropriately’. 
 
According to this divergent evaluation Irish imprisonment regimes were too lax, 
the use of the State’s power too concerned with releasing people rather than 
containing criminals.  
 
This was more fundamental, more ideological than a personality clash. While 
MofO was avowedly committed to reinforcing the existing penal logic, the forces 
from which this political outlook had drawn its strength and its common-sense 
appeal. The communitarian class relations and the attendant bonds of trust, the 
dominance of the family as a unit of social control, a marginalised but 
sympathetic prisoner, and the rationale of a state reluctant to directly intervene 
in the moral affairs of its citizens, had, by 1994, progressively diminished in a 
country rapidly modernising, becoming socially polarised as those bonds of 
collective efficacy softened (Peillon 1998a:117). However, many people in the 
Division remained committed to pastoral  approachs to impriosnment and it 
could have gone on to find its resurgence, but events conspired to marginalise it 
as a form of penal politics. 
 
 
5. Signal Crime 
 
The reading of the prison problem in the Department had clearly become more 
fractious, the debates concerning the appropriate role of Government intervention, 
the justification on the limits of imprisonment were ongoing and the revolving door 
continued to undermine the legitimacy of penal authority. During these protracted 
difficulties a crime occurred that was felt to be so significant that something akin to 
a state of emergency was declared (Kilcommins et al 2004) in which crime, disorder, 
and political weakness, were seen as fatal causal factors.  
Veronica Guerin, who was a renowned and well known investigative journalist 
writing about organised crime in Dublin, was fatally shot while sitting in traffic in 
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June 1996. The murder was an assassination organised by one of Ireland’s notorious 
gangland leaders, whom Guerin had been reporting. That such an act could be 
organised and carried out was seen not as an anomalous tragedy but as the terrible 
culmination of a changing Ireland. At Guerin’s funeral, the Archbishop of Dublin 
was reported to have told mourners that it was now ‘time to reflect on the drift in 
the direction of our society and to ask how it may be halted’ (quoted in O’Donnell 
2005:106). 
In the Dáil, Guerin’s murder was similarly understood as a tragic event but also a 
crescendo in the longer historical social change: ‘This event is an indictment of how 
crime has been allowed to grow rampant in our society for many years’ (Dáil 
Éireann Debate Vol. 467 No. 5, 26 June 1996). Shortly thereafter, the Government 
was recalled from summer recess for a debate regarding the urgent crime problem, 
the ‘assassination’ of Guerin, and newly proposed measures in the battle against 
crime – including discussion of the use and capacity of the prison system. 
The following quote illustrates the instant effect Guerin’s death had on 
imprisonment, it released the sorts of resources that had always been out of reach to 
the penal state: 
 
‘Veronica Guerin, the day she was murdered we got a phone call from an 
official in the Department of Finance. [They] rang up and said ‘how many jails 




However, we must be careful not to think of this as being strategic action on the part 
of the penal state, shrewdly capitalising on Guerin’s death. This was also a rupture 
in public sentiment, a feeling of panic in which the moral cultural consensus was 
perceived to be unravelling (Hall et al 2013), but also a pronounced sense of threat 
and emergency in regard to citizens’ safety (Sparks 2006:40). Guerin’s death gave a 
focal point for the absolutist and expressive feelings about a changing Ireland, 
tapping into a wider anxiety about social malaise and the changing dynamic of 
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social problems such as drugs, urbanisation (Holland 1997; Peillon 1998b), and the 
sovereign power of the State (O’Donnell 2011:78). It was a ‘signal crime’, seen as a 
manifestation of the now permeant categories of ‘risky people, places and events’ 
(Innes 2004:336) in Ireland. It was not that those proponents who had mobilised 
inside the Department and were campaigning for greater penal power simply 
convinced others of their political outlook. Rather, with the conjuncture of events 
and longer social change, they found their cultural schemas now ‘fit’ with Ireland’s 
changing governmental environment; it was a circumstance brought about as much 
by the happenstance of events as by changing conscience of Irish political culture 
(Wilde 2004:579). 
	
6. Sovereign Penal Culture 
 
Subsequent to these events and the promise of financial resources, the 
Department entered a self-confessed ‘process of change’ (Department of Justice 
1997b:161) regarding governing priorities and ‘clarification of their 
responsibilities’ (O’Mahony 2000a:7). These struggles reveal that more was felt to 
be at stake in the future planning of Irish imprisonment regimes. This was a 
‘period of transition’. It reveals ‘the competing ways in which the ‘penal 
problem’ was variously formulated’, along with the ‘struggles and concerns 
which decided these choices and the wider issues which were seen to be at stake’ 
in the various choices and tussles between ‘old’ and ‘new’ governance of 
imprisonment regimes (Garland 1985:4). Prison was now condemned as 
inadequate, and as Foucault once observed in France, this led to ‘the search for 
effective, measured, unified penal mechanisms’ (1991:81).  
 
Under these conditions, Ireland’s pastoral conservatism was finally marginalised, 
replaced by a new political culture, sovereign authority. This political culture was, 
first, shaped by a far greater sense of political authority. The Government was 
looked to as responsible for providing discipline and control in the face of social 
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disorder. The culture of sovereign authority permitted the State to intercede more 
directly in the transgressions of its citizens while maintaining order in Irish society. 
Of course, punishment is always ‘an act of sovereign might’ (Garland 1996:461). In 
Ireland, the Government had a new mandate: it, rather than the Church, community 
or families, must be at the centre of Irish law and order. Second, this political 
outlook was also motivated by a new antipathy towards the prisoner, informed by 
broadly similar conservative values, but which had now altered to support the 
belief that there was a greater distance between the offender and the community. 
This was a more exclusive kind of conservatism, in which certain people must be 
excluded from the realms of family and community. These were much more 
punitive sensibilities. Third, in these new cultural and social circumstances Irish 
penal culture became charged (McEvoy 2001), emblematic of past political failures 
and looked upon now for sources of security. This pattern of thinking and action is 
evidenced in detail in the section below. 
 
A New Governmental Authority  
 
The Government’s sense of authority, responsibility, and accountability, began to 
extend and become more prominent, taking over the space vacated by the Church in 
Ireland’s landscape of social control. The 1990s was a time of fervent activity around 
planning, strategising and reviewing in a way that was more publicly visible, 
authoritatively engaged and expressing new collective passions. The organising 
rationale which framed the reports from the Department at this time was the 
rapidly changing Irish society. For instance, a report reviewing probation observed 
that many of the anxieties were concerned with the speed of social change in 
Ireland, a break from the past, which created new demands for state authority and 
control: 
‘Over the past decade, Irish society has experienced profound social, 
economic and cultural change. Much of this change has been positive. 
The rate of unemployment has decreased, enhanced employment 
opportunities exist for those with adequate credentials, and Irish society 
has become increasingly confident of its own capacity to determine its 
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future. For some, this rate of change has been bewildering. Established 
sources of authority in Irish society have been challenged, and in many 
communities, traditional values have been eroded which in turn places 
an extra burden on the State’ (Department of Justice 1999:5, emphasis 
added).  
 
Similarly, a Departmental report on homicide in Ireland from 1972 to 1991 opened 
by illustrating a dramatic scene of change, in which the basic tissue of Irish society 
had been altered: ‘The last twenty years or so have seen drastic changes in the social 
fabric of Irish society’ (Dooley 1995:5). These anxious expressions illustrate a 
Department now actively trying to keep up with a changing Ireland. The 
publication of a Strategic Management Initiative in 1996 (hereafter SMI 1997b) directly 
addressed its agenda towards what it saw as the ‘changing world – an external 
challenge’, in which it described the problems thus:  
 
‘The pace of change, worldwide, in all fields – social, economic, cultural, 
communications – has accelerated enormously over the past ten to 
twenty years. Some of this change has been positive, enlightened and 
clearly for the benefit of mankind. There is also, however, the negative 
side – social exclusion, inequality, selfishness, alienation – side by side 
with a growing incidence and viciousness in crime…The task of the 
Department of Justice is to try to meet this challenge’ (1997b:166-167). 
 
The Department’s political culture, their habits of thought, their patterns of action, 
were adapted to Ireland’s changing social circumstances and not just the Guerin 
murder. For example, the plethora of new documents, this newly emergent 
governmental print culture was intended to exhibit a new democratic, credible and 
assured political identity: ‘[This document] represents a new and fundamental 
change of direction for the civil service and more broadly for the public service…a 
time for constant assessment and reassessment of purpose’ (Department of Justice 
1997b:158). The new publications allowed them to do just this.  
 
There was also a sense of mea culpa, the Department’s traditional political culture 
was called into question, seen as no longer enough to satisfy the need for 
governmental change and open public dialogue:  
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‘We recognise that, as an organisation, we have various shortcomings – 
not least in explaining our work publically. For one thing, we know that 
we are considered by some to be over-secretive and there is a view also 
that we are opponents of progress and change’ (Department of Justice 
1997b:160).  
 
The document had among its central aims a desire to achieve greater public 
accountability, and gain public confidence, as they stated: ‘We hope…[the SMI] will 
give a better understanding of what we do, our place in the overall law and order 
system and what our plans are for the future’ (ibid.:160). This statement also openly 
declares that there is a clear and formal law and order system, over which the state 
was now claiming authority.  
 
These forces of social change clearly impacted Departmental thinking, provided the 
grounding for a very different political culture, and set of penal practices by the end 
of the 1990s in Ireland. But it was not just that social change flowed through state 
agencies and actors – such forces are too broad and epiphenomenal to shape precise 
practices and technologies of imprisonment regimes and specific actions of the 
penal state. How these authorities perceived and rationalised these broader 
problems, how they conceived of the prisoner, the objectives of Government, and 
how these assessments reframed officials’ sense of the rational aims of prisons set 
the scene for the dramatic change in Irish prison strategies by the mid-1990s. It was 
as Hall et al observed of the shifting hegemony and governmental apparatus in 
1970s Britain, wider social changes in Ireland legitimated ‘the recourse to the law, to 
constant and statutory power…it legitimated the duty of the state’ (2013:273).  The 
Government were explicit about this, writing that:  
‘The Department is at the hub of the law and order system…That is why 
it is now essential to decide what the core business of the Department 
actually is and to identify strategies best geared to secure effective 








Law and Order – Crime as a Governable Object 
 
The Department, of course, had precedent in rapid and authoritarian reactions to 
threat, evident in their reactive paramilitary responses to subversive prisoners. But 
treatment of those prisoners was also tempered by how they were construed as 
penal subjects who had political, rather than criminal, intent and were thus also de 
facto political prisoners. In the 1990s, the vision of the prisoner and criminal, the 
cultural script and charged collective passions that surrounded those images, was 
more belligerent. There was a systemic targeting of crime which had not previously 
been apparent in Irish history. Like in MofO there was, they stated: ‘an escalation in 
the volume, sophistication and viciousness of crime’ (1997b:160). But the 
Government could no longer merely tolerate changing crime as a fact, the State must 
act authoritatively:  
‘criminal elements are becoming more powerful, more callous, more 
vicious and there is an expectation that the institutions whose business it 
is to respond to that phenomena will perform effectively and coherently’ 
(1997b:158). 
 
Just a week after Guerin’s murder the Proceeds of Crime Bill was proposed and five 
weeks later it passed into law (Kilcommins et al 2004:164). This established the 
Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) which can seize goods believed to have been 
purchased with the proceeds of crime. There is no onus on the state to prove 
criminal activity thus reversing the burden of proof as the accused has to convince 
the court of their innocence (O’Donnell 2005:101). CAB was one aspect of the 
legislative activity which is described as the ‘1996/97 anti-crime package’. This 
included seven-day detention for those charged with drug-related offences, 400 
extra Gardaí, and a radically curtailed bail law (Hamilton 2014b:35). These new 
legislative tools contributed to the creation of ‘a new practicable object of 
governance, a new field for authorities to know and work upon’ (Garland 1997:177), 
and new mechanisms to address the punitive requirements of the ‘hard core 
criminal’. But also, as Cormac put it, the 1996/97 anti-crime package was an 
extension of Government power in general. There was a new threshold of 
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credibility. The Government felt they had to meet the new objectives of being the 
central organising body regulating Irish life: 
 
‘CAB was a big response to Veronica Guerin. There was a view that 
things were getting out of control and we need to take firm action. We 
needed to sort things and there was a public demand and if you don’t 
meet that demand the credibility of the whole system would collapse’. 
 
The 1997 publication Tackling Crime (1997a) formally identified criminals as a 
distinct group who required new governing techniques. Most importantly this 
document was about invention, establishing a new State approach to governing 
crime.  
 
It advocated new ‘guiding considerations’, including ‘rights’ which outlined a 
distinction between the law-abiding citizens and the offender. These rights 
evidenced the new dynamics of inclusion, exclusion and justice, and were 
advocated in favour of the respectable citizens. The below extract, which summed 
up these new rights, encapsulates the threat of crime and the prevalence of anxiety 
regarding the Government’s responsibility to protect people and maintain social 
order: 
 
‘it is beyond dispute that society has the right to protect itself from the 
activities of criminals. The exercise of that right is a prerequisite for the 
maintenance of social order…[and while] there are various other rights 
which are not being addressed at this point – for example, the right of 
prisoners to safe and secure containment…the focus is on the position of 
the law-abiding majority whose rights are, without any justification, put 
in jeopardy day-in-day-out by a relatively small minority, some of whom 
will literally stop at nothing to achieve their criminal purposes’ 
(1997a:13-14).  
 
The idea of rights set out here shows a dichotomy between good and bad citizens; a 
vivid and anxious dramatization of the emerging social divisions in Ireland in 
which offenders were no longer considered to share in the same rights as fellow 
citizens. The greater sense of division between villainous offenders and the good 
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lawful public also recast the conservative sensibilities and assumptions about the 
primacy of family and community, which had previously motivated as well as 
tempered the use of prison. Such orthodoxies were directly addressed and 
reassessed – making clear that there had been a reordering of penal priorities and 
the conservative rationale within the Department:  
 
‘While it is necessary to take account of the fact (well supported by research) 
that circumstances of their upbringing can have a significant bearing on the 
way on which people behave in later life and that offenders may advance 
arguments of this kind to explain their wrongdoing, this does not mean – even 
if the substance of the argument advanced is accepted – that the wrongdoer 
must automatically go free. The public is not obliged to carry the risk of attack 
simply because the would-be attacker’s tendency to misbehave has been 
exacerbated by negative personal experience or other personal failings’ 
(ibid.:13). 
 
There was a governmental assessment that social ills were no longer a problem of 
poverty, but a lack of control and security. This was an explicit reversal of the earlier 
ethos identified in Chapter Five. As Jim so solemnly recalled, this was a period in 
which something more fundamental than the machinery evolved, rather, the pivotal 
conceptions of the person imprisoned shifted also: ‘We have had a punitive turn, in 
the way prisoners were seen’. An individual prisoner’s background and family 
circumstances could no longer justify that prisoners might ‘automatically go free’. 
Amnesties were losing their authority as a mode of imprisonment.  
 
While MofO reaffirmed the existing order, Tackling Crime asserted a new culture of 
penal practice. This latter document was a declaration of intent, and one must avoid 
mistaking talk for action. But this talk, the very fact of the document, its new 
assertions and programmes sketched out were, to paraphrase Simon (2007:159), a 
reordering of prisons around the problem of crime.  
 
In March 1997 the opposition party, Fianna Fáil, released an election manifesto 
(Fianna Fáil 1997a) and a policy paper, Leading the Fight Against Crime (Fianna Fáil 
1997b), which rallied against the ‘cancer of crime’. In the lead-up to the general 
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election of 1997, Fianna Fáil were keen to mobilise fear of crime as a means to make 
political capital. Crime had not been an issue which had previously required 
Government intervention. Now, they wrote, ‘Organised crime, once something we 
only knew through fiction and film, has suddenly emerged as a vicious reality in 
Irish society’ (Fianna Fáil 1997a:9-10). Crime was a ‘short-hand signal’ to the public, 
‘tapping into powerful ideas’ (Edsall and Edsall 1991:224) such as morality, 
conservative rural life, authority and quickening social transformation.  
 
Just like in other Anglophone countries in the mid-1990s (Jones and Newburn 2007), 
Ireland’s political discourse became inflected with ‘zero tolerance’ rhetoric. The 
power of zero tolerance as a political strategy – and indeed the choice and 
deployment of that particular slogan – drew its power from Ireland’s changing 
social conditions. It was grounded in the emergent worries, historical values, and 
new political commitments concerned with tackling crime and punishment in 
Ireland. For example, the opposition’s election campaign regarding crime was 
couched in terms which reviled the changing Ireland, the erosion of national 
communitarian values, and the rise of disorder: 
 
‘the task of the next government will be to use the human and physical 
resources in this country to confront the malaise of crime and to foster, 
in the Ireland of the twenty-first century, an environment in which the 
traditional values of community, compassion and caring can flourish. 
That task will not be easy…The social fabric of this country is being 
destroyed. The next government must wage war on the cause of that 
destruction. It must wage war on crime’ (O’Donoghue quoted in 
O’Donnell and O’Sullivan 2001:32). 
 
 
This illustrated that political capital was now being harnessed from crime and 
punishment policies and a general hardening in attitude towards criminality 
(O’Donnell and O’Sullivan 2001; Rogan 2011). While the stark and militaristic 
metaphors attached to the zero tolerance campaign are fairly generic, in Ireland it 
was being employed as a means to express a desire to protect and stabilise 
‘traditional’ Ireland. Zero tolerance connected law and order and the prison with 
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conservative values, it was about safeguarding the sanctity of the community – the 
‘fabric’ of Irish life – from drugs and crime. As a slogan, it resonated because its 
framing of crime as a moral crisis fit within these new social theories, rather than 
forced a change upon the collective conception of crime. It was a chastisement of 
pastoral forms of incarceration, now seen as inexcusably tolerant. Zero tolerance 
should be seen as an expressive political act which bespeaks a view of crime as ‘an 
urgent political priority’ (Garland and Sparks 2000:200). It was also symbolic of the 
changing relationship between the Government and crime control, and thus 




Policy Print Culture 
 
A new strategic ‘mission’ for the Department was being publicly outlined. First and 
foremost, the mission was to protect ‘community security’, but it was also tasked to 
address crime and maintain the security of the State. No longer were they 
questioning the efficacy of the prison system, or of the Government’s capacity to 
reduce crime, or restraining the use of certain penal interventions. These areas were 
now within their new inalienable remit, publicly declared in the documents. The 
expanding capacity of the sovereign Irish government was partially achieved by a 
new print culture in the Department. The Department forewent their earlier 
ambiguity and the informality which had characterised their print practice. The 
annual reports, which were often published in arrears, had been the Division’s print 
practice. Often reports and reviews were kept internal, and never made public. 
However, within the new print culture, a slew of publications was produced. There 
were reviews of homicide patterns (Dooley 1999), probation and welfare (1995), 
evidence-based policy (Heylin 2001), a profile of prisoners (O’Mahony 1997), a 
review of the penal state itself (1997c), a strategy statement (1998), a report on 
communicative disease in prison (1993) as well as those mentioned above, such as 
MofO, SMI and Tackling Crime. These publications were an authoritative act, signs of 
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a new political culture establishing its governmental sovereignty over crime, social 
order and punishment. Within the documents there is a strong sense of a 
Government configuring its role in relation to these newly outlined problems. SMI 
(1997b) and Tackling Crime (1997a) were described as a ‘mechanism through which’ 




These documents did more than declare a new authority. They worked as a new 
technology of rule over the penal state and as a cultural conduit, sending new 
messages and ideas to the imprisonment regimes. Tackling Crime (1997a), a self-
professed ‘first ever document of its kind’, would guide ‘the fundamental change 
throughout the criminal justice system’ (p.5). It provided an assessment of the 
existing problem, as well as future goals and the strategies by which to achieve 
them. It displayed to the public the Government’s strategic thinking. It revealed 
new governmental aims and provided a confident reassessment of the 
Government’s abilities in the control of crime. The new character of government 
print culture shows their new activity, their sense of being engaged in the issues at 
hand, publicly accountable and evidencing their leadership. The content of these 
documents highlights their evolving understanding of the criminal population. But 
the very production of the documents as an authoritative act was also a statement of 
their growing power and control as a sovereign democratic entity. This was not 
simply the display of State power over law and order in the face of disorder, as 
occurred in neighbouring parts of the Anglophone world (Garland 1996), but was 
the first assertion of a State expanding, strengthening and legitimating its sovereign 
power to punish. This new political culture had profound repercussions; ushering 






7. The Promise of Prisons  
 
During the Celtic Tiger Ireland was at once more prosperous but also more unequal 
and crime was rising. Modernisation was being politically and socially embraced, 
but a fear about disintegrating Irish traditions was pervasive. In this contradictory 
context, the prisons became a law-and-order tool to allay anxieties.  The prison was 
now understood to be a vital weapon in the crime control arsenal. The Department 
described prisons, crime control and state responsibility as inseparable: ‘The 
management of offenders raises major issues which are inextricably linked to the 
overall response by the State to crime’ (foreword in O’Mahony 1997:5). Prison was 
now explicitly named, without its former qualifications, as one of the ‘primary 
instruments employed by society to secure protection’ (Department of Justice 
1997a:14) and as a ‘law enforcement agency’ (ibid.:17). It was now a ‘necessary 
action’ for the Government to expand and develop this logic in the practical use and 
design of Irish imprisonment regimes: ‘A major impediment to the effectiveness in 
the law enforcement system is the absence of an adequate number of prison places’ 
(ibid.:107). 
 
The narrative espoused in Tackling Crime was one of an Ireland in which the 
character and rate of crime had changed drastically, but in which the prison had 
hardly evolved at all. There was a certitude in this assessment, that prison had 
failed to meet the new needs of the growing crime issue and the greater demands 
felt by Government to respond. Previously the use of prison was tempered by a 
belief that it could cause greater damage to citizens who were imprisoned and 
therefore – as described in the previous chapters – the energies of the Department 
had generally been concerned with maintaining the flow of prisoners as best they 
could. The new assessment provided in Tackling Crime described a new history in 
which increased crime (rather than the increase in prisoners) was the dominant 




Prison’s ‘capacity had constantly been eroded’, the Government lambasted. The 
way the prison system relied on TR had, as they now saw it, ‘the wider negative 
effect’ which had ‘the understandable perception in the community that the system 
is not coping with the crime problem’ (Department of Justice 1997a:109-110). The 
cap on prison places as proposed in MofO was now gone. Prison’s failings were 
assessed to be a lack of space but also, and this is a critical distinction, a lack of 
containment capacity. That is, prisons were not able to meet new standards of 
confinement. It was not just that there was not enough space for all the people being 
imprisoned, but the problem was now that Irish prisons also failed to literally hold 
those who were sent there.   
 
Linking the governing of prisons to the governing of major crime released resources 
to prisons in ways that had previously been denied. It gave support to demands for 
more power to intervene in crime and to contain prisoners. This new political 
culture of a sovereign authority ‘provided a basis for reworking the narratives and 
strategies of the prison’ (Simon 2007:149). By July 1997 an ‘accelerated prison 
building programme’ was announced (Rogan 2011:186).  
 
	
Prisons – Preventative Detention 
 
Prison could also no longer be justified as functionally distinct and autonomous 
from the other criminal justice institutions as it had been before (Department of 
Justice 1997a, 1997b). Prison needed to be allied with the crime control functions of 
other agencies, particularly the courts, who were given greater mechanisms of 
preventative crime control. For example, the result of a referendum in November 
1996 which gave judges greater capacity to deny bail (O’Donnell and O’Sullivan 
2001:33). Previously, due to a legal decision made in the 1960s (the O’Callaghan 
decision) bail could only be denied if a judge believed there was a risk that a 
defendant would either not be present for the trial or would interfere with a witness 
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(O’Donnell 2005:101). As Gerard recalled it, the Government had been failing on 
these new fronts of public protection and containment of the dangerous: 
 
‘We had extremely few people on remand because of the disastrous 
decision, the O’Callaghan decision, which was taken in 1966. That’s a 
very important thing when you’re looking at prison history, or penal 
policy, eventually we had to change the constitution to fix this. But in 
the 1960s, the decision’s called O’Callaghan, the Supreme Court said 
that no court could take into account the likelihood to reoffend. That’s a 
ground for refusing bail. This meant that people who were driving the 
growing drug problem in the streets of this city…Alright, so a lot of 
people who should have been in prison weren’t. A lot of people who 
were in prison were minor league. But there was a growing number of 
people who had exhausted the bail system for years and years and had 
finally been put down for long sentences and they were dangerous 
criminals’.  
Along with the now familiar baleful view of the prisoner, Gerard’s analysis captures 
the changing tolerance for imprisonment, accepting an increase in ‘minor league’ 
offenders if it managed to address the crime problem. Prison in Ireland could, and 




Prisons – Punitive Deterrence  
	
Among the new prescriptions accorded to prison, was an aim to address and punish 
the wider social issues with confinement. The 1999 Criminal Justice Act provided 
for mandatory minimum sentences (Campbell 2010), establishing a new punitive 
dimension and declaration to Irish imprisonment. At this time, Ireland had few 
mandatory sentences, instead privileging Ireland’s independent judiciary (Bacik 
2002; Hamilton 2014). The new Act, however, meant that those convicted of 
possession of drugs worth €13,000 or more faced a minimum ten-year prison 
sentence (Bacik 2002:351). Prison was now emboldened with a greater threat of 
punishment; it would deter drug-related actions, but also use harsher prison 
sanctions as a demonstration that governmental action was also on behalf of those 
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communities most afflicted by addiction, poverty and crime. As O’Donnell has 
written, ‘mandatory sentences for drug offences were an attempt to reassure 
communities blighted by heroin abuse and infectious disease, and largely neglected 
by the state, that they had not been forgotten and that firm action was being taken 
on their behalf’ (O’Donnell 2005:102). This legislation had an expressive capacity, 
communicating the new strength of penal authorities to wider society: not only can 
we confine our prisoners, but we can employ prison to exclude and punish the 
worst and for longer, without exception. 
 
Similar to preventative detention the mandatory minimum sentences for drugs 
swept more people into the system, a practice which would previously have been 
viewed as unjust or unnecessary. Balancing these consequences Cormac reflected: 
‘[Y]ou may have locked up [more people] on long sentences, people 
who wouldn’t normally, like drug mules, but you did take out some 
serious drug dealers who wouldn’t have been before cause it was too 
lenient, so it wasn’t all bad, it had some benefits’. 
This was a reversal of the older orthodoxy, the emphasis was now upon 
containment, reflecting a new ‘threshold of tolerance’ (Foucault 1991:83), justified 
precisely in order to temper previous carceral leniency. 
 
 
Prison Works: Techniques of Intervention  
 
A further quite remarkable evolution in the dynamic of imprisonment regimes was 
a growing belief that prison practices could be used to reduce recidivism 
(Department of Justice 1997b:169). During the late 1990s, programmes focused on 
rehabilitation emerged. In the 2001-2003 Strategy Statement the new stated aims of 
imprisonment included supporting prisoners to ‘address offending behaviour’. In 
this vein, the CONNECT Project was established in Mountjoy and the Training Unit 
as an ‘action-research project’ focused on ‘reducing recidivism’ (Alyward 2002:590) 
and encouraging prisoners to transition from custody, through training, to 
reintegration in the community (Annual Report 1999-2000). In many ways, this is the 
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sort of view that loosely underpinned the original development of the Training 
Unit, but the agenda of CONNECT was to achieve rehabilitation via vocational 
training (Lawlor and MacDonald 2001:23). 
 
A review of the CONNECT Project stated that it ‘required an enormous culture shift 
within the prisons. Actions required that the prisoner take ownership and primary 
responsibility for his/her own rehabilitation’ (Lawlor and MacDonald 2001:206-207). 
The causes of crime were social and external but also, according to the evaluation, 
‘intrinsic’ (2001:205). It was on this personal level that prison could now aspire to 
alter a prisoner’s future behaviour. The irony in this case was that rehabilitation 
logic came to bear upon Irish imprisonment regimes not as a progressive measure, 
though it was presented as such, but through othering of the prisoner, a programme 
which acted upon prisoners as different from non-offending citizens. The criminal-
prisoner informed the new operating logic of the regime, displacing the prisoner of 
poverty. This strategic regime was addressing ‘core issues affecting prisoners 
including personal decision-making capacity’ according to prison authorities 
(Alyward 2002:591). There were now Thinking Skills courses in several of the 
prisons (Cork, Curragh and Arbour Hill) which offered ‘an offending behaviour 
programme delivered by multidisciplinary teams…The aim of the course is to equip 
participants with a range of problem solving skills and social skills’ and honed in on 
‘anger management, evasion of personal responsibility and relapse prevention’ 
(Alyward 2002:587). Additionally, a new Sex Offender Treatment programme was 
developed (Irish Prison Service Annual Report 1999-2000:17-18).  
 
While rehabilitation was not the dominant operational motive across imprisonment 
regimes it was at this time that Irish penal culture developed a belief that prisons 
could reform criminals, a view that came to be institutionalised (which is of course 
later than other countries e.g. Foucault 1977; Garland 1985). But old and new 
rationalities of political culture mingled in these later imprisonment regimes. 
Perfectly encapsulating the ethos of humanity and helping as a subordinate to the 
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new concern for crime control and punishment. Cormac described the aim of penal 
programmes at the end of the 1990s in these dualistic terms: ‘you’re here to help 





The shift in Irish political culture occurred during a time when Ireland’s economy 
began to flourish. Unlike any time before, in the mid-1990s the Government had the 
capital to give material reality to their new political authority and cultural 
sensibilities. The promise of prisons then ‘found its logic realized in physical 
structure’ (Simon 2007:153). And so commenced a second wave of ‘modernisation’ 
in Irish imprisonment, a punitive evolution mainly emphasising new buildings and 
increased space. 
 
For each year from 1990 to 1996, Ireland maintained an average prison population 
of 2,100; but by 1999, Ireland had 2,871 prisoners, five new prisons and severely 
curtailed use of TR. In 1996 the Irish Government re-commissioned the Curragh 
prison for the purpose of holding difficult prisoners and four other prisons were 
also newly constructed, which included the Midlands Prison, Castlerea, Cloverhill 
and the Dochás Centre for women.43 Overall, this marks a dramatic expansion in the 
size of the Irish prison estate. But from the lessons learnt in Chapter Five, which 
charted the development of a pastoral penal culture, we should know that prison 
expansion is not necessarily a wholly negative development. Certainly, the building 
of the women’s prison, planned since the 1970s, finally being built was a significant 
development. More space might have allowed increased room and capacity for 
welfare services, greater living comfort, improved sanitary conditions for the 
majority of people imprisoned, increased out of cell time, a chance to amend the 
1983 doubling-up rule, a diversification of programmes and so on. However, the 
crime control rationale and the growing animus towards prisoners and offenders 
																																																						
43 Dochás is Irish for ‘hope’. 
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were formalised in the more punitive dimensions which came to dominate 
imprisonment regimes.  
 
The most striking feature of these newly devised imprisonment regimes was the 
emphasis on confinement. All the new prisons were closed prisons. Though the 
women’s prison was organised in the style of houses – some with more liberal 
regimes than others – it was still within closed walls. Similarly, an open prison at 
Castlerea was established, but again, within a closed perimeter wall. These prisons 
mimicked earlier pastoral ideas of permeability but within the uncompromising 
context of tight secure containment. Cloverhill prison, also a closed prison, was the 
first designated remand prison. Cloverhill in particular marked a pronounced 
departure in the function and agenda underpinning Irish imprisonment regimes. 
Irish prison capacity was increased, but there was also a new energy behind 
developing means to hold people who previously would have rarely been 
imprisoned; prison now could now live up to its preventative ends.  
 
The Training Unit was still an institution within the regime, but it was subject to a 
transformation in the new regime, taking on a graded status as a ‘step down unit’ 
(Irish Prison Service 2006:15) for those prisoners at the end of their sentence, it was 
no longer for any kind of ordinary prisoner. Shelton Abbey also remained a part of 
the regime, but what this pattern should make clear is that Shelton Abbey and the 
Training Unit’s underpinning logic and their value-driven motivations had been 
marginalised. Irish imprisonment regimes now placed a greater emphasis on its 
architectural capacities to confine and hold dangerous people away from society. 
The below quote from John encapsulates precisely the nature of the change in the 
dominant governing sensibilities and ambitions in the mid-1990s in the Republic of 
Ireland. He describes the 1970s and 80s as a set of historical practices which were 
replaced by impulses that were rather more control-orientated, and which came to 




‘[T]he old school, one prisoner per cell and so on. That was an exciting 
time and there was a commitment in those times to developing education 
and develop work-training. But that came into conflict with the other 
school of thought, you know, our main business here is just to contain 
them, and the pressure of numbers versus the amount of money that’s 
going to be available to build prison ended up meaning they 
compromised, and Cloverhill was designed with I think the scope to 
accommodate two prisoners per cell’.  
 
This comparative reflection perfectly demonstrates that imprisonment regimes – 
how people were imprisoned – is always rooted in schools of thought, ideational 
leanings and governing rationalities. While the pastoral regime may have had only 
limited funds, with them they developed the Training Unit, Shelton Abbey and 
Wheatfield (before it was re-designated) and increased the access to training, 
education, psychology and probation and welfare. Liam described how the new 
management styles and priorities of the late-1990s devalued these previous 
techniques in favour of security: ‘[Senior Management] wouldn’t have seen 
therapeutic services as particularly relevant or positive, it was about secure 
containment’. 
 
Punitive modernisation was not just about expansion. It was also interested in 
ending penal permeability. In 1995 21 percent of prisoners served their sentence 
on temporary release, by 2001 that had dropped to only 6% (O’Mahony 2002:550; 
O’Donnell 2004b:261). In 1999, the Minister for Justice announced that certain 
categories of prisoners would no longer be eligible for TR, such as those 
convicted for perpetrating violent acts against women and the elderly, serious 
public order offences and car theft (McCullagh 2002:599).  
 
Kilcommins et al (2004:265), and O’Donnell and Jewkes (2011), have rightly 
suggested that the continued use of Christmas release is indicative of a humanity 
and trust that remained a current in Irish penal culture. But by the end of the 
twentieth century, TR operated in a more restrained version, a signal of the 
changing dynamics of imprisonment regimes and political culture.  Irish pastoral 
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imprisonment regimes had been authoritatively and systematically revised. By 
2000 Ireland’s predominant form of incarceration was punitive imprisonment 
regimes: prison restraint, pastoral support and permeability  were replaced by 
deterrence, exclusion and punishment. 
 
 
8. The Reinvention of the Penal State  
 
The new duty of the State was evident not only in the punitive turn in Irish 
imprisonment regimes, but were also reflected in the reconfigured landscape of the 
penal state and the new techniques of hierarchy. After railing against it, a 
Government decision was taken in November 1996, prior to the 1997 general 
election but only shortly after Guerin’s murder, to establish an independent prisons 
board or agency (Department of Justice 1997c; Alyward 2002). This administrative 
development conveys the remarkable change in vision and direction of the penal 
state and an increase in power and resources; a moment which has not been singled 
out for analysis by other researchers. The logic was that change in the prison system 
would be better facilitated and strengthened by an independent agency. This meant 
that the Department, ‘instead of being totally immersed in the day-to-day delivery 
of various services…will have greater focus on policy formulation, setting down 
and monitoring general performance indicators’ (Department of Justice 1997a:17), 
becoming a ‘policy driven organisation’ (Department of Justice 1997b:179). In 1999, 
the Irish Prison Service (hereafter IPS) was established as a separate agency, though 
never on a statutory basis and therefore not independent of the Department – a 
pragmatic compromise between old and new political rationalities.  
 
IPS was moved physically outside of the Department. After a review process 
Probation and Welfare also gained its own agency status, and a Parole Board was 
established. In addition, the Department of Justice became the Department of 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform in 1997, a declaration of their broader legal remit. 
A new political culture was now formally institutionalised in the political and 
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bureaucratic machinery of the penal state, which was now strengthened to address 
and maintain Irish social order.  
 
The change in political culture was also evident in the material character of the 
annual reports. The lengthy narrative style of the previous thick annual reports (the 
last of which was in 1994) were gone, replaced by a slick, thin and corporate-style 
A4 brief. The difference in experience, population, programmes, initiatives and the 
general highs and lows in each prison was subsumed into a homogenous 
presentation, a system revealing its goals of uniformity in its drastically different 
style of presentation. As the first Director General of IPS wrote at the time a central 
goal was  
‘to standardise the service we deliver. In our case to make consistent 
across the service our management of the staff who serve the 
organisation and the offenders who sentences we mange on behalf of the 
community. Standardisation is not just a commercial concept. Justice 
and efficiency alike are impossible without consistency’ (Alyward 
2002:581).  
 
Here the penal state was re-presented as a confident, strategic and competent 
bureaucracy. This was an enactment of the new culture in the penal state – a 
physical product declaring this as a Government that could now achieve and 
maintain the lofty goal of justice.  
 
The Government’s new modern management techniques, its officious policy 
products, supported the repressive ‘closure’ of a new sovereign political culture and 
punitive penal consensus (Hall et al 2013). As the Director General described it, the 
prison was now seen as: ‘one of the essential bulwarks of civil society’ (Alyward 
2002:579). By the end of the twentieth century incapacitation and control were the 
primary imperatives of imprisonment and the prison in Ireland had become more 





9. The Irony of the Punitive Turn 
 
Irish political culture, its proclivities and sensibilities, changed dramatically during 
this period, evolving into a culture of sovereign authority and giving rise to what can 
be defined as punitive imprisonment regimes. Rather than being exceptional to the 
punitive turn, Ireland may in fact represent an exemplary case of the Anglophone 
punitive shift. More people were held in prison, not by accident but by design; the 
intentional result of the expansion of the prison estate and the curtailment of TR. 
But these dramatic changes cannot be fully explained by changes in political culture 
alone, for that we must adopt a broader sociological perspective. This will, however, 
problematize our capacity to denounce any place as punitive based on its 
imprisonment regimes, even in the case of Ireland where the prisons so clearly 
underwent a punitive shift. While prisons and political culture clearly became more 
punitive, what is an inescapable and fundamental part of this story is that during 
this period of the 1990s, Ireland had become a far less oppressive place, Ireland as a 
nation became less punitive in general.  
 
The coming of late-modernity in Ireland, given its historical context, actually 
marked the acceleration of a progressive social transformation. The Church waned, 
because of scandal, protest and the influence of global ideas, markets and politics 
(Giddens 1991). In the ‘depillarization’ (Downes 1988, 2011b) of Irish social order, 
Ireland was being unmoored from the anchors of Catholic conformity and religious 
power. That contrast between a liberalizing nation and punitive imprisonment are 
in fact part of the same story. The changes in Ireland’s imprisonment regimes, were 
so clearly negative – the prison lost something, its interpersonal nature, informality, 
it predominant humanity, and its inherent scepticism. However, Ireland’s punitive 
prison turn and the felt imperative for governmental penal authority were the 
consequence of a much more progressive and positive social revolution in which (1) 
the Catholic Church had been de-institutionalised and the Government became 
responsibilized as the central organ regulating Irish social relations; (2) Irish citizens 
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were gradually released from the extra-legal threat of being moved outwith society, 
forgotten and denied, censored and prohibited in all sorts of oppressive ways and 
forced to emigrate; (3) but also, inadvertently – through changing access to 
opportunities of education, work and middle-class affluence – these modernising 
social forces created a more socially excluded class. A class-group who, 
subsequently, were then further excluded by the workings of a more extensive 
penal system. The conjuncture of these social forces – along with the rise in crime, 
Guerin’s murder, and the negative perception of de facto prison amnesties – created 
the new conditions for Irish political culture, placing new demands upon it, giving 
rise to new penal problems but also social problems, which came to be addressed by 
the prison.  
 
As those other forms of social control waned and the context of social problems 
coalesced, the Government’s tool of the prison was modified, adapted and 
expanded accordingly to reflect the State’s more central role in the changing 
organisation of Irish social and political order. The political culture which governed 
prisons was realised in the changing sensibilities and rationalities of those working 
in the Department and solidified and made visible in the new publications, but it 
was predicated on the state taking on the power to punish and to confine 
(O’Sullivan and O’Donnell 2012:257). Sovereign authority as a political culture was 
emboldened with a new social authority and governing power, rather than 
confronted by its limits and denying the crime problem (Garland 1996). Quite the 
opposite happened in Ireland. The Government seized upon the crime problem, 
materialised in the punitive adaptions of the prison, reflecting a new abiding sense 
of the Government’s capacity to regulate Irish social life in a country moving away 
from a more informal regime of social control. Comparative criminologists 
interested in the prison and punitiveness often lament the rise in prison numbers 
and increased severity of penal measures, or laud the moderation and penal 
restraint of other jurisdictions (e.g. Pratt and Ericsson 2013; Cavadino and Dignan 
2006). However, sociological and historical research reveals that judging national 
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punitive proclivities from the penal system alone defies our ability to understand 





The changes in Irish political culture and imprisonment regimes at the end of the 
twentieth century were immense. The chapter has sought to provide a 
descriptive analysis of the changes in Ireland’s political culture, showing in close 
detail the evolution from pastoral penal culture to sovereign authority expressed 
in punitive imprisonment regimes. The new Irish political culture marginalised 
pastoral techniques, which had favoured informalism and ambiguity. The 
culture and ethos of sovereign authority was realised in the new public 
declarations of power, criminal legislation, the emergence of a feeling of 
responsibility towards the health and security of Irish citizens and an intertwined 
anxiety around crime and social change. There was, however, also an antipathy 
towards the prisoner, demoting the once predominant empathy. 
 
This chapter adds further evidence to demonstrate this thesis’s central argument: 
that political culture shapes the practices of imprisonment. We saw that 
expanding prison places was not just about a pragmatic calculus regarding size 
and space. It was a concerted effort at changing the imprisonment regimes so 
that their walls were less permeable, that people moved less freely from prison 
back into society, that their exclusion and punishment could be more permanent 
and that the prison sanctions of the court could be better enforced. These changes 
converted the prison, re-coding and re-organising it as a law enforcement tool 
and a crime control mechanism. 
 
But politicians and Government officials never fully control the process of penal 
transformation. In establishing a punishment and society analysis of Irish penal 
history, central to the aims of this thesis, wider changes in the Irish social 
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landscape are contingent explanatory factors in the punitive turn in Irish 
incarceration. As Ireland became a ‘late moderniser’, and the power of the 
Church and the perceived efficacy of the family dwindled the Irish political 
system was burdened with a greater responsibility for the maintenance of order 
and the protection of the well-being of its citizens. The Government faced 
unprecedented social pressures: to intervene, to protect communities from crime, 
to take control. It is in this social context, and considering the shifting Irish social 
structure and balance of power between institutions, that the prison became a 
more centralised dynamic of social order. The strengthening of prison’s 
incapacitative function, its expansion, and its expressive punitiveness, was a 
reflection of these shifts in the wider Irish social landscape.  
 
These social changes, events, historical influences, and shifting social authority 
bore down upon the sensibilities inside the Department and coalesced to solidify 
a new operating logic of sovereign authority. Taken together, the historical, 
sociological, political and cultural analysis provided across these chapters, 
culminating in a punitive penal turn, revises and extends the current history of 
Irish penal politics. This account moves visions of penal politics away from 
Ministers and steadies our focus upon political culture as a way of explaining 
how events and social conflict come to be realised in the material practices of 
imprisonment. This historical and sociological research strategy allows us to 
explain the punitive forms and social meanings of imprisonment in Ireland by 
the year 2000. 
 
But this chapter also complicates the concept of the punitive turn. It has been 
illustrated here that such a clear and unambiguously negative shift in the Irish 
penal system was in fact also the consequence of a wider social liberation. The 
combination of historically researching and interpreting imprisonment from the 
perspective of key actors in the penal state, and also from the macro sociological 
view, tempers our ability to conclude that penal change in Ireland in the late 
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twentieth century was simply a punitive turn, truly reflecting the complexity of 













The History of Scottish Imprisonment and 




















The three chapters in this section detail and analyse the history of Scottish political 
culture and imprisonment from 1970 until 1995, using archival material, secondary 
data and quotes from interviews with Euan, Henry, Philip, Douglas, William, 
Alistair, Robert, Adam, Ken, Derek and Peter. This chapter will first introduce the 
major cultural and social forces, political practices and historical events which were 
the central fault lines of Scottish society by the 1970s. It first explains the nuances of 
the distinct Scottish governmental apparatus. Then it outlines the character of the 
expanding social welfare field, the urban and industrial nature of Scottish life, and 
the class divisions. Poverty was a subject of social concern, but violence was also a 
serious issue, and the images of unrefined masculinity, hard men and gangsters, 
were prominent in Scottish cultural imagination.  
 
Following on from this extended introduction, I will make three claims. The first is 
that Scottish imprisonment in this era can be defined as a form of disciplinary and 
exclusionary imprisonment. Its regimes were shaped by low skilled industrial work, 
prisoner progression, segregation, containment and security. The prison operated to 
discipline prisoners, incapacitate them, render them docile and gain the maximum 
amount of utility from them and the prison. Secondly, this form of incarceration was 
buttressed and reproduced by Scotland’s political culture of paternalistic liberalism 
– a political outlook informed by liberal ideas of individual reason and 
responsibility, a reactive and coercive paternalism and cultural sensibilities of 
antipathy and fear. Finally, and more broadly, the prison was understood and 
operated as a site of exclusion and confinement. The prison was employed as a 
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central technique of social control, directly tackling petty crime and serious violence 
that blighted Scotland by fully removing non-compliant and recalcitrant social 
subversives from mainstream social life. Central to this thesis is the aim of historical 
recovery. These arguments will endeavour to reassemble Scotland’s historical 
memory of punishment from 1970, and offer a new explanation for Scotland’s 
austere and punitive forms of imprisonment.  
 
  
2. Scottish Historical Landscape 
 
Scottish Administrative State 
 
The Scotland familiar to most is post-devolution Scotland. A new devolved 
parliament was instated in 1999, though Scotland remains part of the UK, with 
Westminster retaining control of certain UK-wide legislative and policy matters. 
When Scotland became part of the UK in 1707, it retained its distinct legal and 
criminal justice system (it also retained authority of other matters, such as health 
and housing (see McEwan 2002:71)). While having been ruled by Westminster on 
many matters until the establishment of the Scottish parliament in 1999, criminal 
justice has always been a Scottish affair, organised and ruled by a separate Scottish 
bureaucracy and legislation (Midwinter et al 1991:11) – though legislative 
amendments needed to pass through the parliament at Westminster (Keating and 
Midwinter 1983).  
 
In 1937 it was recommended that Scottish government departments be relocated 
from London to Scotland and in 1939 the Scottish Office – the equivalent to a 
Scottish Whitehall – opened in Edinburgh (Harvie 1977:51). The Scottish Office, 
based at St Andrew’s House, was responsible for law, criminal justice, education, 
health, agriculture and fisheries. In the absence of a devolved government the 
Scottish Office became a powerful administrative apparatus (McCrone 2001:117). It 
is therefore suitable and appropriate to think of Scotland as a separate comparator 
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nation, particularly in relation to the prison system because this has always been 
controlled by the Scottish administration.  
 
Over the mid-twentieth century, Scotland’s administrative and governmental 
capacity was incrementally expanded (Harvie 1977:169), and a new ‘development 
philosophy’ took hold in the 1960s. The Scottish Office’s new Development 
Department was charged with urban and economic planning, both of which were 
now undergoing a modernisation process (Gibson 1985:141-143). Between 1960-
1975, Scottish governmental activity increased as strategic planning dominated, 




The Kilbrandon Philosophy  
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the field of social work field was significantly and 
indeed radically extended. In 1964 the seminal (and now historic) Kilbrandon 
Report was published. The Kilbrandon Committee had been tasked with 
investigating juvenile justice. They suggested that, in Gibson’s words, ‘inadequate 
families’ (1985:149) who were subject to multiple social work interventions were 
regularly appointed numerous social workers to assist with their different needs 
and issues. Kilbrandon proposed streamlining and expanding social work, and 
radically reorganising the juvenile justice system. 
 
There were several important consequences of Kilbrandon. First, the 1968 Social 
Work (Scotland) Act	identified children’s misbehaviour as the result of social failure 
or familial difficulty (McAra 1999:366). A Children’s Hearing System replaced 
juvenile courts in 1971. The Children’s Hearings System was a forum for 
‘administrative tribunals’. These tribunals dealt with children who committed 
offences as well as children with a wider array of issues, such as truancy; not only 
crime. The Children’s Hearings System addressed all cases as welfare cases. At 
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these hearings decisions were (and indeed, still are) made by a lay panel about the 
interventions a child needed, as opposed to deciding whether or not they were 
guilty or innocent (Asquith and Docherty 1999:245).  
 
A second consequence of the 1968 Act was that social work gained new status and 
powers by making it a generic rather then specialised set of disciplines. As a result, 
probation was dissolved into general social work and moved into the new social 
work departments, which were transferred to the Education Department of the 
Scottish Office (Gibson 1985:148). The Kilbrandon Report and the 1968 Act reflected 
a widely held belief about ‘the necessity for, and efficacy of, governmental activity’ 
(Brodie et al 2008:701, referencing Stewert 2004) and a believe in the paternalistic 
state to create and support a more prosperous Scotland. Gibson described the 1968 
Act as the single most significant piece of social legislation in Britain since the 
establishment of the National Health Service (1985:149). What Kilbrandon achieved 
was seen as a ‘breakthrough’ for a new conception of Scottish law (Harvie 1977:197). 
In addition, Kilbrandon was the first clear example of Scottish Office autonomy and 
policy distinction (McEwan 2002:72).  
 
Kilbrandon has been considered the ‘quintessential’ penal welfare document 
(Garland 1996; McAra 2005, 2008). It became a cultural totem, a signal of a distinctly 
Scottish approach to social policy and criminal justice (Brodie et al 2008), in which 
social work and the welfare approach was favoured over criminal justice (Cavadino 
and Dignan 2006:206; Croall 2006; Duff and Hutton 1999; McAra 1999; Young 1997). 
The ‘Kilbrandon philosophy’ has become a shorthand for this	among policymakers 
and academics (McAra 2008:489; McNeil 2005; Asquith 1992; Halliday et al 2009)   
 
However, how Kilbrandon impacted adult criminal justice is less clearly 
understood, though there is evidence that it was not entirely positive. The discretion 
accorded to local governments to allocate funding to generic social work was 
subsequently criticised for creating an ‘opportunity for the operation of the doctrine 
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of less eligibility’ (Moore 1978: 39). In practice, adult offenders in the community 
were often side lined, with a decreasing number of probation orders given to male 
offenders after the 1968 Act was implemented (ibid.).  
 
Writing on Kilbrandon goes beyond empirical research, entailing a distinct kind of 
enterprise, a sort of monument to the emergence of a ‘New Scotland’, shaped by 
presentist desire to establish the long and distinct history of egalitarian and 
communitarian civic values.44 The Kilbrandon Philosophy and the Children’s 
Hearing System are often invoked as cultural symbols. Providing what Lévi-Strauss  
described as ‘a metaphorical representation of collective identity. Totems are central 
to the stories that cultures tell themselves about who they’ are, but also who they 
were (1964, quoted in Stevens 2011:249-250). Retrospective praise for the Kilbrandon 
penal ethos is often intertwined with a feeling that Scotland had historically been 
distinct from England. These accounts emphasise Kilbrandon’s success while 
downplaying the ways in which Scotland’s social landscape of the late twentieth 




City Clearances  
	
Because of Scotland’s nineteenth century industrialisation it had a predominately 
urban population, the majority of whom lived within the Edinburgh/Glasgow 
‘central belt’ (Keating and Midwinter 1983). By 1900 40 percent of Scotland’s 
population lived in cities, with more than half that number living in Glasgow 
(Harvie 1977). Glasgow had long been a subject of state concern, with inner city 
populations living in what were perceived as overcrowded slums. The housing 
																																																						
44 This presentist remoulding of the past is not confined to Scottish criminal justice histories. Clark and Gibbs (2018 
forthcoming) write that the monuments erected to commemorate Scotland’s industrial past often convey narratives 
of positive social transition into ‘New Scotland’, moving from industrial and working class to a ‘brain intensive 
industry’ and middle class society(citing Devine 2007). They critique how other associated ‘academic accounts gloss 




problem in Glasgow, while not unique in Britain, was among the most acute in 
terms of deprivation and overcrowding (Johnstone 1992:76). The city thus had long 
been a source of concern. During the first half of the twentieth century Glasgow had 
been subject to slum clearances and housing development projects (Damer 1989; 
Keating and Midwinter 1983).  
 
After the Second World War, there were local government proposals that the 
population of Glasgow should be significantly reduced via relocation (Hutchinson 
1996:58). Gibson (1985:141) suggests that there was an optimism about the potential 
of urban planning to help create a more prosperous Scotland. However, urban 
redesign and relocation – while explicitly concerned with improvement in living 
standards (Robinson 2010) – were also motivated by a desire for urban re-
moralisation. Moving people and razing areas was a means to address the ‘social 
evils’ that were long associated with these places (Begg 1996:2).45 As a result, there 
were extensive plans put in place to move ‘problem people’ and reorder these 
‘problem places’ during the 1950s and 60s (Damer 1989; Pacione 1995).  
 
The new ‘overspill estates’ and high rise flats which were built experienced 
problems from the start (Damer 1989:51), and living conditions often remained 
substandard (Craig 2003: 49). These schemes, while certainly offering housing 
capacity, often failed to develop the necessary amenities such as schools, shops, 
pubs, recreational facilities and transport links. Issues of exclusion and crime were 
exacerbated at these new housing schemes, which had higher rates of deprivation, 
male unemployment and infant mortality than the places they had replaced. By the 
1980s these ‘peripheral schemes were themselves to pose some of the most severe 










Glasgow was also a thriving social hub founded upon heavy industries (Harvie 
1977:109-110). As well as being an urban nation, Scotland was also home to the 
heavy industries of steel work, coal mining, shipbuilding and rail works, which 
provided a major source of employment and shaped both the cultural landscape 
and the national image. At the beginning of the twentieth century 10 percent of the 
Scottish work force was employed in a coalmine – 13 percent higher than the British 
average (Perchard 2013:82). Tens of thousands of people were employed in railway 
engineering and at the beginning of the 1950s Scotland had 12 percent of the world’s 
shipbuilding industry (Harvie 1977:174), giving Scotland a different and less 
diversified economy than England.  The heavy reliance on industry had cultural as 
well as economic consequences, forging the national Scottish trope of male culture 




Masculinity and Violence 
 
While Scotland already had a reputation as a violent country (McAra 2008:485), 
violent crime and offending had been increasing throughout the 1960s (HC Deb 26 
March 1968 vol 761 cc1330-77). While violence was a pervasive national stereotype, 
there was generally a distinct regional understanding attached to this image. Gangs 
were synonymous with Glasgow from the 1920 and 30s (Davies 1998, 2007a) and the 
city has been described as ‘Scotland’s Chicago’ (Davies 2007b), associated with the 
‘archetypical construction of masculinity in industrial Glasgow’ (Young 2007:71). 
Fears regarding crime and social disorder had a localised character, with certain 
urban and poor areas believed to have cultivated an alternative and disturbing 
‘moral economy’ (Thompson 1971). 
 
Deviance and crime were increasingly associated with some of the ‘overspill 
housing estates’ (Bartie 2010:395), many of which were now seen as ‘delinquent 
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areas’ (Armstrong and Wilson 1973), with their own ‘ecosystem’ perpetuating a 
more acute poverty (Begg 1996:161). The culture within these estates did not just 
invoke violence but also, according to Damer, was perceived to instil drunkenness, 
anti-social traits, fecklessness and immorality in its residents (1989:52). To speak of 
life in many of Glasgow’s overspill estates in the 1970s was to describe dystopian 
places besieged by deprivation, unemployment, vandalism and serious crime, as ‘an 
atmosphere of decay and poverty’ made these housing schemes ‘notorious’ (Begg 
1996:154, 158). This was part of Scotland’s ‘urban predicament’ (ibid. chapter four). 
The problem of crime came to be seen not as structural inequality but ‘the alleged 
pathology of its tenants’ in certain difficult estates (Damer 1989:12).  
 
Scotland also had some of the highest homicide rates in Europe, comparatively high 
rates of male victimisation, high rates of weapons used in attacks and more people 
dying from ‘hitting and kicking’ than in England and Wales (McAra 2008:486). 
Again, Glasgow was seen as presenting a perturbing picture, with the city’s high 
homicide rates linked to ‘pockets of extreme neighbourhood deprivation; a culture 
of knife-carrying amongst young males; sectarian/football violence; organized crime 
and gang culture; and a heavy drinking culture’ (ibid). However, Armstrong and 
Wilson (1973) and Bartie (2010) each pointed out the discrepancy between the 
cultural image of Glasgow violence and the empirical reality. Knife crime and 
violence were rising in all of Scotland’s cities, including Edinburgh (Leyland 2006). 
There was a contrast between where violence was believed to be and the statistical 
reality of the rise in violence. This speaks to Scotland’s class conflict and entrenched 
social division between respectable groups and problem places.  
 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the image of the Glasgow hard man 
began to permeate the cultural imagination. ‘A cult of toughness characterised’ 
those men working in Glasgow’s heavy industries (Johnston and McIvor 2004:138). 
There was an engrained cultural image of a Scottish masculinity – this ‘hard man’ 
characterised by toughness and endurance (e.g. McIlvanney 1975, 1985). As well as 
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violence, with famous tales of Glasgow gangs (McArthur and Kingsley 1935), stories 
of men’s work as dangerous and competitive (Moffat 1965) and a masculine 
‘convention to appear crude’ and always willing to ‘exchange fun for fists’ 
(Kirkwood 1935). This was a cultural stereotype which came to permeate the image 
of the prisoner as well (e.g. Boyle 1977, more on which below). A macho culture of 
heavy drinking, smoking, gangs and violence was perceived to be part of Scotland, 
but particularly Glasgow’s, distinct historical and cultural development (Damer 
1989:170; Bartie 2010:385). 
 
Scottish Decline   
In addition to the difficulties of crime and deprivation, British heavy industries 
suffered a sharp reversal in fortunes in the 1960s. The post-war years witnessed a 
period of massive technological innovation, shifting demand away from Scotland’s 
industrial specialisations. These changes heralded unemployment throughout the 
1970s and into the 1980s, the scale of which turned this from a regional and 
production matter into a serious Scottish national crisis (Pechard 2013:86; Harvie 
1977:174).  
 
This was a fractious and difficult time for Scottish society. The loss of work was 
compounded by the disruption of settled communities through city clearances, 
making some formerly close networked groups less cohesive. Perchard (2013), 
referencing Sennett, describes this as a ‘corrosion of character’. There was anger in 
the coal mining communities as hard men became ‘broken men’ (Perchard 2013; for 
a personal and political reflection see Reid 1976). Unemployment in Scotland 
increased from 7.5 percent in 1979 to 15 percent in 1982. By 1971 34.5 percent of men 
were unemployed (Carstairs and Morris 1989), one in five Scottish people living in 
poverty by the end of that period, and an even larger number of people were 








The legacy of the shifting economic and social order after deindustrialisation had a 
serious impact on income inequality, social exclusion and chronic illness in 
Scotland. Connected to this decline and structural inequality were Scotland’s 
mortality rates, which have been higher than the British average, a gap that 
increased from the 1970s. McCartney et al (2012: 459) suggest that ‘the most 
plausible explanations’ for the rise in Scottish mortality between 1950 and 1980 ‘link 
to particular industrial, employment, housing and cultural patterns’, what others 
have called the ‘aftershock of deindustrialisation’	(Walsh et al. 2010). Throughout 
the 1980s, mortality rates related to suicide, alcohol, drugs, and violence increased, 
but most acutely in Glasgow and the surrounding west of Scotland (McCartney et al 
2012). 
 
From the 1970s Scotland contained ‘some of the poorest parts of the UK…[and] 
some of the lowest life expectancies in Western Europe’ (Campbell et al 2013).46 
Scottish mortality rates began to negatively diverge from their English and Welsh 
equivalents in the 1970s, particularly for Scottish men, and that this pattern 
diverged significantly from Scotland’s mortality rates in the early 1960s which had 
been broadly similar to the British average. Scottish heath inequalities contributed 
to an expanding social division between class groups, an invidious physical 
distinction between the poor and the non-poor. By the 1970s Scotland was 
confronted by the problems of high unemployment, low income and poor health 
(Hutchinson 1996).	
 
Scottish Social Anxieties and Aspirations 
This extended historical introduction provides a backdrop which is rarely presented 
																																																						
46 In recent years this has now become known as the ‘Glasgow Effect’, where the morality rates in still considerably 
higher in Glasgow than it is in other equally deprived post industrial British cities, such as Liverpool and 
Manchester (e.g. Reid 2009; Walsh et al 2016) 
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in Scottish penal history. Almost no other European countries experienced the 
increase in economic inequalities on the scale of Great Britain in the 1970s, with 
Scotland containing ‘some of the poorest parts of the UK’ (Campbell et al 2013:184) 
the impact of economic changes were disproportionately felt there (Carstairs and 
Morris 1989; Fraser and Sinfield 1987; Mok et al 2012). 
Crime, poverty and social (particularly urban) disorder became serious and 
intertwined social and governmental issues. The consequences of these forces 
contributed to a rise in mortality rates, new anxieties about crime, violence and 
gangs; social polarisation around poverty and the existence of stigmatised groups 
and areas. It is this context from which this chapter now begins to reconstruct the 
historical dynamics of Scottish penal culture from 1970 to the beginning of the 
1980s. This wider set of social relations will be shortly readdressed in order to help 
explain the nature of Scottish political culture and imprisonment regimes, details of 
which we now turn. 
 
3. Imprisonment in Scotland  
	
Administration and Expansion 
 
The Prison Division operated in the outskirts of Edinburgh in a separate office 
beyond the hub of St Andrew’s House in city centre Edinburgh.47 The Division was 
not a policymaking unit, but rather a practical and reactive administrative 
operation. Part of its administrative work included ad hoc amendments to the 1952 
prison rules – a process of tweaking which responded to the contemporary needs of 
the system, the staff and the prisoners. This included such disparate matters as food 
scales, onion rations, delivery drivers’ pay, holiday pay rates, prisoners’ earnings, 
officer uniform rules, censorship, visits etc. The Prison Division compiled copious 
addenda and rule adjustments which were dispatched to prison governors via 
																																																						
47 The Prison Division was also sometimes known as the Prisons Group, referring to it as a collection of 
administrative aspects. Throughout, and for the purposes of consistency, I will refer to it as the Division. 
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circulars and standing orders. These administrative concerns dominated their work, 
particularly as prison social work and probation had been transferred into the local 
authorities and release was decided upon by a separate Parole Board.  
 
Larger scale policy changes were often the result of a desire to keep pace with 
prison policy in England and Wales. While the Home Office did not direct the work 
of the Scottish Prison Division, they were nonetheless influenced by its English 
counterparts, keeping an eye trained on English penal innovations and advances. 
For example, the security classification in Scottish prisons was an adoption of 
changes recommended by the Mountbatten Report (MacDonald and Sim 1978:7), 
even though that report was concerned almost wholly with England. They relied on 
the Home Office for smaller insights too. Rather than attend international seminars, 
they would await the report from the English team who attended (HH57/1742/125). 
They often followed the small changes in policy that occurred in England and Wales 
too, such as Governors’ right to reply to media requests, their responses to 
dangerous prisoners, the role of the Prison Inspector and changing prison 
censorship (HH57/1961; HH57/1794). The Prison Division in the 1970s had an 
administrative ethos, meaning they maintained the prison order, monitored its 
provisions, and altered rules and practices as required.  
 
Managing the prisons had become increasingly demanding by the 1970s. The prison 
population had grown in the previous decade: in 1964, Scotland had 3,250 prisoners, 
but by 1971, the daily average number of prisoners had risen to 5,338 (Annual Report 
1971:1). By 1983 they were responsible for over 5000 prisoners and thirteen 
institutions for adults, with a fourteenth prison under construction.48  With the 
number of prisoners rising rapidly the Division reported that it was ‘alarming’ that 
‘Two out of every 1,000 of the whole male population of Scotland are now in 
																																																						
48 The annual reports list 12 adult prisons with a 13th under construction. I include the Barlinnie Special Unit 
separately as it had its own governor and was autonomous of the main Barlinnie prison. More on which below.	
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custody in a penal establishment at any one time’, which was a ‘higher proportion 
than in most other Western countries’ (Annual Report 1971:1).  
 
By the 1970s, one of the main priorities of the Prison Division was to expand the 
prison system so that it could meet the needs of the courts. This was done by 
allowing multiple prisoners to occupy a cell and devising a prison construction 
programme aimed at keeping pace with forecasted growth of the prisoner 
population (Annual Report 1972:20-17). The Division had a budget of £30 million to 
build three adult prisons and an institution for young offenders. By 1978 the 
Division aimed to provide an extra 3,000 prisoner places (HH57/322/52). Of the 
three adult establishments one (HMP Shotts) would hold up to 1000 prisoners. The 
other two would be built for a population of 500 each (HH57/322/60). Greenock, a 
young offenders institution, was also being converted into a prison for 180 males 
(Annual Report 1980). Two more prisons, Dungavel and Cornton Vale, both opened 
in 1975. The latter was a female-only prison for 220 women and girls (Carlen 1983) 
and Dungavel was a medium-security prison for 150 adult men. While expansion 
remained the Division’s central prerogative, it was severely curtailed when Britain 
entered a recession in 1973, due in part to the decline in traditional heavy industries 
and the oil crisis. As a result, the planned 1000-person prison, HMP Shotts, had to 
be built on a phased basis. In 1978 phase one opened, a drastically smaller 60 place 
unit.  
 
Health and Hygiene  
A routine concern for the Division was the monitoring of health, preventing the 
spread of diseases within prisons and treating prisoners with chronic illnesses and 
addictions. During the 1970s they promoted abstention from alcohol, drugs and 
cigarettes to prisoners, and were concerned with the ‘hazards of venereal disease’ 
and personal cleanliness (Annual Report 1970:16-18). Prisons regularly welcomed in 
Alcoholics Anonymous and in 1971 a small alcohol treatment unit was opened at 
Low Moss prison (Annual Report 1971:13). These, often short-term, prisoners were 
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not being subject to punishment, but prison care, as it was referred to as a medical 
control regime of ‘penal medicine’ (Annual Report 1982:20). 
 
The Division was concerned with the prevalence of ‘mental disorders’ among the 
prisoner population. These were described as prisoners who exhibited nervous 
disorders, neuroses, or were emotionally disturbed or mentally unstable. Among 
the mundane routines of Scottish imprisonment was the treatment of these various 
vulnerable and disordered groups (Annual Report 1981:19). Within the broader remit 
of psychological disorders, the Division was also preoccupied by prisoners with 
‘personality disorders’, and distinct from other kinds of perceived incapacity of 
other ‘disordered’ and sick prisoners. It was explicitly stated that personality 
disorders ‘do not come within the definition of mental disorder’, particularly as 
their main characteristic was ‘disruptive behaviour’ and violence (HH57/1794). Each 
year thousands of prisoners were reportedly diagnosed with these pathologies. 
 
Prison Industries  
Among the most important dynamics propelling the daily regimes of Scottish 
imprisonment was industry. Only a small minority of prisoners worked outside the 
prison (0.5% in 1978 Annual Report p.14). Most prisoners worked within the prison 
and were involved in textile and manufacturing – which included making and 
repairing mailbags, producing goods from canvas, mat making, net making and 
mattress making – as well as domestic work, such as cleaning, working as orderlies, 
working in the library. A small number of around 100 prisoners were involved in 
trades such as carpentry, plumbing, painting, plastering and labouring. Full 
employment for all prisoners was a key aim of the imprisonment regime (Annual 
Report 1985:5). The prison system was seen to have failed the prisoner ‘by the waste 
of their [the prisoners’] own resources during imprisonment’ (Parole Board for 




Prison industries were not aimed at ‘capacity building’ (Garland 2013:501). Prison 
industries were also a cheap and effective means to keep prisoners usefully 
occupied (Annual Report 1972:14), to ‘counter boredom’ (Annual Report 1970:12), 
stimulate industriousness and prevent prisoners from ‘idleness’ (HMCIP Annual 
Report 1981:12). Prisoners would not rest, loll or lounge while imprisoned. Prison 
industry was lauded because it provided a systematic and simple template for 
prisoner control and prison order, contributing to ‘the efficient management and 
control of prisoners and prisons by providing a stable and regular routine’ (Annual 
Report 1985:5). To increase the rehabilitative capacities of prison industry, the 
Division acknowledged that the forms of industrial labour would have to be better 
aligned with outside job opportunities, but within the prison system low-level 
factory work was over emphasised (Annual Report 1972:17). The heavy reliance on 
industry prioritised utility over welfare. Low and unskilled work activities were 
largely organised so as to maximise the utility and output of ‘inmate labour’ (Parole 
Board for Scotland Report 1972:15). 
 
The ideas of utility were so deeply ingrained that an increase in the prisoner 
population was also viewed positively, resulting in increased productivity because, 
as they described it, the prison now had ‘a larger workforce’ (Annual Report 
1972:16). Thus when there was a small reduction in prisoner numbers in 1981 it was 
reported that: ‘it caused short manning on lines of production’ (Annual Report 
1981:14).  
 
The rehabilitative agenda was, essentially, subordinate to the economic and 
utilitarian penal rationality:  
‘modern industrial work under enlightened conditions gives no worse a 
result in terms of positive rehabilitative benefit than other more 
expensive forms of institutional treatment. Well organised and well 
managed prison industry can be carried out for up to 8 hours a day at 
virtually no cost whatsoever to the Exchequer and, in some cases, at a 
significant profit. The cost/benefit to society as a whole therefore of 
expanding and modernising prison industries is an important factor 
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which deserves special consideration in the overall planning of 
treatment programmes’ (Annual Report 1974:13).   
 
The Division monitored the ‘value of work done’, calculated via output of products 
and the financial value of goods produced by prison industry (Annual Report 
1970:12). Using these figures the Division tracked, compared and reported the 
annual sales turnover per inmate. Each Scottish prisoner had an equated economic 
value, and it was that which the Division monitored and actively sought to 
stimulate via imprisonment regimes.   
 
Security as Classification 
While almost all prisoners were workers, they were categorised into discrete 
security classifications which distinguished them in terms of danger and risk of 
escape: 
 
Category A:  Those who if they escaped would be highly dangerous to 
the public, the police or the security of the state; 
 
Category B: Those prisoners for whom the very highest conditions of 
security are not necessary, but for whom escape must be made very 
difficult; 
 
Category C: Prisoners who cannot be trusted in open conditions but 
who do not have the ability or the resources to make a determined 
escape attempt; 
 
Category D: Prisoners who can be trusted in open conditions 
(MacDonald and Sim 1978:8). 
 
Adult prisoners were categorised as either short-termers (sentences less than 18 
months) or long-termers (sentences of 18 months and above, including 
indeterminate sentences). The majority of the average daily prison population in 







Long and Short-Term Prison Population: 1973-1975 






1973 4951 2042 1176 
1974 4689 2078 1123 
1975 4810 2257 1126 
Source: Annual Report 1975 
 
Induction 
The 1970s Scottish prison system of the 1970s was preoccupied with the long-term 
prisoner and had several special systems set-up specifically for them within the 
regime. Upon entering the prison system, long-term and life sentence prisoners 
were assessed by the National Classification Board (a mix of Governors, Chief 
Officers, social workers, industrial managers and specialist officers) who tested 
them on skills such as cutting joints, arithmetic, IQ etc. (McNeil 1988; Adler and 
Longhurst 1994). This process was used to identify whether the prisoner would 
accept and settle into their prison sentence or if they were likely to be disorderly. 
Those long-term prisoners deemed ‘trainable’ were sent to Perth or Edinburgh. But 
if the Classification Board deemed the newly incarcerated person as recalcitrant, or 
if the prisoner refused to be assessed then they were immediately identified as a 
disruptive prisoner and subjected to a much more austere regime (Coyle 1991; 
Scraton, Sim and Skidmore 1988). In that way, Scottish long-term imprisonment was 
organised hierarchically. 
 
Underpinning the hierarchy of Scottish imprisonment was a distinct pattern of 
movement known as progression: long-term male prisoners were moved around the 
prison in a system intended to work as a rational system of reward and punishment. 
Once assessed and allocated the long-term male prisoner would enter the routine of 
industry. However, it was unlikely a long-termer would complete their sentence in 
one prison. Speaking from his experience working inside the prisons and the 
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Division, Derek told of how the imprisonment regimes were organised around 
circulation, which progressed long-termers through their prison ‘career path’. 
Progression occurred between what were considered ‘mainstream’ institutions. 
Ideally, a long-term prisoner would spend time in different prisons as they 
progressed towards the end of their sentence. But a prisoner could also be 
downgraded and returned to a lower establishment as punishment. Penninghame 
open prison relied less on ‘physical restraints’ of discipline, control and security, 
instead: 
‘Formal controls are replaced by a high degree of personal discipline 
and if it becomes apparent that an individual is incapable of exercising 
an acceptable level of control, he is transferred to another establishment’ 
(HMCIP Report on Penninghame 1982 p.15).  
Misconduct could be punished by extreme downgrading to more austere prison 
settings, and there was the risk of being segregated outside the mainstream system. 
 
It should be noted, progression was always for adult male prisoners. After Cornton 
Vale opened, very little time or energy was spent developing women’s 
imprisonment. As Alistair described it, he thought the Division saw Cornton Vale as 
‘the bee’s knees’ and that they were absolutely astounded by Pat Carlen’s (1983) 
critique of Cornton Vale. 
 
Segregation – ‘psychopaths’ and ‘pests’ 
Scottish imprisonment had ‘deep end’ institutions that existed at the bottom, and 
even outwith, the mainstream prison hierarchy; these were what Sparks has termed 
‘termini’, the lowest points ‘on an ostensibly rational system of incentives and 
sanctions’ (Sparks 2002:559, original emphasis).  Dangerous, non-compliant and 
disruptive prisoners were an accepted reality of Scottish imprisonment and thus 
necessitated permanent facilities of exclusion and segregation (HC Deb 15 July 1982 




Peterhead maximum security prison was the ‘end of the road’ (HMCIP Report on 
Peterhead 1981:4); it represented extreme confinement, a ‘place of internal exile’ 
(Sparks 2002:576), providing extra ‘security and control’ for those prisoners serving 
long-term and indeterminate sentences (HMCIP Report on Peterhead 1981:3). 
Peterhead was a notorious prison for notorious prisoners. Its role was described 
thus: ‘to assist other establishments by holding those prisoners viewed as most 
disruptive’ (SPS 1990a:21). Prisoners who were deemed to be of ‘Peterhead 
classification’ (Coyle 1987:145; Scraton, Sim and Skidmore 1988:255) had been 
identified as requiring extra penal incapacitation and exclusion:  
‘at any one time, Peterhead contained a very mixed group of prisoners 
including maximum security prisoners, prisoners who presented 
management problems, and a wider group of inadequate, often disturbed 
prisoners’ (SPS 1990a:21).  
 
The Chief Inspector described the incendiary atmosphere at Peterhead: ‘[it] 
experiences an uneasy calm which can erupt into violence without warning’ 
(HMCIP Report on Peterhead 1981:3-4). Throughout the 1970s the prison endured 
intense bouts of prisoner resistance such as rioting, roof top demonstrations, escape 
attempts and hunger strikes.  
 
Peterhead itself required greater exclusionary measures to maintain its own internal 
order. Working inside the prisons at the time, Alistair outlined the predicament. 
Inevitably some prisoners would never accept the authority of the prison and the 
legitimacy of their sentence. Thus the prison authorities required a means to both 
punish and deter prisoner disorder:  
 
‘[Peterhead] was the end of the line, and once you were there, there was 
nowhere else to go, and once you take hope away – you know the usual 
argument….if you create the end of the line, you need an end of the line 





More restrictive segregation existed in the form of ‘the Digger’ at Peterhead (Sparks 
2002) and ‘the cages’ at Inverness (Boyle 1977; Wozniak 1989), developed for 
prisoners deemed to need ‘complete physical separation from the normal prison 
routine’ (SHHD 1971:13). The segregation ‘cages’ at Inverness opened in 1966, 
providing a short, sharp, shock type of penal deprivation (HH57/1794). Its ‘basic 
philosophy’ was ‘that any prisoner who showed that he was violent, subversive or 
recalcitrant could be sent to the unit at Inverness until such time as he demonstrated 
his fitness to return to his normal prison classification’ (SHHD 1971:4).49   
 
Segregation was, first, a form of punishment. No matter what, there would be 
serious consequences for prisoner misbehaviour. Segregation provided extra-
physical constraint and degrading rituals. Later critics at the time described how 
prisoners segregated at Peterhead would stand  
‘naked before prison officers in a ‘cage’ 9 feet by 6 feet the prisoner 
underwent a full body search three times each day. The solitary 
confinement and personal humiliation of the cages represented the 
ultimate loss of dignity for any individual receiving punishment’ 
(Independent Committee of Inquiry 1988:29). 
  
These units were about exercising total control over prisoners, managing their time, 
space and bodies. Its aims also included behavioural modification as the prisoner, 
would ideally be returned to the mainstream with a more compliant disposition. 
 
In 1972 there was a particularly violent incident in the cages. A prison officer lost an 
eye, other officers were stabbed and two inmates were seriously injured 
(HH57/1742), which led to the temporary closure of the unit. Scotland had only 
abolished the death penalty shortly before these incidents in 1965. Without the 
																																																						
49 These were relatively small numbers in comparison to the size of the rest of the system. But nonetheless a regular 
feature which was relied upon. 
 
Year       Number of Prisoners         Avg Length of stay     
1968      32                                     2 months 3 weeks 
1969      17                                     4 months 2 weeks 
1970      11                                     3 months 3 weeks 
1971      14                                     2 months 1 weeks 
1972      17                                     2 months 3 weeks 
source: HC Deb 24 November 1978 vol 958 cc756-7W	
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threat of execution, the Division had been adjusting the imprisonment regimes to 
meet the perceived potential dangers of the long-term prison population (Cooke 
1989a). Confronted first by these troubling incidents, as well as Scotland’s rising 
murder rate, visions of a new breed of prisoners with ‘nothing to lose’, the Division 
had the residual feeling that in abolishing the death penalty the Scottish penal 
system had lost its most serious deterrent (HC Deb 26 March 1968 vol 761 cc1330-
77). In this context of desperation, there was a small but profound innovation in 
Scottish segregation regimes in the early 1970s. The cages had not brought a 
reduction in prisoner misconduct, and that ‘crisis of violence’ opened a window of 
opportunity for more radical solutions (Nellis 2010). St Andrew’s House intervened, 
establishing a working group on The Treatment of Certain Male Long Term 
Prisoners and Potentially Violent Prisoners. Their job was to explore the possibility 
of another alternative regime for the endemic problem of unrelentingly disruptive 
prisoners. The working party argued that without the death penalty the work of 
prison officers had become more dangerous (SHHD 1971:3). They suggested a new 
segregation unit for the most violent prisoners (HH48/100/34), to provide intense 
support for those ‘very few inmates [who] manifest any signs of violence’ (SHHD 
1971:2). Their report suggested a therapeutic model of incarceration (Circular No 
73/1973), inspired by prisons such as Grendon in England (Stephen 1988). As a 
result, the Barlinnie Special Unit (hereafter BSU) opened at Barlinnie prison in 1973 
in what had been the women’s prison, but which had been unused.  
 
Recalling the discussions in St Andrew’s House shortly after the opening of the 
BSU, Henry described what he sensed as innovation born of desperation: ‘The 
Barlinnie Special Unit was conceived of because they didn’t know what else to do 
with these people’. But this small unit quickly became a radical and bold penal 
departure for Scotland. Holding up to eight men, some of whom were already 
renowned as among Scotland’s most dangerous prisoners. While the BSU was part 
of Scotland’s segregation network, its internal regime was far from segregative. The 
BSU returned autonomy to prisoners, allowing them and the staff to evolve into a 
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single ‘community’ rather than maintaining the distinctions between officers and 
prisoners. Everyone engaged in a democratic kind of governing arrangement which 
centred around weekly meetings. At these meetings, any member of the community 
(prisoner/officer) could be requested to take a place in the ‘hotseat’, where he could 
be subject to questioning from the rest of the group (Sparks 2002; Boyle 1977). As a 
result of the community meetings the prison rules were amended at the BSU. 
Together they decided to relax censorship outwith stipulated prison regulations; 
they allowed the free use of workshop equipment and telephones; and in a highly 
symbolic act, the group decided to remove the door from the punishment cell. The 
internal regime of the BSU was less regimented, unconcerned with industrial 
training in favour of the arts (Nellis 2010). This was also undoubtedly a more 
permeable prison. Prisoners moved in and out of the prison with greater freedom, 
and also enjoyed liberal visiting regimes including visits in their cells (HC Deb 13 
February 1978 vol 944 cc5-10W). The BSU became a celebrated unit (Sparks 2002), 
and with some of its prisoners – particularly Jimmy Boyle who produced a 
biography and sculpture while at the unit as well as Larry Winters, who published 
poetry – gaining a kind of celebrity status as they and the unit entered the Scottish 
cultural imagination. 
 
The BSU was also controversial. The media refereed it as ‘the Nutcracker Suite’, 
‘Butlins for prison toughies’ and ‘Porridge with cream’ (Cooke 1989b). The Unit also 
gained a wide audience of admirers, it became symbolic of what prison could 
achieve. It demonstrated that the worst and most dangerous of Scotland’s criminals 
were not beyond redemption, as one politician characterised penal practice in the 
BSU: ‘The Barlinnie experiment was, and is, based on the premise that lifers and 
other hard nut offenders will respond positively to being treated like human beings’ 
(HC Deb 12 February 1980 vol 978 cc1493-502). The BSU was perceived to have been 
successful at civilising Scotland’s most recalcitrant citizens. But, as the latter quote 
identifies, the BSU began as an ‘experiment’, an exception to the normal prison 
regime (13 February 1978 vol 944 cc5-10W) – a status which it always maintained 
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(Sparks 2002). The BSU was pioneering – and it was anomalous. The unit never sat 
comfortably within the Prison Division. St Andrew’s House had maintained a 
policy of protection over it according to Henry, who said they were to leave the unit 
be without too much oversight, having been told ‘don’t de-mystify it if it works’.  It 
was, as an official described in it 1980 ‘developed “apart from” rather than “part of” 
of the prison system’ (Working Party on Alternative Regimes 1985:11). Within the 
prison system, however, people were, according to Coyle, embarrassed by its 
academic and public success and notoriety (Coyle 1987).  
 
However, a demand for segregation units did not dissipate after the creation of the 
BSU. The BSU was not the only separation unit opened in the 1970s, concerns 
regarding the need to expand segregation continued into the 1980s. Calls were 
made by the prison officers to have the Inverness Unit reopened, which happened 
in 1978, only six years after it was mothballed. In justifying this decision, the 
Secretary of State described the cages ‘as an integral part of the prison system’ for 
prisoners who would ‘not respond to normal measures of management and control’ 
(HC Deb 24 November 1978 vol 958 cc756-7W).  In June 1982 construction of a new 
unit within Peterhead commenced. This was called the Ten Cell Unit, access to 
which was granted by the governor of Peterhead. According to the Under Secretary 
of State for Scotland, the unit would provide ‘facilities to deal with prisoners who 
require, for whatever reasons, to be removed from normal circulation’ (Working 
Party on Alternative Regimes 1985:14) and was thus not quite as punitive or austere 
as the digger or the cages. Concern over security and segregation also led to the 
establishment of The Working Party on Alternative Regimes (hereafter WPAR) in 
1982, who were to investigate the problems with the mainstream prison regime for 
long-termers, and explore possibilities about the future use and need for segregation 
units. The WPAR were interested in ‘(1) psychopaths with a repetitively violent 
disposition, (2) pests to the administration/subversives and (3) prisoners in need of 




While the BSU presents a remarkable moment in Scottish penal history, it should be 
seen as part of this network of segregation. All prisoners held in the Ten Cell Unit, 
the BSU, the cages and the digger were all beyond the mainstream prison system. 
As Derek described it, a prisoner in the BSU was considered ‘out of the system’. 
Other interviewees who worked inside the prison system and the wider criminal 
justice field at the time described BSU prisoners as ‘stagnating’ (William; Alistair). 
Segregated prisoners could not progress until they returned to the regular hierarchy 
of the mainstream prison system (Sparks 2002; Bottomley et al 1994). To progress – 
and thus be released – prisoners had to re-enter the mainstream prison regime, a 
reminder that even the more innovative unit, such as the BSU, existed to keep 
people out of the mainstream. The ideal dynamic of Scottish imprisonment regimes 
was to encourage long-term prisoners to circulate, to travel upwards through the 
prison hierarchy. While the BSU was far more progressive than other types of deep 
segregation (and maybe even mainstream imprisonment), it was not progression.  
 
Progressing  
One could ascend upwards along the prison hierarchy, towards open prisons like 
Penninghame, which had room for 74 inmates, or to a Training for Freedom Hostel 
(hereafter TFF). Dungavel prison had an important function in the ladder of 
progression. It was described as a midpoint between an open and closed prison 
(though this description was more symbolic, given its high walls, and ‘standard 
security fence’ (HMCIP Report on Dungavel 1981:1). Dungavel was for long-termers 
nearing the end of their sentences, who had been recommended for progression 
based on low risk of disorder and escape. TFFs were the final step on the ladder of 
progression. There were 8 TFF places in Aberdeen, 16 in Edinburgh and 11 at Perth. 
These prisons were described as ‘a necessary step on the road to liberation on 
licence’ (HMCIP Report on Penninghame 1982:3). 
 
Prisoners who reached Dungavel, Penninghame or a TFF could potentially enjoy 
greater freedom. They could attend evening classes in the community or work for 
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an outside employer and the majority would receive five days leave for Christmas. 
Nonetheless, a rational and regulated system prevailed, in which a prisoner had to 
maintain good behaviour within a stipulated timeframe before release was 
permitted. For example, if a prisoner had progressed to Category C in Shotts and 
had served four months under that category, they were then permitted an afternoon 
home visit every three months (HMCIP Annual Report 1985:6). That leave was still 
largely escorted, even from the open prison at Penninghame and the ‘semi-open’ 
Dungavel (HMCIP Annual Report 1985:6; HMCIP Report on Dungavel 1985). The 
prison kept its grip on a person as they were slowly being released back into society. 
This ‘support’ was considered optimal on the grounds that it helped prisoners 
better ‘contribute positively to local life and, equally important, the community 
itself may be better protected because the ex-offender under supervision appears 
less likely to offend again’ (Parole Board Annual Report 1980:11) 
 
To progress in prisons, it was ‘not enough to simply conform to prison rules and 
regulations’ (Parole Board for Scotland Report 1972:12).  The prisoner had before him 
the opportunity to graduate up the prison hierarchy and, ideally, in the process 
learn to master the self-control of ‘personal discipline’ and adopt more socially 
acceptable behaviours (HMCIP Report on Penninghame 1982:15). The prison rules 
were external constraints, but to progress the prisoner had to internalise these as a 
set of individual behavioural rules. As the Parole Board reflected in 1974,  
‘A man’s behaviour in prison…[is] usually to a considerable extent in 
his own hands. He can see prison as a challenge and decide to make use 
of such opportunities as it provides, or he can simply conform and pass 
his time quietly’ (p.6). 
 
In these prisons, a new emphasis was placed upon training prisoners to be 
responsible. For example, the ‘principles’ of the regime at Dungavel were ‘designed 
to encourage individual acceptance of responsibility appropriate to life in the 
community’ (HMCIP Report on Dungavel 1981:12). Further along the progression 
ladder at a TFF, personal responsibility was not just instilled but tested:  
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‘The purpose of the Training for Freedom Scheme is to provide 
conditions in which an inmate’s ability to live in the community can be 
tested while he is still under sentence, and to ease his transition to 
normal life in the community on his release’ (Annual Report 1978:21). 
 
Progression was an attempt to ‘train’ prisoners to be responsible by moving them – 
literally (through progression) and metaphorically (the process of socialisation) – 
towards a better prison with more privileges and, as part of that, ‘becoming 
reasonably responsible citizens’ (Parole Board Annual Report 1972:12). The 
expectations of responsibility were inscribed in these regimes, such that ‘responsible 
citizenship’ was the central motif of progression (Annual Report 1971:22; HMCIP 
Report on Penninghame 1982:3). 
 
Discipline and control were maintained in these more open prisons through the 
threat of downward progression, sending a prisoner back to the institution from 
which they transferred (HMCIP Report on Dungavel 1981:6). It was considered that 
‘The greatest controlling factor in an open institution is the sanction of being 
returned to closed conditions’ (HMCIP Report on Penninghame 1982:14). Discipline, 




For prisoners to begin to move out of the prison prior to their official release or 
remission date they required parole. For Scotland parole was a relatively new 
innovation, a product of the 1967 Criminal Justice Act which stipulated that only 
those serving over 18 months were eligible for early release (McManus 1999:231). A 
prisoner was considered for parole after completing one-third of their sentence or 
serving one year, whichever period was the greatest in length.  
 
The entire process was a staged series of ‘screenings’ (Parole Board for Scotland Report 
1979:14). Each prisoner considered by the Parole Board would have an individual 
dossier compiled by prison staff and social workers, containing a plotted history of 
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their criminal and social background, a review of their conduct on any previous 
supervision in the community, details of the current offence, comments or 
observations made by the Judge, and insights into their domestic life and how they 
had responded to imprisonment regime. But the most vital concern was public 
safety, and the risk of future offending was paramount for the Parole Board (Parole 
Board for Scotland Report 1972:9). This data would then be examined by a local 
review committee who would determine whether or not to recommend the 
applicant to the Parole Board, which then ultimately decided whether a prisoner 
would be recommended to the Secretary of State for early release.  
 
In 1979 it was reported that the Parole Board recommended that 72.8 percent of 
applicants receive parole, a total of 236 people (Parole Board for Scotland Report 
1979:7). This represented a high rate of parole success. But if we look at this figure 
measured against the entire number of parole eligible prisoners what we see is that 
in fact 29.5 percent of prisoners eligible for parole were successful in their 
applications.50 This demonstrates that in Scotland that parole was a cautious and 
stringently regulated process.  
 
For those who did receive a release date, the Parole Board would recommend a 
series of preparatory steps, which would expose a prisoner’s ‘weaknesses and 
strengths’ (Parole Board for Scotland Report 1972:9). Having progressed to this stage, 
any evidence of misconduct or doubts about ‘their suitability for release’ would 
mean that a prisoner’s parole date could be withdrawn and they would descend 
back into closed conditions (ibid.), a reminder that parole was ‘a privilege to be 




50 I calculate this by using the figures from the 1979 Annual Report. This calculation commences at the very 
beginning of the parole process, including the 764 eligible prisoners plus a further 36 people considered by the 
parole board (so, 800 people) and the final figure of 236 who received parole. 
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4. Disciplinary and Exclusionary Penal Culture 
 
I define the characteristic forms and practices of Scottish imprisonment regimes 
from 1970 into the early 1980s outlined above as disciplinary and exclusionary penal 
culture. Focused firstly on discipline, Scottish imprisonment regimes ensured 
prisoners obedience using ostensibly rational penal circulation, observation, the 
threat and use of segregation, the incentive of parole and a graded hierarchy of 
prisoner categories.  
 
First, mapping the practices of progression makes it is clear that it was not just each 
individual institution which disciplined and trained prisoners. Progression and 
downgrading, was fundamental to rational disciplinary logic of Scottish 
imprisonment regimes. Armstrong, citing Deleuze, writes that circulation ‘is not 
merely the means of getting from one disciplinary enclosure to another, but contains 
the essence of social control itself’ (2015:11-12).  Progression was fundamental to the 
regime, rather than merely getting a prisoner to somewhere where penal aims could 
be achieved. Progression represented the ‘calculated combination’ of prison forces 
which were believe to be ‘the highest form of disciplinary practice’ (Foucault 
1977:167). The logic of this form of imprisonment was manifest in the animus felt for 
the BSU across the prison system. It was seen as a potential ‘incentive for bad 
behaviour’ and that there should be ‘no carrots if good must be emphasised’ 
(original emphasis HH57/1622). The BSU transgressed the logic of disciplinary 
circulation of Scottish imprisonment regimes. 
 
Second, and relatedly, was the aim of utility (Foucault 1977:25), which rendered 
prisoners biddable and productive through the discipline of industry. In the 1970s, 
prison regimes in Scotland had ‘labour requirements’ (HMCIP Report on 
Penninghame 1982:16). Factory labour in Scottish prisons was intended to use the 
prisoners as a resource, as the Division reported, ‘to make economic use of the 
considerable labour force which the prison represents and which ought not to be 
	
268 
wasted’. Thus the administration managed the prisons to be ‘as profitable as 
possible’ (Annual Report 1972:14); the prisoner was constituted as part of the prison’s 
‘efficient machine’ of industry (Foucault 1977:164). 
 
Third, the dominant operational goals of disciplinary and exclusionary 
imprisonment were generally penal rather social, to create well behaved prisoners 
by instilling in them the ‘instinctive habits’ of prison obedience and self-control 
(O’Malley 1999:176). Imprisonment regimes were largely designed to efficiently 
support security and containment, rather than rehabilitation or personal 
improvement.  
 
Fourth, these historical Scottish imprisonment regimes were also characterised by 
penal exclusion and retribution, what was described by a senior civil servant in 
charge of criminal justice as a ‘humane’ form of ‘restrictive retributivism’, which 
meant that the prison sentence was the ultimately the fair and rational result of the 
legal system (Cowperthwaite 1987:4). The primary objective of the prison was to 
house prisoners for as long as the court had stipulated, providing their due 
punishment. In this way, the prison was a servant of the criminal justice system; its 
fundamental purpose was exclusion and deprivation of liberty. 
 
Fifth, and by contrast, some prisoners were subject to a kind of confinement that 
was concerned with neither rehabilitation nor punishment (O’Malley 1999:177), but 
with containment and exclusion, providing prison health care for those habitual but 
low level criminals. Specifically, those prisoners subject more to health 
interventions.  
 
Finally, disciplinary and exclusionary penal culture was informed by a public safety 
agenda. The prison served to keep those who posed problems for social order out of 
social circulation through careful and tightly measured parole process and restricted 




Together, these features capture the bleakness of Scottish prison practices during 
the 1970s-1980s, arguably, so often side-lined in the memory of Scottish cultural 
distinction which there is a duty to remember, (what Ricoeur (1999) calls the devoir 
de memoir).  
 
5. Political Culture: Patrernalistic Liberalism 
 
The character of imprisonment in Scotland in the 1970s into the 1980s can be defined 
as uninterested in rehabilitation, hyper-vigilant on security, fuelled by an 
unquestioned belief in the necessity of an ever expanding prison estate, shaped by 
an industrial quality and concerned with disciplinary circulation of prisoners. 
Having recovered the distinctive patterns which constitute Scottish disciplinary and 
exclusionary prison practices, how can we explain the commitment to its 
underpinning penal principles? I argue that Scotland’s distinctive imprisonment 
regimes were based in the preoccupations, sensibilities and objectives of Scottish 
political culture of paternalistic liberalism; a distinct political outlook which combined 
otherwise contradictory components of political thinking and cultural meaning.  
 
Liberal Aspirations 
The imprisonment regime’s aspiration for the prisoners to achieve good citizenship 
and personal control were rooted in the ‘key requirements’ of liberalism, 
emphasising freedom, individual responsibility, rationality, independence and good 
citizenship (O’Malley and Valverde 2004:27).  
 
These liberal ideas provided the accepted logic behind the progression system, 
particularly in the use of upward progression, becoming more prominent in the 
open prison settings. Long-termers who were progressing through the 
imprisonment regime to parole demonstrated they understood ‘the idea of good 
citizenship’ (Parole Board Report 1974:7). The ‘new found freedom’ in the higher 
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tiers of the prison regime, ‘far from being a soft option imposes responsibilities 
requiring personal decisions’ (HMCIP Report on Penninghame 1982:3). To progress 
meant the imprisonment regimes raised their liberal expectations. The prisoner in 
the open prison or TFF was expected to demonstrate responsibility and sensible 
personal judgement. 
 
Within the penal state it was felt that some prisoners could be literally ‘trained for 
freedom’. Those who could cope had, as Derek described it, right type of 
disposition, which enabled them to adapt to the responsibilities and expectations of 
freedom:  
‘Sometimes they were happy to be sent back [from an open prison] 
because they couldn’t cope…I think most prisoners would have 
adjusted, human nature makes the best of a bad job…But some couldn’t 
cope with the freedom’.  
 
 
The ideal outcome of disciplinary progression practices was not just reduced crime 
and better prison behaviour. It sought to instil a liberal rationality of ‘self-
determination’ which was believed could be encouraged in a small number of 
prisoners (HMCIP Report on Penninghame 1982:3). Theoretically, progression and 
Training for Freedom were ‘institutions which would encourage the internalisation 
of liberal democratic values, the creation of individuals who would learn how to 
rule their selves’ (Dumm 1987:6 in Melossi 2004:86). However, self-control was an 
ideal but marginal expectation in Scottish imprisonment. The penal state did not 
view the majority of prisoners as capable of this kind of inherent liberal rationality 
because of the cultural and social specifications which shaped the penal state’s 
understanding of the prisoner. As the Chief Inspector for Prisons wrote, when a 
prisoner was ‘exercising a personal choice on most occasions’, it was likely ‘a 
relatively new experience’ for the prisoner (HMCIP Report on Penninghame 1982:10). 
Prisoners were perceived to be people who had not been inculcated in the ways of 
socially acceptable behaviour. The prison was not engaging prisoners pre-existing 
liberal disposition, but the regime sought to implant it in prisoners. We cannot fully 
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understand prison practices by looking at political ideas alone; we must also 





The Feckless: Drunk, Diseased and Disordered 
 
In Scotland, justifications for disciplinary and exclusionary imprisonment regimes 
were also reflected a dismal and hopeless view of the prisoners. There was a sense 
that prisoners, first, were Scotland’s most chaotic, sad and disorderly citizens. 
Respondents provided straightforward descriptions – lacking in either heightened 
emotional sympathy or open disdain, offered as flat facts – of the prisoner as 
generally incompetent: ‘The majority are feckless, they don’t know how to organise 
their life, they’ve never known any better’, according to William. What was 
described in one correspondence (24 November 1983, HH57/1794) as ‘high grade 
defectives’: someone who was not ‘fully aware of, and responsible for, their actions’ 
and likely had a ‘below average IQ’. A similar observation was made by Douglas, 
who said that ‘the majority of the prison population are…the poor, the feckless etc., 
as you know, the illiterate’. I took the comment ‘as you know’ to refer to what was 
perceived to be my expertise as a person who researches prisons. Here Douglas 
appealed to that position to locate his perceptions within a broader framework of 
irrefutable social reality.   
 
The image of the feckless prisoner was pervasive, and was implicit in the specific 
metrics presented on prisoners’ health, which focused on the high rates of disease 
and morbidity that were plotted, typified and materialised through the annual 
report statistics of prisoner ill-health. There was a strong emphasis on venereal 
diseases, self-inflicted injuries, injuries by other inmates, drug dependence, 
alcoholism, diseases of the teeth, and lice or infestation. This array of disease and 
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disorder were a vivid and stigmatising statistical outline (Goffman 1963) of the type 
of penal subject with whom Scotland contended: contagious, infectious, and morally 
weak. There was an implied narrative that the causes of prisoners’ disorders were 
somehow internal. Prisoners then did not just need to be cared for and treated; they 
also needed to acquire this sense of personal responsibility. Prisoners should be 
taught ‘the principles they would need to observe if they were to lead more 
successful lives after liberation’. When it came to the provision of health, hygiene 
and mental health ‘treatment and education cannot be sharply separated’ (Annual 
Report 1970:18). The perceived identity of the prisoner as unstable, dysfunctional, 
maladjusted and lacking rationlity emerged time and time again. 
 
But matters became more endemic and problematic when it came to prisoners who 
suffered from ‘disorders affecting the mind’ (Annual Report 1972:21). This 
disordered prisoner haunts the annual reports. Many were described as suffering 
from neuroses or personality disorders (Annual Report 1978:17). A personality 
disorder, however, was explicitly defined as a non-medical issue (HH57/1794) and it 
was rarely required that these prisoners were required to be transferred into 
medical settings. In 1978, 2,872 people in prison had problems of the nervous 
system, 12 of whom had a ‘mental deficiency’ and only 10 were diagnosed with 
medically recognised psychoses which required a transfer to a hospital. Otherwise, 
prisoners’ mental disturbances were often ‘not treatable in a mental hospital’ 
(Annual Report 1983:3) and in 1983 the Division wrote that prisoners with ‘treatable 
mental illnesses are not kept in penal establishments’ (HH57/1794).  A memo 
described the problem as ‘the critical dividing line between treatable and 
untreatable’ (ibid.). Criminal acts were themselves believed to ‘frequently’ be the 
result of ‘some personality defect or disorder’ (Parole Board for Scotland Report 
1972:10), meaning that ‘severe emotional problems and very disturbed personalities’ 
were presented as endemic and pathological problems in the Scottish prison 
population (Annual Report 1982:19) which made prisoners ‘unpredictable’ (HMCIP 




The other prisoner who demonstrated habitual rather than serious criminality, and 
with whom the prison system continuously contended, was the inebriate. This was 
certainly not an exclusively Scottish problem, but it was believed to be more acute 
there (Moody 1979). In keeping within the liberal outlook of the political culture, the 
alcoholic prisoners were generally perceived to be those who lacked the will power 
to resist the temptation of overindulgence: ‘The relationship between over-
indulgence in alcohol and the offences committed by those sentenced to custody has 
long been recognised’ (Annual Report 1980:3). The Parole Board lamented the 
situation for these prisoners, writing that they were ‘simply irresponsible under the 
influence of drink’ (Parole Board for Scotland Annual Report 1972:11). The alcoholic 
prisoner lacked self-possession and self-control, and found himself continuously 
churned through the system in a cycle of short sentences.  
 
The inebriate prisoner placed special demands upon the system. Here we see the 
first streak of Scotland’s ‘coercive paternalism’ (Conly 2012, 2014), which viewed 
prisoners as individuals who had scarified their autonomy by a living a life marked 
by poor choices, thus justifying, even demanding, extra-state intervention without 
question. The view was that given that the medical and personal needs of this 
prisoner cohort, that the cost of keeping them in the community was high, and the 
chances of them remaining sober and out of the way of the law were low, prison 
was necessitated as the last resort for these sad recidivists. The prison served as a 
coercive social service for those beyond the help of non-coercive services: ‘The 
prison Service [sic] will continue to have an important social role to play in the care 
of this vulnerable group of offenders’ (Annual Report 1975:20), and that for alcoholic 
prisoners the prison was ‘a social as well as a medical service’ (Annual Report 
1982:20). Despite the intervention of ‘penal medicine’, it was felt that ‘in so many 
cases’ patients would ‘rapidly lapse from grace on release and return again and 
again to the care of the Prison Medical Service’. The succession of crime and 
punishment here was presented as a cycle of addiction and carceral social welfare. 
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Prison was thus for the prisoner who had nowhere else to go, for whom the prison 
was required as a social and personal, rather than punitive, intervention. These 
prisoners may seem unworthy of imprisonment, they explained, but ‘in many cases 
[there is] no alternative to confinement’ (HH57/1794). Containment and exclusion in 
prison was the last resort.  
 
Many of the prisoners were understood to have highly dysfunctional emotional and 
cognitive capacities which rendered them beyond the spectrum of normalcy; 
Scottish prisoners were not like the average Scottish citizen. The manner in which 
the prison regime diagnosed, plotted and categorised prisoners as diseased, 
alcoholic and disordered was a reflection of Scotland’s liberal and paternalistic 
political culture – which itself was also a reflection of the embedded problems of a 
deindustrialising economy and a society in decline. These were moral diagnoses as 
much as they were medical diagnoses. These categories, evident in the interviews, 
political publications and reports, did not generate or inspire sympathy, but evoked 
unworthiness, connected to how those many short-term prisoners were often 
observed to be (stereotypically) sad rather than bad. These people were imprisoned 
because they had failed at the art of self-control. This view was made evident when 
Peter spoke about the problematically high rates of Scottish imprisonment and the 
perturbing use of prison sentences for petty crime. He concluded with some 
exasperation that the fault was not with the criminal justice system, but in the 
failure of individuals to grasp alternatives:  
 
[Sheriffs] will say, because I’ve had many conversations, tell me what I 
should do when a man, to whom I have given community service because 
you encouraged me to do that, comes back for the tenth time having the 
same thing, or having failed, or alternative or community service and 
hasn’t turned up to do it, what am I meant to do? And their only answer 
is, and there aren’t alternative answers, but their answer almost 
eventually has to be to put him in prison, you see. And, that’s, that is their 
answer, it is quite a difficult one to counter really, if somebody is 
completely failing then the only answer to carry on putting them on 
probation, but it can lower the public belief in probation if a person is out, 
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as it were, on approval and they’re carrying on shoplifting… I think the 
Sheriffs, they’re always being put upon, and they are sending too many 
people to prison but I can see their point of view they have to come up 
with, and we having been trying this for a long time, to try and come up 
with other ways to stop people reoffending…and prison for certain 
people who have to send them to prison, I mean murders and very violent 
people need to be in prison, but minor dishonesty, but then what do you 
do with the people that carry on?’ 
 
High prison populations were perceived to be the result of the prisoners’ prior 
unwillingness or inability to desist. The intervention of prison exclusion was 
required because many Scottish prisoners were ‘perceived as failing to use available 
opportunity for advancement in the various approved runways of society’; showing 
‘open disrespect for their betters; they lack piety; they represent failures in the 
motivational schemes of society’ (Goffman 1963:171). In Scotland this paternalistic 
outlook tended to exclude or deny social inequality as a cause of crime, allowing the 
prevailing discourse to focus on personal failure and its consequences.  
Once imprisoned these short-termers found themselves in a routine that was 
marked by the often mundane regime of industry. It was noted that it was neither 
necessary nor plausible to make imprisonment regimes more specialised precisely 
because most prisoners lacked the capacities to engage with more autonomous and 
diversified regimes: ‘the great majority of prisoners remained an unleavened mass 
in the middle, undistinguished for any practical purpose’ (HH57/1742). By the end 
of the 1970s, key actors within the penal state were reported to believe that the 
nature of Scottish imprisonment was shaped by ‘a loss of faith in the effectiveness of 
treatment of any sort’ (Department of Justice 1981).  
 
This dysfunction was among the ‘practicable objects’ of the prison system (Garland 
1985:95).  As Carlen (1983) wrote with such force and clarity of Scotland during this 
period, these dysfunctional citizens ended up in prison not because they are morally 
unworthy of social welfare support but because they were believed to lack the 
‘moral capacity to respond to welfare intervention or medical treatment’ (ibid.:183 
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original emphasis). Prisoners were presented and reproduced as ‘disordered’, 
‘untreatable’ and ‘as being beyond the remit of the treatment agencies, without hope 
and beyond recognition’ (Carlen 1983:194). This captures the tension in Scottish 
penality between the ‘practicability’ (Gordon 1991) of the prison and perceived 
intractability of the prison problem. Scottish imprisonment regimes bore an implicit 
sense of failure, whereby containment rather than reform was the primary purpose. 
By and large, prison was necessary for those many irresponsible and dysfunctional 
Scottish citizens who were marked out as beyond rehabilitative programmes. What 
they required was basic medical treatment, containment, habits of regularity and, if 
necessary, repeated exclusion from society.  
 
Coercive paternalism asserts that the state can intervene if its actions will help the 
subject or citizen live a better life (Conly 2012). However, in the context of Scottish 
imprisonment the prisoners were generally believed to be hopeless and incapable of 
exercising their autonomy in a socially acceptable way. The deprivation of liberty 
was accepted as an unfortunate but rational mode of damage control. The best that 
could be hoped for was to confine them in prison as often as was necessary. This 
governmental disposition was best summed up by Henry who, from his position 
inside the Scottish Office: ‘[we] were trying to save people from themselves’. These 
visions of the penal subject as a failed person, as someone who had through their 
own actions forfeited their liberty, were materially constituted in Scottish 
imprisonment regimes. As a result, it was considered to not be ‘necessary, or indeed 
possible, to think in terms of positive treatment towards rehabilitation in custody 
for all inmates’. For those short-term inmates and ‘others serving longer 
sentences….The prison service’s role…is primarily therefore one of containment 
and physical care’ (Annual Report 1971:2). Among the meanings of Scottish 
imprisonment was the need to incapacitate and control a population of ‘lifetime 
clients’ who while not necessarily dangerous were social failures, and therefore 




Pathologisation of Place  
 
However, it is clear from the description above that forms of imprisonment were 
also concerned with violence and danger. The prospects of prisoners being 
dangerous, as well as disordered or hapless, were connected through a web of social 
narratives and cultural imagery from which Scottish imprisonment regimes drew 
their degrees of legitimate force and common-sense justification. Prisoner disorder, 
fecklessness, petty recidivism and recalcitrance were seen as ‘symptomatic of a 
dysfunctional cultural milieu’ (O’Malley and Valverde 2004:35). 
 
Serious crime and violence loomed large in the imaginations of penal state actors. 
Murder rates increased fourfold between 1950 and the 1960s, compared with 
England and Wales where there was only a twofold increase (Smith and Young 
1999). Examining crime sensibilities more specifically, however, we see that the way 
crime was understood had a specific influence in giving meaning to certain kinds of 
prison regimes, which were produced partially to solve certain kinds of crime and 
social problems.  
 
It was felt that the worst and most endemic crime and disorder tended to belong to 
the ‘central slum parts of the city with a long-established reputation for containing a 
disproportionate number of habitual criminals, prostitutes, drug addicts and the 
like’ (SHHD 1975:10). While the proximate causes of crime were understood as 
individaul, the particular places in which such social circumstances prevailed were 
often framed by fear and antipathy. These places were described with florid, 
paternalistic and often unsympathetic detail: ‘gardens strewn with refuse and 
broken glass, vacant houses boarded up, gang slogans on the walls of properties, 
neglected pets etc…These are the characteristics of areas which contribute 
disproportionately to crime’ (SHHD 1975:11). The descriptions of these areas verged 
on the dystopian, as communities of drunkards, people living in self-made 
wastelands, who had high mortality rates and even higher unemployment: ‘the 
cultural setting, in which the overwhelming majority of violent offences occur, is 
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itself characterised by the acceptance not only of heavy drinking but also of violent 
behaviour’ (SHHD 1975:17). During the 1970s, Henry said people’s concerns were 
honed in on ‘the problems of violence in Glasgow’. The following quote from 
Robert, a senior criminal justice practitioner, illustrates that these problems were not 
a mere statistical matter but a ‘felt imperative’ that was abundantly evident, a kind 
of sensory assault: 
 
‘[In] Glasgow the jury trials all seem to be more serious. And we have 
two heavy duty guys from the west of Scotland and I thought we [in 
Edinburgh] rarely get guys like that. And they had suits on and they 
looked like ancient boxers. I rarely see people like that. So there is a 
significant difference in that. I think the other thing I did see that 
shocked me…this tribalism and all this display of bigotry. I was just 
horrified…And it was a kind of uneasy co-existence. Very little coming 
together’. 
 
For Peter, who worked inside the Scottish Office, the shock of Glasgow became the 
inspiration to work in public policy:  
‘I decided I wanted to work in public administration really, partly 
because of what I saw in Glasgow there seemed like a lot, you know, a 
lot that needed to be done…Glasgow was in a bad way then. All the 
ship yards were being closed down, unemployment, poor housing. You 
know being brought up in Edinburgh, you know, you can see what it’s 
like, and being in Glasgow you saw something quite different’. 
 
These places inspired anxiety precisely because they were seen as communities with 
a persistent brutal streak, a cultural proclivity for violence and a tolerance for crime 
and cruelty in general:  
 
‘there was a degree, a threshold, I still think there’s a different threshold 
between Edinburgh and Glasgow. Edinburgh are more fussy and more 
likely to call the police…in Glasgow where there is probably a lot more 
inherent violence, and something happens in your garden and your 
house and they get slashed in the face, but I’ll not bother calling the 




This quote explicitly illustrates that it was not merely crime, but the quick resort to 
brutality, which was perceived to be part of the routine domestic life of Glasgow. 
Violence could erupt in ‘your garden’ or ‘your house’, an ‘inherent’ aggressive 
impulsivity simmered below the surface of normal social relations in those kinds of 
places. Euan, who worked in the criminology research division of the Scottish 
Office, was a more critical respondent, identifying anxious feelings that contributed 
to this paternalistic sentiment. He described an information-gathering trip to one of 
west Scotland’s poorer and more marginalised enclaves where some colleagues did 
not want to venture too far as they were afraid of ‘the natives’. A similar sentiment 
was also expressed by Philip when he described the work of criminal justice and 
social work in Scotland: ‘that was what Scotland was like, you’ve got a tough job 
with a tough population’. 
 
These place-specific narratives delineated a sharp line between respectable and 
disreputable classes. For government actors, prisoners were not one of them; they 
did not share values, views or manners. It was believed that many prisoners were 
drawn from places lacking in ‘community spirit and social controls’ (SHHD 
1975:25). The most effective form of prisoner rehabilitation, it was suggested at the 
time, would need to ‘liberate the prisoner from the effects of the social, educational 
and emotional conditioning which have rendered him unable to function effectively 
and acceptably in our society’ (Annual Report 1971:20-21). It was not just that a 
prisoner had transgressed the law, but they also existed more permanently outwith 
‘our society’.  
 
Glasgow rested in the political cultural imagination as a ‘territory of disorder’ 
(Bowden 2014), stoking up uneasiness, appealing to their interconnected fears of 
social downfall, violence, poverty and disorder. Those governmental 
preoccupations with urban clearances, shown at the beginning of this chapter, also 
permeated the political culture of the Scottish penal state. That vision of the territory 
of the disordered was what some of the respondents and reports were referring to 
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when they said, as Philip did: ‘behaviour and social circumstances are totally 
intertwined’. In Scotland, to have said that crime has social causes meant it was 
locally ‘embedded’ (Melossi 2001) in the lifestyle of certain Scottish estates and 
neighbourhoods, rather than to accept that wider social structures and inequalities 
perpetuated it.  According to the Parole Board, one of the most positive 
interventions to reduce recidivism that could have occurred was that the area a 
prisoner was from ‘may have been pulled down and redeveloped’ (Parole Board for 
Scotland Annual Report 1972:11).  
 
When explaining the uses of imprisonment, excusing the prisons’ security and 
control regimes the image of Glasgow and urban poverty recurred.51 In telling the 
story of prisons Douglas and Alistair told stories of ‘notorious gangsters’ and 
known hard men from Glasgow. Robert described those ‘problems in the West of 
Scotland: hard drinking, buckfast and valium mentality’. These were the ‘urban 
unrepentant poor’ of Scotland (Goffman 1963:171). Prisoners were seen as people 
raised in criminogenic environments, ‘central slums’, with their ‘notorious streets’ 
(SHHD 1975:11) which inculcated aggressive and criminal behaviour. Reflecting 
upon the low use of parole for long-termers, Peter said how it was ‘not punitive’, 
though it might appear as such. Rather, he argued, it was a reflection of their being 
‘cautious’, given the kind of people they were releasing. The poverty, rising 
unemployment and the attendant culture of unhinged masculinity within certain 
places were diagnosed as having a criminal and socially dysfunctional logic. As the 
Parole Report in 1972 recorded: ‘In the nature of things many offenders come from 
areas of high crime and delinquency…where the downward drag [of their 
community] may well prove almost irresistible’ (p.11).  Paternalistic liberalism in 
1970s Scotland viewed the prisoners as being from a violent urban ‘underclass’ 
																																																						
51 I will certainly not be arguing that Glasgow, nor any other economically neglected or socially marginalised 
communities were or were not dangerous or violent. Thus, I am neither challenging nor fortifying the veracity of 
these depictions and recollections. But instead these geographical areas combine both empirical reality and cultural 
imagination, such notions have ‘currency’ (Said 2003:331). That such feelings reflect the political culture rather than 
precisely mirroring ‘its putative object’ (Said 2003:22) is the point of this thesis; that such images, and the feelings 
they muster, are precisely what give imprisonment its peculiar material reality and social uses. 
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(Sampson 1987), what Simon has described elsewhere as defining ‘the poor as a 
dangerous class, and their perceived dangerousness reinforces their isolation’ 
(1993:253). The fact that prisoners of all categories were not returning to the 
productive and respectable classes of Scottish society went largely unquestioned 
within the penal state. 
 
Controlling dangerousness through violence 
 
Dangerous prisoners, particularly men (depicted through tropes, as hard men, 
heavy drinkers, career housebreakers, brawlers, petty thieves and gangsters), were 
contextualised through the stigma of place. Throughout policy documents the 
dangerous prisoners were always acknowledged as a statistically minor group, but 
this evidence-based rationality was secondary to the more emotional logic and 
accepted sensibilities concerning prisoner violence. This group – dehumanised, 
pathologised and feared – necessitated and legitimised the greater use of coercive 
and sometimes brutal control. Ken recalled this fear ‘mentality’ among governors 
and staff, stating that 
‘people [staff] didn’t have watches, because in those days, well, actually 
now the officer’s going round the corridor and we’ve got seven minutes 
and we could try and escape, and if you had a watch you could work it 
all out’.  
 
The prisoners were subjects from whom the institution and its staff needed to be 
protected. 
 
The coercive paternalist dimensions, along with the fear of prisoners inculcated in 
violence that characterised Scottish political culture, also help explain the most 
extreme reactions to danger within Scottish prisons. While liberalism advocates 
restraint, it also has a despotic side which allows for a rationally justified 
authoritarian mentality (Valverde 1998). This side is seen as a rational response to 
subjects who are unlikely to succeed at self-improvement, and who, as a 
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consequence must be permanently excluded, have their citizenship suspended, or 
within imprisonment, be subject to penal exile. 
 
Segregation was maintained by continuously invoking the threat of the violent 
prisoner, which served to justify the known physical ‘brutality’ of the prison 
(Scraton et al 1988), particularly Peterhead and the segregation units. The function 
of segregation was to keep ‘the mentally or inadequately aggressive out of ordinary 
circulation’ (HH57/194). William lamented segregation. But, he reflected, volatile 
prisoner responses to the segregation units (such as dirty protests) only reinforced 
the belief in the need for segregation: ‘[That] was all you had to show those in 
Operations convinced for the need for militaristic management’. The perceived 
erraticism, self-debasement and violence of the prisoners justified the extremity and 
regularity of the segregation control to which they were subject. As such, in the eyes 
of the penal state, it was not segregation that corrupted prisoners, but rather that 
their violent responses to penal exile reflected their inherent behavioural 
characteristics – i.e. precisely what had necessitated segregation in the first place. 
 
While the BSU had been a St Andrew’s House innovation, even that most profound 
development was understood to be another extreme control measure:  ‘The Special 
Unit was about getting control of really quite difficult prisoners’ (Peter). Adam 
remarked the unit’s benefits to the system were understood as being exclusion and 
control:  
‘It was a response to the loss of control. In the end if you [the prisoner] 
don’t consent you can’t rule these people, if they were willing to take all 
the risks they take then you can’t control these people’ and that its 
rehabilitative claims were ‘thin at best’.  
 
Scottish segregation was a punitive form of control and deterrence, justified within 
a coercive paternalist political ethos in which authoritarian actions against the 
prisoner were taken in the interest of fulfilling the order of the prison system (Conly 
2014). But such coercive means were also motivated by the less rational fears and 
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lurid affect which also surrounded crime and punishment in Scotland. Together, 
these concerns and agendas – shaped by Scottish political culture – elevated security 
and control as organisational priorities for prison and made segregation a 
permanent and central feature of Scottish imprisonment regimes. This is close to 
what Sarat has called the ‘civilizing violence’ of order against social disorder. The 
violence of the system, in this case segregation, was ‘described as rational, 
purposive, and controlled through values, norms, and procedures external to 
violence itself’ (1995:1134). The dehumanising physical control of segregation and 
penal exile was used legitimately to oppose, control or quell violence by its penal 
subjects. These shared cultural perceptions about Scottish violence and disorder, 
and the graphic interpretations that prisoners were dangerous and subversive, led 
the Division in their routine use of brutal segregation. Segregation served the 
‘common purposes’ of prison security and order and was aimed ‘against the anomic 
savagery lurking’ in Scottish long-term imprisonment (Sarat 1995:1104, 1134). 
 
6. Prison Exclusion and Social Control 
	
Building on these insights regarding Scottish imprisonment and political culture, 
this section takes a broader sociological perspective in order to demonstrate how 
Scotland’s distinctive forms of imprisonment were connected first, to broader social 
insecurity, highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, and were, second, a product 
of the exclusionary dynamics of Scottish welfarism. 
By the beginning of the 1970s (and before the advent of Thatcher; see Chapter Ten), 
Scotland was dealing with the ‘after shock of deindustrialisation’ (Walsh et al 2010). 
Social work was organised mainly to help children in need, vulnerable citizens and 
those who had been involved in pettier crimes, but not to tackle the chronic 
deprivation caused by deindustrialisation and concentrations of urban crime. Local 
authorities faced growing social disorganisation, poverty and welfare in the 
community. Probation and work with offenders and ex-prisoners were dissolved 
into generic social work, and received little funding when compared with groups 
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considered more worthy of welfare interventions, such as the elderly, the sick and 
the young (McNeil 2005:34). As Adam described it: ‘offenders were smelly, children 
were needy. So, criminal justice became the poor relation’. It is clear from the above 
section on pathologised understandings of certain neighbourhoods that there was 
distrust of certain communities where, it was a believed, that the informal social 
controls between neighbours and within families were absent. Within Scotland 
there were areas of ‘concentrated disadvantage and residential instability’, and a 
perceived absence of collective efficacy (Sampson et al 1997), all of which rendered 
prisoners and criminals culturally and psychologically aberrant.  
In this way, as pointed out above, containing, treating and re-training social 
dysfunctionals was the prison’s practical social function. The prison operated to 
protect Scottish civic stability. The welfare system worked with responsible and co-
operative liberal citizens; the prison worked upon their opposite. As Philip 
described the division as to why certain people were denied community welfare 
and subject to incapacitation: ‘Adult offenders were quite different. A different ball 
game altogether. The usual categories of permanent offenders...someone who is not 
suitable for probation’. Crime was perceived as the act of the irresponsible, those 
wayward and aggressive citizens resistant to community based support. As the 
WPAR concluded in December 1983, ‘if society can find no other response to certain 
forms of behaviour resulting from disorder of personality than to place the 
perpetrators in custody, then the place for them to be held in custody is prison, not 
hospital’ (HH57/1794). Alistair best summed up this view when he said the prison 
was designated and designed for those ‘for whom there were no other options’.  
For these distinct social classes of the respectable versus the disreputable, two 
regimes of control and intervention were implemented (Simon 1993:154). These 
regimes help explain the tension between the prisons practicability and 
intractability, mentioned above. Scotland’s prisons were the ‘obverse of the 
responsibilizing moral imperatives of welfare reform’ (Rose 2000:336).  While the 
Kilbrandon innovations sought to help people flourish in the community through 
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social support, the prison worked to maintain security and public safety through 
social exclusion. We see the persistence and expansion of disciplinary and 
exclusionary imprisonment in Scotland in this period, despite the prison’s failure to 
achieve or contribute to welfarist objectives of rehabilitating vulnerable or wayward 
citizens, and despite claims that Scottish social work expansion improved social life 
for the most vulnerable (Brodie et al 2008). This is because Scottish imprisonment 
regimes began where welfare interventions ceased; prison was constituted as a 
‘terminal position’ (Garland 1985:28), it was the last resort for those seen outwith 
hope, order and normal social control. Given that the Scottish prison served this 
central regulatory and protective function, the necessity of the exclusionary prison 
was embedded and taken-for-granted, thus its ‘failure never matters’ (Muncie 1990). 
At the end of the 1970s, when researching women’s imprisonment in Scotland, 
Carlen also found this two tier system where ‘certain petty, recidivist prisoners’ 
were ‘systematically and authoritatively…ineligible for non-custodial supervision’ 
(1983:154). The Scottish adult penal system operated and functioned as it did not 
because it was the welfare system’s safety net. It was openly described, as we saw 
above, as a social service of last resort, for those adult offenders perceived as 
beyond hope. In Scotland, the prison was a coercive control setting, a function 
reinforced by rising crime, social anxiety and the strict limitations on welfare 
eligibility.  
There were consequences of this two-tiered social control system, however, and of 
how Scottish political culture compartmentalised the excessive use of prison and its 
denial of structural inequality on the one hand, and the aspirational expansion of 
welfare interventions on the other. Scotland’s reliance on disciplinary and 
exclusionary imprisonment regimes would have further eroded the collective 
efficacy and informal social controls that were seen as the root cause of criminality 
and dysfunction. The high use of imprisonment would have de-stabilised family 
units (Comfort 2008) who found themselves in a ‘web of shame’ as the stigma of the 
prison extended out into their lives (Condry 2007). Imprisonment can become a 
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cycle which is difficult to escape, trapping people in a routine of short-term 
imprisonment, a life sentence by instalments (O’Donnell, Baumer and Hughes 
2009). All this would have undermined family life and employment opportunities 
for prisoners. Given that prisoners tend to be drawn from distinct geographical 
locations (Houchin 2005; Goffman 2014), the heavy reliance on exclusionary 
imprisonment would likely have also eroded community cohesion and entrenched 
social exclusion, class stigma and its consequent disorder. Ironically, Scotland’s 
division of social control labour between paternalistic welfare intervention and 
coercive paternalistic exclusion, would likely have only further entrenched the need 
for an extensive prison system as a coercive measure of last resort. In so doing, 
Scotland’s field of social control, and the dominance of the prison in particular, 
reinforced and perpetuated the characteristic classed divisions between 




This chapter has employed archival material, interviews, secondary material and 
various annual reports to recover, reconstruct and interpret the major dynamics and 
practices which constituted Scottish penality from 1970. First, I have mapped the 
Scottish political culture of paternalistic liberalism – those distinct Scottish penal 
sensibilities and cultural narratives which combined with a liberal and paternalistic 
political rationality. This constituted a dismissive, anxious and authoritarian 
political culture in relation to the prisons. Second, I tried to show how these cultural 
currents supported the programmes, routines, activities and architecture of Scottish 
imprisonment regimes, laid out in the second part of the chapter. Visions of 
blameworthy individuals or groups who were imprisoned – the diseased, alcoholic, 
disordered and dangerous – provided prison with its intentions, inspired its 
methods of redress, its characteristic progression, and its extensiveness and almost 
total lack of capacity-building programmes. Through the bureaucratic choices to 
build certain prisons, to routinize particular kinds of prison discipline, to organise 
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the prisons hierarchically, to expand segregation and keep industry a mainly low 
skilled endeavour, Scottish political culture influenced the material form of the 
prison system. These characteristic practices of Scottish imprisonment regimes 
combined to create a disciplinary and exclusionary form of incarceration. Third, the 
analysis took a broader perspective towards the end of the chapter, proposing a 
connection between Scottish penality as defined above and the wider organisation 
of the Scottish social landscape. The end of the 1960s Scotland diverged from 
England and Wales, as rising crime, violence and increased deprivation, each 
becoming pressing concerns. This was the problem context which informed the use 
of the prison. The social services were not designed to address these kinds of 
disarray, which were also seen as threats to the informal social controls of the 
community and the family. The use of incapacitation and exclusion filled the void 
where these other interventions did not operate or were considered impaired. 
Moreover, the rise in violent crime and growing fear of hard men and gangs gave 
the prison a warrant for tighter control in light of an almost unquestioned air of 
urgency and necessity. 
 
But Scotland’s social problems of the 1970s continued. And while these exclusionary 
and disciplinary forms imprisonment were well established by the 1980s, unrest, 
protest and rebellion began to spread across the prison system, no longer confined 
just to Peterhead. How and why disciplinary and exclusionary incarceration briefly, 
but sometimes spectacularly, was magnified and intensified in the 1980s are 













The previous chapter demonstrated how and why from the 1970s into the 1980s, the 
Scottish governmental apparatus relied upon the prison as a means to address the 
growing social difficulties of crime, urban disorder and social divisions. The prison 
picked up where Scotland’s welfare system left off. Internally it had a bleak routine 
of low skilled labour, health, hygiene, segregation, and progression. Having 
recovered the historical chronology of Scottish penal culture, we return to the 
central concerns of how and why imprisonment regimes change and evolve. Rather 
than simply documenting the 1980s, this chapter attempts will analyse questions of 
penal transformation. I will use interview data, archival material and reports, which 
together suggest that changes in the prison system during this short period reflected 
the assessments of prison problems by those within the penal state. Decisions made 
by those actors were, in turn remained embedded in the dominant political culture 
of paternalistic liberalism.  
 
This chapter will begin with an outline of the extreme pressure on the Scottish 
prison system in the mid-1980s from a series of crises, with rising prisoner numbers 
and disturbances and riots. Assessing the prisoners’ view of the prison regimes and 
their reasoning behind the different riots remains outside the remit of this thesis 
(though see Independent Committee of Inquiry 1988 for an insightful account which 
includes the prisoners’ perspective). This chapter reconstructs these events as they 
appear in the documentary record and analyses the accounts of their causes and 
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consequences offered by Scottish penal state actors. In response to the riots, the 
system increased both segregation and increased security. The rising numbers were 
met with the expansion of the adult prison estate. In the face of extreme challenges, 
disciplinary and exclusionary imprisonment was reinforced and enhanced.  
However, the Division began to draw public criticism for their responses to the 
prison crisis, putting pressure on the largely unexamined management rationale. 
This historical account provided below further explores and substantiates the 
importance of Scottish political culture in the evolution of imprisonment regimes. 
 
 
2. New Prison Problems 
	
In 1983, the British Home Secretary, Leon Brittan announced new parole restrictions 
on prisoners serving five years or more, who from then on would only qualify for 
parole under exceptional circumstances. With the threat that those changes may 
come to bear in Scotland, the Secretary of State for Scotland, George Younger, 
initially restated the fact that Scotland had a distinct legal system. However, by 1984 
he had reversed his commitment to divergent parole policies and the more 
restrictive changes were implemented in Scotland’s parole system (McManus 
1999:239). Writing of the negative impact this change in parole practice had on the 
long-term prisoners in Scotland, the Chief Inspector stated: ‘what light there had 
been at the end of the tunnel had been extinguished’ (HMCIP Report on Peterhead 
1987:64) and that prisons risked turning ‘the man of violence’ into a ‘no-hoper’, who 
then may ‘become a serious danger to prison officers and other prisoners (HMCIP 
Annual Report 1986:15). The second urgent problem faced by the Division in the 
1980s was overcrowding. Prisoner numbers, already high, rose from 4,518 in 1981 to 
5,588 in 1986, and the numbers ‘peaked at an all time high of 5,797 on 4 March 1986’. 




But a third and even more serious set of issues were to culminate within the prisons. 
In the mid-1980s, a sustained pattern of disorder and rioting erupted across the 
Scottish prison system which was described as ‘unprecedented in its intensity [and], 
duration’ (SPS 1988b para1.6). The first major riot occurred in January 1984 at 
Peterhead, where prisoners took over a hall for 18 hours. The following year in 
March 1985 at Peterhead, nine members of staff were taken hostage in the course of 
an abortive escape attempt (Annual Report 1985:15). Not long thereafter in 
November, again at Peterhead, seven members of staff were held at gunpoint 
during another escape attempt; though afterwards the gun was revealed to have 
been a replica (ibid.). 
 
The Governor of Peterhead wrote in an internal report in 1984, reaffirming 
Peterhead’s inherent danger: ‘The history of Peterhead Prison is littered with 
incidents of one degree of ferocity or another, and this latest was simply another 
chapter in that history’ (HH57/1622). Though Alistair recalled it as a new level of 
violence: 
‘Basically up until then, incidents in prison had always been things like 
hostages, individual prisoner took an individual officer or another 
prisoner hostage. How do you deal with these incidents? Then in 85/86 
we had the first incidents where prisoners took over a landing or a hall, 
and we never had that before’.  
 
Prison unrest was not out of the ordinary, protest and demonstration had been 
routine, but from 1985 the scale of these incidents expanded. Within a small 
window of time these disturbances evolved into a discernible and perturbing 
pattern, no longer isolated to Peterhead, nor merely sporadic, but a recurring 
feature of Scottish prison life. There were several fire-raising incidents and dirty 
protests at a number of prisons and numerous occasions when prisoners refused 
food. In 1985 there was another riot, but this time at Dumfries Prison (which had 
only recently been converted into an adult prison from a young offenders’ 
institution) during which four prisoners held another prisoner hostage for more 




Prisoners at Longriggend Remand Centre destroyed furniture and set fire to their 
cells in 1986. There were two serious fires at Peterhead, which meant 150 prisoners 
there had to be transferred due to loss of facilities and caused serious damage to the 
kitchen and laundry facilities (Annual Report 1986:15). There were further roof top 
demonstrations at Barlinnie and Edinburgh prisons, and more dirty protests and 
two further fires at Peterhead. In another escalation in October 1986 at Edinburgh, 
an officer was held hostage for four days by prisoners. This was the most serious 
incident in Scottish prison history, but was almost immediately superseded in 
November 1986 when a prison officer was held hostage for five days at Peterhead 
by 32 prisoners.  
 
In response to the Peterhead disturbance the Chief Inspector was commissioned to 
investigate. His report, published in 1987, found that Peterhead had a small group 
of prisoners who were ‘pernicious by nature and often volatile in temperament’ 
(Chapter 12). The Inspector suggested control could be regained through increased 
segregation. The report concluded that four separation units, each with 15 places, 
should be built at the mainstream adult prisons (Perth, Shotts, Glenochil and 
Edinburgh). 
 
The pattern of traumatic incidents continued into 1987, which began to occur in 
quick succession. In January, a number of prison officers were held hostage for six 
days at Barlinnie. For two days in April two prisoners held a group of fellow 
prisoners hostage at Perth. Then in September, a prison officer was held hostage at 
Shotts prison. Just as that incident at Shotts drew to a conclusion on the 27th, the 
following day on the 28th of September two prison officers were taken hostage at 
Peterhead in what was described by Alistair as the ‘Peterhead siege’. One prison 
officer was reported to have been ‘held hostage, subject to assaults, humiliation and 
threats’ (1988b:Appendix 2). This incident was also an unparalleled spectacle, as 
‘television viewers around the world witnessed an officer being dragged across the 
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roof of Peterhead Prison with a chain around his neck’ (Coyle 1992:8). The siege was 
not resolved until a dramatic decision to send in the British Special Air Service 
(SAS), who stormed the besieged hall at 5.15am on Saturday 3 October 
(1988b:Appendix 2).  
 
Then, on the 4th October, a prison officer and a group of prisoners were taken 
hostage at Perth prison for 33 hours. After the quick succession of hostage takings 
and the intensity of these distressing sieges, the Division took decisive and firm 
action to immediately reduce the risk of dangerous prisoners to mainstream order 
(1988b para.8.4). All adult male prisoners were denied association. A further 60 
prisoners, believed to pose the greatest threat to the mainstream, were removed to 
Peterhead (Coyle 1991:143).  
 
The prison administration described themselves as ‘under intense strain’ (Annual 
Report 1986:15) and noted that 1986 had been a ‘traumatic period’ (HMCIP Annual 
Report 1986:14). For many participants in this study these were distressing 
memories. Ken, who was working inside the prisons, reflected the feeling that a 
small but considerable carceral civil war had erupted:  
‘for a while, about two, three years, we were in a warzone… a lot of staff 
were held hostage, injured, a lot were traumatised, a lot of staff felt they 
couldn’t really cope. It wasn’t why they were in the prison service. A lot 
of staff retired and left. I suppose damaged people. It was a very 
difficult time.’  
 
A sense of conflict had engulfed the prison system. Prisoners on one side, pulling 
against and clashing with the physical environment – the building, the landings, the 
cells –and those agents of power, the prison officers, who every day sought to 
manage and control them. A cycle of mutual hostility and retaliation began to shape 
life in Scottish prisons – dirty protests, riot gear, landings blockaded, negotiations 




Though these problems were severe, they were identified as an extreme form of the 
inherent problem faced by Scottish imprisonment. Minutes from the WPAR in 1984 
described problems at Peterhead as a ‘microcosm of the problem in general’, but 
that at Peterhead there was a ‘Premier League’ group of violent and disruptive 
prisoners (HH57/1622). The broader assessment of the situation depicted these 
incidents as, according to the Governor of Peterhead, ‘inevitable’ and as having 
‘everything to do with the character of the participants’, which he went on to 
characterise as being ‘consumed with hatred’ (HH57/1622). The Chief Inspector 
gave this view official confirmation in his 1987 report, in which dangerous long-
term prisoners, as well as a new group of ‘very long term prisoners’, were identified 
as the central causal factor driving the prison riots (HMCIP Annual Report 1987). 
 
The Scottish prison population as a whole had been expanding, but the number of 
adults serving three years or more had increased at a quicker rate. In 1971, 22 
percent of the Scottish prison population were serving very long sentences, here 
meaning those serving five years or more. By the end of the 1980s, 45 percent of 
convicted prisoners were ‘VLTPs’ (Annual Report Prisons 1986:1; SPS 1988b Table 
1). The background characteristics of this group were painted with familiar imagery 
- truanting from school, broken family, raised in the slums of inner-city housing, 
lacking in morals, long patterns of criminality in which violence ‘predominates’ 
(HMCIP Annual Report 1986:15). Now this group were larger and imprisoned 
without the promise of parole to incentivise them, apparently making them 
particularly ‘bitter’ and ‘uncooperative’. They were thus ‘liable to be disruptive, 
anti-authority and may inflict physical injury on prison officers or other prisoners’ 
(ibid.). The fundamental functions of the imprisonment regime were seen as sound: 
prisoners were individuals who generally could not be coerced into rehabilitation, 
but the rational ‘stick and carrot’ system of progression and downgrading to 
incentivise good behaviour was, and should, remain paramount within the 




Faced with the problems of violence, and in an attempt to stabilise the prison 
system, the practices of disciplinary and exclusionary imprisonment intensified. 
First, the capacity for segregation was increased. Within the Prison Division it was 
minuted that senior civil servants believed the incidents ‘served to highlight the 
need to tackle the question of facilities for difficult prisoners’ (HH57/2070). In 1986 
the Chief Inspector of Prisons (Annual Report p.17) suggested that governors in 
Scotland required a greater array of options ‘for the removal of disruptive prisoners 
at short notice’ which would allow them to concentrate on maintaining the stability 
of the mainstream prison system. Following the first major incident at Peterhead in 
1984, the 18 cells in B Hall at Peterhead were sealed-off, transforming it into a 
segregation lock down facility (SPS 1988b:Appendix 6; HMCIP Peterhead Report 
1985:5). The Prison Division continued to tighten perimeter security at a number of 
Scottish prisons (HMCIP Annual Report 1986:14), while new ‘punishment blocks’ 
and security systems were provided at Greenock, Barlinnie, Aberdeen and Shotts 
(Annual Report 1985:14). There were already 78 places for disruptive prisoners at 
Aberdeen, BSU, Inverness and Peterhead.52 Shotts E Hall was added to this 
inventory in 1987, but its function was slightly different to the existing units. The 
Shotts Unit was a new progression point where prisoners leaving conditions of 
limited association at Peterhead could be assessed before being returned to the 
mainstream. It was also a ‘time-out’ site for those prisoners not suitable for 
segregation but who required downgrading out of the mainstream (SPS 1988b 
para.9.13). A six-cell national unit opened at Perth prison, designed to segregate 
prisoners from any of the long term prisons. Another alternative small unit for 12 
disruptive prisoners opened at Shotts (HMCIP 1988:iii; Adler and Longhurst 1994; 
SPS 1988b, 1990). By the end of the 1980s, the Prison Division proceeded to plan a 
‘new generation’ of maximum security units. This included a 60-person unit to be 
built ‘as quickly as possible’ given the ‘Department’s anxiety to make progress’ 
(1988b para. 8.3-8.8).  
																																																						
52 This official figure only includes the specific segregation and exclusion spaces within Peterhead, but does not 
include the almost 130 people at Peterhead deemed too dangerous and thus were sent to Peterhead because they 




Secondly, a new military style of control was developed in response to prison 
disturbances. In trying to be proactive and plan for the future security of the prison 
system, the Division developed two mobile military teams: Alpha and Beta. These 
were run by senior governors and would be, according to Alistair, ‘dispatched 
around the country’ in response to major incidents. Ken described this response as 
something extreme, seductive and necessary:  
‘We were very much trained in the dark arts of handling major 
incidents. The three major incidents led us to set up incident command 
teams…So that was our insurance policy solution’. 
 
 
New practices of observation were also implemented. The Division reviewed how 
they assessed long-termers and a new system of increased monitoring was 
introduced for prisoners serving five years or more. These very long-term prisoners 
were now subject to an individual annual report until they were eligible for release 
or parole (HMCIP Annual Report 1986:iii) 
 
Finally, with matters of security and control being addressed the need for space 
now required renewed efforts. To expand the adult imprisonment regime a number 
of young offender institutions and detention centres were converted into adult male 
prisons in 1986 and 1987. These included Greenock (for adult males serving 3 years 
or more), where capacity had been increased from 180 to 231 with the use of 
doubling-up; Glenochil came on-line as a long-termers prison, and Friarton (just 
under 100 prisoners) was for adults serving 9 months or less.  
 
Prison violence was now an ‘epidemic’ (Cooke 1989b). Senior management within 
the Division then decided to make a ‘high risk’ and systematic alteration to adult 
imprisonment regimes. The entire prison estate was to be reorganised under an 
operation called Grand Design, which was their ‘game plan’ to reclassify five 
prisons, this would, they hoped ‘meet the accommodation need of the Scottish 
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prison Service for at least the next three years and perhaps even into the early 1990s’ 
(HH57/2070).  Dumfries and Greenock, the latter of which had only just been 
reclassified as an adult prison, were converted into YOI (Annual Report 1988) and an 
open prison, Noranside, was established in 1987 (Annual Report 1986; Annual Report 
1990-1991; HH57/2070). During this time the delayed Phase II of Shotts prison was 
finally completed after a long gestation. This increased Shotts’ capacity from 60 to 
528 prisoners. These organisational actions were both tactical and reactionary. The 
Division was trying to ameliorate of the problems faced by the prison system, they 
were trying to safeguard the future from further chaos and the increased 
dangerousness of Scottish imprisonment. 
 
3. Legitimacy Crisis  
 
For years the Division had been seeking a return to an equilibrium within prison 
through a reactionary phase. But the legitimacy which had underpinned those 
actions was undermined as the prisoners had become evermore irreconcilable to 
their imprisonment.  There was a crisis within the Division, as they felt they could 
no longer secure the objectives of control and containment. Interviewees told stories 
of senior managers ‘breaking down’ in tears in public, or on television broadcasts or 
never returning from holidays. While these anecdotes could not be confirmed, they 
were formed in this time, visceral tales of a Government department which had 
‘exhausted’ its well of authority and unsettled the consensus about how best to 
control prisons and prisoners and now found itself in a new form of internal crisis 
(Hall et al 2013).  
 
Despite their attempts to subdue and control the prison system, from the end of the 
1980s a number of key penal state actors came to be perturbed by the excessive use 
of physical control, discipline and exclusion which ordered (and now failed to 
order) the Scottish prison system. Across the period of disuptions, small groups 
within the prison service had begun to probe the logic of the imprisonment regimes, 
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suggest new ways to engage with prisoners, advocate for a distinctly Scottish 
approach to imprisonment, or aver against certain regulations (such as the recently 
formed Association of Scottish Prison Governors, e.g. Bruce 1982; Spencer 1983; 
Withers 1985; Walker 1987). The WPAR meeting minutes from 1983-1984 
highlighted a growing concern about the adverse impact of the rigid security 
divisions applied in the prisoner classification system, the crude use of 
‘downgrading’, the lack of policy initiative from the Division and the idea of 
disciplinary training (HH57/1622; HH57/1794). The Chief Inspector criticised the 
arbitrary use of progression and the systems for long termers as ‘inadequate’ 
(HMCIP Annual Report 1986:5). The Chief Inspector also noted what he described as 
a clear ‘degenerating trend’ among a number of prisoners subjected to segregation 
and exclusion. He stated that it had become ‘less clear how to discourage 
irresponsibility and past experience is not encouraging. The usual way of dealing 
with anti-authority behaviour is to impose tighter control’ but that ‘Some prisoners 
respond, other merely [sic] become more bitter, anti-authority and dangerous’ 
(ibid.:16). Despite the expanded use of prison’s ‘civilising violence’, Scottish 
prisoners continued to breach the rules and disrupt the order of the prison with 
intensifying frequency. Perhaps its was the modes of control which were the 
problem.  
 
For the most part, prisons had not been exposed to intense public or political 
intervention or criticism from the period after 1970. Given the events of the 1980s, 
the Division began to draw public opprobrium for their reactive responses to prison 
disorder. The Scottish Prison Officers along with the Scottish Council for Civil 
Liberties wrote to the Scotsman newspaper to critique the ineptitudes of Prison 
Division in the face of the current crises of violence and overcrowding. An 
independent review published a report criticising the abuses at Peterhead and the 
official responses to the disorder (Gateway Exchange 1987). Critical aspects of the 
unpublished report from the WPAR were leaked to the press. These blamed the 
current prison problems on a lack of accountability from the Division, and an unfair 
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system which provided little reward for a prisoners’ personal obedience and efforts 
(Kinsey 1988:108).   
 
In addition to these admonishments, there was a new uncertainty within the penal 
state. William described it as a confluence of fragility and futility: ‘The prison 
service breaks down, it can no longer manage…[The Division] lost the plot… 
prisons at that stage were in a real degree of crisis’. The trauma and chaos of the 
prison system was perceived to have taken an understandable toll upon those in 
charge, Derek referred to the departures of senior Division civil servants as 
‘casualties’: ‘At the time of the troubles…[there were] casualties among governors 
and managers, who were suddenly away’. Despite their best efforts, and with the 
Secretary of State’s support, senior officials in charge of prison left post, leaving 
Scottish prisons in an unsettled state. Increasingly, the Division was confronted by a 
waning of consent on two fronts, within the prisons and within the Division itself.  
We can identify here a ‘crisis of delegitmation’ what Sparks defines as the 
‘withdrawal of consent’ (1994:15, original emphasis). With each internal suggestion 
of potential unfairness against prisoners, the on-going incidents, and public 
identification of the Division’s weakening authority each served to undermine the 
dominance of paternalistic liberalism and the reactive forms of disciplinary and 
exclusionary imprisonment. Some absence of legitimacy inside the prison had 
always been accepted, evident in the existence of the downgrading and segregation 
so characteristic of Scottish disciplinary and exclusionary imprisonment. As crisis 
and prisoner dissensus was no longer an exclusively (and mainly private) Peterhead 
problem, but a Scottish prison problem, the intractability of the prisoners now 
became seen by some as the result of the problems of the Scottish penal authority.  
 
The ‘extensive hegemony’ which had characterised the approach to prisons in the 
1970s, as well as the immediate reactive response detailed above, disintegrated – a 
‘crisis of authority’ emerged (Hall et al 2013). As the riots and disturbances became 
more prolonged and distressing they altered the practicability of the prison and the 
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prisoners, and undermined the legitimacy of the Prison Division’s traditional use of 
authority over these matters. 
 
4. Care and Control 
	
What people described from this time was a profound sense of fragility. 
They felt that the whole order of their work and the system had become 
severely weakened. As Alistair said with some frankness: ‘We really 
thought we were going to lose the prison service’.  The Division needed to 
reassert its control. At the end of the 1980s a more proactive approach to 
prison administration emerged. The extension of disciplinary and 
exclusionary imprisonment received formal footing in two policy 
documents that espoused the bifurcated view of prison’s role as 
somewhere of last resort for the most vulnerable and a place of exclusion 
and control for Scotland’s most dangerous criminals. In 1988, Custody and 
Care – Policy and Plans for the Scottish Prison Service (1988a) and Assessment 
and Control – The Management of Violent and Disruptive Prisoners (1988b) 
were published.  The Division had rarely published detailed policy reports. 
Now these documents exhibited some new governmental leadership for 
Scottish prisons. 
 
Assessment and Control addressed itself towards ‘the specific issue of inmate who 
present violent and disruptive behaviour’ (para.1.5). In doing so, it reaffirmed the 
traditional view of the inevitable subculture of dangerous, incorrigible and wilfully 
subversive prisoners. The diagnosis of the problem at this time remained coherent 
within the established political culture. It was asserted that in ‘the experience of the 
Prison Department’ (1988b para 2.13) that the nature of the violent, gang related, 
disordered, anti-authority long-termer led to these incidents.  In this view, the 
problem remained the behavioural patterns of individual prisoners and that: 
‘rather than looking to changes in the way in which the Prison Service as 
a whole goes about it’s task, a more productive approach may be to 
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concentrate attention on the individual personality and ‘repertoire’ of 
particular disruptive and violent inmates’ (1988b para 2.11).  
 
The logic which followed stated that with greater numbers of long-term and very 
long-term prisoners there was a greater volume of violent incidents. Moreover, that 
the capacity of segregation units was now insufficient to address the problems 
posed by Scottish prisoners. It was assessed that previous practices of security and 
control were no longer adequate (1988b para 1.2) and that the Prison Division must 
proceed to develop a ‘new generation [of] maximum security units’ (1988b para.8.9) 
with a 60-person maximum security segregation unit (1988b para.8.3).  
 
But Assessment and Control also posed the possibility of softer control techniques, 
such as better assessment tools for ‘control profiling’ of risky prisoners (1988b 
para.3.5). As seen in the previous chapter, the Division had favoured a more 
physical rather than psychological form of security intervention, their ‘policy of 
minimum intervention in the lives of prisoners’ (para.4.8). However, rather than 
merely continue to react to events, the Division suggested the policy objective 
should be prevention (para.4.9.2). The document suggests that prisoners should be 
seen as ‘responsible’ and thus ‘accountable’ for their actions (para.4.9.1) and the 
system should develop means of on-going interventions such as ‘control risk 
profiles’. 
 
Custody and Care took a wider view of the mainstream regime, providing an outline 
of the central objectives of the Prison Service: (1) ‘security’, defined as containment 
and the prevention of escapes; (2) ‘control’ achieved through disciplinary measures 
and maintaining quality of life; and (3) ‘quality of life’. Like Assessment and Control, 
largely reasserted existing principles and practices rather than establishing new 
ones. For example, the more positive dimension of quality of life meant access to 
‘basic services’, such as medical attention, along with ‘opportunities for work and 
other activities’ (1988b para.2.9), which as shown in the previous chapter, were basic 
tenets of the existing Scottish prison practices. Custody and Care did, however, 
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extend the ideas of care and pressed for more institutional responsibility towards 
prisoners. Ideas of intervention were proposed in this document: ‘routines and 
discipline’ should seek to ‘stimulate a positive contribution and response from 
inmates’ (emphasis added para.2.9). Staff, it was argued, should provide more 
support to prisoners to help them build better prison-based relationships and prison 
regimes should encourage prisoners to turn away from crime (ibid. para.2.11). 
 
Plans forwarded in Custody and Care aimed at improving the progression process 
and a new mechanism of surveillance and control were suggested: ‘sentence 
planning’. This was described as a more ‘dynamic process of assessment, [and] 
review’ for long-termers. A file would be kept in which a prisoner’s response to 
prison, the rules and his sentence were to be recorded. These files would serve as 
early warning systems for those prisoners ‘who cannot or will not come to terms 
with their sentences’, alerting staff to those prisoners who would require ‘intensive 
assessment’ outside the mainstream (SPS 1988a para.9.7-9.9). The reports would 
become like a surveillance diary, a subtle new technique which aimed to reinforce 
penal control and prevent future disorder.  
 
These policy documents, released within the same short period, exhibited a marked 
comparative contrast in their substantive focus, revealing the distinct operational 
logic and penal sensibilities underpinning Scottish imprisonment regimes. Custody 
and Care explicitly did not address Peterhead (para.7.14) or the segregation units, 
but the rest of the system, namely progression and the provision of care. It was 
interested in the routine patterns for the mainstream, but also the ‘carrot’ of 
persuasion through progression. Assessment and Control, however, addressed the 
‘stick’ element of coercive imprisonment tactics. A material demonstration of the 
cultural delineation between the mainstream (the willing and cooperative prisoners) 
and the outgroup (the non-compliant prisoners), a dichotomy which they sought to 




The problems confronted by the prison system from 1985 were substantial, but the 
common-sense thinking and affective criteria which inflected decisions regarding 
the uses of imprisonment had not altered, but were magnified. The riots and 
protests were felt to be the result of bad prisoners – the hard core, the Premier 
League prisoners, antisocial and filled with hatred. Those prisoners must be 
removed from circulation or potentially subject to preventative policy such as 
personal assessment, profiling and observation as a means to reduce the risk of 
future prison disturbances. And in the worst case scenario, the Division could also 
employ their own military response. In 1987, the Secretary of State for Scotland, 
Malcolm Rifkind, issued a statement which reinforced the balance of sympathies 
which ordered the prison system:  
‘Prison regimes by their very nature will never be ideal for those who 
have grievously offended against society. It is my view that we have 
had, in recent times, too great a concentration of attention upon the 
criminal element. The lawbreaker does not have the sympathy of the 
population at large. Their support lies with the forces of law and order, 
and while the Scottish prison system is passing through a particularly 
trying period our support for them is not in doubt and never will be’ 





Drawing on historical data, this chapter has illuminated a particularly bleak period 
in Scottish penal history. In response to the perceived size and intractability of the 
problems faced, the penal state adopted a reactive punitive strategy of increased 
segregation and prison expansion. The cumulative effect of this strategy was to 
render Scottish prisons more punitive in the 1980s. In chronicling this history, this 
chapter has also sought to empirically identify how the actions and decisions of 
actors within the Division gave rise to punitive adaptions within the imprisonment 
regimes. The analysis has also demonstrated that the meanings which actors 
attached to those decisions were consistent with contemporary penal sensibilities, 
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social narratives and political rationalities, reflecting the sentiments and outlook of 
the pre-existing paternalistic liberalism 
 
The importance of the policy document as an important expression of authority has 
been demonstrated, deployed as a means to regain control over the system and as 
an important communicative technique for the penal state. However, as a result of 
the riots in particular, the Division was left feeling vulnerable, the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of its approach faced increased scrutiny.  
 
Simultaneously, Scottish social interests were colliding with the governmental and 
ideological changes brought by the new Thatcher government in the 1980s, and 
strife and tension beset Scottish social, cultural and political life. The following 
chapter will explore the consequences of these shifting penal and political 










Prisons in Scotland had been evolving in response to the broad problems of social 
disorder and the perceived danger and failure among the prisoners in the 1970s. By 
the 1980s, prison disorder was an increasingly important factor in decision-making. 
Despite their uncompromising approach to control, the Division was unsettled by 
the period of the riots, its inability to quell the disturbances and the surrounding 
climate of criticism that followed. In light of this context, this chapter maps the 
dramatic pattern of penal transformation that took place from 1989. The Division 
was replaced by a more powerful organisation, SPS (the Scottish Prison Service). 
SPS had more power and greater authority and increased policymaking capacity. 
With that, SPS purposefully went about reforming Scottish imprisonment. To 
understand Scottish penal transformation, we must grasp the forces in which SPS 
was forged. The first claim of this chapter is that SPS’s creation was the result of the 
particular problems inside the prisons; but it also reflected the rise of a new civic 
nationalistic sentiment in Scotland which developed in response to anti-Thatcher 
sentiment and Conservative government’s increasingly managerialist approach.  
 
Second, there were improvements in the material conditions of prisons. The use of 
segregation was altered and softened, and the engagement with prisoners became 
more respectful. By the mid-1990s, prisoners (long-term prisoners in particular) 
were seen as rationale beings with a degree of ownership over their prison career. 
These developments reflected the changes in Scottish political culture; consequently, 
SPS was seeking to achieve a stable and calm prison system and a resilient and 
prepared prison administration. By framing issues in this way, prisons in Scotland 
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were reinvented and presented as more egalitarian and humane. Moreover, Scottish 
penal culture came to be seen as distinct from the English and Welsh prison policy. 
This was significant: at a time when other Anglophone countries were becoming 
more punitive, Scottish imprisonment and political rhetoric communicated 
something much more progressive and parsimonious.  
 
However, thirdly, while charting these positive and progressive steps, this chapter 
and the history of contemporary Scottish penal culture provides a broader critique. 
While the transformation was presented as the deliberate outcome of liberal 
reforms, in many ways these changes simply enabled more ‘civilised’ means for 
achieving the prison’s aims of exclusion, discipline and control. The historical 
trajectory presented from Chapters Nine to Ten tempers the urge to over-emphasise 
the breadth of the penal changes. The prison remained a central technique in 
maintaining Scottish social order and, as a result, these impressive and redeeming 
penal reforms actually entrenched the prison as a place of last resort. This chapter 
demonstrates that an understanding of political culture, situated within the wider 
social context, is key to explaining transformation in the forms and routines of 
imprisonment. In addition, it suggests that historical perspective can be a critical 
tool, allowing us to make more accurate assessments of the nature and character of 
penal transformation. 
 
2. Reassessment  
	
This phase of the story begins in 1988-89. It was at this time that the Director of the 
Prison Division stood down and, as Derek described it: ‘So a group of young Turks 
took over’. The new Director wanted ‘New approaches and new ideas are needed to 
avoid further disruption’ (McKinlay 1989:4). Other civil servants were promoted 
and hired into senior Division management positions, some of whom had already 
been advocating within the Division for changes through the Governors’ 
Association and the WPAR. What had been an ‘emergent’ movement calling for a 
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refinement of the logic of exile and the systemic practices of Scottish imprisonment, 
now had a chance to become Scotland’s ‘dominant’ penal outlook (Loader and 
Mulcahy 2003:59-60). 
 
Interviewees positively described the new management of the Division as people 
who were ‘mavericks’ (Ken; Alistair; William; Henry) and William, who had been 
directly involved in the change in management, excitedly recalled how the crisis 
came to be viewed as ‘a window of opportunity’. The new management, acting with 
all the fervour of reformers and activists, felt they could radically alter the 
foundation principles of imprisonment: ‘Traditional criminological assumptions 
and ideas on the organisation of prisons are under challenge from the new 
perspectives’ (HH57/2071), and that the ‘fundamental philosophical concerns’ of 
impriosnment were now subject to a ‘programme of change’ (SPS 1992:10).  
 
These new key state actors began a process of reflection and assessment. The 
fundamental problem was variously described as an improper balance between the 
imperatives of control and consent: ‘The prison service lost its way and lost control. 
And in prisons you have to have control and consent. And you don’t get control 
without consent, you lose consent, you lose control’ (Adam). This emergent penal 
norm of consent suggested that order within prisons should be earned rather than 
imposed. It was felt that the Scottish prison system had undermined the importance 
of a prisoner’s consent through the rigid imposition of downgrading without the 
same vigilance given to maintaining a fair and enticing privilege system. As a result, 
Derek reflected: ‘we’d lost the good will of the prisoner. So when the incidents 
happened we couldn’t call on that good will because it was gone’.  
 
Further failings of the imprisonment regimes were described as their inherent 
violence – evaluations which had previously been exclusively reserved for the 
prisoner.  Many in the Prison Division had become embarrassed about the physical 
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excesses and militaristic responses of the Division. As Ken went on to mournfully 
recall:  
‘Our response was a very hierarchical, forceful, coercive response. We 
were out there knocking the hell out of prisoners. Prisoners were taking 
hostages, were destroying buildings, attacking staff, attacking each 
other. It was a very violent time. And the response was violence by the 
authorities back, and we locked down and we locked up. And we 
damaged a lot of people; a lot of prisoners’.  
 
People reflected on the cruelty of segregation in particular. According to Ken, ‘in 
Peterhead and in the [segregation] cells all sorts of horrible things were happening’. 
William described the violence that was endemic to the prison system, recalling the 
early 1970s prisons as ‘pretty nasty places’. Douglas critiqued the barbarity of 
Scottish imprisonment, a central part of the imprisonment regime itself, saying it 
appeared to him that ‘Prisons used to systematically brutalise people’.  
 
The newly instated Division administrators began to turn away from the inhumane 
practices and reactive punitiveness which had governed imprisonment regimes. 
Speaking of his predecessors in the Division, William said:  
‘They thought they knew everything, they were operational guys…we 
recognised we were not doing this properly, you know, we were not 
treating people as people; we were treating them as animals. We needed 
to change’.  
 
The dehumanising character of imprisonment was also a critical recollection of 
Ken’s: ‘If you treat people like animals you’re not going to get them to respond in 
humane ways’. The Prison Division were chastened by the excess of the physicality 
and coercive segregation. The Division began to suggest that they ‘had to pull back 
from total control’ (Ken). 
 
At times of crisis, as Hay has written, ‘disparities between previously unquestioned 
cognitive frameworks and the ‘realities’ they purport to represent are starkly 
revealed’ (Hay 2002:214). Reflecting this cultural analysis, William described how 
Assessment and Control became a defunct penal programme – a punitive and 
	
308 
uncompromising reaction that was now felt to be offensive and seen as illogical and 
needing to be repudiated:  
‘It came from the common-sense: we have 50 bad apples, or 200 bad 
apples in the barrel, let’s take them out, but let’s do something for the 
rest but let’s get these guys out. But what soon became apparent was 
that another 50 came along……[it] was about ‘let’s get a cage 
somewhere and let’s forget about them’. Adults were forgotten, prisons 
were forgotten services. There was a concept that perhaps we can do 
things for young offenders, but when someone gets to 21 they get 
stamped…and this was the shift in the argument that takes us away 
from Assessment and Control …[new senior management were] able to 
say Assessment and Control was shite’.  
 
Like William, Douglas also wanted to invalidate the Prison Division and was critical 
of them, describing it as a ‘semi-performing’ Department. New management was 
intent on transforming the Division and taming the disorder in Scottish prisons. 
William enthusiastically described the new tempo and reform ambition among the 
senior management of the Division: ‘The atmosphere was great. It was mental, it 
was a party. That’s when, where, all this started to happen’. 
 
3. The Scottish Prison Service 
	
In tandem with the changes in Scottish penal values, the whole rationality of 
government – its functions, limits and aspirations - had also begun to evolve. 
Throughout the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government, armed with 
a new doctrine of free market economics, launched an assault on the welfarist and 
social democratic developments of Britain’s post-war settlement. Ministers sought 
to minimise citizens’ dependency on government by reducing social provision in 
education, health, reducing the abuse (as they saw it) of welfare benefits, and 
introduced new policies to reduce the inefficiencies of public administration and 
encourage privatisation of state subsidised industries (Gamble 1994). Under 
Thatcher, the ideology of British politics began to shift to the right, becoming 
simultaneously anti-state intervention but also more coercive, in what Hall (1985) 




In 1988, the seminal Improving Management in Government - Next Steps (1988) was 
published. It outlined an agenda for government shaped by a ‘business-type 
managerialism’ (Rhodes 1994:144), which dictated that the civil service should 
follow the corporate doctrines of performance measurement, greater accountability, 
responsibility and the principles of competition. In addition, government agencies 
should be decentralised in order to reduce costs (Hood 1991:4-5). Ideas of ‘economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness; performance targets, auditing, and monitoring; 
consumer responsiveness and customer satisfaction’ gained ascendency in British 
political culture (Loader and Mulcahy 2003:260).  
 
The corollary of these corporate political mentalities was the new demands they 
placed upon of the liberal citizen. Citizens were still rational and responsible, but 
were also required to be ‘autonomous agents who make their decisions, pursue 
their preferences and seek to maximise the quality of their lives’ (Rose and Miller 
2010:298). The Government should better encourage citizens to be an entrepreneur 
of their own fortune and well-being by becoming prudent (O’Malley 1992; Garland 
1997).  
 
The new governmental paradigm of entrepreneurship in ethos, appealed to the 
Division’s new maverick spirit. The critical evaluations of the civil service that Next 
Steps outlined seemed to neatly reflect the problems they faced with the Scottish 
prison system. As Douglas commented: ‘A badly functioning organisation is only 
interested in the process and stultifies initiative, which summed-up precisely what 
was wrong [with the Division]’. 
 
But the rise of Thatcher and the Conservative brand of liberalism were highly 
contentious in Scotland. The majority of people in Scotland voted for Labour MPs 
through the 1970s and into the 1980s, while Conservatives won the most overall 
votes across Britain, maintaining power from 1979 until 1997. This did not 
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necessarily represent a democratic deficit in Scotland, the British political system 
had always operated so that the party with the greatest number of seats across the 
UK won the mandate to govern. Constitutional difficulties and cultural divisions 
emerged, however, in the 1980s, as the Conservative administration pursued social 
policies which were seen to hasten the problems of deindustrialisation and poverty 
in Scotland. Scotland’s higher reliance on public provision than England, with 15.5 
percent of people in Scotland dependent on benefits, extensive social housing, 
higher unemployment rates, chronic health inequalities and the country having 
some of Britain’s most deprived areas, meant that it ‘had much to lose’ from 
Thatcher’s economic policies (Stewert 2009:120). Accusations followed from Tory 
leaders in Westminster that the English were subsidising a dependent Scotland, and 
that Scotland needed to develop a culture of enterprise (Mitchell and Bennie 
1995:94).  The Government subsequently imposed policies that were felt to be 
particularly harsh on Scotland, such as the poll tax, curtailing social provision, 
introducing privatisation into healthcare, electricity and transport, re-ordering 
education and local government funding. While these same policies were also being 
resisted and disputed in England and Wales, in Scotland these policies were viewed 
as a hostile attempt to ‘Anglicise’ Scottish government institutions and cultural life 
(Stewert 2009).  
 
As shown in Chapter Eight, by the 1970s Scotland bore ‘cultural scars’ (Perchard 
2013) from the loss of industry. As a result, in the 1960s saw a ‘resurgent’ and 
‘powerful national narrative’ emerging (ibid.:78). The policies Westminster pursued 
fractured the cohesiveness of Scottish-British social and political culture as 
Thatcherism provoked a Scottish ‘civic nationalism’ (Perchard 2013:n14).53 By the 
end of the 1980s, Scotland had become a ‘restless nation’ (Munro 1999; Stewert 2009; 
Midwinter 1990). Scotland was increasingly depicted as culturally distinct, 
collectivist, left wing, sitting in stark contrast to the liberal ideology of individual 
																																																						
53 Civic nationalism has a more collective and inclusive view of citizenship based on shared values (as opposed to 
ethnic nationalism which has the common grounds of race and ancestry) (Brubaker 1999; Keating 1996). 
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responsibility in British politics (Perchard 2013).  A new cultural identity emerged, 
one in which Scotland was felt to be ‘different’ (McEwan 2002:79), or a sense that 
Scotland was, as Doig (2013) put it, ‘special’. Despite Thatcher’s commitment to 
unionism and renewing a sense of British greatness (McEwan 2002), her policies had 
inadvertently ‘alienated [Scottish] civil society and fuelled demands for Home Rule’ 
(Stewart 2009:139), thus undermining the union of the British state. Scotland, rather 
than Britain, was ‘construed as the unit of political and economic management from 
the 1970s’ (McCrone 2006). The view that Scotland should free itself from the 
‘internal colonialism’ (Perchard 2013:86) of Britain became influential. 
From the middle of the 1980s Scottish public dissent against Thatcher grew. 
Scotland’s local government, civil society and media engaged in a protracted 
resistance against the commodification of public services and the responsibilisation 
of citizens (Holliday 1992; Stewert 2009). By 1987, the cultural and political divisions 
were apparent: 72 percent of Scottish people stated that Thatcher only ‘looked after 
the interests of one class’ and 54 percent said she was ‘uncaring’ (Stewert 2009:122). 
In 1989, the Scottish media reported that 77 percent of Scots felt like second class 
British citizens (Mitchell and Bennie 1995:96). As Stewart writes, Thatcher came to 
be perceived to be ‘anti-Scottish’ (Stewart 2009:2).54  
These influences – changes in the nature of British liberalism and an insurgent 
Scottish political outlook – provided new ideational resources to address the 
Scottish problems of imprisonment. It was at this time, that the Prison Division 
underwent a reinvention and became the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) (1989). In 
becoming SPS they acquired a logo which adorned their documents, their 
letterhead, their staff IDs, etc., demonstrating and consolidating their new 
managerial power. The deliberate reconfiguration of the ‘culture’ of Scottish prison 
governance (Frizzell 1993) was to be made literally and physically evident. For 
example, the reception at SPS headquarters was to be re-designed on the 
																																																						




instructions that it ‘portray a positive image of a forward-thinking service’ 
(HH57/1897). In 1990, the annual report covered 1988-89 so that it corresponded 
with the financial year instead of the calendar year. SPS set out a Mission Statement 
in which the old concerns of custody, order, care and opportunities were now 
precisely stated:  
  
• To keep in custody those committed by the courts; 
• To maintain good order in each prison; 
• To care for inmates with humanity; and 
• To provide all possible opportunities to help prisoners to lead law-abiding 
and useful lives after release. 
 
In 1994, the 1952 Prison Rules were updated, giving their actions greater legal 
certainty and reducing the emphasis on discretion, reaction and incremental 
amendments. The political authority of SPS provided new visual organisational 
referents by ‘which to define itself and advance its claims’ (Geertz 1983:143) as a 
professional, cohesive and organised headquarters. The new virtues and future 
aspirations of prison governance were to be articulated wherever possible, and by 
doing so, also conveyed a new form of organisational control, consensus and unity. 
A ‘culture-producing process’ motivated by what Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 
(1991:379) describe as a ‘pleasure principle that produces a unified positive image’ – 
the creation of SPS was a positive act of political cultural affirmation. SPS was in a 
process of producing and reifying new penal meanings and political motivations in 
their managerial paraphernalia. 
 
In 1989, SPS published a Business Plan – an extensive organisational review 
conducted by a private consultancy firm which sought to provide explicit 
organisational goals, functions and boundaries for the prison management. It also 
aimed to illustrate how to improve accountability and establish proactive strategic 
management. Building on this corporate identity, SPS produced Organising for 
Excellence (1990a) which outlined a new streamlined and more efficient 
organisational structure for the Division. This document was explicitly developed to 
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reproduce the political outlook advocated for by Next Steps for Scottish prisons 
(1990a:iv, 94-95). The problems with imprisonment were now firmly identified as 
being largely problems with management, or more precisely, a lack of clear 
authority and planning capacity. SPS wanted the prisons to function with a long-
term plan, to replace a ‘control culture’ with a more open accountability culture 
(SPS 1990a:95).  
 
An important outcome of the ascendant British public management agenda was the 
conversion of branches of the civil service into independent agencies. SPS was not 
initially considered for agency status, but undeterred its new management of SPS 
pursued this opportunity (SPS 1990a). In 1993 SPS became an executive agency (SPS 
1993). Douglas, who had been directly involved in this bureaucratic conversion, saw 
this as a great liberation for SPS, and he described the agency status as an 
unreservedly positive advance: ‘More freedom…It meant more freedoms. That 
really sums it up… it gave [SPS] the freedom and trust that we needed’. However, 
during the 1970s and 80s the Division had been largely free of the downward 
pressure from central government at Westminster and the bureaucracy of St 
Andrew’s House. My suggestion is that freedom and trust can be more accurately 
interpreted as increased penal power. SPS had a greater capacity to reconfigure 
management and prison infrastructure. As Douglas defined it, they were no longer 
merely administering prisons. Becoming an agency ‘empowered 
headquarters…That was when we made the most of our progress’. As a corporate-
like organisation, SPS had more power, and was able to create a ‘coherent line 
management structure with clear accountability for the overall direction and control 
of prison operations’ (SPS 1990a:i). Adam also saw the reinvention as one which 
moved prisons away from administrative bureaucracy towards a more powerful 
corporate system: SPS became ‘a managed place rather than an administered place, 
you can’t do any of these things [systematic reforms] without a grip on the 
business’. The historical irony is that as we saw in Chapter Eight, prison literally 
operated like a factory, with detailed employment rates, profit margins, marketing 
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strategies and annual sales figures. For the prison to be a business in the 1980s 
reflected a new set of governing rationalities, ones which prioritised corporate 
rhetoric and strategies. Being an agency with contemporary statutory rules, a 
corporate philosophy and a mission statement meant that SPS was now organised 
and professionalised. What distinguished SPS’s organisational DNA from the 
administrative Division it replaced was its new corporate identity of effective and 
strategic control and planning (SPS 1988c; 1990a; 1990b; 1990c; 1993). 
 
Opportunity and Responsibility  
	
Spurred on by a new reformist fervour, some of the new senior members of the SPS 
contacted the Secretary of State in 1990, suggesting they wanted to build upon ‘the 
development of thinking over recent months in Prisons Group’. They proposed that 
SPS abandon the plans for expanded segregation facilities and instead spend the 
budget improving existing physical conditions. The Minister agreed, but requested 
a ‘small White Paper’ which he could use to announce this new policy direction 
later in 1990 (HH57/2112). This became the most seminal document of this period, 
Opportunity and Responsibility (1990b).  
 
While the practical focus of the document was trained upon the long-term prisoner, 
Opportunity and Responsibility reads as a manifesto. In posing new ideas and re-
articulating the aims of imprisonment, it was also intended as an assault upon the 
Scottish political culture of the preceding period. It was a totemic publication and 
marked a new beginning that dispelled what had gone before.  
 
Opportunity and Responsibility outlined a new ‘humane’ (ibid.:18) vision for 
imprisonment. SPS would support prisoners’ family contact, improve the quality of 
life and minimise the ‘harmful effects of the prisoner’s removal from normal life’ 
(ibid.:9). But the document explicitly linked this vision to the contingent political 
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changes that were afoot: ‘external changes were taking place in society at large, 
which called for the Service to review its traditional view of the prisoner’ (1990b:22). 
Mirroring the new prevailing policy language, SPS presented a new vision of 
Scottish prisoners’ capacity for personal responsibility. It asserted that Scottish 
imprisonment had ‘concentrated excessively on individual pathology’. The dynamic 
of care and control was replaced by the semantic framework of opportunity and 
responsibility, whereby the prison provided programmes and prisoners were 
responsible for making the most of them. The prison should avoid a ‘coerced cure’, 
their new goal was to provide opportunities for ‘facilitative change’ (1990b:17).  
 
These ideas entailed a ‘new understanding’ of the ‘prisoner as a responsible person’ 
whose ‘personal problems’ inside the prison could be alleviated if they were 
provided with better interventions and activities. The prison should not coerce them 
but engage the prisoners’ consent and ‘co-operation’ (ibid.:16-17). This new vision, 
as described by the Chief Executive of the SPS, was that the prisoner was neither 
‘sick’ nor defective; nor ‘an inferior kind of person who is unable to exercise 
decision making’ (Frizzell 1993:206). The prison administration began to think more 
should be expected from prisoners and that to achieve their aims of ‘custody’ and 
‘control’ they should be underwritten by a regime of ‘opportunities’ (HH57/2067). 
They could no longer just do things to prisoners. They envisioned a system of 
‘mutual responsibilities’ between the regime and the person confined (ibid.:18). But 
this would place new demands on the prisoner. As the new Director of Prisons 
stated ‘prisoners claimed their rights. Many [in senior management] feel they did so 
without living up to their responsibilities’ (ibid.). Training prisoners to be 
responsible had been a marginal practice in the 1970s and into the 1980s, a 
generosity which had previously been restricted, given to prisoners only as 
privilege as they progressed into Training for Freedom. By 1990s it was the 




Opportunity and Responsibility also gave renewed impetus to other existing prison 
practices. Segregation was now referred to in the more civilised terminology as 
‘small units’ (ibid. Chapter 8-9). It reaffirmed the need for segregation facilities, 
though was opposed to the large unit recommended in Assessment and Control 
(ibid.:53). Moreover, it outlined a coherent single policy to govern all segregation 
units, no longer would segregation be the discretionary and summary power of the 
Governors (ibid.:59). The object of SPS’s attention was upon the entire prison system 
and not, they felt, disproportionately concerned with the most discordant prisoners. 
Keeping prisoners within the mainstream prison system had become their ultimate 
goal.  
 
A New Prison Expertise 
SPS officials presented themselves as reformers and modernisers. Douglas observed 
that these were civilising developments: ‘From the 1990s on civil servants [in SPS] 
were more enlightened’. Similarly, Alistair described this as the time SPS became a 
‘thinking organisation’. By contrast, leading scholars have identified an Anglophone 
trend in which imprisonment was inflected with a new austerity, stripped of its 
reformative capacities, prison policies were no longer the preserve of insulated 
researchers and civil servants. These experts were, according to the general 
historical trajectory of British penal policy, displaced from the policymaking 
process, which was increasingly beholden to popular sentiment and public opinion 
(Garland 2000:349-350; Cavadino and Dignan 2006:230; Loader 2006). In Scotland, 
the growing power of SPS and the establishment of ideas of efficiency and 
effectiveness opened up a new space for evidence-based policy and at the beginning 
of the 1990s a new research unit was established at SPS (Annual Report 1991-1992).  
In notes from 1990, the ambition of SPS and a new tool of evidence was revealed: 
the ‘role of research in the SPS’ presents ‘in theory a process which promises 
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significant, if not radical approaches for dealing with the management of prisoners 
in Scotland’ and research was intended to take a ‘proactive role in prison policy’.55  
 
Research facilities were intertwined with the new business approach to managing 
prisons:  
‘The transformation in this period was that knowledge, evidence was 
used to drive the business…Why? Partly, because we could write, the 
prison service couldn’t string together an argument. We transformed the 
quality of what was brought to the board, just transformed. Two pages 
became 22 pages. Things had references to academic work, footnotes – 
that was never ever part of that agenda before. So, the whole way of 
doing business became much more professional’ (William).  
 
The descriptions of the reams of paper and the influx of radical new ideas evokes 
another image, that of the coloniser and the proselytiser.56  Understandably, given 
the ambition of the penal transformation posed by SPS, there was not unified 
support from all management and staff behind the new initiatives of prisoner 
empowerment and responsibility (HH57/2112; HMCIP Annual Report 1992-1993:11). 
As Ken explained, ‘it was a time to take stock. And I am glad that is what the prison 
service did. We tried to think about things. People were polarised’. For the 
transformation to ‘work’ they needed to convince but also coerce other SPS staff of 
this new way of thinking:  
Some ‘prison staff, they were the anchor, and they were slowing us 
down. As long as you can have more people on your side you can make 
it very uncomfortable for the minority. Lots of people sit on the fence, 
you’ve got to show them your way was the better way’ (William).   
 
Documents allowed them to raise the standard of the previous archetypical prison 
administration, the way it looked, the form it took and the outlook it communicated. 
As Alistair explained it, being capable of ‘joined-up writing’ gave them an 
																																																						
55 These are no archive code as were taken from SPS internal files. 
56 Not all documents are intended as colonising practices. In this cultural and political context, at a time of self-
conscious and deliberate transformation, the concrete practice of document production had ideational and cultural 
promotion as its characteristic meaning. It is about reading the meaning agents produce by undertaking social 
practices of production (Biernacki 2000:289), in this case report compilation and publication. 
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advantage. There was an avalanche of information, of publications, writing and 
ideas. They used the documents to colonise the space vacated by previous 
management and destabilised by persistent disturbances, but also to convince those 
who were skeptical of the changes. The research and policy publications allowed 
them to establish a striking penal identity; allowing, as William described it, new 
‘ideas to get supremacy’.  
 
The existence of so many publications, a series of extensive prison research reports, 
research bulletins, policy documents, business plans and strategic reviews57  was in 
many ways an anathema to the previously reactive administration of the Prisons 
Division. Moreover, these documents also looked different: all adorned with the new 
SPS logo, they were sleek and glossy A4 documents. Documents should be read 
literally as a cultural knowledge source, but also read visually as an object, 
describing the document’s forms as, additionally, a cultural agent and cultural 
product. Without having to literally read their content or narrative framing, these 
documents send viscerally attainable signals that demonstrate new practices of 
penal administration and a new configuration of penal politics. These documents 
were a ‘powerful technology of rule’ (Stoler 2002:101) and identity creating 
practices, cultural artefacts establishing and producing the foundations of a new 
professional and authoritative penal culture.58 In addition, the slew of documents 
were also cultural artefacts of a new ‘fact production’ (Stoler 2002:91) that were 
establishing a new vision of the prisoner, the prison, prison governance and new 




57 In 1994 reports were published on HIV/AIDS in Prison; Physically Disabled Prisoners; Psychological Disturbance 
Amongst Prisoners; Mentally Disturbed Prisoners; Drug Use and Prison (Summary); Drug Use and Scottish Prisons; 
An Evaluation of Barlinnie and Shotts Units; Evaluation of Parole Procedures; Research Bulletin; The Second Prison 
Survey; Evaluation of the Saughton Drug Reduction Programme. In 1995 reports on Vulnerable Prisoners; 
Relational Prison Audits; A Review of Regimes and a Research Bulletin were published. 
58 Stoler, in her article ‘Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance’ (2002) chastises the historical anthropologists 
who neglect form which, like content, also reveals cultural shifts and dynamics: ‘Students of the colonial experience 






4. Mainstreaming, Normalisation and the Entrepreneurial 
Prisoner 
 
The SPS structure was now empowered to ‘endorse the new philosophies’ 
envisioned for Scottish imprisonment (Annual Report 1991-92:ix). To align the 
prisons with its campaign for a new organisational culture and penal philosophy 
SPS set about transforming imprisonment regimes into a single efficient and 
business-like system. While disciplinary and exclusionary penal culture had shaped 
a system which relied heavily upon the logic of segregation and exile, SPS inverted 
that thinking. Their new general objective for Scottish imprisonment regimes was 
‘mainstreaming’. No longer would attention be directed at the expansion and 
oversight of segregation, but was retrained upon the mainstream system, supported 
by new techniques of prisoner intervention, responsibilisation and pacification. 
 
Regimes now had performance agendas and targets to meet and each prison was to 
be aligned with the Service’s business outlook. The annual reports no longer 
provided summaries of health, order, hygiene, activities etc. but set an agenda for 
each prison which was assessed. Each establishment was now listed with its 
particular strategic objectives for facilities, conditions and security. The annual 
reports took on the character of a report card organised around ‘Performance 
Measures’: 
1. The number of prisoners unlawfully at large 
2. The number of significant events. 
3. The numbers of serious assaults on staff and prisoners 
4. Basic quality of life for prisoners. 
5. The amount of available opportunities for prisoners’ self           
development. 
6. Time out of cell for unconvicted prisoners. 
7. Average annual cost per prisoner place. 





The bureaucratic rationality manifest in this new method of accountability, in the 
‘making prison up’ (to paraphrase Hacking), operated as new techniques of rule 
and hierarchy, a means of controlling and realigning imprisonment regimes to 
reflect a new political ethos.  
The Scottish commitment to new public management within prison practices was 
most vivid in the official representation of the prisoner. SPS attempted to 
rhetorically re-position the prisoner: from a person who was primarily a worker and 
a danger to a customer. SPS was spreading this new mantra through workshops at 
which staff were ‘learning a business approach to forward planning, focusing on 
quality of life service and customer needs’ (HH57/2071). At senior management 
meetings they began to refer to prisoners as ‘customers’, ‘SPS customers’ and 
‘prisoner customers’ (ibid.; HH57/1897).  
 
With this in mind they developed the Prisoner Survey, described as ‘a major market 
research study’ (Wozniak and McAllister 1992:10). The survey was extensive and set 
about gathering prisoners’ opinions of the Scottish mainstream system. Questions 
focused on accommodation, work and wages, education, cooking and food, clothing 
and hygiene, cleanliness, general state of repair, official complaints, length of visits, 
privacy and visiting facilities for children. It inquired about the atmosphere and 
relationships within the prison (between prisoners, officers, governors, specialists). 
The survey also sought to gain insight into a prisoner’s personal reflections about 
being imprisoned: the character of their personal problems, their sense of personal 
safety, issues they anticipated upon release such as jobs, homelessness, etc.  
 
William described how the ideas of consumerism gave new legitimacy to Scottish 
imprisonment:  
 
‘the customer has a legitimate voice…we were using populations of 
prisoners, and prisoners’ voices in a very different way. I think it starts 
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the change. People think, [the] prisoner’s voice is right!’.  
The prisoner survey directed SPS’s efforts in the process of mainstreaming. To reduce 
prison disturbances, SPS set about improving the conditions and quality of life for 
prisoners in the mainstream prisons rather than relying on the threat of segregation 
to maintain order. In response to these reports there were a variety of improvements 
in the visiting facilities. This also included, though not systematically for every 
prison, the addition of pictures, piped music, plants and a baby changing area. SPS 
produced separate information booklets for prisoners and for people visiting the 
prison. Food was also improved after a catering audit (HMCIP Report 1993-1994). A 
new grievance procedure was introduced in 1994 when an Independent Complaints 
Adjudicator for prisoners was appointed. SPS also shifted the use of classification 
terminology for long-term prisoners. First, in a stroke, SPS reduced the number of 
long-term prisoners by increasing the threshold for long-term imprisonment from 
18 months to two years and then to four years. In so doing  SPS had decreased the 
problem prisoner category by making it more difficult to qualify for that 
classification. Second, in 1993, the Standing Committee on Difficult Prisoners was 
replaced with a lay membership and given the banal unprovocative new title of 
Advisory Committee on Prisoner Management (Annual Report 1993-94:42). During 
this time SPS did not build new prisons, they modernised and ameliorated some of 
the harsher and objectifying aspects of Scottish prison life. SPS sought to increase 
the legitimacy of the system among prisoners. 
In addition, the existing ‘small units’ for prisoner exclusion were given a different 
dynamic. Small units would provide opportunities for facilitated change by 
addressing prisoners’ anger issues, emotional problems, ‘criminal attitudes, values 
and beliefs’, then quickly returning them to the mainstream with improved 
behaviour (SPS 1994:42). Rather than relying solely on spatial and temporal control, 
small units would also help normalise the prisoner, though not for society at large, 
but for the mainstream prison system. Segregation was now a site for more 
proactive intervention with the dangerous and disordered prisoner. Within this 
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same normalisation endeavour, a National Induction Centre for newly convicted 
long-term prisoners was opened. This was an independent unit for up to 52 
prisoners at Shotts, where prisoners serving a sentence of ten years were sent after 
sentencing (excluding sex offenders). There, prisoners underwent a 2-3 week 
induction programme. This provided ‘a supportive regime for prisoners’ at the 
beginning of their sentence to help them adjust to the mainstream prison system, 
and decisions were made regarding a prisoner’s security category (SPS 1998:10). It 
was hoped that this would reduce long-termers’ hostility towards the system, 
according to Douglas: ‘The induction unit at Shotts [aim was] to get more long term 
prisoner inducted into the system in a way that would hopefully make them less 
likely to be disruptive’. 
 
Bolstering the mainstream like this, however, put the BSU in a tricky position. The 
BSU had always been outside the mainstream system, and had been lambasted for 
perverting the progression system, as it was often perceived as a reward for bad 
behaviour (HMCIP Annual Report 1986). Now it was criticised for undermining the 
mainstream system and harbouring prisoners who were opposed to SPS’s positive 
interventions (SPS 1994:40-41). The Unit became emblematic of a system that had 
fallen into disarray because of prisoners with non-compliant attitudes (ibid.:41), it 
was now an anathema to the governing ideas of systemic consistency, harmony and 
mainstream efficiency. Douglas reflected the disdain for the Unit when he described 
it as ‘rotten to the core’. People were also repulsed by the permitted conjugal visits 
at the BSU (William; Douglas), the prisoners there were described a ragtag bunch of 
misfits whose prison life was offensive to senior managers’ modernising 
sensibilities. In the era of mainstreaming, the BSU was seen as a relic, that it had 
become mummified; an historical oddity in the new modern organisational field of 
imprisonment. William, recalling this time, characterised the BSU as being 
‘completely beyond its sell by date’. Alistair felt similar, saying that ‘the Barlinnie 
Unit had outlived its time’. The BSU, once considered Scotland’s great prison 
experiment (Sparks 2002), by the 1990s was a prison out of time, in both senses of 
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the term. SPS’s progressive programme of mainstreaming made BSU’s position as a 
penal outlier untenable, as encapsulated by Douglas’s account: 
‘we felt we were improving the whole system. The arguments for it [the 
BSU] were becoming less and less. And we did an internal thing and 
discovered things that were going on that were making it insupportable. 
To be honest, it was outrageous’.  
 
SPS commissioned a report on small units (Bottomly et al 1994), which was left 
unpublished for some time (Sparks 2002). That report was largely positive about the 
character and routine of the Special Unit – which was not what the Division wanted 
to hear, according to William. Shortly thereafter, another working group on small 
units, this one internal, was established. Its criticisms were decisive and 
unambiguous (SPS 1994). The BSU was not improved, reclaimed or realigned. Like 
so much else, it was, as Sparks has written, ‘a standing admonition of the very 
system that the reformers believed they had superseded’ (Sparks 2002:576), and in 
1994 the Unit was disbanded and the prisoners distributed across the mainstream 
system. 
 
Other innovations and techniques were introduced. SPS implemented psychological 
interventions, such as cognitive behaviour groupwork and disruptive prisoner 
programmes, making prisoners compliant through a personal evaluation of the 
reasons for their criminality and acts of prison disorder (SPS 1998:10; Annual Report 
1994-95). These practices and interventions accepted that in Scotland most 
psychological disorder was ‘imported’ into prison rather than created there (Cooke 
1994:8), while good behaviour and decision-making could be inculcated through 
psychological interventions. 
 
The imprisonment regimes evolved to include new techniques of intensive micro-
management. Personal Development Files and Sentence Management were 
introduced for long-term prisoners in July 1992. These dossiers would enable 
prisoners ‘to address personal development issues and problems’ (SPS 1998:9). They 
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provided ‘a formal and standardised system within which all information relevant 
to the prisoner can be consistently and coherently gathered, collated and 
maintained.’ (HH57/2110). From 1992, all prisoners serving a sentence of two years 
or more could take part in the Sentence Planning Scheme and Personal Officer 
Scheme (Annual Report 1991-92), in which they were appointed a personal officer 
and along with them would agree the best way for them to make the most of their 
time in prison (Coyle 1992). These techniques combined the vision of prisoners as 
responsible and as customers with the idea that imprisonment was an opportunity:  
 
‘As far as possible prisoners are allowed to make choices about their use 
of the opportunities available. The aim is to give prisoners the 
opportunity to address their offending behaviour and to assist and 
encourage them to make constructive use of the available facilities which 
include education, programmes, work, vocational training, counselling 
and contact with other agencies. Prisoners are involved in the preparation 
and review of their sentence plans and have the opportunity to see, 
discuss and comment on what has been written about them by their 
personal officers’ (SPS 1998:10). 
 
Prisoners now could be taught how to behave in a socially acceptable form: 
‘responsibility must be learned’ and prisoners must be encouraged to negotiate 
between ‘choice (the freedom to do as I want) and obligations (my duties towards 
others)’ (SPS 1995a:7). Sentence planning gave prisoners ‘increasing responsibility’, 
establishing a ‘sphere of freedom’ around them (Rose and Miller 2010:298), while 
making prisoners meet their ‘targets’ for improvement and good behaviour as they 
worked on their files and progressed through the system (SPS 1995a:15). By 
rendering themselves responsible, prisoners were allowed ‘to take part in the 
government of their own confinement’ (Garland 1997:192). The system moved from 
the idea of authoritative assessment by staff to entrepreneurial ‘personal 
assessment’ by the prisoner on his own behalf (Coyle 1992:6).  
 
It was no longer sufficient for a prisoner to physically circulate through the prisons 
on their progression career, instead the regime of the prison could also move the 
prisoner from within once he had the opportunity to exercise agency. Now the 
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Scottish prisoner was promised that he could be ‘master of his own destiny’ (Coyle 
1992:6). The responsible penal persona was productive and aspirational, giving the 
SPS a new impetus. It was not just simply that the Scottish prisoner became 
responsible because people expressed that belief, but these new rationalities 
materialised in the altered shape of imprisonment regimes which sought to 
‘encourage’ prisoners into the kind of ‘responsible citizens’ they desired (SPS 
1994a:26). The responsible prisoner was both ‘imagined and moulded’ (O’Malley 
2010a:14). 
 
A final systemic innovation that developed to support a stable mainstream was the 
emergence of risk management. The particular statistical silhouette of the prisoners 
– created by the new research reports, prisoner self-prepared dossiers and survey 
data – allowed SPS to engage the prisoners’ needs as institutional risks. Suicide, for 
example, was not just a mental health issue or welfare need, but a behavioural risk 
(Power 1997:21). The reports on drug taking in prison, psychological disturbance, 
vulnerability and communicative diseases provided a more nuanced crop of 
behavioural typologies: 
‘The information thus gathered should be used to develop a detailed 
needs profile for each prisoner and should be used to expand upon and 
develop the needs analysis built into the Sentence Planning process. In 
some instances it may also be necessary to carry out more explicit 
assessments, such as formalised risk-needs analyses, intelligence tests or 
assessments for psychopathy’ (SPS 1994a:28).  
 
These prisoners were not looked upon in a manner that made them an object for 
help or a threat to be warehoused and excluded. Scottish prisoners were 
institutional risks to be monitored and contained with a minimum amount of 
disorder. Moving away from the overt physical control of segregation, a new 
process of behavioural management was informed by risk and needs assessment 




We should not equate rhetorical change with material transformation in prison 
practices. Imprisonment regimes did not become a business.59 They did not pivot 
entirely on risks and probability. Prison regimes remained humming along to the 
beat of the textile factory. Prisoners continued to progress through their prison 
careers. But the new lexicon of economic ideas and their attendant terminology and 
tactics: customer, efficiency, accountability, responsibility, strategies, corporate 
philosophies, all became widespread and were manifest in the adaption and 
developments of Scottish imprisonment regimes. The industrial regime in Scottish 
prisons remained largely the same as a physical process, but its semantic framing 
was adapted to align with the new patterns, codes and agendas of Scottish political 
culture. It was no longer just a means to prevent idleness, it was now also an 
opportunity for the prisoner to exercise his agency and civic responsibility.  
Working on the prisoner with these combined techniques meant that SPS did not 
need to rely so much on high security categorisations, and could decrease the 
number of high security prisoners and reducing the violence and disturbances 
inside the prison system. 
 
These changes were spoken of with great enthusiasm by almost all of the 
interviewees. Speaking in 1991, a senior governor reflected that through their 
reforming efforts SPS had ‘overtaken and passed traditional penal reform groups, 
such as the Howard League’ in the development of new practical theories of 
incarceration (Coyle 1992:6). In the face of crisis, violence and adversity it was now 
felt that Scotland was leading the way in progressive prison reform. Such was its 
faith in the positive changes being made, SPS outlined an almost utopian vision of 
the future of Scottish imprisonment: ‘the current privilege system will wither away’ 
(SPS 1990a:63). By the mid-1990s, imprisonment was ‘rendered more homogenous, 
more knowable and more governable’ and with the ‘centralization of powers and a 
																																																						
59 Or at least not until quite some time later when private sector prisons enter the scene (for which this period might 
be regarded as preparatory). 
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shift from a patchwork of particular expertise to a more homogenized field of risk 
and resource-management’ (Garland 1997:190). 
	
5. Soft Authoritarian Imprisonment 
	
In the space of a few years, Scottish imprisonment underwent a striking revolution. 
Physical segregation was minimised, with a new emphasis placed on psychological 
intervention. Prisoners were not to be viewed as alien and subhuman. They were 
now service users, proprietors of their personal development with legitimate insight 
into the best use of imprisonment. Prison conditions were being modernised, and 
improving the quality of life became an important goal of Scottish imprisonment. By 
the 1990s there were no more celebrity prisoners, celebrated units, notorious prisons 
or infamous cells. Imprisonment regimes were made less threatening through new 
techniques and terminology, yielded less potential for harm, were de-militarised 
and in significant ways were materially improved. In this time, techniques such as 
Sentence Management and Personal Development, progress targets, the survey, 
economic rationalities, and efficiency measurement all replaced what Ken described 
as the physical and macho character of imprisonment, the ‘brawn and bravado’, 
with ‘talking to prisoners’.  
These transformations are all the more astounding given the violence and disorder 
which preceded them and, moreover, that in the context of the riots Scottish 
imprisonment became more punitive and exclusionary. But that was the immediate 
and uncompromising reaction to the crisis inside Scottish prisons. Then there was a 
second and more programmatic change during which it is clear that disciplinary 
and exclusionary imprisonment had been replaced by a more caring and managerial 
form of imprisonment. However, this programmatic transformation is best 
understood not as a total break from the past, but as an adaption of disciplinary and 
exclusionary penal culture. This new form of imprisonment which can be defined as 
soft authoritarianism. It is the distinct characteristics of this hybrid imprisonment 
regime, and its penal subject over whom its authority is exercised that I will now 
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briefly trace out. 
Soft authoritarianism recognises and encourages the agency and rationality of its 
penal subjects. The prison developed practices of subjectification, such as 
psychological and cognitive programmes and schemes which encouraged self-
regulation and promoted responsible decision-making. The image of the ‘prisoner 
customer’, cognitive behavioural programmes, Personal Development Files and the 
Sentencing and Personal Officers Schemes which emerged during this period, were 
cultural conduits, means to indoctrinate in prisoners a new identity framed by 
responsibility and self-control. The Scottish prisoner was no longer passive, but an 
active consumer, ‘an entrepreneur in his own personal development’ (Garland 
1997:191), who was being taught how to manage their own risks and potential. As 
SPS wrote: ‘It is not sufficient to say: ‘Be responsible’. Responsibility must be 
learned in a context’ (SPS 1995a:14). As a result, soft authoritarian imprisonment 
was ‘tighter’ (Crewe 2011b), it made greater expectations of prisoners.  
Characteristic of soft authoritarianism is the recognition of the criminogenic 
potential of the prison situation. SPS sought to moderate the prison in order to 
reduce the threat of unrest. The carrot and stick style was replaced by persuasion, 
the attraction of better mainstream prisons and a promise of ‘pseudo-autonomy’ 
(Crewe 2011a). Soft authoritarianism, as a form of imprisonment, could produce 
discipline, order and efficiency within imprisonment; where the hard power of 
disciplinary and exclusionary punishment had proved counter-productive and ‘de-
generating’. SPS accepted that the mainstream prison conditions were in fact 
substandard. The survey demonstrated that SPS largely accepted the prisoners’ 
complaints. In so doing, SPS provided an ‘implicit inducement’ for non-compliant 
prisoners to return to the mainstream and ‘subtle ways of undermining’ the 
resistance and protest of prisoners (McEvoy 2001:252). This agenda was conveyed 
with some optimism and confident reflection by Derek:  
‘we wanted to make the mainstream good, and if we make the 
mainstream good then we can have less difficult prisoners, that’s how 
	
329 
we managed difficult prisoners. So that was the policy, and I think it by 
and large worked’.  
By focusing on concessions in, and improvements to the mainstream, reduced the 
battle lines within the prison system, allowing it to operate more smoothly and 
diminish its criminogenic impact upon prisoners.  
It would seem that the routine of autonomy and responsibility that had 
characterised the BSU would be consistent with this new rational regime. However, 
it came to be seen as a potential threat to the authority and practices of the newly 
homogenised mainstream system. Prisoners were to be offered autonomy, but no 
prison could be autonomous from the mainstream. There were to be no escape 
routes and places of exile which would undermine the newly emboldened 
authority, the inducement of soft authoritarianism with its goals of good order, 
control, compliance and prisoner responsibility. 
The aims of soft authoritarianism were an evolved form of disciplinary and 
exclusionary penal culture, which share the prison objectives of order, confinement 
and control. What distinguished soft authoritarian imprisonment from its 
predecessor was that utility and docility were no longer the ideal prisoner outcomes 
for imprisonment regimes to strive for (Crewe 2011a:460). The prison could no 
longer just warehouse people, it had a responsibility to intervene (Hannah-Moffat 
2005:42). Highly intrusive psychological and cognitive programmes which 
encouraged self-regulation and promoted rational decision-making exerted a 
‘broader and tighter grip on behaviour and cognition’, helping to ensure compliance 
to the prison order (Crewe 2011a:460). During the 1990s, Scottish imprisonment 
regimes became more controlling, if less physically oppressive, transforming long-
term imprisonment in particular ‘from something to be endured into something to 
be worked at – a personal project or occupation’ (Crewe 2011b:522). 
The objectives of soft authoritarian imprisonment were concentrated on achieving 
and maintaining the good order of the prison system and not upon social outcomes, 
such as reducing crime or transforming lives. Normalisation, for example, was used 
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to support prison order and to make good prisoners. Like the disciplinary and 
exclusionary forms of imprisonment that had preceded it, SPS avoided the language 
of recovery and rehabilitation for the same reasons they always had, the hopeless 
character of the prisoners. Douglas summed up the careful balancing of new penal 
aspirations with familiar penal problems thus: 
‘we didn’t call [it] the rehabilitation agenda, but the opportunity agenda 
to prepare for release. And there was a debate around how do you 
rehabilitate the non-rehabilitable in the first place given where the 
majority of the prison population are drawn from’.  
 
Adam made a similar point:  
‘It was a kind of therapeutic despondency in that we’re not actually very 
good at causing people to desist from a life of crime and so we have to 
recognise that and acknowledge it’.   
 
At the height of these transformations the Chief Inspector also noted that while 
commendable progress was being undertaken, there was still an absence of prison 
programmes which encouraged desistance (Annual Report 1993-1994:11). This form 
of imprisonment had clear lines of institutional responsibility, in which the prison 
was not accountable for directly addressing social problems (Hannah-Moffat 
2005:43); it was not interested in prisoners’ social biographies, but concerned with 
achieving the targets of imprisonment (O’Malley 1992:264). 
 
6. Neo-paternalist Liberal Political Culture – Civilising 
Imprisonment  
	
In this section I wish to illuminate the political cultural sources of Scotland’s 1990s 
prison transformation. In doing so, I suggest that the evolution of soft authoritarian 
imprisonment was an instantiation and material extension of the neo-paternal 
liberalism political culture which took hold in SPS. As a political outlook, it favoured 
rational responsibility, governmental intervention and managerialist outcomes. It 
had its cultural antecedents in paternal liberalism, and was also informed by latent 
Scottish penal fears of dangerous prisons and disorderly prisoners. Further, we can 
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connect these changes in political culture to wider social forces and political shifts. 
This provides a broader critique of the nature of the penal reform that took place 
and which has been described above. The cultural currents, social factors and 
political ethos which combined to create neo-paternal liberalism were multifaceted 
and complex. Highlighting each thread of reasoning in this culture will allow us to 
explain and understand the range and character of Scotland’s soft authoritarian 
prison transformation. 
First, the view of the rational subjectivity of the prisoner changed. Paternalistic 
liberalism denied that most prisoners were capable of well-reasoned thinking. 
Instead, those in the Prison Division had viewed prisoners as inherently irrational, 
and responded to them as erratic and unpredictable. The Division therefore sought 
to control male prisoners physically, using rudimentary behavioural techniques and 
physical punishment. The view of neo-paternal liberalism accepted that prisoners 
manifested at least a degree of rationality, and credited them with the potential for 
self-control and responsibility. In taking seriously the need to improve the 
mainstream prisons, SPS were taking seriously the rationality of the ‘prisoners’ 
voice’, which they believed the Division had not previously respected: ‘That the 
prisoners’ voice was a legitimate voice in the change process’ (William).  Archive 
material shows that senior officials were self-consciously transforming the 
understanding of the prisoners’ capacity for rationality: 
‘I know that many of you will find this a challenge but it is fundamental 
to what the paper is about; substituting some phrase such as “a person 
who is capable of acting responsibly” may encourage people to duck the 
issue. The point is that we believe that the prisoner is a person who is 
responsible for his actions and who should be encouraged to act 
responsibly, then it follows that we must believe that he is a responsible 
person’ (HH57/2112).  
In viewing the prisoner as such, and constituting him as responsible in the new 
interventions, SPS now had a new site to work upon; namely, prisoners’ perceived 
rationality as a means to shape prison order. As Garland has written, by ‘assuming 
the reality’ of the prisoner to be responsible and rational, ‘the authorities begin to 
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give substance to it, projecting it on to live men and women’ (1997:190). 
Second, the straight managerial dimensions of Scotland’s evolving political culture 
should be clear and, thus, it should be similarly apparent that the changes occurring 
in Scotland reflected those taking place elsewhere in the British Government. Such 
as being effective, technocratic, encouraging entrepreneurship, reorganising the civil 
service to mimic private sector businesses, and developing an evidence-based policy 
portfolio. These particular views on the role of government were reflected in 
abundance in the many accounts from the interviewees, were evident in the framing 
of the new SPS documents, and the very creation of SPS as an organisation first, and 
the active pursuit to establish it as an agency. The Scottish case of penal 
transformation clearly demonstrates how managerialist ideas and practices were 
quickly and eagerly embraced in the governance of Scottish prisons.  
Thirdly, this managerialist transformation should be seen as a distinct Scottish 
transformation, and not just an instance of new managerialism identical to any other 
(McEvoy 2001; O’Malley 1992; Pollitt 1990; Loader and Mulcahy 2003; Garland 
2001). After the prison disturbances and the crisis inside the Prison Division, the 
pre-existing consent that formerly seemed certain unravelled. From 1989 until the 
mid-1990s, the senior prison administrators were seeking a return to an equilibrium 
by reorganising the most provocative and inciting aspects of their rule – 
managerialism provided the tools for that project.  There was no protest and angst 
around the implementation of new public management and signature Conservative 
policies in Scottish prisons – as there had been when it was grafted onto other areas 
of Scottish social provision. People in the penal state were high-spirited and jubilant 
about the managerial transformation in Scottish imprisonment regimes and its 
supporting governmental processes. This is because it appealed to their fears 
summoned up by the events of the prisoner riots. Actively pursuing the new public 
management agenda bestowed SPS with the power and a complete set of ideational 




The enthusiastic embrace of managerial ideas in Scottish penal culture reflects the 
desperation and anxiety which had over taken the Division. The trauma of the riots 
left people feeling vulnerable about the prison as a workplace. The prison service 
was all too acutely aware of its own fragility as a public and political institution. The 
language of the customer, the new business motifs and the orderly outlook 
safeguarded the organisation against future vulnerability. As the Director of SPS 
remarked in the 1990-91 Prison Report: ‘Prisons will always be potentially volatile 
but I believe that the more professional we become at managing the Service, the less 
violence will occur’ (p.3). By being more proactive and managerial, SPS were 
seeking out forms of safety and protection as much as managerial efficiency, 
according to the next Chief Executive of SPS (Frizzell 1993). Undoubtedly the 
efficient management of the prison system was bound up with what was going on 
in British politics. The new managerial systems and evidence-based penal 
stratagems, as they emerged in relation to Scottish prisons, converted the view of 
surviving the present into a long-term vision of a thriving organisation; it gave 
people a renewed sense of order and certitude. Ken illustrated this with the starkest 
imagery, likening the prison work to a concentration camp:  
it was ‘a concentration camp almost, where you are absolutely running 
everything. You really needed to get a position where it was relaxed and 
as stable as possible’. 
 Stability was what they aspired to, it could restore security. The life of a person 
working in and on prisons could be more relaxed, rather than rigidly disciplining 
and violently controlling prisons and prisoners. 
Similarly, prison research liberated them from the unpredictability of experiential 
know-how with the facts of evidence. Risk indicators gave SPS a view into the 
future; responsibility, compiling personal prisoner dossiers, and mainstreaming 
were also anticipatory technologies (O’Malley 2010b:488). These modes of 
imprisonment provided SPS with new controls to prevent future disorder and 
disarray. Responsibilisation and the ‘techniques of the self’, such as sentence 
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planning, allowed SPS to ‘optimize autonomous subjects’ as a means to prevent 
‘potentially traumatic futures’ (ibid.).60 They stated this quite explicitly in 
Opportunity and Responsibility:  
‘It is, however, to be hoped that as the other developments in this 
document are introduced, there may be less need for prisoners to have 
to resort to the grievance system’ (SPS 1990a:33).  
 
Literally, management were intent on reducing the prisoner’s desire or need to take 
a stance against the system.  
 
The perceived inherent danger in the prison population was replaced by a 
measurable, preventable and unemotional organisational capacity to cope. 
Delightedly reporting the success of this era of transformation, Douglas stated that 
imprisonment ‘had become stable, no riots, you know… I’m proud of the way we 
created a service that could cope’. Responsibility as an organising concept reflected 
‘a logic of resiliency’, which, according to Lentzos and Rose: 
‘implies a systematic, widespread, organizational, structural and 
personal strengthening of subjective and material arrangements so as to 
be better able to anticipate and tolerate disturbances in complex worlds 
without collapse, to withstand shocks, and to rebuild as necessary 
(Lentzos and Rose 2009:243 in O’Malley 2010b).  
 
 
In addition, the new responsible prisoner-customer criteria and objective pro forma 
of performance measures allowed SPS to begin the de-dramatization of the Scottish 
prison system. Loader and Mulcahy describe a similar transformation in English 
police governance (that took place at the same time) as rendering it ‘profane’:  
‘to make the police profane; no different from any other public 
bureaucracy, and able, like them, to learn from organizations that have to 
compete and survive in the marketplace’ (2003:289).  
 
																																																						
60 Responsibility as a technique of preparedness differs from probabilistic techniques of risk calculation, because 
‘Probabilistic risk is a threat-specific technique of harm minimization. Preparedness on the other hand involves the 




But for Scotland, the motifs of managerialism were less about surviving the 
marketplace, concerned instead with the distribution of a stabilising effect across 
prison life, which had been marked by chronic chaos.  
 
Fourth, a vital source of change that helps explain the particularly positive glow 
around managerialism and penal change (McAra 1999) was the desire to implant a 
distinctly Scottish identity in the penal system. There was something amoral 
(O’Malley 1992) in how SPS conducted itself and treated prisoners. But when 
interviewees recalled this time, their stories were also charged with the nationalism 
which had been mobilised in response to the Tory policies of the 1980s. Interviewees 
were appalled by Thatcher. Discussing these feelings about Thatcher, Philip stated 
that the difference lay at the level of values: ‘She made some terrible decisions, and 
her value system was just wrong’. 
Showing the overlap between these anti-Thatcher sentiments and the positive 
Scottish managerialist motivations, Douglas, who had commended the Next Steps 
policy document, described Thatcher’s influence as totally ‘toxic’, dividing Scotland 
from England:  
‘The Tories in Scotland tended to be gentry, to be from the country. They 
tended not to be card sharps and corner boys that became the Tories in 
the 1990s, dealers in the cities and were from Eaton. They were rather 
different here…the Thatcher years, which were toxic because she was a 
south-east England posh lady and anybody with that type of accent 
doesn’t go down well here.’ 
Douglas’s statement conforms to what Mitchell and Bennie described as source of 
Scottish nationalism: a deep personal dislike of Thatcher, who was felt to personify 
‘anti-Scottish’ Westminster politics (1995:96). 
Alistair described the Scottish penal changes in contrast to England, with an abiding 
sense of stability and penal betterment in Scotland: ‘It worked quite well, and quite 
different from England and Wales, and [they’re] in crisis now and in contrast to 
here’. Yet, at the same time Scotland’s prison rates exceeded those of England and 
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Wales, a point often footnoted or side-lined in history (e.g. Cavadino and Dignan 
2006:n111; Hamilton 2013, 2014b) and in memory. The object of penal reform 
around this time was not so much concerned with reducing the number of people in 
prison, which in fact continued to expand throughout the 1990s, rising to a daily 
average of 6000 prisoners by 1998. The penal reforms SPS enacted gave a new 
discursive life to the distinctly Scottish prison. A penal shift that was a reflection of 
the contemporary ‘neo-nationalist sentiment’, which McLennan described as 
forming an image of ‘New Scotland’ in the collective consciousness, representing 
‘the historical consolidation of a coherent and distinctive national civic culture of 
progressive pluralism’ (2006:592). This was occurring elsewhere in the Scottish 
Office, which also found ways to embed an image of national distinction in Scottish 
governmental departments, described by McEwan (2002:72) as a ‘tartanisation’ of 
the Scottish government administration.  Douglas best summed-up the nationalist 
charge within Scottish penal cultural:  
‘During the 1990s we had the Tory government and we had people like 
Michael Howard in England preaching about prison works and all that 
stuff and a very right-wing agenda, and of course we weren’t quite 
following that here. We were trying to be a bit more evidence-based 
rather than politics based…Scotland didn’t like the Tory government. 
Scotland hates the Tories’. 
SPS’s actions affirmed a distinct way of doing things north of the border that was 
less right wing, it implied a cultural and political victory over Tory England. As 
commentators wrote at the time: ‘The perception that Scottish public attitudes were 
progressive as compared with 'Tory England' seems quite accurate’ (Mitchell and 
Bennie 1995:99). By improving prisons, anti-Thatcher views and growing nationalist 
sentiment found some practical expression. In its name and how its declared its 
rationale and penal intentions, the Scottish Prison Service communicated very 
clearly that it did not identify with the Conservatives and that there were alternative 
ways to govern Scotland. 
Fifth, to explain the high levels of control and intervention which continued to 
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pattern Scottish imprisonment regimes in the 1990s, we also have to look beyond 
the amoral institutional language and optimistic nationalist bent, to the enduring 
sense of dangerousness and dysfunction. Yes, many SPS officials believed prisoners 
could be trained as responsible, giving life to those ideas in their programmes. The 
traits and subjectivities that supported these perceptions of the prisoner, however, 
remained rooted in the earlier period preceding the 1990s (outlined in Chapter 
Eight). As Mary Douglas (1992:46) reminds us, risk is never separable from the idea 
of danger and hence blame. For example, SPS conducted research on their various 
prisoner groups, such as drug addiction and personality disorders (McManus 1994; 
Power et al 1994; Shewan et al 1994; SPS 1995b). The survey was also a means to 
monitor the temperature of prisons, and performance measures were used to keep a 
close eye on levels of prisoner assaults and escapes. SPS never fully relinquished 
their visions of prisoner disorder, dysfunction and threat. These concerns were 
overlaid with more attentive objective measures, research and focused reports. 
These, in turn, contributed to SPS’s sense of resilience and identity as an amoral 
public service, detached from the penal fears of the past. That ‘cultural sterility’ 
(Simon and Feeley 1995) dulled, but did not entirely dissipate the aura of disorder 
around the prisons. This helps explain why SPS avoided, as Douglas suggested they 
purposefully did, the language of rehabilitation. The cultural ideas which also 
informed the understanding of a prisoner’s personhood were largely consistent 
across this period from 1970. Consequently, this embedded, though largely implicit 
and unacknowledged, anxiety maintained a cap on the aspirations of their prison 
rhetoric and strategies, allowing SPS to avoid objectives and aims which would not 
undermine the efficiency of their new penal power. 
Sixth, a neo-paternal cultural current formed within SPS. While being overtly and 
publicly committed to managerialism, SPS still accepted its authoritarian role as a 
paternalistic social organisation. The soft authoritarianism qualities of the prison 
reflected how that paternalist streak evolved into a more refined cultural form. 
Crewe defines neo-paternalistic thinking as an:  
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‘almost protective support, stopping the prisoner from succumbing to 
inertia and preventing him from making hasty or uninformed decisions, 
while steering and inducing him towards ‘sensible options’ (as defined 
by the authorities), providing opportunities, and appealing to his ‘better 
self’ (Crewe 2009).  
For SPS, containment and discipline remained their aim, but neo-paternalist 
thinking relies on a more civilised approach to achieve authoritarian penal ends. In 
line with this neo-paternal cultural landscape, SPS reformed the reasoning behind 
even the most inexcusable prison practices. Segregation was now ‘small units’, 
aimed at achieving normalisation, not exclusion (though segregation was still what 
small units did). Use of the small units was now for the prisoners’ own good, 
backed up by official reviews and policy (SPS 1990b; SPS 1994). Neo-paternal 
thinking was also evident in how SPS rationalised their use of penal power and 
prison interventions. SPS encouraged prisoners to work upon themselves, through 
cognitive behavioural programmes and attending to their dossiers.  Similarly, 
improving the mainstream facilities further demonstrated SPS’s more magnanimous 
approach to achieving their ends of containment and control. Reflecting this, Adam 
– recalling from his position inside the new SPS – somewhat glibly described the 
combination of care and control as ‘do-goody’ practices. But these were sensible 
choices: giving prisoners more rational prison interventions gave SPS improved 
control over prisoner behaviour:  
‘In the events at that time we formed a mission statement of the prison 
service, and there had to be order, that’s the first. Order, 100%, that’s 
your job. You can’t do anything unless it’s orderly. You do have to take 
care of them, you have to feed them…[that’s] why we get personal 
officers, why we get sentence planning and all that do-goody stuff. And 
we have control’. 
 
These features constituted Scottish neo-paternalistic liberalism and help explain the 
decisions SPS made regarding the uses and objectives of imprisonment regimes. Yet, 
I aver a caution against too positive a reading of this period of change. That is 
because the nature of the penal reform that took place in Scotland was a civilising 
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transformation, rather than a humanitarian one. Scottish civilising penal reforms 
were not about making prisons more humane, but reflected a ‘a new configuration 
of power, knowledge and bodies’ (Garland 1990a:223; Elias 1978; Foucault 1977). 
Civilising Scottish punishment was about winning back management’s ruling 
prestige and returning the prison to some form of acceptability and predictability, 
while reducing the quotient of violence. In confronting their prison problems, an 
embarrassment also crept in among the SPS professional managers, who expressed 
an open discomfort at the physicality and brutality of Scottish imprisonment. As 
shown above, interviewees felt uncomfortable when faced with the bodily aspects of 
prison, the segregation and dehumanising nature of the regime.  Euan recalled it 
now as something despicable and inexcusable. Looking back, he felt what he 
described as a  
‘horrible kind of, this impression of grey, they [prisoners] ate off tin 
plates… And they had sex offenders sewing mail bags. It was grim, 
absolutely grim…I know that sounds bad, and when I look back no one 
was interested in these and what was going on in these places’.  
They had seen it, but and had not always acknowledged the prison was dismal and 
sometimes inhumane. By the end of the 1980s, in Scottish prisons, ‘forms of cruelty 
that had once gone unquestioned’ were increasingly hard to justify (Halttunuen 
1995:303). These realisations had clear benefits for the prisoners: improved food and 
visiting facilities, better clothing, and access to a complaints commissioner. The 
prison system itself was more accountable and publicly opposed to the summary 
punishment of segregation and other kinds of prison cruelty.  
However, while there was a ‘diminution in the gratuitous suffering’ imposed upon 
prisoners (Morris 1966:628), a humanitarian shift in penal sensibilities would have 
curtailed the very act of inflicting imprisonment (Halttunen 1995); making the 
imposition of harsh punishment unacceptable (Garland 2013:148). What happened 
in Scotland was not a reduction in the use of the prison, but a concealment of its 
penal pains and a refinement of its forms of oppression. Both Adam and Douglas 
outlined the spirit of the change as humane, but their pairing it with terms of 
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‘efficient’ and ‘evidence-based’ reveals a concern for preventing penal impropriety 
rather than preventing penal pain: 
Adam: [We] ‘made policy a bit more humane, a bit more efficient’. 
 
Douglas: ‘I would say sensible, I would say humane, I would say 
evidence-based and legal…From the 1990s on [prison] civil servants 
were more enlightened’. 
The civilising desires of Scottish neo-paternalistic liberalism were more ambivalent 
about the infliction of pain, not doubting its necessity, but appalled by its brutality 
and vivid existence. Managerialism and mainstreaming were part of this civilising 
process, making the administration of prisons dispassionate; both ‘offered a variety 
of narrative strategies designed to distance’ SPS ‘from any imputation’ of barbarism 
and prison brutality (Halttunen 1995:328). The civilising reforms that took place 
instead created a more palatable modern form of imprisonment. Implementing the 
ideas of rationality and opportunity made prisoners more visible and accountable 
for their progress. If prisoners failed inside the mainstream, the blame must rest 
with them and not SPS, who offered prisoners a programme of positive 
engagements. Segregation was also made more sensitive to the demands of penal 
civility. What they expressed was an unease and embarrassment about the prison’s 
excessive force, but not about its aims, social function or stigmatising practices. 
These ‘Civilised sensibilities might be best understood as an aesthetic of refinement, 
delicacy, and self-restraint’, they ‘reduce the sight of pain’, but not ‘its infliction’ 
(Garland 2010:150).  
There were few traces of humanitarian sensibilities, such as an increased empathy, 
or social identification with the plight of the prisoner or their life trajectories, 
poverty and background. The BSU, for example, was a more humane prison. It 
reduced the use of penal pain, acknowledged prisoners as people and was managed 
with greater discretion. The Unit, however, offended the sensibilities of many senior 
SPS officials, it transgressed a civilised system. The BSU, as William 
contemptuously described it, ‘was sending mixed signals to the system’. Douglas 
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described people there, the way they looked, and how they conducted themselves, 
as ‘outrageous’, too lurid to go into detail – though he was quite clearly hinting at 
the fact that BSU prisoners were allowed to have private visits in their cell and that 
sex had become an ‘open secret’ of the BSU (Bottomley 1994:27). How could a 
prison system that strived for a more rationalised form maintain this peculiar, even 
deviant, experimental outlier – and one which appeared to have abandoned 
civilised order? The closing of the BSU epitomises how the civilising agenda was 
privileged at the expense of more humane penal reforms. 
This civilising and neo-paternalistic reinvention was as much a strategic 
transformation in penal power, ‘an arrangement that gains more by concealing’ its 
‘violence than by showing’ it (Garland 2010:146). It is likely that the cumulative 
impact of prisoner disturbances, political and public criticism and demands for 
greater governmental accountability, pierced the inertia which had surrounded 
prisons in the 1970s and early 1980s in Scotland. Confronted by the public 
unravelling of their legitimacy, SPS sought to civilise both the prisons along with 
the prisoners, and in so doing also rehabilitate the image of Scottish penal power. 
Like so much new governance, there was transformation at the level of rhetoric and 
policy products. Often it was ‘more a matter of words, than deeds’ in which similar 
policies, perceived to have failed, were publically and authoritatively re-packaged 
(Muncie 1990:64). The ideas of Opportunity and Responsibility were inherently 
civilised. SPS took opportunities away, they removed the opportunity for prisoners 
to dissent, and soft authoritarian imprisonment employed control techniques which 
relied directly on the ‘pains of self-government’ and psychological assessment 
(Crewe 2011b). Hence the Scottish prison ‘dialectic of liberty and discipline’ 
(Vaughn 2000:80) became more cultivated, control became subtler. These civilising 
reforms, a product of the neo-paternalistic political culture, successfully renewed 
the prisons’ institutional purpose: to confine efficiently and effectively. These acts 
reinforced SPS’s newly established authority, making the organisation’s civilised 
sensibilities publicly clear.   
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In addition, defining themselves in contrast to England also gave the impression of 
penal culture in Scotland as more humane. But in Scotland, while senior SPS 
managers became averse to overt and indecent prison control, their neo-
paternalistic liberalism ethos maintained the prisons central place within the social 
field. Those new performance management techniques and declarations of civilised 
penal sensibilities entrenched the prison as the terminus for deadbeats and the 
dangerous. Philip reflected on this time of ‘sensible and humane’ penal reform, but 
wondered why the use of the prison continued to expand. The demand for the 
prison was still driven by the fault of the prisoners: 
‘The thing is, bringing down the prison population is so difficult. I think 
it probably shouldn’t be thought of, thinking back on it, as an end in 
itself. You do need some people in prison, very dangerous ones, and 
therefore it’s making sure you’re using it sparingly, and we didn’t 
manage to solve that. I think that’s a pity, but a lot of people were 
interested in doing that, trying to have less use of prison, and that in 
a  sense is a failure. But the whole system, but it’s not as if we had a little 
down we could turn....the very difficult problem, the continuing 
offender, which drives quite a lot of it’. 
 
SPS never lost their faith in the use or justification for confinement, nor challenged 
the sociological forces which caused crime. The prison remained extensive, because 
it had to; the prison still had to deal with those people who were dangerous and 
those who simply would not stop: ‘what do you do with the people that carry on?’ 
(Philip). The answer was not social welfare, but prison. Scottish imprisonment 
regimes continued to perpetuate the social distance between society and the 
prisoner, but now those practices were more professional, efficient and presented in 
profane language. Without the tenets of social justice or aims of penal welfare, the 
transformation that took place by the 1990s in Scotland was that the exclusionary 
prison was made amoral, riven with liberal rationality, civilised and neo-
paternalistic; thus, its forms of pain became more deniable. The prison was 
redeemed, appearing civilised rather than punitive, communicating an impression 
of Scottish penal superiority. The historical and mythopoeic narrative of Scottish 
prisons and pre-devolution penal welfarism, which has classified Scotland’s more 
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virtuous place in the Anglophone historical imagination, has as its source the 




This chapter has shown how the civilising sensibilities, nationalist distinctions, 
benevolent authoritarianism, managerialism, visions of entrepreneurial citizens and 
rational prisoners, constituted a new Scottish governmental disposition of neo-
paternalist liberalism. The political culture in the penal state had adapted in this 
way in response to the problems of prison disorder, and as a consequence of the 
diverging trajectories of British and Scottish politics. As this political culture took 
hold it provided the ideas which transformed the institutional structure of prison 
administration and allowed SPS to transform the character of the imprisonment 
regimes. SPS recognised the limits of reactive administration and unfettered 
discipline and control. Imprisonment regimes were to be made less archaic and 
shameful, but also less chaotic. The changes in the prison system, the new 
techniques of control, prisoner auditing, mainstreaming and normalisation, were 
conditioned by Scottish political culture.  
The changes in Scottish penal culture described in this chapter could be seen as a 
case of total penal metamorphosis, a swing of the pendulum (Goodman et al 2016). 
But researching these changes historically and from the political perspective that 
generated and supported these changes – and following the interpretation provided 
in the preceding two chapters – allows for a more nuanced assessment. Key actors 
in the SPS at that time were deliberately, through their documents, name change, 
agency status and new rules and procedures purposefully demonstrating a root-
and-branch penal transformation – that was the intended effect. The image of 
transformation was precisely what they wanted to express: Scottish imprisonment 
has (1) had a break with the past and all of its inherent dangers and incivilities; and 
(2) a separation from British political ideology. The desire for resilience and 
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preparedness begins to explain the particularly enthusiastic managerialist overhaul 
of Scottish imprisonment and penal state. These methods of governing were 
politically tactical and instrumental. But they were also contingent; a means of 
redress for Scottish prison disorder, a system of governing that provided a complete 
framework to diagnose their previously intractable management problems and 
provided an effective route out of their trauma. But the creation of SPS and the 
determined series of reforms inaugurated were also intended to put a distinctly 
Scottish stamp on Scottish prison matters and to assert that when it came to penal 
matters and Conservative policy there was no comity within Britain.  
Imprisonment and political culture in Scotland was adapted to the changing 
political context and in response to acute prison problems, but consistent with the 
historical findings in Chapters Eight and Nine, prisoners in Scotland in the 1990s 
remained entrenched outwith society. The prison’s intrinsic social function as a 
secure site in which to contain and exclude those social nuisances and public threats 
remained steadfast. It is this combination of political and cultural forces that 
allowed the contradiction in Scottish imprisonment to prevail in the 1990s. A penal 
system that has been lauded for its humanitarian and welfarist values (McAra 1999, 
2005; Croall 2006; Tata 2010) but continued to imprison people in greater numbers, 
subject to greater penal controls. With its new institutional forms, dispassionate 
management style and civilizing reforms, SPS upheld and redeemed Scotland’s 












This thesis has sought to explore, historically and comparatively, the political and 
social dynamics of imprisonment in Ireland and Scotland during the second half of 
the twentieth century.  It has examined how punishment differs between 
neighbouring jurisdictions in ways both obvious and less immediately perceptible. 
The thesis has sought to demonstrate that divergences in Irish and Scottish penal 
culture were the result of differences in collective morality, social order and political 
culture, which found institutionalised form in the functions of the prison system. 
 
To conclude I want to suggest four points about the benefits of this approach. First, I 
want to suggest how the thesis contributes to comparative penology by developing 
a conceptual framework. Second, this account questions the dominant narratives for 
the history of penal politics in Ireland and Scotland. Third, the thesis queries the 
prevailing generalities concerning the punitive turn and Irish and Scottish penal 
exceptionalism. Fourth, having studied penal culture in Ireland and Scotland 
historically provides the potential to open up new spaces of ideas and more 
searching considerations for humane penal reform in these countries. 
 
 
Implications for Comparative Penology 
 
A contribution of this thesis is a more grounded comparative research framework 
for penality, which is an empirically engaged kind of comparative strategy which 
transcends ‘sheer description or empirical generalization’ (Merton 1968:39). This 
framework provides conceptual and methodological tactics which can recover the 
phenomenology of penal politics, trace their effects on the systems of imprisonment, 
connect these practices back to wider social structures and in doing so allow us to 
explain differences in cross-national penality. Comparison is complex, and this 
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approach is labour-intensive, but entirely feasible, and in my view, hugely 
beneficial in terms of conceptual development and sociological research.   
 
I have presented the cases of Ireland and Scotland as two separate narratives, in 
order not to violate the historical integrity of each, but neither the descriptions nor 
the analyses could have been reached without the benefit of continuous 
comparative reflection. While penal culture, imprisonment and the political ethos 
that undergirded it, was certainly different in Ireland and Scotland, as is evident in 
the empirical detail, the thesis examined these issues comparatively in the belief that 
such a perspective could teach us more generally about punishment and penal 
politics. The dialectic between empirical research, thematic analysis and comparison 
provides a vantage point from which to observe the characteristic patterns that 
political culture and imprisonment regimes exhibit. The analytical benefits of 
comparison were that the patterns observed in one place provided reciprocal insight 
on its counterpart, which provided deeper analysis of the material and also 
contributed to the framework for comparative research.  
 
A central aim of this thesis was to develop a more politically insightful comparative 
criminology. It was in the course of the comparative research process of speaking to 
people, reading archives and documents that a different vision of political work and 
intention began to emerge. As noted in Chapter Three, political culture is embedded 
in social relations and practices, it is not ‘merely’ ideological or institutional. The 
penal state here was viewed as a sociological, cultural and ideological space forged 
within a distinct social order, with a sense of its own limitations, rendering it more 
plural in its meanings and intentions, and grounded in the everyday business of 
ruling. Governments may rely on a distinct, and sometimes detached, 
organisational and policy language which is not often part of our lay discourse. We 
should not, however, overstate government’s detachment from the social space it 




As we saw in Sections Two and Three, what officials (and the departments in which 
they worked) did was always entwined with a narrative of why they did it, their 
collective and personal mores, moral standards and ideational commitments. 
Government officials drew on their views regarding the nature of governmental 
responsibility and their political vision of the nation, which gave a distinctly 
political rationale to their penal decision-making. Aspirations for the penal system 
and penal politics were also tempered by a felt sense of the constraints of 
government and the limits of the prison therein. Civil servants spoke of prisoners as 
certain kinds of people, construed in these very capacious ways. Prisoners were felt 
to be deserving and/or undeserving, responsible or understandable, and these 
accounts were attached to often-vivid causal social back-stories of how prisoners 
came to be imprisoned. These descriptions variously invoked allusive disquietude, 
genuine empathy and intense disgust. Prisoners were understood as being drawn 
from distinct social places, communities and families, each of which in turn exposed 
broader social judgements. Prisoners’ criminal acts were always framed by 
preponderant but patterned understandings of their moral, social and political 
causes and consequences. The problems of crime were rarely reflected upon as 
dispassionate statistics – if crime was going up or going down that brought new 
anxieties or welcome relief, but it could also be dismissed, depending on the 
circumstances. Crime then had a more descriptive and cultural character, as 
bothersome, merely a nuisance and implicitly excusable. Or alternatively, crime, 
criminality and violence were described with dismay, as something grave, 
threatening and potentially socially destructive. These political cultural fault lines – 
evident in the digressionary talk, the narrative framing of reports and archival 
material – were attached to each and every government decision, choice and 
struggle. 
 
Because of the nature of political culture, and its centrality to how the power to 
imprison was deployed, certain kinds of prison intervention would have been 
utterly inappropriate for them, the Government, to undertake – it was truly 
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unthinkable. Interventions which may have been routine in one country were 
judged to be beyond the capacity of their prison system to achieve – such ideas 
required rethinking in this context, to fit their political ethos. In Scotland, for 
example, addressing overcrowding by developing prison amnesties such as the 
Irish did, with TR and shedding, would have been out of the question. Scottish 
prisoners were perceived as social outsiders, dehumanised in the eyes of the penal 
state. Their perceived criminal proclivities and social immorality rendered them too 
risky or unworthy of more inclusive systems of release. In Ireland, in the 1970s to 
the 1980s, the kind of exclusionary and segregative long-term imprisonment 
characteristic of Scottish imprisonment regimes would have transgressed their view 
that the prison was inherently abnormal and should be curtailed where possible. 
The kinds of exclusionary imprisonment that developed in Ireland in the mid-1990s 
would have likely been entirely unpredictable to their predecessors. Those officials 
in the 1970s Irish penal state, who were enculturated in conservative pastoralism, 
were encouraged to draw on their well of tolerant, indulgent and humanitarian 
sensibilities (Melossi 2001; Pavarini 1994; Garland 2010); overt punitive sentiments 
which shaped the later political culture of sovereign authority would have been 
grossly out of place in the earlier epoch. The character of Irish political culture in the 
1990s, particularly its expressive punitive sensibilities, however, would have felt 
almost forbidden within the governing political culture that developed in Scotland 
at around the same time. Scottish neo-paternalistic liberalism privileged a profane, 
amoral and bureaucratic approach to punishment, and developed a distaste for the 
less civilised penal rhetoric and prison practices. The actions of officials were also 
laced with ambivalent feelings, fears and sympathies about the character of crime 
and narratives of social inclusion/exclusion. Rehabilitation in Scotland was seen as 
veering towards the fanciful, particularly given the characteristics of the Scottish 
prisoner. Industry and utility were promoted as the best alternative to welfarism. 
While in Ireland, rehabilitation was deconstructed so that it fit better with the 
pastoral demands of Irish political culture: supporting the sanctity of family and 
community. In Ireland, the open prisons were developed with a view to developing 
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communal and social bonds of trust with the prisoners; Scotland’s open 
establishments (and the regime of progression to get there) hoped to implant liberal 
rationality in prisoners’ behavioural frameworks. Scottish prisoners were to learn 
the art of self-government, Irish prisoners were to feel a sense of collective 
belonging. As such, political motivations of the penal state were in part tempered 
and determined by a visceral diagnosis of the personhood of prisoners (be it 
socially, culturally and in terms of their criminality). These cultural sensibilities and 
political mentalities helped define understandings of problems, the refinement of 
solutions, and legitimated penal choices and carceral plans. The concept of political 
culture used throughout was developed in response to these intricate webs of 
meaning and ideation, and how they appeared to operate in guiding thinking, 
habits and actions of actors inside Irish and Scottish penal states.  
 
The comparative perspective forced me to rethink and reconsider the prison’s forms 
and characteristic features and how they are researched in comparative study. 
Prison systems may vary in their depth and moderation between jurisdictions, but 
within each of these national systems of incarceration it is very likely that there is 
also different kinds of settings, spaces and programmatic interventions. But its 
institutional heterogeneity has an underlying dynamic which orders it. The prison 
works upon people to seek certain ends. The prison teaches, trains and utilises 
prisoners. An imprisonment regime is designed to move prisoners through, in-and-
out and around the prison system in ways that will accord with its penal, political 
and social fears and desires. By concentrating on only the exceptional uses of 
imprisonment, the volume of people in prison, the quality of prison architecture or 
physical conditions, we frequently overlook the forms and functions which give 
national imprisonment its characteristic style.  
 
I required more precise and consistent ways to map and describe national prison 
systems so that we can make better comparative judgements and assessments of the 
prisons systemic character. But in so doing, the researcher must be open to 
	
351 
imprisonment’s positive possibilities and intentions, and be willing to see prison as 
both punishing and remedial, hurting but potentially healing, pacifying people but 
also seeking to develop them. In demonstrating that specific differences in 
imprisonment regimes were the result of political culture I hope to have moved 
towards ‘bringing politics back in’ (O’Malley 2000:162) to our understandings of 
comparative penality 
 
This kind of situated and in-depth governmental and cultural line of inquiry into 
penal politics has rarely been pursued in comparative criminology. By focusing on 
political culture in particular, and in this grounded manner, I have sought to avoid 
some of the essentialist national models of culture that are common in comparative 
penology. To say: Europeans are more egalitarian (Whitman 2003); Anglophone 
countries more punitive (Tonry 2007b); Nordic nations have a greater sense of 
fairness (Pratt and Eriksson 2013); or the Scots are more civically minded (Hamilton 
2014b), depicts punishment and penal politics as the product of national habit. 
Culture in these accounts is instead seen as embedded and unchanging – inherited 
and perpetuated by each new generation. These explanations are too broad to offer 
comparative explanation for heterogeneous imprisonment regimes, and too 
detached to describe the plurality of working political cultures. In Ireland and 
Scotland, the very distinct cultural motifs, mores and political ideologies shaped 
forms of incarceration that were both humane and exclusionary. In the short period 
of just less than 30 years, the currents of Irish and Scottish political culture shifted 
and adapted to the changing world around them. Change in the uses of 
imprisonment and the form of the penal state were the material results of these 
developments. Therefore, to depict penality in terms which relate to essential 
national cultures appear ahistorical, has an ambiguous social location and 
deterministic in comparison (Swidler 2001:188-189). To comparatively explain 
penality, culture is an essential component. If we are to add a cultural dimension to 
the study of penal practices and comparative politics of imprisonment, then it needs 
to be based on grounded findings. The precise nature of those visceral cultural 
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forms, moral judgements and political ideologies must be researched in relation to 
the actual penal practices, and the historical context and events which produced it. 
 
Historical Sociology of Punishment 
 
This study began without a clear sense of what it anticipated finding because it was 
firstly about historical recovery. The grounded and interpretive research agenda 
was intent on capturing the past in its own terms. It sought to follow the shifting 
forms, practices, meanings and discursive patterns entailed in the deployment of the 
power to imprison in Ireland and Scotland across almost 30 years. Interviewing 
provided new insight into the work of government. Archives and documents as 
monuments of the politically momentous and the mundane illuminated the texture 
of meanings and the understanding of the prison problem. Secondary material 
yielded extended insight into social relations which informed the particular 
character of penal politics and thus imprisonment. This kind of mixed research 
approach has rarely been undertaken before in the study of the history of Irish and 
Scottish penal politics or in comparative penology.  
 
The histories presented here are chronological, often immersive and employ a 
narrative form. It is hoped that having done so they achieve certain historical and 
analytical ends. Perhaps, from now on, to speak about the contemporary history of 
punishment and penal politics in Ireland and Scotland will be to call on analytical 
descriptions of two places that developed distinct kinds of imprisonment which 
reflected the contingent social order, political process, cultural norms and historical 
events in each country. To have been imprisoned in Ireland and Scotland in the 
1970s were two very different fates. In Scotland we saw that the logic of exclusion 
defined the imprisonment regime in two ways. Internally it excluded those not 
willing to succumb to the utility or docility the prison demanded, and sociologically 
the prison was for those who should be excluded from daily civic life. 
Contrastingly, in Ireland release and permeability in the early period worked to 
enforce a prisoner’s place in society, particularly their communities and families. 
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Thus their social exclusion was less complete than their Scottish counterparts, 
whose social exile and stigma were encompassing. But as the fault lines of Irish and 
Scottish social and political life evolved in tandem with a sequence of practical 
events – such as the rising of crime, prison disorder, prison overcrowding, social 
modernisation, political evolution – the respective political cultures which governed 
prisons began to change.  As these social changes were realised in the values which 
constituted political culture, they in turn brought new meanings, social demands 
and political rationalities to bear upon the practices of imprisonment. The prisons 
and the penal state were modified so as to express these new social orders, cultural 
meanings and political sentiments.  
 
Ireland began to modernise. What had been in the 1970s the weakening of Church 
social regulation accelerated in the 1990s when the Church had to accept its 
diminishment. Ireland urbanised. It became more socially unequal as social 
relations polarised. As a result, Irish conservatism developed a more exclusionary 
and adversarial outlook and pastoralism became marginalised. The state was seen 
as more sovereign, facing greater demands for political responsibility. In Ireland, 
pastoral conservatism was replaced by sovereign authority. The extension of the 
prison’s punitive capacities that followed, allowed the government to express a new 
authority over a changing Ireland, and to exert control in the face of the social 
fragility brought on by rapid change. This account considerably advances what we 
know about the history of Irish imprisonment and political culture in this period 
and the nature of the penal transformation that took place.  
 
For those who have fully imbibed the story of Scottish penality as a paragon of 
welfarism, the case presented here may come as a startling counter-narrative. Prison 
in Scotland was mundane. But also inflicted pain and worked to exclude problem 
citizens – those who were diagnosed as socially, psychologically and morally 
beyond hope, help and good citizenship – governed and maintained by Scotland’s 
paternalistic liberalism throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, with its anxious and 
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disdainful sensibilities. But this evolved into a more refined form, neo-paternalistic 
liberalism, in response to the changing moods in both British and Scottish politics. 
The emergence and coalition of these political ideas and identities provided new 
energy to address the prison and legitimacy crises that had developed in the 1980s.  
 
In putting forward these analyses this thesis has tried to faithfully recover the past. 
But in addition, and central to the aims of the thesis, there was a desire to develop a 
punishment and society project. In studying imprisonment, I have also learned 
about how Irish and Scottish society were organised, the conditions that made 
certain kinds of punishment possible and injected imprisonment with different 
cultural meanings and gave political ideas traction; what forces normalised the uses 
of punishment, what social relations and changes dramatized and problematized 
the use of penal authority. These broader insights help explain the micro-dynamics 
of penal politics and how they were transformed and reproduced. Chapters Five to 
Ten showed how punishment came to play an important role in the shape of Irish 
and Scottish social order, reinforcing a certain image of government and a particular 
vision of society. This modifies our historical understandings of the character of 
political culture and the uses of imprisonment in Ireland and Scotland, and 
providing new sources of explanation for both.  
 
Given the in-depth and qualitative nature of this study the thesis does not provide a 
neat ‘positivistic formula’, so often the conclusion of comparative research (Downes 
2011b:37), to take away and test. The combined methods generated fuller histories, 
which challenge some of the assumptions about government, punishment and penal 
change in Irish and Scottish penological history in particular. This kind of thick 
descriptive qualitative research ‘produces the detail that guarantees discovering 
differences, thus guarding against forcing the case to fit a theory or a previous case’ 
(Vaughn 2004:319). I hope therefore that these findings temper some of the over-
remembering and under-remembering that, I would argue, has become part of the 




Second, close analytical history can complicate the distinctions which suggest Irish 
and Scottish exceptionalism. When we have situated empirical accounts such as 
these we see local distinction but also familiar trends, which were often woven 
together in the same acts and declarations, such as rehabilitation, managerialism, 
zero tolerance. This adds weight to Girling et al’s (2001) study of crime sensibilities 
in which they found that understandings of crime and punishment are intertwined 
with ideas and meanings which are both regional and global. This evidenced 
finding makes it more difficult to describe Ireland or Scotland as somehow 
exceptional because neither country was ever entirely beyond the reach, or fully 
resisted, the emergence of Anglophone political and penal trends from 1970 until 
the 1990s. This insight also obliges us to rethink the kind of crude insider/outsider 
patterns which inform how we describe exceptional penality. It is hoped that at the 
very least Ireland and Scotland can no longer be set to one side, or reduced to a 
dismissive footnote in the contemporary history of Anglophone penality. 
 
Third, in taking this historical, sociological and comparative approach, the thesis 
findings problematize some of the understandings of Ireland and Scotland’s 
experience of the ‘punitive turn’. Across Sections Two and Three we observed the 
trajectory of two penal transformations. Ireland’s penal transformation was 
negative, while the Scottish one presented a much more positive story. The 
historical and sociological lens allow us to probe those claims further, however. 
Viewing penality within its historical-social context, illuminated a clear and sharp 
punitive penal turn in Ireland that was in fact tied to more progressive and 
liberalising social change. Scotland’s positive penal reforms, on the other hand, 
were a civilising attempt to tame penal and political problems and better instil order 
within prisons and pacify prisoners. It was about the refinement of the prison’s 






Futures: Concluding Thoughts 
 
Fundamentally, the ambition of the ‘historically tutored memory’ (Nellis 2010) is to 
provide us with new possible ways to think about our futures. Cultural sensibilities, 
penal passions and social aspirations change over time, but they remain steadfastly 
features of political culture, whether openly evocative and public, sequestered away 
by de-politicised agencies, evidence-based or discretionary. These emotions and 
feelings are ever-present and were sources of both good and ill in the history of 
penal politics and imprisonment. Rather than seeking to tame or exclude them from 
our public life, or even to chase the belief that such an aspiration was feasible, we 
should seek to understand their logical frameworks and cultural supports. In doing 
so we may be better able to directly engage the core pillars, implied, denied and 
explicit, which maintain forms of imprisonment that otherwise might feel 
inexplicable and unjust. 
 
In addition, an historical memory of the specific travails of penal politics and 
imprisonment may help us develop a rapprochement between our knowledge of the 
past and our vision of the future. The fieldwork here, conducted as a study of social 
reproduction and change, shows that nothing is inevitable in how punishment is 
undertaken. In the case of Ireland, the 1970s, in terms of the culture of prison 
administration, was a very different place. It was less bureaucratic, though 
centralised and authoritarian, it also was motivated by more humane sensibilities. 
Officials were more sceptical of the prison, recognising its disintegrative affect on 
individuals and society. Using the prison to reduce re-offending was seen as too 
thin a mission to consider the complexity of people and the sociality of crime. But in 
the 1990s, Irish imprisonment was bereaved of much of its inherent permeability 
and its more pastoral aspirations were demoted – a pattern which persisted into the 
next decade (Brangan 2009; Rogan 2011). Understanding the change that happened 
this way makes the present look a little less triumphant, less like a victory of 
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strategic government over a neglectful and stagnant past (O’Donnell 2008; Rogan 
2016).  
 
Currently, however, Irish penal politics endeavours to envision a new future for 
imprisonment in a spirit of reform, seeking out ways to move the prison closer to 
strategic goals of consistency and reducing reoffending. But the government also 
aspire to have greater use of open prisons, community based sanctions (Department 
of Justice 2014) and new forms of ‘decarceration’ (Houses of the Oireachtas 2013). 
The Director General of the Irish Prison Service recently described the ambitions 
and the problems of Irish imprisonment: ‘we get these adult bodies that are actually 
empty and what we have to try and do is fill them back up. And usually the main 
ingredient is love; care and love, decency, respect’ (Donnellan 2014). In the current 
Irish climate of willingness for penal reform, and perhaps even willingness for a 
more pastoral kind of incarceration, we might pause and see the immediate history 
of Irish imprisonment and government as a source of its future improvement. We 
might argue that this humane outlook is indeed a return to something – not merely 
imagined but once in operation – that was not eradicated but marginalised and side-
lined for a period. This can be a source for the revivifying of a more sceptical and 
compassionate kind of imprisonment and penal politics, justified on the grounds of 
a collective sense of national well-being and the need to make a prison more 
humane. 
 
Scotland’s penal past was a more dismaying time. Crises and disturbances in 
prisons, such as those endured in Scotland in the 1980s, are not entirely rare (we are 
only too aware of names of prisons made familiar due to such disorder: 
Strangeways, Attica, San Quentin). But the crises that these events represent are 
rarely followed by the kind of progressive and programmatic change that occurred 
in Scotland. The organisational amendments brought about from 1990 were a 
process of redemption for Scottish imprisonment and the power to imprison, one 
which allowed for prison’s pain to be denied rather than undermined. In retrospect, 
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it seems that despite the rhetorical claims to penal reform, this was a moment of 
unrealised potential.  
 
As the Scottish prison population has grown further still, there have been more 
episodes of reflection about the potentially tragic impact of prison on prisoners and 
society (Social Work Services and Prisons Inspectorate for Scotland 1998; Scottish 
Prisons Commission 2008; Angiolini 2012; SPS 2012). This suggests that anxiety 
regarding the way imprisonment is used in Scotland has remained an abiding 
concern in Scottish political culture. Perhaps the hopes for prison reform as they 
emerged in the 1989-1990 period remain prevalent because they feel still unrealised?  
 
The way these moments of episodic reflection have been resolved have tended to 
follow the pattern developed in the early 1990s. While there is a productive and 
reformist narrative in recent Scottish prison policy, SPS has faced its problems by 
refining penal techniques, expanding its capacity, modernising the prison 
architecture, improved rehabilitation techniques and a heavier reliance on evidence-
based policy.61 But the prison in Scotland has not escaped its fate as an instrument 
first and foremost for excluding Scotland’s social outsiders (Scottish Prisons 
Commission 2008). SPS describes prisoners now as ‘proto-citizens’, and still wishes 
to convert them into ‘responsible citizens’ (SPS 2016:10). Despite the new jargon, the 
Scottish prisoner remains a liberal citizen-in-training. The comparative history in 
this thesis, which showed the differences in humanitarian and civilising penal 
changes in Ireland and Scotland, suggests the need for a more cautious disposition 




61 Particularly the extensive modernisation of Scottish prison architecture that has taken place over the last 20 years; 
to improve the situation or women and girls at Cornton Vale prison SPS designed a new ‘women centric’ prison 
(though this plans was abandoned after sustained penal reform efforts); SPS policy has become heavily reliant on 
desistance literature (SPS 2012; SPS 2016); SPS trains personal officers who can follow prisoners into the community; 
SPS have expanded the metrics for measuring prisoners’ purposeful activity and so on. 
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Perhaps this historical recovery can reveal the unrealised possibilities of Scotland’s 
period of critical reflection at the end of the 1980s. During the first moments of 
critical reflection in the 1980s there was a sceptic’s view of prison’s cruelty and a 
desire to improve matters. However, confident plans for penal refinement were 
adopted over a more thoroughgoing and critical questioning of prison’s social 
functions and its enormous capacity for social and personal destruction. But there 
was briefly a time when Scottish political culture was animated by a fear of the 
prison and the misuse of penal authority, rather than the problems of the prisoners. 
A vision of a just Scottish society partially motivated these optimistic plans. Such a 
society, which stands as a beacon of tolerance and caring, is more openly desired 
than ever (Scottish National Party 2017; Sturgeon 2017). But it cannot be realised 
when the use of penal exclusion and control remains so prevalent in shaping and 
regulating Scottish social order. Change could be informed by those dormant 
ambitions, wanting again to seek out more humane and civically minded kinds of 
imprisonment, rather than those which are civilised but inherently anti-social.  
 
In general, criminology continues to face the challenge of trying to find new routes 
out of our current penal predicaments. Combining comparative penology and 
historical sociology can first challenge what we think we know about our penal 
pasts and their place in the wider history of our times. This perspective can also 
broaden our horizons by showing that there is nothing inevitable about how penal 
politics is exercised and how people come to be imprisoned. If the power to 
imprison is deployed in ways which project an image of society while seeking to 
solve practical problems, then historical and comparative insight can evidence the 
practical limits, logical contradictions and social consequences of these agendas, and 
suggest alternate pathways to achieve a more equitable form of penality. The 
promise of an historical comparative sociology of punishment is that it can succeed 
in creating detailed analyses which reveal the political cultural foundations of 
punishment. In so doing, it can also illuminate the potential for a different kind of 
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Annual Report on Prisons (Ireland), various years 
 
Prison Visiting Committee Reports (Ireland), various years 
 
Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prison for Scotland – Annual Report, various years 
 
Prisons in Scotland – Report, various years 
 
Parole Board for Scotland – Annual Report, various years 
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Anonymity, Ethics and Limitationa 
	
Interviewees here are referred to with pseudonyms and vague references to their 
place in the penal state. I have cleaned the data, carefully used quotes in ways that 
do not reveal a person’s position, their promotions, departmental switches or their 
civil service rank. Identifying someone by rank does not really provide anonymity, 
and is potentially revealing to those who know the field of prison in these times and 
places. Some positions, such as Director of the Scottish Prison Service, Secretary of 
the Department of Justice are single posts. Also, if someone worked in the Scottish 
Office and then the Prison Division, or in the Irish case, worked in a related job in 
the Department of Justice and then moved into the Prison Division they ae more 
easily identifiable. These are small work places and the CV trajectory of the main 
players are well known to each other. I forewent using job titles as monikers. Job 
titles are often the artifice of anonymity rather than actually letting people be 
present in the pages of the thesis with the protection of anonymity.  
 
Often people asked to be named, they wanted to lay claim to their words, they 
wanted to be identified with their critique. This however, would be a disservice to 
the analysis, I believe. I was opposed to revealing interviewees names, no matter 
how desirous they were to be identified. Part of the thrust of this thesis has been to 
move it away from figure heads, characters and individuals, and to identify how 
what people did reflected and perpetuated patterns of thought, acceptability, 
intentionality, values and morality. In dulling people’s identity, I have also dulled 
some of their agency, a point which I suspect some of the participants will not feel 
entirely comfortable with. These are, however, some relatively public figures – of 
course that varies by degree – whose testimonies about their work in prisons and 
administration are on record or very well known to those who work and campaign 
on these matters in both jurisdictions. I felt this collection of potentially recognisable 
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voices could distract the reader or, at worst, undermine the purchase of my 
argument and the nuance of my analysis. No longer would people be reading my 
account of penal history but find themselves reading X’s views, or taking sides 
between one person and another. Moving away from known individuals has meant 
readers are not distracted by their own attempts at pop-psychology in assessing the 
interviewees words based on their own knowledge of that person. In sum: more 
rigorous anonymity allowed me a greater authorial control of the text. 
 
Instead what was elevated were collective narratives, themes and moral codes. But 
this kind of material is itself not infallible to the practices of identification. These are 
not just the words of people; people are often defined by their stories. These are 
probably among some of their key and favourite anecdotes which they likely wheel 
out at the pub, over dinner, with their families and at times with former colleagues 
recalling work. To those close to my interviewees they will likely recognise the 
timbre of a person’s vernacular and their arsenal of stories, familiar with the patter 
of their repertoire. That has been impossible to ‘clean’, but that is precisely the 
valuable stuff of oral history – those stories and what they seek to convey. I have 
kept what made interviews personal and sociological without making it individual. 
 
But anonymising can still be humanising. During 2017 I read Eviction by Matthew 
Desmond (2016). This is a fantastic and inspiring piece of critical sociology and 
empirical research. Part of what made it so impactful (though this does little justice 
to the scope and ambition of the work) was how humane the account was, how full 
of personality Desmond’s participants were. Ethnography often employs 
pseudonyms, but when we discuss people in the people state they are more 
dehumanised, understood by job title alone (Carlen 1983; Annison 2013). Until this 
point, within the thesis my interviewees had been numbered, e.g. Ire1, Ire2 and so 
on, and for Scotland: Sct1 and Sct2 etc. Part of the thesis motivation was that people 
undertook governmental work in ways that were affective and logically complex, 
the subject of moral struggles and political debates, and tied to wider social norms 
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and cultural codes. These political cultures were felt as deeply personal – this was 
how social relations came to find themselves embedded in imprisonment regimes. 
Giving my interviewees pseudonyms allowed me to return some of that identity to 
them and give the reader, I hope, a better sense of people at work, why they did 
what they did and the different emotional, political, ethical and social stances that 





All methods are necessarily partial and limited, and this study is no exception. 
Comparison requires you to make certain kinds of decisions about what s being 
compared. While this study advances comparative imprisonment to include the 
order, routines and functions of a prison regime it does not include insight into the 
lived experience of those programmes. Imprisonment regimes operate between 
internal description of prison life and aggregate prison data. As a consequence, 
certain features of prison life are not included here, such as internal discipline, food, 
or minutiae of the daily regiment. Instead imprisonment regimes focus on the main 
features of the prison, its designated purpose, its characteristic mobility. 
 
People who have written on the harshness of historical Irish and Scottish prison 
conditions may feel aggrieved to encounter what at first appears to be more 
sympathetic accounts which attempt to establish what it was governments were 
trying to achieve with imprisonment. Though descriptive accounts such as this are 
no less critical. 
 
With all that said, the ethnographic view of prison life is not here, instead what is 
presented is an historical ethnographic account of prison administration. To include 
both would make a cumbersome study, I believe. Cultural sensibilities and the 
subjectivities of prisoners would need to be established, related to different social 
forces, then contrasted to the administration. This would seem to open up a space to 
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also study prison officers and prison managers, who are vital conduits in directing 
and shaping the experience of prisoners, but also are themselves constrained by in 
large by the imprisonment regime and political culture. These present valuable 
future avenues for future outworking of this thesis, to further explore how the 
relationship between politics and imprisonment holds or is modified on the ground. 
 
In terms of data gathering there is always more that could be done. Though it had to 
end somewhere, and the decision to leave the field was really only prompted by the 
impending start date of a visiting scholarship at another university. Was there more 
people I could interview? Yes, certainly. More so in Scotland than in Ireland, the 
latter took longer to find people, to track them down, but when I did making 
contact and the eventual interviewing happened quickly. I don’t think a few more 
interviewees with key personnel would change the direction of the critical analysis, 
but it might add more texture to the accounts of change if I had. 
 
The thesis rarely includes contemporary news reporting on events, mainly because I 
think this is a serious topic of study in its own right, quotation from these sources 
require their own methodological and theoretical resources. When people reference 
news reports in a glib fashion it is often done to add quotation colour to their 
comparative or historical narrative and suggested as an example of a lived 
perspective from that time. However, the risk is that people rely on polemical 
accounts and editorialising in lieu of some other more serious reflection and 
empirical recovery, presenting a potentially hyperbolic account of politics and 
punishment. It is hoped that the insider voices of the interviewees, the archival 
material and the close reading of the official publications will give the reader a sense 
of the time and place and the concerns that animated change.  
 
All limitations are accepted in the hope that they allow for more profitable 
theoretical and methodological choices elsewhere. These limits were justifiable in 
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the hopes of building a comparative and ethnographic historical account of 































The purpose of this information pack is to furnish guidance to researchers, and in 
particular research students who are undertaking a recognised post-graduate 
qualification, on the procedures for applying for access to the Scottish Prison Service 
to conduct empirical research.  Although this guidance is intended primarily for MSc 
or PhD students, the advice contained herein is of general relevance to all those who 
may be contemplating research work within a prison environment.   
 
Opportunities to undertake research within SPS are limited by the nature and operating 
environment of the organisation, but SPS is always open to collaborating with 
qualified individuals and research students who can demonstrate clarity of purpose and 
evidence quality proposals pertaining to prisons research.   
 
In order to ensure that all research is methodologically sound, complies with ethical 
codes of conduct and is of relevance to the work of the Service, all researchers must 
submit in writing a full outline proposal to SPS.  Proposals must have the formal 




























measurement	 information	 to	 underpin	 rational,	 strategic	 decision	 making	
within	the	Service;	
• provide	 relevant	 data	 analyses,	 performance	 information,	 evaluations	 and	
research	 based	 evidence	 to	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 public,	 organisational	 and	
parliamentary	interests	(from	grassroots	to	Partner	Agencies	to	Ministers);	
• scan	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	 horizons	 and	 disseminate	 innovative	



















dramatically	 in	 quality	 and	 content,	 but	 all	 are	 assessed	 against	 standard	 criteria	
which	include	items	such	as	literature	review,	knowledge	of	the	substantive	area	of	
enquiry,	methodology,	objectives,	ethical	propriety,	utility	of	the	proposed	work	
for	 SPS,	 experience	 and	 ability	 of	 the	 researcher,	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 prison	
environment,	extent	of	access	required,	timescales	and	dissemination	plans.			
	


















study	 and	 to	 abide	 by	 the	 appropriate	 ethical	 guidelines	 of	 their	 profession	 or	
discipline.	 	 The	 Committee	 upholds	 the	 highest	 ethical	 standards	 to	 protect	 the	
welfare	 and	 dignity	 of	 prisoners.	 	 Where	 health	 related	 research	 is	 involved,	
concomitant	 clearance	 is	 also	 required	 from	 the	 relevant	 NHS	 Research	 Ethics	
Committee.			
 
Adherence	 to	 the	 research	 access	 process	 allows	 accurate	 records	 to	 be	 kept	
regarding	 research	 demand,	 prevents	 possible	 repetition	 or	 duplication	 of	 effort,	
permits	 priority	 to	 be	 given	 to	 SPS-sponsored	 work,	 monitors	 levels	 of	 research	
activity	in	Scottish	prisons,	imposes	a	standard	set	of	regulations	on	all	researchers	
























































The	 increasing	 punitive	 and	 retributive	 pattern	 of	 punishment	 in	 the	Anglophone	
world	from	the	1970s	has	been	much	discussed	among	academics	and	practitioners	
(Garland	2001;	Simon	2007;	Lacey	2008;	Cavadino	Dignan	2006).	How	can	we	explain	
such	 dramatics	 punitive	 shifts	 in	 the	 tone	 of	 penal	 rhetoric	 and	 the	 aims	 of	
punishment?	Yet,	unwittingly,	 this	 accepted	grand	narrative	 is	 far	 from	complete.	
Scotland	and	 Ireland	are	 two	small	countries	 that	are	closely	 linked	to	 their	other	
Anglophone	neighbours	geographically,	culturally,	historically	and	economically.	Yet,	








moments	 in	Scottish	 imprisonment	between	1970-1998?	What	 impact	did	generic	
social	 work	 have	 on	 prisons	 and	 probation?	 How,	 when	 and	 why	 did	 prison	
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by	 the	 managerialism	 heralded	 by	 Thatcher’s	 Conservative	 government?	 The	
development	and	publication	of	Assessment	and	Control,	Custody	Care,	and	finally,	
Opportunity	and	Responsibility	have	been	spoken	about	as	a	trio	of	landmark	texts,	




policymaking	 process.	 This	 will,	 firstly,	 offer	 a	 critical	 reassessment	 of	 generally	
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4)	 What	 were	 the	 sources	 of	 institutional	 and	 policy	 changes	 and	 how	 did	 they	
ultimately	 impact	 the	manner	 in	which	prison	and	punishment	was	managed	and	
governed?	
5)	 By	 asking	 these	 questions	 comparatively,	 what	 new	 light	may	 be	 shed	 on	 the	
familiar	 and	 local	 understandings	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 government	 and	


















these	 factors	 change	 overtime?	 In	 comparatively	 studying	 historical	 penal	
policymaking	in	Scotland	and	Ireland	between	1970-1998	this	research	will	offer	a	i)	
critical	reassessment	of	the	punitive	turn	in	Anglophone	penal	politics;	ii)	provide	a	






Employing	 oral	 history,	 this	 project	 has	 sought	 to	 reconstruct	 the	 views	 of	 those	
people	 who	 were	 involved	 in	 practice	 of	 penal	 policymaking	 in	 Scotland.	 These	
interviews	are	now	near	completion.	
	























































managed	 and	 shaped	 in	 pre-devolution	 Scotland.	 Further,	 it	 will	 illuminate	 the	





























































REGULATIONS CONCERNING RESEARCH ACCESS TO PRISON ESTABLISHMENTS 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF CONDUCTING RESEARCH 
	
















4. All	 research	 data	 and	 material	 of	 whatever	 kind	 (i.e.	 interview	 notes,	





than	 that	 agreed	 to	 and	 contained	 in	 the	 original	 research	 proposal.	 	 All	
confidential	 research	 data	 obtained	 from	 SPS	 must	 be	 destroyed	 within	 12	
months	of	completion	of	the	research	project.			
	
5. All	 researchers	 must	 abide	 by	 the	 ethical	 guidelines	 of	 their	 profession	 or	







7. The	 Chair	 of	 the	 SPS	 Research	 Access	 and	 Ethics	 Committee	 (RAEC)	 must	 be	
informed	 in	 writing	 and	 agree	 to	 any	 changes	 to	 the	 project	 which	 involve	
alterations	to	the	essential	nature	of	the	agreed	work.			
	








to	 the	researcher’s	property	or	of	any	personal	 injury	 to	 the	researcher	which	




10. In	 principle,	 the	 Scottish	 Prison	 Service	 supports	 the	 publication	 and	
dissemination	 of	 research	 findings	 arising	 from	 approved	work.	 	 However,	 all	
material	 resulting	 from	 such	 access	 and	 which	 is	 intended	 to	 be	 presented	
publicly,	 must	 be	 submitted	 to	 the	 Chair	 of	 the	 Research	 Access	 and	 Ethics	






















Proposals	 which	 seek	 research	 access	 to	 the	 Scottish	 Prison	 Service	 should	 be	









































Sample Consent Form  
 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed for this research project. I am a PhD student 
at the University of Edinburgh and the focus of my research is on penal policy-making 
in Ireland and Scotland from 1970-1998. I am interested in what it was like to work in 
both jurisdictions during this period, and mapping the various organisations and 
groups who were involved in this process. 
 
Therefore, I am interested in interviewing those who were involved in penal policy 
during the period before 1998, such as civil servants, criminal justice practitioners, 
criminal justice researchers, advisors etc., and hearing about their experiences. 
 
By signing this form, you acknowledge that I have fully explained the purposes of the 
research and they have been understood. All interview recordings will be destroyed 
once they are transcribed. All the participants in my research are offered anonymity, 
which means they will not be named and I will do everything reasonable to make sure 
they are not personally identifiable. Also, you are consenting that anonymised 
information from this interview can be used in the Doctoral thesis and any subsequent 
publications. 
 
o	I consent to this interview being taped for the purposes of this research	
o	The researcher has told me about the research project and answered any questions 
I had about it	
o	I understand that I do not have to answer any questions I do not wish to.	
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o	I understand that my name and personal details will not be used in any way that 












Appendix 2  
Subversive Activities in 1970s Republic of Ireland  
	
 
• 1971 2nd February British embassy burned down 
• 1972 May Special Criminal Court was established 
• 1972 1 December Loyalist planted bombs in Dublin at Sackville Place and 
Liberty Hall where two people were killed and 127 injured.  
• 1972 28 December bombs in Belturbet, Clones and Pettigo  
• 1973 3 September Attempted murder of angler from Northern Ireland in 
Mayo. 
• 1973 28 October murder of Detective Constable Doherty RUC at Ballindrait 
Co Donegal 1973 1973 31 October direct rescue attempt by helicopter/escape 
from Mountjoy of three prisoners.  
• 1974 24 January helicopter hijacked at Gortahork and used in attempted 
bombing of Strabane. 
• 1974 11 March Murder of a member of Irish parliament Billy Fox. 
• 1974 22 May – armed robbery, Beit paintings stolen. 
• 1974 May shooting at Gardaí in Mayo. 
• 1974 17 May – UVF planted bombs in Dublin (three car bombs within ninety 
seconds) and Monaghan (car bombs an hour and half after the Dublin 
bombings) where 33 people were killed and 153 wounded. 
• 1974 19 IRA prisoner break out of Portloaise after ‘blasting open a gating’. 
• 1974 4-9 June Kidnaping of Lord and Lady Donoughmore. 
• 1975 3 October-7 November 1975 Kidnapping of Dr Herrema by Republican 
affiliates and resulting in a seventeen day siege wit the Gardaí. 
• 1975 11 September murder of Garda Reynolds. 




• 1976 Garda killed in an explosion in Laois. 
• 1976 15 July attempted escape of prisoners from Green Street courthouse.  
• 1976 9 July bomb exploded at a Salthill hotel. 
• 1976 21 May bomb exploded at Swanlinbar. 
• 1976 21 July British ambassador and Miss Cooke murdered in Dublin. 
• 1976 incendiary devices planted in hotels throughout the country and in pub 
and cinemas in Dublin during the summer. 
• 1978 Ireland brings Britain in European Court of human rights accused of 
torturing republican prisoners in the north 
• 1978 16 people killed in an explosion in Down. 
Sources: Department of Justice (1976) unpublished internal memo on state of 







Appendix 3  
POA Strikes 
Date Prison Action Taken Problem 
1981    
30 January-2 
April  
Arbour Hill  Ban on supervision 









Ban on all escorts 
and to process 
newly committed 
prisoners  
Protest against a 
discipline 
incident with a 










Cork Ban on evening 
recreation, use of 
the education unit 
and visits. 
Staffing levels 
5 November  St. Patrick’s Prisoners not 
unlocked 






20-24 November Limerick Ban on evening 
recreation 




1982    






Response to a 
prison officer 
being suspended 





















12 April-1 June Cork Ban on outdoor 
recreation 
Staffing levels 
17 April Loughan 
House 











29 April Arbour Hill Staff refused to 
unlock prisoners 
between 2-2.30pm 
Staff wanted time 
off to cash their 
pay cheques 





8 June-22 June Limerick Officers refused to 
wear caps 
Wearing caps 
should not be 
compulsory  
19 August All Prisons Ban on: workshop 
supervision; 
transferring 
prisoners; all work 
but essential 
maintenance; prison 





parties who work 
outside the prison; 
review and liaison 
meetings; and 
instigating a go-












30 August  Mountjoy 
Women’s 
Unit 
Refusal to unlock 
more than four 












not available  






22 November Loughan 
House 
Refusal to use 
prison transport 
Vehicle alleged to 
be not road 
worthy 
1-3 December Portlaoise Staff refuse to 
unlock prisoners for 
evening recreation 
Staffing levels 
14-29 December Cork Refusal to work 
overtime 
Protest in 





1981    
4 January Cork Refusal by basic 










Limerick Refusal to open 
craft shop 
Manning levels 
17-20 February Cork Ban on prisoners 
being transferred to 
Cork 
Manning levels 








15 March Portlaoise  Not all rostered 
staff turn up for 
overtime 




Portaloise Refusal to man 
prison boiler 
Return pf boiler-
man to 7 day 
liability 





26-27 March Several 
prisons 
Refusal to unlock 
prisoners 




cut in overtime 









16-17 May Limerick Ban on visits Dissatisfied with 
manning levels 
23 May Mountjoy Prisoners unlocked 








12-13 July Mountjoy Ban on workshops Lack of response 
to POA demands 




special leave for 








6 September St. Patrick’s Limited out of cell 
time 
Call for more 
prison officers 
following a fight 
between two 
prisoners 






Source: Committee of Inquiry into the Penal System (1985) Report of the Committee of 












18-19 October Shelton 
Abbey 
Ban on supervision 










4-18 November Mountjoy Ban on court escorts 







Date Prison Action Taken Problem 
1981    
30 January-2 
April  
Arbour Hill  Ban on supervision 









Ban on all escorts 
and to process 
newly committed 
prisoners  
Protest against a 
discipline 
incident with a 










Cork Ban on evening 
recreation, use of 
the education unit 
and visits. 
Staffing levels 
5 November  St. Patrick’s Prisoners not 
unlocked 






20-24 November Limerick Ban on evening 
recreation 




1982    






Response to a 
prison officer 
being suspended 





















12 April-1 June Cork Ban on outdoor 
recreation 
Staffing levels 
17 April Loughan 
House 











29 April Arbour Hill Staff refused to 
unlock prisoners 
between 2-2.30pm 
Staff wanted time 
off to cash their 
pay cheques 





8 June-22 June Limerick Officers refused to 
wear caps 
Wearing caps 
should not be 
compulsory  
19 August All Prisons Ban on: workshop 
supervision; 
transferring 
prisoners; all work 
but essential 
maintenance; prison 





parties who work 
outside the prison; 
review and liaison 
meetings; and 
instigating a go-












30 August  Mountjoy 
Women’s 
Unit 
Refusal to unlock 
more than four 












not available  






22 November Loughan 
House 
Refusal to use 
prison transport 
Vehicle alleged to 
be not road 
worthy 
1-3 December Portlaoise Staff refuse to 
unlock prisoners for 
evening recreation 
Staffing levels 
14-29 December Cork Refusal to work 
overtime 
Protest in 





1981    
4 January Cork Refusal by basic 










Limerick Refusal to open 
craft shop 
Manning levels 
17-20 February Cork Ban on prisoners 
being transferred to 
Cork 
Manning levels 








15 March Portlaoise  Not all  scheduled 
staff turn up for 
overtime 




Portaloise Refusal to man 
prison boiler 
Return pf boiler-
man to 7 day 
liability 





26-27 March Several 
prisons 
Refusal to unlock 
prisoners 




cut in overtime 









16-17 May Limerick Ban on visits Dissatisfied with 
manning levels 
23 May Mountjoy Prisoners unlocked 








12-13 July Mountjoy Ban on workshops Lack of response 
to POA demands 




special leave for 








6 September St. Patrick’s Limited out of cell 
time 
Call for more 
prison officers 
following a fight 
between two 
prisoners 






Source: Committee of Inquiry into the Penal System (1985) Report of the Committee of 










18-19 October Shelton 
Abbey 
Ban on supervision 










4-18 November Mountjoy Ban on court escorts 
and dealing with 
newly committed 
prisoners 
Manning of 
escorts 
